Helios Crash
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Stourbridge & Corfu
Age: 39
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I was under the impression that the aircraft didnt have any proir issues (save of cource for the pressure switch possibly being left in the MAN instead of AUTO possition )
Join Date: May 2008
Location: Kettering
Posts: 150
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If only the world were as black and white...
If people did their research they would find that, in the 12 months prior to the Helios accident, other aircraft got airborne with the system in MAN and the crew did not spot it. Other crews failed to diagnose systems problems related to pressurization. Other crews misdiagnosed the warning horn. Other crews failed to don their masks. It happens every year and will continue to happen. Helios is no more than an extreme example of a not uncommon event.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing and the court action is just a social system wanting to find a scapegoat to explain an irrational tragedy. I blame God. If she hadn't invented gravity aircraft wouldn't crash.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing and the court action is just a social system wanting to find a scapegoat to explain an irrational tragedy. I blame God. If she hadn't invented gravity aircraft wouldn't crash.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: UK
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Funny how nobody seems to be mentioning the word 'Accountability' as in Accountable Manager - there is reference in the report regarding poor quality oversight, and there lies the root of the problem, regulatory oversight (or lack of) and self-regulation (of a poor standard). So why isn't the regulator in the dock?
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: Calgary
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
turbocharged
Spot on. This has happened 100's if not 1000's of times over the years and has been dealt with properly by many embarassed crews. Only once , to my knowledge , was the outcome this disasterous.
Despite many chances to break the chain (maintenance and pilot checklists) this mistake is still being repeated. Where it really went off the rails in this case , was the crews failure to identify the problem. In my opinion the shared warning horn has the potential to confuse a crew as it seems it did in this case.
We are probably lucky this has'nt ended up this way more often than it has.
Spot on. This has happened 100's if not 1000's of times over the years and has been dealt with properly by many embarassed crews. Only once , to my knowledge , was the outcome this disasterous.
Despite many chances to break the chain (maintenance and pilot checklists) this mistake is still being repeated. Where it really went off the rails in this case , was the crews failure to identify the problem. In my opinion the shared warning horn has the potential to confuse a crew as it seems it did in this case.
We are probably lucky this has'nt ended up this way more often than it has.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: UK
Age: 69
Posts: 475
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
well the armchair enthusiasts full of little or no fact are out in force again.
The facts are:
Helios was poorly regulated from day one
All aspects of the operation were sub standard
The UK CAA was actually advising the Cypriot NAA at the time (if you can call it that)
There were serious questions marks about the maintenance setup and the relationship and interaction between quality, ops and maintenance
There were serious question marks about crew training
Helios were to be placed on the EU blacklist but the politicians lost their nerve
The aircraft had a fault prior to the fateful flight but the engineer and everyone else involved did everything correctly
The fact is the aircraft departed serviceable
The fact is it is a disgrace that the accident report cites regulatory failings and no one single regulator is being charged
The fact is Helios was operating well below european standards just like many still are today.
The fact is the regulators should be holding their heads in shame for being totally incompetent or unwilling to deal with the failings of Helios and other still flying airlines.
The fact is money talks and safety comes second.
Yet we still have pilots and engineers who knowingly assist such companies by not being prepared to say NO.
You reap what you sow
The facts are:
Helios was poorly regulated from day one
All aspects of the operation were sub standard
The UK CAA was actually advising the Cypriot NAA at the time (if you can call it that)
There were serious questions marks about the maintenance setup and the relationship and interaction between quality, ops and maintenance
There were serious question marks about crew training
Helios were to be placed on the EU blacklist but the politicians lost their nerve
The aircraft had a fault prior to the fateful flight but the engineer and everyone else involved did everything correctly
The fact is the aircraft departed serviceable
The fact is it is a disgrace that the accident report cites regulatory failings and no one single regulator is being charged
The fact is Helios was operating well below european standards just like many still are today.
The fact is the regulators should be holding their heads in shame for being totally incompetent or unwilling to deal with the failings of Helios and other still flying airlines.
The fact is money talks and safety comes second.
Yet we still have pilots and engineers who knowingly assist such companies by not being prepared to say NO.
You reap what you sow
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Oxford
Age: 52
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Home Truths
All -
Our Cypriot friends had excellent advice from the CAA on airline regulatory oversight prior to Helios. Sadly, they chose to ignore much of it.
Problem as I see it: The main airline in Cyprus, Cyprus Airways, has always been a very good airline from a safety point of view. (The airline was created by BEA and is run operationally like BA). Possibly because of this, the Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation took a pretty laid back attitude to airline safety. (Conversely, their attitude to aviation safety from a non airline perspective - aerodrome, air navigation etc., was pretty much ok. Indeed, let us not forget that the one of the worst mid-air disasters of all time occurred in Swiss controled airspace, not in ‘poor’ Cyprus).
Don’t forget that apart from CY, all the other aircraft flying in and out of the place were regulated by their home regulators. The vast majority of these aircraft were British, so they were policed by the CAA. No problems there. You also had Air France, Lufthansa, Olympic, Austrian, KLM etc. etc. - again all very well regulated by their home regulators. So the Cypriots smoked lots of cigarettes and continued not to worry.
Don’t forget that Hellas (NOT Helios - which confused people) and Cypriana were gov / CY controlled and operated to the same high standards of CY. Helios was the FIRST Cypriot deregulated airline.
So then....deregulation occurs. Now deregulation is fine PROVIDING you have very good regulatory oversight. When Helios popped up this firm regulatory oversight didn’t exist on the island. Moreover, many people flew on Helios / Flash Air thinking that European oversight would guarantee their safety. Most people thought that if an airline that wasn’t up to scratch it simply couldn’t operate in Europe. (Me included. And I work in the industry.) We all now know better, of course.
I know the little island very very well. This was an accident waiting to happen. There’s no point paying for and getting world class advice on airline regulation - as the Cypriots got from the CAA - and then ignoring it. Sadly, that’s what occurred. And without prejudicing the trial that’s about to occur, most commentators would agree that Helios did not run a tight ship (to put it diplomaticaly).
Again, I emphasise - this happens in rich and poor countries, Just look at the Swiss aviation safety record as a comparison. That does not excuse the lack of regulatory oversight of Helios. But there was very much ‘Don’t worry - airlines know what they are doing’ approach to things’.
Our Cypriot friends had excellent advice from the CAA on airline regulatory oversight prior to Helios. Sadly, they chose to ignore much of it.
Problem as I see it: The main airline in Cyprus, Cyprus Airways, has always been a very good airline from a safety point of view. (The airline was created by BEA and is run operationally like BA). Possibly because of this, the Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation took a pretty laid back attitude to airline safety. (Conversely, their attitude to aviation safety from a non airline perspective - aerodrome, air navigation etc., was pretty much ok. Indeed, let us not forget that the one of the worst mid-air disasters of all time occurred in Swiss controled airspace, not in ‘poor’ Cyprus).
Don’t forget that apart from CY, all the other aircraft flying in and out of the place were regulated by their home regulators. The vast majority of these aircraft were British, so they were policed by the CAA. No problems there. You also had Air France, Lufthansa, Olympic, Austrian, KLM etc. etc. - again all very well regulated by their home regulators. So the Cypriots smoked lots of cigarettes and continued not to worry.
Don’t forget that Hellas (NOT Helios - which confused people) and Cypriana were gov / CY controlled and operated to the same high standards of CY. Helios was the FIRST Cypriot deregulated airline.
So then....deregulation occurs. Now deregulation is fine PROVIDING you have very good regulatory oversight. When Helios popped up this firm regulatory oversight didn’t exist on the island. Moreover, many people flew on Helios / Flash Air thinking that European oversight would guarantee their safety. Most people thought that if an airline that wasn’t up to scratch it simply couldn’t operate in Europe. (Me included. And I work in the industry.) We all now know better, of course.
I know the little island very very well. This was an accident waiting to happen. There’s no point paying for and getting world class advice on airline regulation - as the Cypriots got from the CAA - and then ignoring it. Sadly, that’s what occurred. And without prejudicing the trial that’s about to occur, most commentators would agree that Helios did not run a tight ship (to put it diplomaticaly).
Again, I emphasise - this happens in rich and poor countries, Just look at the Swiss aviation safety record as a comparison. That does not excuse the lack of regulatory oversight of Helios. But there was very much ‘Don’t worry - airlines know what they are doing’ approach to things’.
Last edited by Bridge Builder; 1st Mar 2009 at 17:37.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: UK
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SC - I'm right with you on this point
'The fact is it is a disgrace that the accident report cites regulatory failings and no one single regulator is being charged'
and to add insult to injury UK CAA if your listening - you knew there were serious concens not only with Helios but also with thier oversight yet you saw fit to allow them to operate int UK airspace.
Whats the problem Oh don't tell me politics - of course they always coe before saftey!
'The fact is it is a disgrace that the accident report cites regulatory failings and no one single regulator is being charged'
and to add insult to injury UK CAA if your listening - you knew there were serious concens not only with Helios but also with thier oversight yet you saw fit to allow them to operate int UK airspace.
Whats the problem Oh don't tell me politics - of course they always coe before saftey!
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Oxford
Age: 52
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
EU 'Blacklist'
Question:
1. Are there any European Union based airlines on the blacklist?
2. If the answer is 'no' is it conceivable that an EU airline could be placed on the list, as it would in effect be the same as EASA admitting that they are failing to regulate a particular airline? Moreover, wouldn't the EU member state which hosts said airline get very cross and throw its toys out of the pram?
(My definition of European Union: EU 27, plus Norway, Iceland, Lithcenstein, and Switzerland).
1. Are there any European Union based airlines on the blacklist?
2. If the answer is 'no' is it conceivable that an EU airline could be placed on the list, as it would in effect be the same as EASA admitting that they are failing to regulate a particular airline? Moreover, wouldn't the EU member state which hosts said airline get very cross and throw its toys out of the pram?
(My definition of European Union: EU 27, plus Norway, Iceland, Lithcenstein, and Switzerland).
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Oxford
Age: 52
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks Safety Concerns. And interestingly the list is cannily called the,
‘List of airlines banned within the EU’.
So, by definition, an airline such as Helios (Cyprus) could not be banned as Helios is / was already within the EU. It would therefore be a contradiction in terms.
You have to hand it to our friends in Brussels and Baden-Württemberg!
‘List of airlines banned within the EU’.
So, by definition, an airline such as Helios (Cyprus) could not be banned as Helios is / was already within the EU. It would therefore be a contradiction in terms.
You have to hand it to our friends in Brussels and Baden-Württemberg!
Last edited by Bridge Builder; 1st Mar 2009 at 20:19. Reason: typo (another!)
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: UK
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What's the point of a regulator (any regulator) that has no teeth, a regulator that puts politics first before safety, a regulator that was aware of and voiced concerns about this particular operator but did nothing to prevent an incident of this nature happening in the first place. If they prevented them flying into the UK that may have sent them a message to shape up and sort themselves out, but oh no... just write the report and walk away but do nothing.
And where does ICAO stand here I wonder... are they taking an interest in this case? As there are no 'regulators' in the dock probably not as this too will make a mockery of their USAOP.
And where does ICAO stand here I wonder... are they taking an interest in this case? As there are no 'regulators' in the dock probably not as this too will make a mockery of their USAOP.
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Oxford
Age: 52
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Agreed.
And please don't get me started on ICAO! ICAO missed the TCAS 'warning from God', the JAL 747 / DC10 near miss in 2001.
ICAO twiddled its thumbs until the totally avoidable and tragic fiasco that was Uberlingen.
And please don't get me started on ICAO! ICAO missed the TCAS 'warning from God', the JAL 747 / DC10 near miss in 2001.
ICAO twiddled its thumbs until the totally avoidable and tragic fiasco that was Uberlingen.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: UK
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How many fatal incidents could have been prevented if the regulators had stuck thier heels in and demanded change instead of caving in to political pressure or the industry jumping up and down saying 'it'll cost too much'.
Regulators should regulate regardless of money or politics - thier primary concern should be safety and prevention of injury / loss of life.
Instead we have an industry regulated by pussy cats - paper tigers who write reports wash thier hands and walk away.
Yes we may have individuals who may share some responsibility in this particular incident in the dock - but there is one who isn't, they just walk away calling themselves regulators... how perverse.
Regulators should regulate regardless of money or politics - thier primary concern should be safety and prevention of injury / loss of life.
Instead we have an industry regulated by pussy cats - paper tigers who write reports wash thier hands and walk away.
Yes we may have individuals who may share some responsibility in this particular incident in the dock - but there is one who isn't, they just walk away calling themselves regulators... how perverse.
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Oxford
Age: 52
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Since the Manchester air disaster in 1985, regulation got better and better. The chap who is head of the AAIB has said - and I agree - that the reason everyone survived the Toronto A340 crash was due to the lessons learnt way back then in how we design and configure aircraft.
However, in the past few years there has been pressure to dilute standards. EASA is being battered around by different interests to lower its standards to the lowest common denominator. That may well mean that high standards that exist in, for example, the UK, are dragged down. This is not an anti-European rant. I am all in favour of the EU. But harmonisation should be about harmonising to the highest possible common denominator, not the lowest. EASA is in real danger than its going for the lowest.
What’s more is that EASA has these crazy nationality quotas in how its staff is made up. That may be fine for the European Central Bank, but in EASA you want people from the countries who do safety best in the high up positions, so they can then share their best practise with the whole organisation and the whole of Europe. They need to scrap nationality quotas and hire senior staff based on their knowledge and experience. If they don’t they’ll be just like ICAO.
However, in the past few years there has been pressure to dilute standards. EASA is being battered around by different interests to lower its standards to the lowest common denominator. That may well mean that high standards that exist in, for example, the UK, are dragged down. This is not an anti-European rant. I am all in favour of the EU. But harmonisation should be about harmonising to the highest possible common denominator, not the lowest. EASA is in real danger than its going for the lowest.
What’s more is that EASA has these crazy nationality quotas in how its staff is made up. That may be fine for the European Central Bank, but in EASA you want people from the countries who do safety best in the high up positions, so they can then share their best practise with the whole organisation and the whole of Europe. They need to scrap nationality quotas and hire senior staff based on their knowledge and experience. If they don’t they’ll be just like ICAO.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: London
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Helios accused plead not guilty
By Elias Hazou
(archive article - Friday, September 18, 2009)
THE HELIOS trial yesterday adjourned to late November after the five defendants pleaded not guilty to the charges of manslaughter and of causing the death of 119 people through a reckless act.
The defendants are: Andreas Drakos, chairman of the board of Helios; Demetris Pantazis, chief executive officer; Ianko Stoimenov, (former) chief pilot; Giorgos Kikidis, operations manager; and Helios Airways as a legal entity.
Each faces a total of 238 counts, consisting of the 119 victims aboard the ill-fated plane (minus the two pilots) times the two charges.
The trial resumes November 27 at the Nicosia criminal court. The new date is the result of a deal struck between the defence and the prosecution in court yesterday.
Drakos, Pantazis, Stoimenov and Kikidis remain free on bail.
The defendants stood poker-faced in the courtroom as the charges were read out, making no eye contact with Helios relatives seated inside.
The case of the prosecution (the Attorney-general’s office) hinges on demonstrating that the company and its officers are liable for employing, and continuing to employ “inadequate and unfit” pilots, as state prosecutor Eleana Zachariades said in court yesterday.
But legal circles are already voicing doubt over the prosecution’s approach, which they see as flimsy at best. Under Cyprus law, manslaughter is defined as “causing death through an illegal act” – begging the question of what an illegal act in this case would constitute. Could operating or flying an aircraft be considered an illegal act, for example?
In short, the Attorney-general’s office’s angle is that the accident was caused by mistakes/omissions made by Captain Hans-Jurgen Merten and his co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, that they were unfit to fly, and that therefore it is the airline’s fault for allowing them to do so.
There is also the matter that the two pilots were fully licensed.
Among relatives of the Helios victims resentment over delays in starting the trial (it has been four years since the accident) has now been mixed with criticism of the prosecution’s handling of the case. Many are not at all happy with how things are going.
A trial is also set to get underway in Greece (the location of the accident), with reports recently of possible legal barriers and jurisdiction complications in the case of an individual being set to appear before trial in two different countries for the same case.
The Greek indictment also features Pandazis, Kikidis and Stoimenov, as well as chief mechanic Allan Irwin, who has not been charged in Cyprus.
It is said the trial in Cyprus could be threatened should Greece not co-operate in handing over evidence germane to the case. Latest reports, however, say a deal has been struck between the two countries.
“Justice? What justice? They’re going to lay all the blame on the pilots…it’s so obvious,” said Elena Georgiou, who lost her brother, his fiancée Christiana and six other friends on the doomed flight.
And she wondered why it took the Attorney-general’s office “four whole years to ask for the evidence in Greece, when they knew all along that this would come up.”
On the morning of August 14, 2005, a Boeing 737-300 jet operated by Helios Airways out of Larnaca smashed into hilly terrain 40km outside Athens after running out of fuel. All 121 people on board were killed, making this the worst aviation disaster in Cypriot history.
A subsequent fact-finding probe on the accident primarily blamed the two pilots, but also cited shortcomings within the airline as well as Cyprus’ Civil Aviation as latent, or underlying, reasons for the crash.
The crash report found that the airflow valve was set at a 14-degree angle from the manual position, allowing for partial pressurisation. For this type of Boeing, it should have been set on auto before takeoff.
According to the report, on the night before the accident, airline engineers left the switch on manual, but on the fateful day the pilots apparently omitted to conduct the pre-flight checks.
Cyprus Mail Internet Edition
By Elias Hazou
(archive article - Friday, September 18, 2009)
THE HELIOS trial yesterday adjourned to late November after the five defendants pleaded not guilty to the charges of manslaughter and of causing the death of 119 people through a reckless act.
The defendants are: Andreas Drakos, chairman of the board of Helios; Demetris Pantazis, chief executive officer; Ianko Stoimenov, (former) chief pilot; Giorgos Kikidis, operations manager; and Helios Airways as a legal entity.
Each faces a total of 238 counts, consisting of the 119 victims aboard the ill-fated plane (minus the two pilots) times the two charges.
The trial resumes November 27 at the Nicosia criminal court. The new date is the result of a deal struck between the defence and the prosecution in court yesterday.
Drakos, Pantazis, Stoimenov and Kikidis remain free on bail.
The defendants stood poker-faced in the courtroom as the charges were read out, making no eye contact with Helios relatives seated inside.
The case of the prosecution (the Attorney-general’s office) hinges on demonstrating that the company and its officers are liable for employing, and continuing to employ “inadequate and unfit” pilots, as state prosecutor Eleana Zachariades said in court yesterday.
But legal circles are already voicing doubt over the prosecution’s approach, which they see as flimsy at best. Under Cyprus law, manslaughter is defined as “causing death through an illegal act” – begging the question of what an illegal act in this case would constitute. Could operating or flying an aircraft be considered an illegal act, for example?
In short, the Attorney-general’s office’s angle is that the accident was caused by mistakes/omissions made by Captain Hans-Jurgen Merten and his co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, that they were unfit to fly, and that therefore it is the airline’s fault for allowing them to do so.
There is also the matter that the two pilots were fully licensed.
Among relatives of the Helios victims resentment over delays in starting the trial (it has been four years since the accident) has now been mixed with criticism of the prosecution’s handling of the case. Many are not at all happy with how things are going.
A trial is also set to get underway in Greece (the location of the accident), with reports recently of possible legal barriers and jurisdiction complications in the case of an individual being set to appear before trial in two different countries for the same case.
The Greek indictment also features Pandazis, Kikidis and Stoimenov, as well as chief mechanic Allan Irwin, who has not been charged in Cyprus.
It is said the trial in Cyprus could be threatened should Greece not co-operate in handing over evidence germane to the case. Latest reports, however, say a deal has been struck between the two countries.
“Justice? What justice? They’re going to lay all the blame on the pilots…it’s so obvious,” said Elena Georgiou, who lost her brother, his fiancée Christiana and six other friends on the doomed flight.
And she wondered why it took the Attorney-general’s office “four whole years to ask for the evidence in Greece, when they knew all along that this would come up.”
On the morning of August 14, 2005, a Boeing 737-300 jet operated by Helios Airways out of Larnaca smashed into hilly terrain 40km outside Athens after running out of fuel. All 121 people on board were killed, making this the worst aviation disaster in Cypriot history.
A subsequent fact-finding probe on the accident primarily blamed the two pilots, but also cited shortcomings within the airline as well as Cyprus’ Civil Aviation as latent, or underlying, reasons for the crash.
The crash report found that the airflow valve was set at a 14-degree angle from the manual position, allowing for partial pressurisation. For this type of Boeing, it should have been set on auto before takeoff.
According to the report, on the night before the accident, airline engineers left the switch on manual, but on the fateful day the pilots apparently omitted to conduct the pre-flight checks.
Cyprus Mail Internet Edition
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: Gods Country
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Helios accident
The F/O flew with me in the UK prior to joining Helios.I knew him well and his operating standard under pressure in the Flight Deck. Anyone want any more info,please P 
M me.
M me.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: UTC +8
Posts: 2,626
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
System design would be safer with VOICE generated warnings
Accident investigation committee should equally address airplane manufactures about shortcomings in sytem design.
A simple, inexpensive voice generated aural warning: "don oxygen masks," intermittently announced with the cabin altitude warning horn, would have saved the day. Pilots wouldn't have to "think" and waste precious time interpreting any of the conventional aural warning bells, whistles, whalers, beeps and horns.
This type of voice generated cabin altitude warning system was included in the Lockheed L1011 TriStar which I had flown many moons ago.
A simple, inexpensive voice generated aural warning: "don oxygen masks," intermittently announced with the cabin altitude warning horn, would have saved the day. Pilots wouldn't have to "think" and waste precious time interpreting any of the conventional aural warning bells, whistles, whalers, beeps and horns.
This type of voice generated cabin altitude warning system was included in the Lockheed L1011 TriStar which I had flown many moons ago.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Greece
Age: 84
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
why not have drop down masks like the pax? even in addition to the masks already there?
Few things are as unambiguous as a yellow mask popping down in the face.
A horn which sounds just like a horn for something else is kind of hard when you are no doubt starting to suffer from hypoxia
Few things are as unambiguous as a yellow mask popping down in the face.
A horn which sounds just like a horn for something else is kind of hard when you are no doubt starting to suffer from hypoxia
Join Date: Dec 2002
Location: Inside an airplane
Posts: 58
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cabin Decompression
Many will be surprised to know that in this modern aviation days and in respected airlines, there are cargo pilots out there believing and preaching that it is possible to survive a cabin decompression just by donning the mask and continue the flight until the oxygen level is low. No need to do an emergency descent, it’s only for passenger planes…. That’s what they say… Oh Dear… 