Passenger on Challenger Jet Dies from Turbulence

[pattern_is_full]

Originally Posted by Lake1952

I couldn't see anything unusual from this flight record except that from takeoff from KEEN to landing at KBDL took 25 minutes, yet it reached FL 260.

https://flightaware.com/live/flight/.../KBDL/tracklog

Apologies if you already figured this out from the Flight Aware ADS-B data you provided - but consistent climb rates of up to 2800 fpm and descent rates of up to 3400 fpm mean it isn't hard to climb to and then descend from FL 260 in just 11 minutes, let alone 25.

What we don't know yet, from the brief prelim report, is why the climb continued for 8 minutes after the upsets, and exactly when the crew realized they had a medical emergency as well as a systems emergency.

[H Peacock]

Well I think the circa 100kt ASI split prior to aborting the first take-off gives a fair indication of how far behind the aircraft this crew were!

[IGh]

Pitch upsets

Preliminary Report N300ER
". . . Those numbers ... in excess of the design limits ... close to the ultimate load limits . . . may even need to be scrapped..."

Pitch upset ? -- everyone recalls just such an investigation :

TWA742 / 28Aug73 B707-331B (N8705T) during descent into Los Angeles, night, experienced pitch oscillations. One passenger killed. HNL - LAX, routine until descending through FL220 at 350 KIAS, at 2150 PDT (night) aircraft began to porpoise, over 50 oscillations within about 2 minutes, peak forces of +2.4g to -0.3g, pitch from 5-7 degrees nose up to 5-7 degrees nose down. Pitch oscillations abated as speed decreased to about 300 KIAS at FL195. F/As and pax standing in aft cabin were thrown repeatedly from floor to ceiling while aircraft porpoised. N8705T had previously experienced pitch oscillation onset with similarities of entry speed, peak loads, and average frequency: .on 18July72,

Glorify NTSB

[MechEngr]

The thread title should change if it was from an aircraft control problem.

[Lake1952]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

The thread title should change if it was from an aircraft control problem.

As the thread starter, the title is the best I could do with the information I had at the time. Like most incidents and accidents, knowlege and truth evolve over time.

[MechEngr]

Originally Posted by Lake1952

As the thread starter, the title is the best I could do with the information I had at the time. Like most incidents and accidents, knowlege and truth evolve over time.

It's a request to the mods, not a complaint about how it got there in the first place.

[BFSGrad]

Wondering about the flight crew decision to perform an ad hoc, partial exterior inspection on a taxiway with one engine running. While it certainly solved the lazy airspeed indicator fault, I would then also have plenty of doubt about the validity of the rest of the pre-flight inspection. IMO, a return to the ramp, shutdown, and complete pre-flight inspection was in order.

[Concours77]

Originally Posted by BFSGrad

Wondering about the flight crew decision to perform an ad hoc, partial exterior inspection on a taxiway with one engine running. While it certainly solved the lazy airspeed indicator fault, I would then also have plenty of doubt about the validity of the rest of the pre-flight inspection. IMO, a return to the ramp, shutdown, and complete pre-flight inspection was in order.

Seems like clearing the aircraft of reported faults on the screens would take some noodling, yes? If not, why would the aircraft report them, in the first place? Would Boeing have been prescient to include a warning: "MCAS ACTIVE STAB TRIM NOSE DOWN" ....? Should taking off with a pitot cover left on not involve some kind of time penalty? Aviation does have a "penalty box"​​​​​​​... ​​​​​​​thank you...!​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

[H Peacock]

Can’t help but think that the lack of a full power-down (and hence reset) after the extreme IAS mis-compare from the initial take-off run is likely to be an issue here.

[roulishollandais]

wrong checklist ?

[roulishollandais]

Preliminary Report :The crew recalled EICAS messages of ‘AP STAB TRIM FAIL’ [autopilot

stabilizer trim failure] ‘MACH TRIM FAIL’ and ‘AP HOLDING NOSE DOWN’.

[….]

The PIC asked the SIC to refer to the quick reference handbook. The SIC, via an electronic flight bag (iPad), located the quick reference card and the ‘PRI STAB TRIM FAIL’ [Primary Stabilizer Trim Failure] checklist. The SIC visually showed the PIC the checklist, and they both agreed to execute the checklist. The first action on the checklist was to move the stabilizer trim switch (‘STAB TRIM’), located on the center console, from ‘PRI’ (Primary) to ‘OFF.’ The SIC read the checklist item aloud and he subsequently moved the switch to off. As soon as the switch position was moved, the airplane abruptly pitched up.

[Lake1952]

Originally Posted by BFSGrad

Wondering about the flight crew decision to perform an ad hoc, partial exterior inspection on a taxiway with one engine running. While it certainly solved the lazy airspeed indicator fault, I would then also have plenty of doubt about the validity of the rest of the pre-flight inspection. IMO, a return to the ramp, shutdown, and complete pre-flight inspection was in order.

This happened at an uncontrolled airport. I cannot picture this same scenario at a controlled field.

[RichardJones]

Originally Posted by Piper_Driver

Victim identified. It sounds from the quotes from her spouse as though passengers were thrown around the cabin. This implies no seat belts were being used.

Turbulence victim

If your sitting down, strap in. C.A.T., is very hard to predict.that same thinking should be conveyed to passengers.

It is also prudent to select a cruise level, fuel permitting, where you have good G protection. In other words dont get too high. Dont try and outclimb weather. Best to go through it at a lower level, monitoring AS. When I was on cargo fl310 to 330 was a good level to penetrate weather, a/c weight permitting.

[alfaman]

Originally Posted by RichardJones

If your sitting down, strap in. C.A.T., is very hard to predict.that same thinking should be conveyed to passengers.

It is also prudent to select a cruise level, fuel permitting, where you have good G protection. In other words dont get too high. Dont try and outclimb weather. Best to go through it at a lower level, monitoring AS. When I was on cargo fl310 to 330 was a good level to penetrate weather, a/c weight permitting.

That's pretty well understood, but those in the cabin cannot be strapped in for the whole flight: cabin crew need to move around to perform their duties, & sitting down for long periods isn't healthy either. it's perhaps more pertinent that, if time permits, the crew issue a warning to the passengers to sit down & strap in before trouble shooting an issue which may cause an upset (no criticism implied to this crew, who may have done, or may not have had time to do so).

[Uplinker]

Originally Posted by BFSGrad

Preliminary Report N300ER

Key points:

Incident not caused by turbulence
Multiple AP/trim faults prior to upset
Upset event initiated due to pilot implementation of QRC for primary stabilizer trim fail
Upset g forces +4.2 to -2.3
1st takeoff attempt rejected due to right pitot tube cover installed
2nd takeoff no V-speeds entered
Both pilots under 100 hours in type

My bold

FFS !!! how difficult is it to perform a proper walk-around? Answer = not remotely difficult, even in the pouring rain - just do it.

2nd bold, sounds like those pilots had 100 TT, let alone on type.

Are pilots nowadays learning nothing from CRM and studying crashes?

[punkalouver]

Originally Posted by roulishollandais

Preliminary Report :The crew recalled EICAS messages of ‘AP STAB TRIM FAIL’ ...........

[….]

located the quick reference card and the ‘PRI STAB TRIM FAIL’ [Primary Stabilizer Trim Failure] checklist.

Sounds to me like they might have referred to a checklist with a different name than what was shown as a fault. Regardless of whether that is the case in this incident, that is why with paper checklists, it can be a good idea when starting to read the checklist, to read out loud the name of the displayed fault and then read the title of the checklist and then continue on. There can be similarly named faults which have significantly different action items.

[WillowRun 6-3]

"Chop" can produce surprising reactions out amongst the populace.

About 10 minutes after rotating off the KORD runway last week on board a 787 operating to Paris CDG by, uh, let's just say one of the big 3 U.S. airlines, the aircraft suddenly seemed to have been punched downward, pretty forcefully. Your friendly forum-neighborhood SLF/attorney was in the window seat, in the section between the high-end seats and the squeeze-'em-in rows (it's worth it, even on a budget, but I digress). My seatmate in the aisle seat - it's just 2 abreast at the sides of the rows - was quite startled, and frightened. So, what....??

So she grabbed my arm on the armrest with such force that her fingernails went through two layers of admittedly relatively thin fabric. This didn't quite draw blood but very nearly. She didn't let go for what seemed like 30 seconds or more - the chop had lasted maybe 5 to 8 seconds (I wasn't timing). The marks she left on my arm were still quite visible, let's see, it was a Wednesday evening flight, the marks were still quite evident the following Monday evening.

Perhaps this would be relevant to the thread if this unwarranted - though not naked - aggression had been followed by "clever conversation".... alas, the young lovely had excellent French. Though only.
.... .... ....
P.S. The look of fear in her eyes - I'm not kidding. In the moment, the words she fired off at me about what had just happened didn't register in my mind enough to be recaled, something like, "what's happening?" It helped, however, that the chop had hit the aircraft while one of the F/Os - there appeared to be two on the flight crew - was in mid-"Public Announcement." WR 6-3

[roulishollandais]

NTSB

Originally Posted by punkalouver

Sounds to me like they might have referred to a checklist with a different name than what was shown as a fault.

Of course , they had an autopilot trim failure commanding a pitch down.
And the crew used the primary trim failure check-list requesting the well working PRIM OFF!!!! : (Reread the NTSB preliminary report)
Thus the aircraft abruptly pitched down !

Why does the NSTB let imagine any other scenario , hiding EFS pilots' fault ???

rh