Helios Crash
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Not familiar with the 737, but am I to understand there is no cabin altitude master warning caption or EICAS message complimenting the aural warning? If not, then while the Helios crew didn't exactly cover themselves in glory, I would consider inadequate design of the pressurization system by the manufacturer to have been a significant contributing factor here. Similar in consequence to the inadequately designed AT retard function which contributed to bringing down THY 1951 at Schiphol.
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Of course BOAC is right, the after take off is the place to do it. However to have additional checks doesn't hurt, even now that Boeing fittet those two additional warning lights per side that tell you if it is either the config warning or altitude warning horn you are right now listening to.
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Denti and Idle, what I said was
- not the only place! 10, yes, 20 yes, 30, yes, 40 yes and then in the cruise. Descent is also a good idea but less vital.
The after take-offs is the best place to start.
BOAC, others;
You mean to say that such a check is actually not SOP or at least part of the kit everywhere? It seems second nature - did it from Day One and for 35 years thereafter - it is absolutely fundamental airmanship because failure of the system can kill, (clearly) and we check and re-check anything that can kill, like speed, like altitude, like clearances for same, like terrain, like wing contamination, like the runway we're about to use - all that, ....don't we?....
You mean to say that such a check is actually not SOP or at least part of the kit everywhere? It seems second nature - did it from Day One and for 35 years thereafter - it is absolutely fundamental airmanship because failure of the system can kill, (clearly) and we check and re-check anything that can kill, like speed, like altitude, like clearances for same, like terrain, like wing contamination, like the runway we're about to use - all that, ....don't we?....
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Question is, can we put everything to checklists? As someone mentioned, pilots should be able to think, not only to follow checklists. And even if we add it, something will still be left out.
Centaurus mentioned how many crews fail to check this instruments during after take-off checks while at simulator checks. Shouldn't this be a moment to strenghten their understanding of the system, its philosophy, traps, how it works, and what should be checked. Good training would mean getting crews to understand what's going on, not just adding things to checklists for people to blindly follow them.
Centaurus mentioned how many crews fail to check this instruments during after take-off checks while at simulator checks. Shouldn't this be a moment to strenghten their understanding of the system, its philosophy, traps, how it works, and what should be checked. Good training would mean getting crews to understand what's going on, not just adding things to checklists for people to blindly follow them.
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some pilots are good....some are lucky...few are both....but when your luck runs out...you better be good...so start working hard at being a good pilot.
the 10,000' check is a darn good one. sensitive ears are important too!
I once had a cabin pressure problem, due to a electrical failure...my first warning was my ears hurting!
the 10,000' check is a darn good one. sensitive ears are important too!
I once had a cabin pressure problem, due to a electrical failure...my first warning was my ears hurting!
criss;
Exactly.
A while back on another thread, the notion of "Killer Items" came up - it was after the Spanair MD82 accident at Madrid where a complex series of mis-steps and minor failures led to the deaths of over 150 passengers and crew.
There aren't many events/items that will kill right away but they exist on every flight. Some of them are,
- slats-flaps set,
- stab trim correctly set,
- speeds correctly calculated/set,
- correct/clear runway,
- spoilers retracted
- controls free, (should be obvious but I have seen data to the contrary),
The way we ran it was: pressurization - checked and announced every 10k in the climb and descent; a Cruise Check covers speeds, altimeters, pressurization, fuel and then a geographical check of all controls/indicators is done.
and there may be other type-specific killer items to check).
Those are checklist items to be emphasized for sure, but in truth the killer items should be automatic - should be habit, and also emphasized during training as an airmanship thing as well as adherence to SOPs. By the time one is flying airliners one shouldn't need "training" to check such items, but if we take a look at the industry's history over the past, say, three years, one or two of the basics were clearly missing in the six or seven stall/loss-of-control fatal accidents which have occurred. Why?
Exactly.
A while back on another thread, the notion of "Killer Items" came up - it was after the Spanair MD82 accident at Madrid where a complex series of mis-steps and minor failures led to the deaths of over 150 passengers and crew.
There aren't many events/items that will kill right away but they exist on every flight. Some of them are,
- slats-flaps set,
- stab trim correctly set,
- speeds correctly calculated/set,
- correct/clear runway,
- spoilers retracted
- controls free, (should be obvious but I have seen data to the contrary),
The way we ran it was: pressurization - checked and announced every 10k in the climb and descent; a Cruise Check covers speeds, altimeters, pressurization, fuel and then a geographical check of all controls/indicators is done.
and there may be other type-specific killer items to check).
Those are checklist items to be emphasized for sure, but in truth the killer items should be automatic - should be habit, and also emphasized during training as an airmanship thing as well as adherence to SOPs. By the time one is flying airliners one shouldn't need "training" to check such items, but if we take a look at the industry's history over the past, say, three years, one or two of the basics were clearly missing in the six or seven stall/loss-of-control fatal accidents which have occurred. Why?
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By the time one is flying airliners one shouldn't need "training" to check such items
criss;
"Comes pretty early...", Yeah, we see that more and more as the smaller carriers continue to pay less but need more - (I don't want to go there, it's been done to death already). Re your comment re 'checked'...blablabla...'checked', etc, in my view quite frankly, only the visceral, primary realization and then active acknowledgement that one's next takeoff or approach and landing could be one's last, and that one has at that moment, the 30 seconds that one may wish one had in the next minute. The Comair crew comes to mind in this example.
Blunt though it may be, it is that kind of thinking, perhaps viewed as morbid by others who don't fly airplanes, that keeps everyone alive during those fw moments of high risk exposure.
"Blablabla" is apparently what happened at Madrid - the F/O called the slats/flaps but clearly never looked at the lever or the guage otherwise they would have been out.
There is a video of this same operator of an MD82 taxiing and lining up with the slats/flaps retracted but where the crew extends them just as they line up for takeoff - clearly forgotten but remembered or warned by the TOWS.
I am of the view that, on top of/in addition to, checklists, one must BE a pilot all the time. That involves and includes knowing and being cognizant of and ensuring that the Killer Items are checked and set correctly.
We all know that the challenge for all crews doing many legs per day sometimes in atrocious hours and weather systems, to engage the checklist process and not just recite it. It is a challenge because everything is so ordinary and normal and routine all the time.
But...it's only about six items per flight and takes less than that 30 seconds - certainly, it isn't the employer putting that much pressure on any crew that they have to get out, line up and get away.
PJ2
"Comes pretty early...", Yeah, we see that more and more as the smaller carriers continue to pay less but need more - (I don't want to go there, it's been done to death already). Re your comment re 'checked'...blablabla...'checked', etc, in my view quite frankly, only the visceral, primary realization and then active acknowledgement that one's next takeoff or approach and landing could be one's last, and that one has at that moment, the 30 seconds that one may wish one had in the next minute. The Comair crew comes to mind in this example.
Blunt though it may be, it is that kind of thinking, perhaps viewed as morbid by others who don't fly airplanes, that keeps everyone alive during those fw moments of high risk exposure.
"Blablabla" is apparently what happened at Madrid - the F/O called the slats/flaps but clearly never looked at the lever or the guage otherwise they would have been out.
There is a video of this same operator of an MD82 taxiing and lining up with the slats/flaps retracted but where the crew extends them just as they line up for takeoff - clearly forgotten but remembered or warned by the TOWS.
I am of the view that, on top of/in addition to, checklists, one must BE a pilot all the time. That involves and includes knowing and being cognizant of and ensuring that the Killer Items are checked and set correctly.
We all know that the challenge for all crews doing many legs per day sometimes in atrocious hours and weather systems, to engage the checklist process and not just recite it. It is a challenge because everything is so ordinary and normal and routine all the time.
But...it's only about six items per flight and takes less than that 30 seconds - certainly, it isn't the employer putting that much pressure on any crew that they have to get out, line up and get away.
PJ2
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Originally Posted by PJ2
You mean to say that such a check is actually not SOP
I always made sure the thing was pressurising normally after take-off and it was only post-Helios that I noticed very few F/Os were aware of what the panel should show and were not really checking it. Always better to 'notice' at 3000' than at 10,000'+ - and it is very easy to see there if it is wrong..
At 10, the BA 'SOP' 'check' was 'FEIPL' - fuel, engines, icing, PRESURISATION and inboard lights (Off). Out of interest the first action of most F/Os was lights (which are the least important of the lot! I insisted always that the 'P' came first, as a finite time passes on the first items and often these 'checks' were interrupted by ATC etc and could sail gently towards mask drop in a light jet, when it would be a mad and uncomfortable scramble.to level off.
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Slight thread drift but this is pertinent to many 737 operators in recent months / years "returning" to the basic Boeing manufacturer's SOPs and checklists as is the trend these days with the supposed fear of litigious exposure.
In my opinion many of the lessons learned from decades of airlines' millions of hours flown, operating experience & accident report reviews have been dumped, opening up a lot of Swiss cheese holes again.
For instance, latterly my previous employer removed the Captain's challenge of "Set Flaps" (provoking the PM who was setting the flap to not be led in to a trap of the usual setting of 5 but to think about the setting they had briefed during the performance review some minutes before) and returned to Boeing's method of "Set Flaps 5/10/15". This was defended only by that tiresome cliche "standard Boeing."
I recall BAe's manufacturer's checklists were painfully long winded during busy stages of flight which my then employer made a good job of adjusting to make more practical, sadly my Boeing experience has been quite the reverse in that the manufacturer's checklist is sparse in comparison to that of the airline's.
It seems to be popular to berate airline's own checklists and praise the manufacturer, but I've seen a lot of good stuff dropped because of it. I'd be interested to hear others' opinions on this.
In my opinion many of the lessons learned from decades of airlines' millions of hours flown, operating experience & accident report reviews have been dumped, opening up a lot of Swiss cheese holes again.
For instance, latterly my previous employer removed the Captain's challenge of "Set Flaps" (provoking the PM who was setting the flap to not be led in to a trap of the usual setting of 5 but to think about the setting they had briefed during the performance review some minutes before) and returned to Boeing's method of "Set Flaps 5/10/15". This was defended only by that tiresome cliche "standard Boeing."
I recall BAe's manufacturer's checklists were painfully long winded during busy stages of flight which my then employer made a good job of adjusting to make more practical, sadly my Boeing experience has been quite the reverse in that the manufacturer's checklist is sparse in comparison to that of the airline's.
It seems to be popular to berate airline's own checklists and praise the manufacturer, but I've seen a lot of good stuff dropped because of it. I'd be interested to hear others' opinions on this.
I would consider inadequate design of the pressurization system by the manufacturer to have been a significant contributing factor here. Similar in consequence to the inadequately designed AT retard function which contributed to bringing down THY 1951 at Schipho
The Helios accident is another case in point. After this accident, Boeing had little choice but to once more grit their teeth and try to cover their arse by acting on the Accident Board recommendation that a specific checklist of the position of the engine bleed switches, the pack switches and the Isolation switch should be made - even though for many years the original checklist items were considered sufficient to be understood by competent pilots.
Despite that, my private view was that the after takeoff checklist should always have been subject to the usual challenge by one pilot and answered by the other. Yet there was no mention by the investigators of the Helios accident of that flaw (my words) in that specific checklist policy favoured by Boeing since the very first 737 flew.
No doubt, former flight engineers could make the point that if an F/E had been carried as a member of the operating crew, the Helios event would most likely have never happened. They may well be right. But that doesn't necessarily mean Boeing should redesign the flight deck to include an engineer in future Boeing aircraft designs.
Plugging perceived loop-holes is never-ending because there will always be slack incompetent pilots on airline flight decks who will find a way of stuffing up somewhere. Maybe not today or tomorrow - but one dark night...
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Centaurus - in defence of 'competent' pilots, the design flaw by Boeing which had the same warning noise for both TOCW and cabin altitude caused a lot of confusion and should have been sorted out years ago.
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Hi,
A common mistake that people make when trying to make something completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools...
Plugging perceived loop-holes is never-ending because there will always be slack incompetent pilots on airline flight decks who will find a way of stuffing up somewhere. Maybe not today or tomorrow - but one dark night...
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the design flaw by Boeing which had the same warning noise for both TOCW and cabin altitude caused a lot of confusion and should have been sorted out years ago