Adam Air B737-400 fatal crash January 2007

[Capvermell]

Anyways, interesting developments. The family has lodged an application for a new airline yesterday. "King and Queen Air" This was revealed by the DGAC yesterday.

I wonder why Kings and Queens would choose an airline with a high probability of never delivering to them their destination.

Surely if your national regulator is to have any shred of remaining credibility then they must turn down this application.

[Jakarta Jock]

Adam Air

PK-KAR

More power to your elbow. I must say that I find your posts to be first class and help to put matters into an Indonesian context.

The background to the financial problems in Adam Air as described do have a "ring of truth" and it would be funny if it were not so serious.

That said take care and keep your head down!!!!!!!!!

[mary_hinge]

Indonesia cancels Adam Air's AOC

http://www.rati.com/frameset/framese.../news/news.asp

Indonesia cancels Adam Air's AOCLeithen Francis, Singapore (23Jun08, 09:54 GMT, 244 words)
Indonesia has cancelled the air operator’s certificate (AOC) of grounded Indonesian carrier Adam Air, putting an end to an airline that was involved in Indonesia’s most fatal crash in the last couple of years.

[ronnieight]

Adam Air Flight 574

Adam Air Flight 574 voice recording:

RapidShare: Easy Filehosting

Or here:

YouTube - Rekaman Adam Air Sebelum jatuh

or here:

http://tengkorak.meektube.com/for/cc...n_Adam_Air.mp3

[PK-KAR]

I've received a few queries on this recording over the past 24hrs, and some from PPRuNe members...

I saw the link at a local forum yesterday, and a few colleagues took it to bits, and we seem to conclude that this recording is real, and most likely to come from the cockpit area mic... the gaps between the parts of the conversation matches the FDR and whatever transcript was in the accident report.

Today I ran into a couple of ex Adam Air pilots, and they wanted to hear this recording. They did say it was the right voices for the Capt. and F/O. The sadness in their faces when hearing this was... beyond words, especially the guy who flew the jet a few days beforehand... with the same problem... He was in the process of quitting when the crash happened.

The media here have put out a simulation of the accident based on this recording and the FDR data in the accident report... dunno how accurate their potrayal is...

PK-KAR

[atakacs]

Is there an english transcript somewhere ?

[punkalouver]

Thanks PK-KAR. Now that things have settled down for a bit, is there much chance of more past accident reports being released. I found the last two quite well written.

[pacplyer]

A certain war story break

Nothing but a hypothetical story follows:

Talk about the twilight zone......

Maybe once in your whole career, you're going to have to take the airplane away from a Captain who can't direct task-management correctly, or has quit flying the airplane for some reason.

This is the oldest cockpit story in the world. One guy MUST fly while the other diagnoses a problem. You can't have both of them troubleshooting. And if that guy can't keep the wings level, you MUST grab the controls, get it out of the [over] bank it's in, and recover. "Captain Captain Captain" is not assertive enough. State: "Captain I have the Aircraft," and do what you gotta do. But you better be right. Yes, you are probably going to loose your job. But at least you will be alive.

I had to do it once as a Flight Engineer and I will never forget it. Both "front enders" were continuing a bad GCA approach where foreign commuications became very uncertain. A different voice broke in and asked if we were going around (atc supervisor?) The GPWS went off and both guys ignored it, Captain pushing the G/S O/R button. I couldn't believe that both pilots weren't getting a read that this new controller was telling us something was wrong. Then he said: "you are Way North of Centerline and Way below Glidepath, are you going around?). They kept the sink rate going to minimums (that was the reason proffered later for not going around: he wasn't at minimums yet.) I pushed the power up from the back all the way to the stops and said to the pilot flying "Go Around, it's no good, Go Around, I'm giving you max power." I was sure I was fired. The F/O was shocked exclaiming "you don't do that, you just don't do that!" But the G/A was commenced. Then we for a second, we thought we saw the rooftops going by the windshield way too close, so I was later congratulated in the bar. But if it had been night, I'd probably be homeless right now....

I once was heavily criticized by a monday morning check captain for returning to base since the co-pilot was neither capable that day of flying or of any systems knowledge whatsoever. There was no way I was going to fool around with this serious mechanical problem while nobody flew the machine.

Maintenance was very unhappy with me that day, but this problem had been going on for weeks on this airframe.

The bottom line is that the PIC must be able to reject a broken airplane if he's been riding around on autopilot all month and is not up to a partial panel flying emergency.

The above is all just my opinion only.

[PK-KAR]

This is the oldest cockpit story in the world. One guy MUST fly while the other diagnoses a problem. You can't have both of them troubleshooting. And if that guy can't keep the wings level, you MUST grab the controls, get it out of the left bank it's in, and recover. "Captain Captain Captain" is not assertive enough. State: "Captain I have the Aircraft," and do what you gotta do. But you better be right. Yes, you are probably going to loose your job. But at least you will be alive.

PK-KKW Irony #1:
F/O's voice stress level rising consistently while captain's seems to be on a roller coaster. Captain was PF.

Irony #2:
After bank angle alert, F/O put a left roll input as the plane was banking right... Captain said "Don't turn it!"

Irony #3:
F/O former fighter pilot, Captain had no upset recovery training. Captain was PF...

Irony #4:
F/O former fighter pilot, normally a hard head on CRM, but over recent years, former fighter pilots have been "humbled" in many cases, and as this case shows, resulting in lack of assertiveness. RIP.

And how many accidents/incidents have happened in Indonesia involving an F/O knowing a disaster was going to happen and did nothing/not do enough?

When ironies happen, swiss cheese holes line up, and the flag gets ironed out in case we need a half mast...

I found the last two quite well written.

Don't hope too much the previous ones are gonna be re-written or released for public.

Is there an english transcript somewhere ?

Parts are in the final report (link to it is in this topic somewhere)

But here's a draft or two based on the recording (not written by me, I have not found the time to check and edit much)...

1.07 FO “not sure” DME is working fine (on FMS display)
1.10 Capt confirmed …..”yes that was what is wrong with it”
1.12 FO Try to recognize MKS – VOR
1.32 FO Says.. if mean while got the wind direction indicates back in normal
1.53 Capt your DME is totally different with this FMS picture
1.56 Capt Expressive …If DME Indicator (dedicated) was not in agreed with the FMS Displays...
2.00 FO Says….(jokes) this aircraft become/like a wooden vessel.
2.05 FO Says…”oke we must trust with this anyway”,…
2.08 Capt (little laugh)….”yes it is,..”
2.13 Capt “it has gone too far”…..
2.15 Both pilot beginning not sure with the cross track angle become bigger and bigger
2.21 Capt Says,…”Again it was wrong with the heading,…”
2.25 Both pilot try to confirmed/established a/c position,…
While Capt says…(ask FO),.. “established report position to ATC on Radial something
……124 DME”…. (means from MKS)
2.45 Capt Says,…”something wrong with EFIS”
2.47 FO Says,….” No this FMS”
2.50 Capt Says,…”FMS is confusing themselves”
3.13 Capt Says,…“I will try IRS mode change over to ATT” (attitude reference)
<--- My edit: A/P disconnect sound
3.30 FO (open the QRH book),….”it will comes to Fault ,…?” (IRS Fault Procedure on QRH)
3.36 FO “…IRS Mode Selector,..?
3.38 Capt “…Attitude”…..
3.40 FO “…which is ‘Left’…..?
3.53 Capt “…initial called for Altitude,…..?”
3.54 FO “…enter the Heading,..?”
3.55 FO Says,…..”What it was Heading now,..Capt,..?”
3.58 Capt “…Zero,……..zero seven nine ,…ya,..”
4.00 Both pilot confirmed/agreed with the current heading 079
4.20 “Bank Angle”,……!!!........
4.22 Capt “…switch the NAV again”………..(back ground sound….still “Bank Angle”,……!)
4.23 Capt (strong Voice),…. “switch the NAV again”,…. “switch the NAV again”…!!!”
4.25 “Nnooottt”,………(Altitude ‘sign’ Warning “sound”/reminder for 1000 feet to go)
4.27 “Bank Angle”,……!!!........
4.28 Capt “…switch the NAV again”
4.29 FO (strong Voice),….”NAV,…!!!”……oke capt,…
4.33 Capt (Shout,..),…..”Don’t Turning it!!!”….
4.35 Capt (Shout,..),…..”We must keep in these Heading,..!!!”
4.39 FO (Shout,..),.”Captain,…Captain….Captain,..!!!” (ask for command control ‘side’ for MCP/FD???)
4.42 “Clack,…Clack,..clack,….!!....(“Clacker” – Over speed warning “sound”/indicates Exceeding over speed limit)
4.45 FO “….Ach,..Capt,…Capt,…!!
4.46 Capt “…Yak,..yak,…!!
4.53 Allahuakbar”…!!!.(All Mighty Allah),…..
4.55 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
4.66 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
4.57 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
4.58 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
4.59 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
5.02 strong sound noise of airframe stressed due to over speed exceeding beyond limits
5.04 strong sound noise of airframe stressed due to over speed exceeding beyond limits
5.07 “What is this,..?!!!,…..what is this,…?!!!
5.13 sound something hard impact (inside cockpit)
5.14 “Aaaaaauuuuw,…. “Allahuakbar”…!!!
5.20 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
5.27 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
5.28 “Allahuakbar”…!!!
5.33 “Allaaaaaahhhhhuuuuakbaaaaaaaar”…!!!
5.36 ………………..silent…………………….(impact point)

As a result of this recording appearing on the internet, and the NTSC has not accepted nor deny the validity of this recording (which everyone now assumes, it is not a fake), the families are now going to commence legal proceedings against Adam Air, whatever is left of Adam Air, shareholders and former shareholders of the airline, either/both in civil and/or criminal law.

The mother of one of the F/As on board has also said, she can now be at peace knowing what happened on the last few moments, thanks to recordings...

PK-KAR

[ronnieight]

The mother of one of the F/As on board has also said, she can now be at peace knowing what happened on the last few moments, thanks to recordings...

Glad to know the recording provides some reliefs to the family of the victims. Interestingly, this recording was found by a sibling of one of the victims after a long rigorous search and somewhat the recording ended up on the internet yesterday and it's circulating fast.

[PK-KAR]

Ronnie8,
Where did you hear that?
Btw, where was the first source on the internet? the earliest I got is 31Jul on 4shared... but it's been running around for a bit I am told...

-KAR

[India Four Two]

Question about loss of attitude information

From the report:

When ATT (Attitude) was selected in the IRS Mode Selector Unit, it resulted in
the autopilot disengaging. The effect on the copilot’s EADI of switching from
NAV to ATT was that the following displays were lost:
· Roll indication
· Horizon scale
· Pitch scale
· Sky/ground shading.
Flight path angle, Acceleration, Pitch Limit display and Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Resolution Advisory (RA) commands
are also removed when ATT is selected.

Can someone explain to me why the attitude information disappears when you switch from NAV to ATT?

[GlueBall]

Ironically, the CVR confirms the written report's revelation about the crew's utter incompetence of basic airmanship; namely that of maintaining wings level attitude by reference to the independently powered SAI [Standby Attitude Indicator] after the synthetic voice generated warning: "Bank Angle, Bank Angle."

[petermcleland]

Well, having read that report, I have to say how grateful I am to have flown my years in command with a three pilot crew.

[punkalouver]

Not on the 737-400 myself.

I notice that on the second last page(83), it says that " the copilot did not inform the PIC when he selected attitude on the right MSU, even though the PIC instructed him to select the left one".

Could this have led to a situation the captain thought that an ADI indication was accurate when in fact it was not and therefore confusion over why the bank angle call was being made? Or is an obvious message annunciated on an ADI when attitude is selected?

[pacplyer]

punkalouver,

I only flew the classic 737 briefly, so my display and nav switching knowledge is lacking on this model. Also I'll use ADI instead of glass names.

Loss of Nav:
Reads kinda like without a warn/fault light on either of the IRU's the F/O was confused about which one deserved to be switched to ATT. This freaked the Captain because he wanted heading info punched into his IRU from the one the F/O just killed!

But yelling to go back to NAV was a real systems knowledge failure on the part of the Captain. ATT is a one-way-ticket, as others have pointed out; once you go there the horse has galloped out of the barn and it can only give you reduced presentation attitude info for the rest of the flight.

Some great earlier posts in this thread. Looks like the CAM recording has disappeared off those links on the net, so there must be some damage control going on?

Looks like these guys were handed a very unenviable situation. One or two bad IRU's (since it sounds like all this airline did was swop them when there was a write up) possible improper differences training (all-too common today,) possible inadequate abnormal checklist distribution.

Loss of A/P: (I'm assuming the A/P was lost as a result of the #2 MSU selected to ATT by the F/O)
But assuming a functioning SAI, (can we on this ship, PK?) both guys, if they're any good, should be doing a cross scan at all three attitude displays: Cpts, F/O's and the SAI before platform alteration occurs. #2MSU is switched to ATT:A/P lets go. A/P horn is cancelled. When the bank angle warning goes off, your primary horizon reference can no longer be trusted. When the altitude alerter tone goes of at ~250' off assigned, you're probably already doing unintended steep turns and losing altitude with increased load factors, who knows. You've had two clues that you're losing it; it's time to abandon the Captain's ADI and go back to the SAI (the F/O's ADI is not usable for 30 secs, right?).

Hard core instrument pilots flying junk call this: maintaining critical triangles of agreement.

But, because of good automated instrument comparator systems today, this old stick and rudder skill (cross-cockpit scan) is sorely lacking in todays air line pilot. Not all the guys I flew with in later years were even capable of flying without a flight director, let alone hand flying raw data across the cockpit at altitude for very long. If you don't keep current hand flying you will pay the price one night when "Outto" decides he's had enough of this flakey maintenance at this place and drops out when ATT is selected.

Ideally, before you start changing anything, you should have an idea which of the three horizon displays is presenting good info. You should then verify that your chosen primary horizon ref (for example: the Captain's ADI) is selected to it's normal display source: (e.g: The #1 IRU?) Instrument switching (which they never even got to) can be tricky, and before you get to restoring displays or even altering platforms as they did, the handing pilot has got to have faith that his interim source of wings level info is working for him.

But you should realize that failures can be progressive, and that you have to keep up the critical triangles of agreement going. Compare both remaining horizons with heading raw data change.

The no checklist way:
Normally, you just vote the odd horizon out. In this case, knowing the ship history and the airline, that's not good enough. The Pilot Flying (Capt) should be verifying partial panel behavior. He should instruct the co-pilot to get a flashlight out and dig out the wiskey compass taking readings of it for a minute in S&L and make sure his selected attitude reference is not changing heading on him (sounds like it did.)

Again, today's modern airline pilot almost never has to do this. But in this case, I wouldn't feel confident in choosing either of these IRU platforms to supply either the attitude reference OR the nav function.

Sounds to me like: This flight was beyond the abilities of most auto-pilot dependent line pilots.

But the colleague that you criticize for hand flying all the time (John Wayne) would have made it to the bar alive maybe.

The above are all just my contrarian opinions only.

[punkalouver]

I am wondering if the captain was thinking that the #2 ADI was working because he had asked for #1 to be switched to ATT(#2 was switched to ATT instead by the copilot, for whatever reason quite possibly without the captain's knowledge).

Therefore in the captain's mind, when the 'bank angle' callout was made, he thought it was a false warning based on what he was now assuming to be the now unreliable #1 ADI(which was in fact reliable) and then didn't use or took too much time to use the standby horizon for confirmation until it was too late.

It certainly doesn't give you much confidence in crews when once again we hear yelling for Allah over and over instead of working to correct the situation. For those tempted to do so in the future, perhaps you could yell "gear down", "speedbrakes" and recovery techniques instead. I guarantee it will provide more help to you and your paying passengers in this life than Allah ever will.

[CSilvera]

Well gee then I guess you've just insulted Allah and every Muslim pilot! Didn't you see how this worked with Egyptair 990? Lawsuit/banning/stoning to follow.

[punkalouver]

The solutions for everything in these societies.

[FrequentSLF]

Question from SLF

Would the airbus aplha protection have prevented/mitigated such occurence?
Thanks