Alaska Airlines 737-900 MAX loses a door in-flight out of PDX
So, in order to trigger the door-opening which would allow access to the cockpit for various porpoises the terrorists would need to trigger a rapid decompression that did not either kill themselves nor crash the plane. Too much Tom Clancy here IMO
Better bet to rush the cockpit with coffee service or on a loo break.
But I'm no terrorist.
Better bet to rush the cockpit with coffee service or on a loo break.
But I'm no terrorist.
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Re the loose bolts found by Delta - is the corresponding part in the non plug door fixed in a similar manner - Is it safe to just inspect door plugs or could the part be loose in full doors?
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No pic of the inside, but sign me up as a fan, nevertheless. Do know now, why Jenny was so enthusiastic.
Boeing Door Plug From Alaska Airlines Flight Found in Teacher’s Yard - The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Boeing Door Plug From Alaska Airlines Flight Found in Teacher’s Yard - The New York Times (nytimes.com)
Just a numbered other
Additional point on "Communication"
Yesterday the NTSB Chair said the following with what I think was the wrong emphasis: (see 22:32 in the video below)
The chair emphasized only 1 of the 3, communication. Is it possible she doesn't know that there is actually a prioritization of focus and action? Or is it NTSB's position that "communicate" is now top priority?
NTSB Chair today again made emotional statements decrying lack of communication, similar to yesterday. The 2 rear section FAs were interviewed, and the Chair stated again the FAs did not know what was happening. Rear FAs only had a mirror that reflected down the aisle but showed no detail as to what was happening in the cabin.
I realized for the first time that all FAs must have still been in their jumpseats for climb and, although they heard a loud noise, maybe none of the FA crew or anyone on the flight deck knew a section of the aircraft was missing!
In a practical sense, it didn't matter. From what I have gathered the flight crew did the right thing. 1) Aviate 2) Navigate 3) Communicate
I can empathize with the FAs and passengers not knowing, but it is a little frightening hearing the NTSB place lack of discussion between flight deck and cabin as a major issue. The flight crew was clearly communicating with the tower, knew they had a decompression, declared an emergency, descended. Probably went through checklists and made sure they had aircraft control. Navigated to PDX and landed safely. All survived, only a few minor injuries.
Is there anything the FAs could have told them that would have changed the course of events?
Maybe the flight crew could have announced to the cabin, "We are returning to Portland, remain in your seats with your seatbelts fastened." Who knows, maybe they did?
Something about this emphasis from the NTSB Chair is unsettling. I understand the advocacy for longer CVR retention, but questioning whether the pilots needed more FA discussion in order to make proper decisions in this case? I'm not seeing it.
NTSB Day 2
Yesterday the NTSB Chair said the following with what I think was the wrong emphasis: (see 22:32 in the video below)
"Anybody who learns how to fly is taught aviate, navigate, communicate. Communication is key. Why? because the flight crew on the flight deck do not have situational awareness to what is going on in the back. They need to know what's going on in the cabin so that communication needs to occur. They have to know how quickly they need to land."
The chair emphasized only 1 of the 3, communication. Is it possible she doesn't know that there is actually a prioritization of focus and action? Or is it NTSB's position that "communicate" is now top priority?
NTSB Chair today again made emotional statements decrying lack of communication, similar to yesterday. The 2 rear section FAs were interviewed, and the Chair stated again the FAs did not know what was happening. Rear FAs only had a mirror that reflected down the aisle but showed no detail as to what was happening in the cabin.
I realized for the first time that all FAs must have still been in their jumpseats for climb and, although they heard a loud noise, maybe none of the FA crew or anyone on the flight deck knew a section of the aircraft was missing!
In a practical sense, it didn't matter. From what I have gathered the flight crew did the right thing. 1) Aviate 2) Navigate 3) Communicate
I can empathize with the FAs and passengers not knowing, but it is a little frightening hearing the NTSB place lack of discussion between flight deck and cabin as a major issue. The flight crew was clearly communicating with the tower, knew they had a decompression, declared an emergency, descended. Probably went through checklists and made sure they had aircraft control. Navigated to PDX and landed safely. All survived, only a few minor injuries.
Is there anything the FAs could have told them that would have changed the course of events?
Maybe the flight crew could have announced to the cabin, "We are returning to Portland, remain in your seats with your seatbelts fastened." Who knows, maybe they did?
Something about this emphasis from the NTSB Chair is unsettling. I understand the advocacy for longer CVR retention, but questioning whether the pilots needed more FA discussion in order to make proper decisions in this case? I'm not seeing it.
NTSB Day 2
this latest report was very little hard fact cushioned in gushing thanks for just about everyone involved. When it got technical she showed a woeful lack of engineering ‘nouse’.
maybe she’s better with trains.
One reason for a lack of communication from the flight deck might be that both pilots’ headsets were reportedly either ripped off or dislodged by the event. And there is very little that the cabin crew can do initially to help.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate still, thankfully, holds sway.
Shortened
The FAA have already thought of that and "New aircraft" must have a secondary barrier for the flight deck on commercial aircraft Part121 above a certain pax load.
Could leave the flight deck a potty and flask, much like our old V bomber equipment as an alternative means of compliance
.
Story: when on one of my charge, small jets experienced a decompression at 38,000ft, the PIC lost his glasses trying to put the sweep on O2 mask, luckily the 3rd crew member was able to assist and find the Jeppesen Manuals for low altitude maps, the comms was difficult over Northern Africa, positioning flight and no pax on board.
Could leave the flight deck a potty and flask, much like our old V bomber equipment as an alternative means of compliance
.Story: when on one of my charge, small jets experienced a decompression at 38,000ft, the PIC lost his glasses trying to put the sweep on O2 mask, luckily the 3rd crew member was able to assist and find the Jeppesen Manuals for low altitude maps, the comms was difficult over Northern Africa, positioning flight and no pax on board.
Last edited by aeromech3; 9th Jan 2024 at 11:21.
I'm struggling to remember last time such an egregious QC problem made the mainstream media.
Shortened
The FAA have already thought of that and "New aircraft" must have a secondary barrier for the flight deck on commercial aircraft Part121 above a certain pax load.
Could leave the flight deck a potty and flask, much like our old V bomber equipment as an alternative means of compliance.
Story: when on one of my charge, small jets experienced a decompression at 38,000ft, the PIC lost his glasses trying to put the sweep on O2 mask, luckily the 3rd crew member was able to assist and find the Jeppesen Manuals for low altitude maps, the comms was difficult over Northern Africa, positioning flight and no pax on board.
The FAA have already thought of that and "New aircraft" must have a secondary barrier for the flight deck on commercial aircraft Part121 above a certain pax load.
Could leave the flight deck a potty and flask, much like our old V bomber equipment as an alternative means of compliance
.Story: when on one of my charge, small jets experienced a decompression at 38,000ft, the PIC lost his glasses trying to put the sweep on O2 mask, luckily the 3rd crew member was able to assist and find the Jeppesen Manuals for low altitude maps, the comms was difficult over Northern Africa, positioning flight and no pax on board.
The GTF issues are general media stuff as well, aren't they?
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Renton the Cause?
I understand that when the fuselages arrive by train at Renton Boeing removes the already-fitted door plugs to facilitate fitting out and it reinstalls them. If this is correct, could the loose bolts be due to either Boeing re-using the original (perhaps now less strong) bolts, using new incorrect bolts, fittings whichever bolts incorrectly, or forgetting to install them? All of which begs the question; what else is not correctly fastened?
Not suggesting it has anything todo with this incident but just out of curiosity:
Some 25 years ago when I was licensed to work on much smaller equipment, we would install the cotter pins by folding them along the castellated nut and driving the ends in the gaps of the castell with a screw driver or small chisel thereby shrearing the excessive length off. Just like in the right hand picture.
The left hand way of doing things I do only know from boat propellers.
Now is that a continental European vs anglo american way of working thing or did it become out of fashion in the past 25 years?
Some 25 years ago when I was licensed to work on much smaller equipment, we would install the cotter pins by folding them along the castellated nut and driving the ends in the gaps of the castell with a screw driver or small chisel thereby shrearing the excessive length off. Just like in the right hand picture.
The left hand way of doing things I do only know from boat propellers.
Now is that a continental European vs anglo american way of working thing or did it become out of fashion in the past 25 years?
I cannot find another source for this right now but I'm sure various training materials will cover this. One reason I can think of is that the tines of the cotter pin may be slightly better at preventing the shear from a turning force on the nut when installed IAW the preferred method.
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Then there are the fighter jets:
https://www.industryweek.com/operati...ing-back-years
Pretty much whatever factory and state Boeing aircraft are built, this continues to happen.
I understand that when the fuselages arrive by train at Renton Boeing removes the already-fitted door plugs to facilitate fitting out and it reinstalls them. If this is correct, could the loose bolts be due to either Boeing re-using the original (perhaps now less strong) bolts, using new incorrect bolts, fittings whichever bolts incorrectly, or forgetting to install them? All of which begs the question; what else is not correctly fastened?
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Not related to ETOPS???
Today on CNBC's Squawk Box broadcast the very estimable former FAA Acting Administrator Billy Nolen was asked whether the limitation of service by Alaska of the incident aircraft - excluding it from service to Hawaii specifically - was related to the pressurization problem indications which had occurred in recent days prior to the incident. In his response, Mr. Nolen did not mention the ETOPS certification of the incident aircraft which, unless I've badly misunderstood previous reporting, had been stated as the prinicipal reason - or one of the principal reasons - for limiting the incident aircraft to domestic, non-ETOPS routes.
The incident aircraft was ETOPS certfied, wasn't it? And the occurences of the pressurization problem indications were the main reason to take that aircraft off ETOPS service, weren't they?
Mr. Nolen also optimistically projected that the pending FAA reauthorization legislation in the Congress is as good as approved and signed into law (my paraphrase, SLF/attorney that I am). But there remain sharp disagreements about certain controversial provisions. Perhaps in the relevant committee jurisdictions in Congress some consensus is forming to shelve pending controversial issues in the legislation that can await resolution until a later time. FAA needs full legislative operating authority, not least because there may continue to be an incorrect elevation of "Communicate" in the all-imporant trilogy, "Aviate . . . .
About Boeing and its evident problems (whether its own, Spirit's or both) . . . what would Wimpy say about all this if summoned to consult with us from the Great Flight Level Beyond? I mean, without casting the late labor leader Wm. Winpisinger as heroic or romanticizing his accomplishments or the era in which he was so iconic a figure (aggressive, radical, blunt, outspoken and flamboyant, according to one biographer), I can't decide. Would he be speechless, or would everyone's ears be pinned back, but good.
The incident aircraft was ETOPS certfied, wasn't it? And the occurences of the pressurization problem indications were the main reason to take that aircraft off ETOPS service, weren't they?
Mr. Nolen also optimistically projected that the pending FAA reauthorization legislation in the Congress is as good as approved and signed into law (my paraphrase, SLF/attorney that I am). But there remain sharp disagreements about certain controversial provisions. Perhaps in the relevant committee jurisdictions in Congress some consensus is forming to shelve pending controversial issues in the legislation that can await resolution until a later time. FAA needs full legislative operating authority, not least because there may continue to be an incorrect elevation of "Communicate" in the all-imporant trilogy, "Aviate . . . .
About Boeing and its evident problems (whether its own, Spirit's or both) . . . what would Wimpy say about all this if summoned to consult with us from the Great Flight Level Beyond? I mean, without casting the late labor leader Wm. Winpisinger as heroic or romanticizing his accomplishments or the era in which he was so iconic a figure (aggressive, radical, blunt, outspoken and flamboyant, according to one biographer), I can't decide. Would he be speechless, or would everyone's ears be pinned back, but good.
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Blancolirio regurgitates the quote from the Reuters piece almost verbatim.
Now maybe the doors are removed in Renton, but I've looked at hundreds of tourist photos from Renton, and have yet to see a single example of with of these doors open or removed.
Today on CNBC's Squawk Box broadcast the very estimable former FAA Acting Administrator Billy Nolen was asked whether the limitation of service by Alaska of the incident aircraft - excluding it from service to Hawaii specifically - was related to the pressurization problem indications which had occurred in recent days prior to the incident. In his response, Mr. Nolen did not mention the ETOPS certification of the incident aircraft which, unless I've badly misunderstood previous reporting, had been stated as the prinicipal reason - or one of the principal reasons - for limiting the incident aircraft to domestic, non-ETOPS routes.
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I wonder if it will end up being as 'simple' as the bolts weren't installed and the door was being held purely by the rollover until it eventually slipped out. Those small movements between the rollover and it's guide could explain a slow loss of pressure.
... In his response, Mr. Nolen did not mention the ETOPS certification of the incident aircraft which, unless I've badly misunderstood previous reporting, had been stated as the prinicipal reason - or one of the principal reasons - for limiting the incident aircraft to domestic, non-ETOPS routes.
The incident aircraft was ETOPS certfied, wasn't it? And the occurences of the pressurization problem indications were the main reason to take that aircraft off ETOPS service, weren't they?.
The incident aircraft was ETOPS certfied, wasn't it? And the occurences of the pressurization problem indications were the main reason to take that aircraft off ETOPS service, weren't they?.