Alaska Airlines 737-900 MAX loses a door in-flight out of PDX
AWST isn't bullish on Boeing at the moment.
https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/m...ers-be-stopped
https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/m...ers-be-stopped
As 2023 ended, the company’s strategy department was abolished. Unit strategy functions were also reduced. The company no longer wants a plan for company-wide new technology development, new product development or, most crucial, restoring the links between the people who design and build aircraft and the people who manage the company. There are also no plans to promote technical people to senior management positions. Stephanie Pope’s recent appointment as chief operating officer means another finance person has been made Calhoun’s heir apparent.
The future, if it can be called that, is simply to run the company for cash—deliver legacy jets, try to make existing defense programs profitable, and resume converting cash flow into shareholder returns. Management may also try to sell off parts of the company—or perhaps all of it. The implications of this for the U.S. aerospace industry, defense industrial base and even the broader economy are potentially enormous.
The future, if it can be called that, is simply to run the company for cash—deliver legacy jets, try to make existing defense programs profitable, and resume converting cash flow into shareholder returns. Management may also try to sell off parts of the company—or perhaps all of it. The implications of this for the U.S. aerospace industry, defense industrial base and even the broader economy are potentially enormous.
If you really want to go there with grammar and semantics, a "door plug" is a plug that goes in a door, like a plug that goes in a bath(tub). But where's the door? It's actually a "door opening plug" or a "door frame plug."
It's like the difference between a divot (gouged out turf) and a divot hole (where the divot came from): When you take a divot, it leaves a divot hole.
It's like the difference between a divot (gouged out turf) and a divot hole (where the divot came from): When you take a divot, it leaves a divot hole.
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True. But the point is that they may have treated it like a door on the factory floor.
If that's the language used on the factory floor, then that is significant.
We now return to our incident aircraft, which was written up for having defective rivets on the LH mid-exit door.
(…)
However, more critical for purposes of the accident investigation, the pressure seal is unsurprisingly sandwiched between the plug and the fuselage, and you cannot replace it without opening the door plug to gain access.
(…)
the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.”
(…)
If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required.
This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility. Finally with Spirit completing their work to Boeing QAs satisfaction, the two rivet-related records in CMES are stamped complete, and the SAT closed on 19 September 2023. No record or comment regarding the retention bolts is made.
(…)
However, more critical for purposes of the accident investigation, the pressure seal is unsurprisingly sandwiched between the plug and the fuselage, and you cannot replace it without opening the door plug to gain access.
(…)
the damning entry which reads something along the lines of “coordinating with the doors team to determine if the door will have to be removed entirely, or just opened. If it is removed then a Removal will have to be written.”
(…)
If you have been paying attention to this situation closely, you may be able to spot the critical error: regardless of whether the door is simply opened or removed entirely, the 4 retaining bolts that keep it from sliding off of the door stops have to be pulled out. A removal should be written in either case for QA to verify install, but as it turns out, someone (exactly who will be a fun question for investigators) decides that the door only needs to be opened, and no formal Removal is generated in CMES (the reason for which is unclear, and a major process failure). Therefore, in the official build records of the airplane, a pressure seal that cannot be accessed without opening the door (and thereby removing retaining bolts) is documented as being replaced, but the door is never officially opened and thus no QA inspection is required.
This entire sequence is documented in the SAT, and the nonconformance records in CMES address the damaged rivets and pressure seal, but at no point is the verification job reopened, or is any record of removed retention bolts created, despite it this being a physical impossibility. Finally with Spirit completing their work to Boeing QAs satisfaction, the two rivet-related records in CMES are stamped complete, and the SAT closed on 19 September 2023. No record or comment regarding the retention bolts is made.
They don't build aircraft; they build durable goods. They aren't an aviation company. They are a liquidation business devoted to shutting down the former world leader in commercial aviation industry as profitably as possible.
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Was paneling in place?
Did Spirit fix the rivets and door plug seal before or after the interior paneling was installed? Would a Spirit rework person have had permission to remove interior paneling to complete the task?
Am I correct in understanding that after the interior was initially installed, the interior panel would have to be removed to gain access to the four bolts--the only way to partially open the door plug or to prepare it for removal from the plane?
Finally, at the time the paneling was initially installed, was there a step to inspect the door plug to insure that the bolts were present before the door was obscured by paneling?
Am I correct in understanding that after the interior was initially installed, the interior panel would have to be removed to gain access to the four bolts--the only way to partially open the door plug or to prepare it for removal from the plane?
Finally, at the time the paneling was initially installed, was there a step to inspect the door plug to insure that the bolts were present before the door was obscured by paneling?
Last edited by fotoguzzi; 25th Jan 2024 at 12:35. Reason: clarity
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Door Closure
Going back to my earlier post 1257, I'd facetiously suggested that Boeing should increase the lift springs rate such that the door guide track fittings MUST be forcibly held down to insert the locking bolts . . .In other words, the door physically couldn't be closed without the locking bolts.
Last edited by Europa01; 25th Jan 2024 at 16:34. Reason: Tweak
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Sounds like what happens in any kind of review - you get a bunch of action item assignments with varying degrees of specificity and then do whatever the assignment is and provide documentation that it's done in order to close it. But they really seem to need some actions assigned from outside the company to make some high level changes, as well as some detailed changes to how they work.
The door can be secured closed without the locking bolts by tightening the adjustable stops no matter how strong the springs are.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
Jon Ostrower summarises. https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...ality-failure/
127 Days: The anatomy of a Boeing quality failure
extract
…Boeing staff on Aug. 31 discovered (and later fixed) loose fasteners on the right-hand side plug exit.
…On the opposite side of the aircraft, next to the left-hand plug that failed on Alaska 1282, Boeing made another quality discovery. Rivets installed at Spirit in the fuselage structure just forward of the plug exit door frame weren’t installed properly in five locations and required rework. In documenting the defects, the quality control report observed four properly installed bolts were fitted to the exit plug, preventing its movement.
…On Sept. 7, the rivets in question were found to be painted over and the underlying issue with their improper installation not addressed. It is not clear at this point who specifically painted over the rivets, but Boeing quality control sent the fasteners back for rework to Spirit…
…On Sept. 12, Boeing conducted a standard test on the aircraft to confirm its structural integrity and its ability to be safely pressurized. 8789 passed successfully, TAC is told. During this period the damaged rivets remained unfixed and an additional five days passed while a final resolution was being planned by Boeing and Spirit.
The key moment, The Air Current has learned, came on Sept. 18 when the plug exit was opened by Boeing to give Spirit contracted staff access to fix the rivets. Whether the plug was removed or just opened remains unknown…
Regardless, the four key bolts that hold the plug in place must be removed to either open or remove the 63-pound plug. The whereabouts of the bolts, according to the NTSB, remain central to understanding what caused the explosive decompression aboard Alaska 1282.
The rivets were fixed fully the following day on Sept. 19. What happened next in the factory is not entirely clear, yet is just as essential to understanding the quality failures that led to the accident…
…Airplane 8789, now fully assembled, was seen outside the Renton factory on Oct. 8 and later moved to the flight line for its Oct. 15 maiden flight…
127 Days: The anatomy of a Boeing quality failure
extract
…Boeing staff on Aug. 31 discovered (and later fixed) loose fasteners on the right-hand side plug exit.
…On the opposite side of the aircraft, next to the left-hand plug that failed on Alaska 1282, Boeing made another quality discovery. Rivets installed at Spirit in the fuselage structure just forward of the plug exit door frame weren’t installed properly in five locations and required rework. In documenting the defects, the quality control report observed four properly installed bolts were fitted to the exit plug, preventing its movement.
…On Sept. 7, the rivets in question were found to be painted over and the underlying issue with their improper installation not addressed. It is not clear at this point who specifically painted over the rivets, but Boeing quality control sent the fasteners back for rework to Spirit…
…On Sept. 12, Boeing conducted a standard test on the aircraft to confirm its structural integrity and its ability to be safely pressurized. 8789 passed successfully, TAC is told. During this period the damaged rivets remained unfixed and an additional five days passed while a final resolution was being planned by Boeing and Spirit.
The key moment, The Air Current has learned, came on Sept. 18 when the plug exit was opened by Boeing to give Spirit contracted staff access to fix the rivets. Whether the plug was removed or just opened remains unknown…
Regardless, the four key bolts that hold the plug in place must be removed to either open or remove the 63-pound plug. The whereabouts of the bolts, according to the NTSB, remain central to understanding what caused the explosive decompression aboard Alaska 1282.
The rivets were fixed fully the following day on Sept. 19. What happened next in the factory is not entirely clear, yet is just as essential to understanding the quality failures that led to the accident…
…Airplane 8789, now fully assembled, was seen outside the Renton factory on Oct. 8 and later moved to the flight line for its Oct. 15 maiden flight…
Last edited by joe_bloggs; 25th Jan 2024 at 18:49. Reason: Added extract
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The door can be secured closed without the locking bolts by tightening the adjustable stops no matter how strong the springs are.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
The door can be secured closed without the locking bolts by tightening the adjustable stops no matter how strong the springs are.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
The better answer is to use a mechanism that doesn't require bolts at all - the latches on car doors and hood are examples of cheap and reliable mechanisms. Even pieces of spring steel that is attached to the door frame to hold against the tops of the door stops or some specifically created bracket.
Please correct me if I have that wrong, but if so the the stop pads would not restrict movement till a positive hull pressure differential was present
....or do you mean that they might be tightened in error?, that's another scary thought to add to the list
In short, the pressurization warnings were related to an electrical hiccup in the pressurization system, not a leak or lack of pressure.
Please quit with that dead end...
United Airlines chief executive, Scott Kirby, also told CNBC that he is "disappointed".
"The Max 9 grounding is probably the straw that broke the camel's back for us," he said, adding that "we're going to build a plan that doesn't have the [Boeing] Max 10 in it".
"The Max 9 grounding is probably the straw that broke the camel's back for us," he said, adding that "we're going to build a plan that doesn't have the [Boeing] Max 10 in it".
I didn't see this discussed elsewhere. I believe United have 250 orders for the MAX10. Can it be that they are cancelling them ?
That is a disturbing report. It puts the future of BCA into question, and that would rapidly convert to a further loss of confidence in the product range. It is essentially doubling down with the problem that exists from the corporate strategy to milk the cow dry, hasn't worked since 1997. Not a brilliant strategy, but then nor is the short sighted structure strategy of the investors