Light aircraft down in the Lake District , Cumbria

[David Thompson]

Sadly pilot reported killed as lone occupant but very few details at present . RIP .
From the BBC ; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-54501995 .

[Timmy Tomkins]

Do we know if that photo was on the day concened? Low cloud, high ground?

[horatio_b]

Moe information has now been released:

https://www.nottinghampost.com/news/...tragic-4598966

[DaveReidUK]

Aircraft appears to have been Aerobat G-CIIR.

The plot on FR24 shows it as departing from Gamston, with a stop possibly at Netherthorpe before heading north.

Final position plot was approaching Ullswater, around 5 nm SSE of Troutbeck.

Originally Posted by Timmy Tomkins

Do we know if that photo was on the day concened? Low cloud, high ground?

Nope - Google StreetView photo.

[NutLoose]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknew...?ocid=msedgdhp

[Newforest2]

As reported, registration confirmed. R.I.P.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/243808

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by Newforest2

As reported, registration confirmed. R.I.P.

As per the photo link in the previous post.

[7of9]

update today.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-59345932

[treadigraph]

AAIB report...

[Pilot DAR]

I'm not sure I accept that the fatal crash force was "between 3 g and 4.25 g." (page 27 of the AAIB report), I expect a much higher number for a .45 to .75 stop from 55 MIAS? My very modest search for a calculation result suggests as high as 65 G. A friend of mine similarly crashed his 150, similarly stopping in about 12 inches, near straight down. The coroner told me that his stop was in the range of 200 G.

In any case, a nose down vertical arrival will likely be fatal, regardless of seatbelt use.

[First_Principal]

Originally Posted by Pilot DAR

I'm not sure I accept that the fatal crash force was "between 3 g and 4.25 g." (page 27 of the AAIB report), I expect a much higher number for a .45 to .75 stop from 55 MIAS? My very modest search for a calculation result suggests as high as 65 G. A friend of mine similarly crashed his 150, similarly stopping in about 12 inches, near straight down. The coroner told me that his stop was in the range of 200 G.

In any case, a nose down vertical arrival will likely be fatal, regardless of seatbelt use.

55 KIAS was the proximated forward speed of the a/c, it was said to have "entered the dive at about 50 ft agl", there is no speed mentioned at impact.

While I agree with you that the deceleration seems to be a rather low number this is acknowledged in Footnote 7 of the report, also there's a reasonable amount of data that we're not privy to (for example the video frame rate/position of a/c on horizon at different frames) which could cast a different light on things.

That said, if we take the stated 'g' my (literally) back-of-the-envelope calcs suggest an approx speed at impact could be as low as 6-8kn... I've allowed a 'fudge factor' to take into account some other variables such as greater initial deformation of the ground (described as soft) and the a/c itself before they both returned to a static state. If this is the case, and given the injuries described, then it seems to me the occupant would have had a [greater] chance of survival had he been more fully restrained (as he likely could have been).

While the inner engineer is interested in the physics I need to say that I was horrified to read this report. I had my head in my hands thinking of all the things that went wrong here, the people affected, and the lives irreparably altered. So sad, so unnecessary, but is there anything more we can do to stop this sort of thing happening again? Is there anything new to learn from the tragedy?

FP.

[pilotmike]

Originally Posted by Pilot DAR

I'm not sure I accept that the fatal crash force was "between 3 g and 4.25 g." (page 27 of the AAIB report), I expect a much higher number for a .45 to .75 stop from 55 MIAS? My very modest search for a calculation result suggests as high as 65 G. A friend of mine similarly crashed his 150, similarly stopping in about 12 inches, near straight down. The coroner told me that his stop was in the range of 200 G.

In any case, a nose down vertical arrival will likely be fatal, regardless of seatbelt use.

I also found the stated figures for decelerative g force to be unbelievable.

An object dropping from 50' (15m) arrives at Earth with a vertical velocity of 17ish m/s, or 40 mph. If stopped in 1 metre, that represents a deceleration of 150 m / s ^ 2, or 15g, in round numbers. Stopping in under 1m causes proportionately higher deceleration. The stated figure of 3 or 4g just doesn't make sense. 30 to 40g would be more accurate approximations.

[Pilot DAR]

55 KIAS was the proximated forward speed of the a/c, it was said to have "entered the dive at about 50 ft agl", there is no speed mentioned at impact.

Though a ground contact speed was not mentioned, it would not be less than the stall speed for the plane, as the plane contacted the ground near vertical. If the plane contacted the ground in a descent, something like a landing, then yes, the vertical speed could be a few knots, where the forward speed were still flying speed. In any case, the visible damage to the plane, zero ground marks showing deceleration at ground contact, and the fact that the pilot died, are evidence of a high deceleration force. I know for a fact that a 14+G forward crash is survivable with injury.

Is there anything new to learn from the tragedy?

Nope.

So sad, so unnecessary, but is there anything more we can do to stop this sort of thing happening again?

Hopefully, discussing it, and impressing upon new pilots that there are things planes cannot do, or might only do, if flown with above average skill. Figure 6 shows a needlessly nose high pitch attitude, which would prevent acceleration to a safe flying speed. The pilot got it off the ground, which sounds like an achievement in the conditions. Lower the nose, and let it accelerate!

He was also “not the most consistent student”. He
described him as one of the “more aggressive, pushy students” at times. He added that
during some of the first few lessons they flew together these attributes gave him cause to
“reel him in” at times and he had to explain to him what was acceptable and what was not.
He added that he had to be quite firm with him at times.

Is concerning. This should be recognized by the instructor, and, yes, reeled in! Some new pilots have unrealistic opinions of their own skills relative to airplane performance, and need to be "told" for their own good. If they will not listen, that's a big red flag. I've encountered a few such pilots, and had to take extra steps for their own safety.

[double_barrel]

Originally Posted by Pilot DAR

Is concerning. This should be recognized by the instructor, and, yes, reeled in! Some new pilots have unrealistic opinions of their own skills relative to airplane performance, and need to be "told" for their own good. If they will not listen, that's a big red flag. I've encountered a few such pilots, and had to take extra steps for their own safety.

It turns out that almost all of us have unrealistic opinions of our skills. This is the Dunning-Kruger effect, we usually take it to mean that dumb people think they are smart, but in fact it happens all the way along the performance curve, with only the very best underestimating their performance. And it has been shown to apply to a huge range of skills and comprehensions. Of course the gap is the most glaring at the bottom end of actual ability, but I suggest instructors need to be aware that everyone, including themselves, can be a victim of D-K.

(trust me, I am an expert in human psychology )

[parkfell]

double barrel raises issues which all flight instructors have to deal with.
Whether age & success prior to learning to fly are factors here are matters for debate.
An attitude that the normal rules & protocols do not apply to you are interesting, if not disturbing.
I would describe such traits as a “loose canon”.

It reminds me of the Tariq Sharer accident in 1992.
The AAIB report on PA28 G-BNOD is on line & valuable reading for all authorising instructors.
After the 1993 FAI in Dumfries, the matter went to the High Court, Edinburgh some 7 years later.

I was ‘surprised’ that prior to PPL issue a solo navigation exercise had been authorised to Troutbeck and the understandable ‘concern’ of the airfield owner when this fact was eventually revealed.

Performance considerations v. safe operations should feature heavy in all pilot training.

The toxicology report that a “recreational drug” had been consumed a day or so before the accident is also worrying, although not directly regarded as an accident factor. Such drugs would appear to be prevalent if sample analysis by scientists of the Thames is any indication.
The CAA have highlighted such off duty activities to ATCOs are not compatible with ATC functions.

So once again ‘human factors’ & the Swiss Cheese model are present in this wholly avoidable accident.

Extremely sad for all concerned.

[uncle dickie]

For those who sat their professional exams prior to 1988, a pass at Performance A gave you blanket exemption from having to sit any other performance group exam aeroplanes when a new type rating was acquired.
Then a (ex?)C130 driver flying a BN2 with parachutists abroad suffered an engine failure very close to ‘lift off’. He attempted to continue the take-off without success coming to a reasonably rapid STOP.
Subsequent investigation revealed a lack of understanding of what I think was a Performance C aircraft abilities.

Rule change: Performance A no longer gave blanket exemption & the appropriate exam for new types was now required.

Might the PPL performance syllabus/exam now be ‘beefed up’ & a stand alone paper be adopted given the circumstances revealed in this Troutbeck accident.

[Maoraigh1]

"Might the PPL performance syllabus/exam now be ‘beefed up’ & a stand alone paper be adopted given the circumstances revealed in this Troutbeck accident?"
I don't see any change to rules or examinations being relevant to this accident. Especially after the warnings before the flight attempt. He knew it was marginal. He failed.
(Many years ago, with a heavy pax, in a similar situation, looking ahead, I aborted after lift off and hit the fence. No injuries. Repaired and flew out solo a few days later. I might have continued and not succeeded.)

[Pilot DAR]

Especially after the warnings before the flight attempt. He knew it was marginal.

I worry that he did not actually understand that it was marginal. He had not learned to be afraid of being in that regime of flight. Very occasionally, one has no choice but to be in that regime of flight, but most commonly, there is a choice. Being afraid of high AoA, behind the power curve just after takeoff should be instinct, not disregarded as being over cautious.

[parkfell]

Advise for Junior Birdmen et al

As an old hand once said to me as a new junior flying instructor at BAeFC PIK:

“Learn from other peoples’ mistakes, as you will never live long enough to make them all yourself”

The other piece of advice received concerned Aeroplane Performance:
If short field techniques are required, then the field lengths are probably inadequate.
Consider the increased risks associated, and whether the insurance is being put in jeopardy…

[First_Principal]

Originally Posted by Pilot DAR

...he did not actually understand that it was marginal...

Quite probable, but even if he had understood it seems he was pushy enough to carry on anyway - given the airfield owner's actions one would imagine the pilot had been clearly advised not to carry on the flight.

I've put some thought into my earlier questions, I agree that's there's little new here, but in relation to "is there anything more we can do to stop this sort of thing happening again?" I think perhaps there are some simple things that could assist:

1. When I think back to my training I'm not sure there was much emphasis on the effect of soft ground, particularly coupled with short grass fields. That's not to say there was none (and my case probably had some unique circumstances) but I wonder if there's some value in being made to actually walk a field with a view to its suitability and effects on t/o and landing? Maybe this should be a syllabus item?
2. During training, is there any real explanation around a PPR? Understanding of this, and why people have such things, seems to have been utterly lacking. Yet again, should this be part of the syllabus? If it's already part of the syllabus does it need to be beefed up, with particular regard to understanding circumstances that might make an airfield unsuitable on a day-to-day basis (including why it might be unsuitable for YOU at a certain part of your career).
3. Is there value in a gradated licence? I don't know this airfield at all, but as I take it it's a private field requiring a PPR I suggest it could carry a higher risk than some other places. Perhaps the first xx flying hours of a new licence holder should be restricted to 'standard' fields, and/or an endorsement required for operation in/out of private fields? An endorsement that's more than just a tick in a box I add - let's check out the candidate's ground planning etc (incl understanding of PPR) as well as actual flying knowledge/perception.

Finally, I agree, Maoraigh1 , that rules by themselves may well not have prevented this tragedy, however I'd like to think that more (specific) experience might have made it less likely. The comments I raise above are around enhancing this, not so much about rules, although I acknowledge they'd probably require minor alteration...

FP.