FedEx 757
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: EGSS
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I don't see any such message in the list?
*There have been a few short term procedures that instructed the flight crew to check the STATUS page - but that was a stop-gap until the EICAS s/w could be updated to include an ALERT level message for the item in question.
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: india
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May be a different Standard of Preparation?
I remember this, because on my entering the snag, the Engineer checked the "STATUS" page and there was a message that both of were unfamiliar with. A check in the Maintenance Manual indicated that the message refers to the failure of the emergency system. If I remember right, it's activated after 30 seconds of the Hydraulic pack operation and a failure to unlock the Uplocks.
tdracer
Look, it's PPRUNE, not amendments to QRH or FCTM!! Just sharing experiences.
But you are right. We have now become 'people of the book".
The preface to the QRH, explicitly warns pilots, not to use Maintenance level knowledge to trouble shoot. Interestingly, it also goes on to say further, that if at the end of the non normal check list, if the situation is undesirable, one may use such knowledge. But do'nt expect any kudos.
Regards
I remember this, because on my entering the snag, the Engineer checked the "STATUS" page and there was a message that both of were unfamiliar with. A check in the Maintenance Manual indicated that the message refers to the failure of the emergency system. If I remember right, it's activated after 30 seconds of the Hydraulic pack operation and a failure to unlock the Uplocks.
tdracer
Look, it's PPRUNE, not amendments to QRH or FCTM!! Just sharing experiences.
But you are right. We have now become 'people of the book".
The preface to the QRH, explicitly warns pilots, not to use Maintenance level knowledge to trouble shoot. Interestingly, it also goes on to say further, that if at the end of the non normal check list, if the situation is undesirable, one may use such knowledge. But do'nt expect any kudos.
Regards
May be a different Standard of Preparation?
I remember this, because on my entering the snag, the Engineer checked the "STATUS" page and there was a message that both of were unfamiliar with. A check in the Maintenance Manual indicated that the message refers to the failure of the emergency system. If I remember right, it's activated after 30 seconds of the Hydraulic pack operation and a failure to unlock the Uplocks.
tdracer
Look, it's PPRUNE, not amendments to QRH or FCTM!! Just sharing experiences.
But you are right. We have now become 'people of the book".
The preface to the QRH, explicitly warns pilots, not to use Maintenance level knowledge to trouble shoot. Interestingly, it also goes on to say further, that if at the end of the non normal check list, if the situation is undesirable, one may use such knowledge. But do'nt expect any kudos.
Regards
I remember this, because on my entering the snag, the Engineer checked the "STATUS" page and there was a message that both of were unfamiliar with. A check in the Maintenance Manual indicated that the message refers to the failure of the emergency system. If I remember right, it's activated after 30 seconds of the Hydraulic pack operation and a failure to unlock the Uplocks.
tdracer
Look, it's PPRUNE, not amendments to QRH or FCTM!! Just sharing experiences.
But you are right. We have now become 'people of the book".
The preface to the QRH, explicitly warns pilots, not to use Maintenance level knowledge to trouble shoot. Interestingly, it also goes on to say further, that if at the end of the non normal check list, if the situation is undesirable, one may use such knowledge. But do'nt expect any kudos.
Regards
I have no issue with a crew - seeing something unusual - checking STATUS to help figure out what's going on. It occasionally came in handy when troubleshooting something particularly tricky or obscure when the flight crew told us that after something happened, they checked STATUS and saw message XYZ...
I suspect the warning to not use Maintenance knowledge to troubleshoot traces back to the Alaska MD-80 that crashed off LA when the jackscrew stripped. There is a strong belief that if the crew had simply diverted and landed at LAX - instead of trying to troubleshoot the issue so they could continue on to Seattle - it wouldn't have ended in tears.
They reported an hour and a half of fuel when they first declared an emergency after about 30 minutes of trouble shooting. They then reported one hour of fuel after the fly by and canceling one attempt at landing. Weather was good in MEM that evening, probably didn’t have an alternate. Two hours fuel for a 45 minute flight seems reasonable.
As per the AvHerald/Preliminary report (avherald.com/h?article=50f4076e&opt=0):
Looks like electricity was involved with regards to the alternate gear system, but not in the way that we thought..... How interesting.
Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear door actuator retract port hose was leaking hydraulic fluid. The hose was removed and retained by the NTSB for further investigation. The examination also found a discontinuity in the wiring of the landing gear alternate extension system. The section of that wire was retained for further examination.
