Adam Air B737-400 fatal crash January 2007

[IGh]

Three IRUs needed?

An observation from “xetroV”, in message #32 on 1Apr, regarding pilots’ analysis of a faulty IRU [when designers provided ONLY two IRUs for those mishap pilots to compare]:

-- [from 2nd paragraph] “... All these observations seem to suggest that the left IRU data was faulty, yet the crew decided to switch the right IRU to ATT. As far as I can see, the report does not attempt to find an explanation for this choice ...”

-- from 4th paragraph] “... after the crew had switched the IRS-R to ATT, the PIC said ‘put it back on nav again, put it back on nav again.’ Once an IRS is switched to ATT, it is impossible to re-align it during flight, so putting it back in NAV is useless....”

Those are good points.

Question inferred from xetroV’s observations:

Wouldn’t a THIRD IRU have aided these mishap pilots?

The 3rd IRU could have aided their fault analysis, and [with proper design switching] the PITCH and ROLL signals from the 3rd IRU could have been selected, or de-selcted, to either PFD. This design, with the 3rd IRU, would be analogous to the better AUX GYRO switching we used before abandoning the VGs (later B737 designs use only 2 IRUs).

[xetroV]

RE: trim

In-flight rudder and/or aileron trim adjustments are not uncommon for the B737, especially as flap/slat rigging appears to be some kind of black art. I know one particular aircraft that requires left aileron for flaps 5, right aileron for flaps 15, and finally left aileron for flaps 30...

Aileron trim should not be used when the autopilot is engaged, as the autopilot will overpower the trim, which may result in an out of trim condition after autopilot disengagement. However, an out of trim condition will also occur after AP disengagement if the aircraft is, well, out of trim. The AP can easily mask out-of-trim situations if you don't pay close attention to the exact control wheel position during cruise.

Primary rudder trim technique is to fly the airplane (AP engaged) straight & level in HDG SEL and trim the rudder to the down-side of the control wheel until the wheel is level. Some forward slip is then deemed acceptable. The secondary rudder trim technique is to use rudder-trim until the bank angle is zero. In this case, the airplane may have a rolling tendency when the autopilot is disengaged; aileron trim can then be used to trim out the remaining control wheel forces.

In my experience, the primary technique is usually effective, but rudder trim deflections of up to one unit are not unheard of. This is after all how aircraft were made in the '50s.

[IGh]

After INITIAL Upset ... then rolling DIVE ....

Another observation was offered by "B757 Driver", in message #10:

"...one thing surprises me - 'rolling before pulling' is something ingrained in basic flight training. ... roll level before you pull otherwise you've got a good chance of pulling the aircraft apart...."

Earlier upset mishaps show many of the same conditions described in the AdamAir case. In earlier cases, G-forces recorded seem to increase during the rolling dive, as the IAS increased. Sustained G's go to 2Gs, then 3Gs, civil jet upsets have recorded IAS to about 470KIAS, with the G's spiking to 5.8 Gs (even in non-fatal cases).

There's one element that hasn't been mentioned: DRAG OPTIONS for the victim-pilots, during the high-speed, uncontrolled, rolling-DIVE. In the AdamAir AAR, can you find anything about SPEEDBRAKES??? Were they kept RETRACTED?

This next item will seem very odd to newcomers to these upset investigations: The EXTENSION of the LANDING GEAR was a common element in three historic cases of RECOVERY from UPSET-rolling-DIVE:

From NTSB AAR-94/02/SUM, pg 20, 2nd paragraph: "... The control column was moved aft ... throughout the descent. According to the flight crew, the recovery was initiated soon after the first officer lowered the landing gear...."

[PK-KAR]

Was there any particular reason for them to reach this conclusion at that particular moment?

None, according to one of the investigators I had coffee with over the weekend... It was lack of understanding of the system.

As far as I see, the report does not attempt to analyse the suitability of this QRH procedure, or try to establish if the assistence offered by the QRH is sufficient for such failures.

Well, better ask Adam Air why no copy of the QRH specific for the aircraft was available... the only copy unique to KKW only existed on KKW... and the copy available elsewhere, are generic QRH. They cannot question based on lack of evidence. The lack of IRS training also led to possibilities of them not identifying the correct reference in the QRH.

And finally, if the left (not the right) IRS was causing the navigation troubles, can we really be sure that the Euler angles (pitch, roll and heading) of this remaining left IRS were indeed accurate?

I think there is a passage that referred to this...

A related question that remains unanswered: why did the air traffic controller who exclaimed: "Where is Adam direct to? My God, he is flying north!" not inform the pilots straightaway? Why did it take 13 minutes before ATC questioned the aircraft's heading?

The quality of the radar at Makassar ATC is also under question, in that it had not been calibrated when it should have.

The line of thought is that there might have been some residual aileron trim which could add some confusion to a disorientating situation; crews normally expect zero roll rate to equate with zero force.

In addition to xetroV's response, with Adam Air's maintenance records and techlogs, whatever record remains could have been doctored after the accident, there were allegations on this circling around based on testimony of an engineer who alleged he was forced to doctor the records. There are however, no attempts by anyone to confirm this and it is unknown if the NTSC also received information regarding this allegation.

In the AdamAir AAR, can you find anything about SPEEDBRAKES??? Were they kept RETRACTED?

The AAR focused on what precipitated the upset. But, as far as I know from the report (or other info), speedbrakes were down and thrust not retarded to idle. *yikes*

Basically the report focused on the prevalent deficiencies that were so general that led to the series of lack of actions that could have prevented the upset from becoming a high speed water impact. The DATC (Directorate of Air Transport Certification) is now under severe criticism from the NTSC, DGAC, Department of Communications, and the office of the President, for letting this happen. There are also recommendations sent to the DGAC and DATC from the NTSC that were not made public as it was sent separate to the report highlighting the gross deficiencies in the DATC in safety and certification oversight.

The report may be deficient for some readers, but the implications for the DATC is huge. The head of the DGCA and DATC has been trying to reform the DATC and clean it up, but the "internal status quo" forces are too great, and this report, I can guess, is rather politicized in that it is aimed at getting the people in the DATC to clean up, or face criminal charges for negligence, manslaughter or corruption. The Garuda 200 report already managed to force the DATC to accept that it needs more training (with the assistance of Govt. of Japan, and Australia), and this report now brings attention to the "status quo" forces within the DATC that their days of the old habits are over.

Some airline crew are already challenging DATC inspectors on ramp checks and some have sent inspectors off the aircraft with tails between the legs for "inadequate knowledge" after the inspectors try to be smartasses and failed miserably.

Now, if the DATC cannot clean up quickly, the DGAC will let some heads roll within the DATC, which has been "requested" by the president.

Airlines are now split. Some have decided to stay one step ahead of the DATC in terms of application of safety systems, procedures etc, while some have adopted to maintain the status quo and monitor the developments... it'll be very interesting times when the DATC have moved ahead and some of the airlines (read: the usual suspects) stay in the same gear... will the DATC and DGAC be able to show their teeth then?

Interesting times ahead...

PK-KAR

[punkalouver]

Hi Mr. PK-KAR.

Thanks for your information. Next time you have lunch with an investigator, could you ask him if the NTSC could publish some of the reports for the several accidents that have been in Indonesia over the last several years. Tell him that they are much appreciated by those who are reading them.

Thanks.

[GlueBall]

Irrespective of IRS failure, autopilot disconnect, FMC position anomaly. . . the crew members lacked elementary survival instinct by not immediately hand flying the airplane, using the independently powered stand by attitude indicator as a primary reference to maintain wings level upon autopilot disconnect warning . . . and furthermore, by not doing so after multiple "bank angle, bank angle" warnings.

This scenario is another classic high altitude high speed upset because nobody was flying the airplane when the autopilot kicked off.

In IMC at FL350, at cruise speed, and especially in stormy weather, there is no time for delay to apply total concentration for one pilot at the controls just to maintain wings level and to hold altitude.

Recurring simulator training with impromptu loss of A/P and instrument displays will re enforce the urgency of manual control before the airplane enters an unrecoverable upset.

[PK-KAR]

Wouldn’t a THIRD IRU have aided these mishap pilots?

Sure, but I doubt it would on an Adam Air jet. You can have 20 on board IRUs if U can, and still wouldn't help. The main point arising from this accident is that the IRU/S are crucial to your aircraft and needs to be maintained properly. Again it goes back to management commitment to safety. Instead of maintaining the IRUs properly, management decides that it's cheaper to perform "clean contacts and reinstall" as their IRU maintenance, repetitively. It basically got to a stage where if you have 20 IRUs on board, none would have helped. If you go to the management and say you need 2 working ones, they'd say, "look, U got two, one's to back up the other", it's best to just leave the company. Why would 3,10,20 make a difference? They'd just say "look, you got 20 IRUs, only one needs to work. Now stop messing around or I'll make your life difficult."

Irrespective of IRS failure, autopilot disconnect, FMC position anomaly. . . the crew members lacked elementary survival instinct by not immediately hand flying the airplane,

Bingo...
Now the question is, why the lack of the elementary survival instinct?

Pilots in Adam Air have refused to fly unsafe aircraft in the past and management instead of doing something positive about it, decided to give hell to those who refuse. Brown envelopes were sent and those pilots faced legal proceedings for breach of contract and arranged the situation such that those pilots had to settle out of court rather than face bankruptcy. Now, U expect those deciding to stay care about staying alive to the same level as "just a pilot at just another airline" ?

And if they do have that elementary survival instinct, they lacked the proper training.

Recurring simulator training with impromptu loss of A/P and instrument displays will re enforce the urgency of manual control before the airplane enters an unrecoverable upset.

Well, that's pretty obvious. But then, simulator sessions were just "a formality" for Adam Air. One member of the "National Evaluation of Transportation Safety Team" (NETST) appointed by the President last week went on TV that it had previously reported its finding where, a simulator was "available" for 2 hours, and they put 5 pilots into it, of which one was the instructor. The simulator had limited function as it was in a 2 hour break inbetween maintenance, and at the end of it, all 5 was then reported as "completed simulator checks".

Sad isn't it.

Next time you have lunch with an investigator, could you ask him if the NTSC could publish some of the reports for the several accidents that have been in Indonesia over the last several years. Tell him that they are much appreciated by those who are reading them.

Had discussed this in the past, and yes, the first thing I did when I spoke to him was to thank him for the report being published and that all who are interested in safety thanks the NTSC for finally making a lot of these allegations on Adam Air, official, through the report.

It appears from the discussions that those reports are "political hotcakes". The GA200 and KI574 reports being published saw huge opposition from the old guard at the DATC. Only since the head of the DGAC and DATC has been changed can the NTSC release reports by ignoring what the old guard is ranting about. The old "we shouldn't release reports because we do not want to blame anyone or have the report used as an instrument of blame" is no longer valid, those guys are on the loosing side in the NTSC, as the current head belongs to the same group as the heads of DGAC and SATC... reformers.

But, they wouldn't want to rock the boat too much. Relations between members of NTSC and old guard members of DATC has been sour since the GA200 report and now with the KI574 report. Now, the recommendations would, again, show DATC deficiencies, crew training deficiencies and also the airport operators, etc... Plus, of the past accidents, we got Lion Air who's now the political darlings of the aviation industry, and to release reports on Lion Air accidents would be a huge political row within the DGAC, and could result in the reformers being replaced by the old guard. If that happens, we're back to square one again, and none of us want that!

The reports of past accidents will be published when the time is right. They must also be careful on the reaction of the public. The GA200 report was just an eye opener, and now KI574, people want heads to roll. The sad side of it, the media isn't helping, and have spun the reports around to paint airlines (regardless of which accident was mentioned) as evil blood suckers. The reports, and new DGAC policies must be in sync. Just last week, the DGAC revealed that it would punish airlines with "repetitive technical delays", and the passengers must be compensated for such. Within days, we got passengers demanding outrageous compensations for delays at airports, and other silly things, culminating in one occurence where the passengers overcame security and invaded an aircraft demanding that it be flown to their destination because they've faced enough of a delay.

The reform, we'd like it to be quick, but then, if we do it that quickly, we'd have a bigger mess on our hands! We don't want planes crashing, but we don't want pax turning into angry mobs either... one new thing we found this week is that, if we move too slowly, planes will crash, and if too fast, we'd have a riot on our hands. Sad reality.

PK-KAR

[Centaurus]

Recurring simulator training with impromptu loss of A/P and instrument displays will re enforce the urgency of manual control before the airplane enters an unrecoverable upset

So right. Some years ago, while training an experienced captain from Indonesia converting to the 737-200 simulator from F28, he was given an IMC turn towards an NDB. During the turn a failure of the captains ADI was simulated which he did not pick up. Within less than a minute he managed to get into an inverted position before twigging something was amiss. The F/O was silent and quite useless (low time CPL with only 250 hours) and stared disbelievingly at his own displays but said nothing. Now disorientated the captain then switched his attention to the standby ADI which was showing the correct attitude of 130 degrees bank and 20 degrees nose down. Mumbling something about the standby ADI being faulty he reached over and pulled the caging button of the standby ADI. The rest is best left to the imagination.
Chaos resulted until the instructor froze the simulator to de-brief.

[Capvermell]

One thing I don't understand about the management of Adam Air is how they thought this policy of not replacing almost any faulty parts was sustainable in the long run.

Had the airline been on its last legs financially at the time of crisis then the policy of postponing replacement of faulty components as an only short term move might have been understandable, but instead of as this they were a rapidly growing operation taking on more and more aircraft how did they expect to keep all these aircraft operational in the long run if they avoided carrying out almost all essential repairs and component replacement?

Surely it would have been self evident that such a set of policies in a fast growing airline would be bound to lead to serious incident(s) sooner or later and that this would then irretrievably damage the brand and the business that those in charge were so eager to build up? I supppose we have to assume that those in charge were previously in some much simpler line of business where slashing all costs to the bone regardless of merit is a policy that actually worked?

[PK-KAR]

Capvernell,
Well their previous business was import and manufacturing of Chinese motorbikes... they made a quick buck but that business has now AFAIK, closed.

As to the brand image... despite numerous delays, complaints backlog, safety breaches, Adam Air is "still" the official carrier of the national games venue set for later this year... Someone didn't do their homework. Only weeks before the final mishap (Run-off in Batam), Adam Air won "most recognized brand" award. And didn't some organization gave Adam Air the "Merit Award for LCC of the year" ??? That merit award is the funniest, how the PR people managed to tie that up to safety is something beyond belief, but they managed to do it...

One thing the management refused to accept/belief, that in the long run, it's cheaper to do it properly. Maintenance costs would be down, and "brown envelopes" would be less coz U'd use it less often on the authorities and disgruntled pax... And the "monkey budget" for their security (yes one of the largest number of thugs roaming around terminal 1C, is Adam Air's security) would be much less.

PK-KAR

[Capvermell]

Adam Air won "most recognized brand" award. And didn't some organization gave Adam Air the "Merit Award for LCC of the year" ???

Well it certainly is highly recognised just like Helios and SilkAir despite the small sizes of both those airlines. But not all publicity is good publicity.......

... And the "monkey budget" for their security (yes one of the largest number of thugs roaming around terminal 1C, is Adam Air's security) would be much less.

What do the security guys do? Do/did they threaten to attack the families of any pilots who were minded to not take off in an especially dangerous aircraft?

[xetroV]

PK-KAR, thank you very much for your replies!

I think this accident tells us a lot about the general state of affairs at Adam Air, but I also know stories about similar IRS and instrument-related confusions (minus the disastrous subsequent chain of events from this accident) that happened to B737 crews elsewhere. Hence the questions in my first reply.

I don't think the report is deficient, and I fully understand the choices made by the investigators, but (like any report) it raises some additional new questions. I hope people will realize that, regardless of all the safety deficiencies identified at Adam Air specifically, there are still lessons to be learned here for everyone, both inside and outside Indonesia. In my opinion, the insidious nature of partial IRS failures in B737 aircraft can catch even the best trained pilots off-guard. Of course, that doesn't detract anything from the observations regarding lacking failure management and upset recovery during this accident (let alone the maintenance can-of-worms).

[Capvermell]

In my opinion, the insidious nature of partial IRS failures in B737 aircraft can catch even the best trained pilots off-guard. Of course, that doesn't detract anything from the observations regarding lacking failure management and upset recovery during this accident (let alone the maintenance can-of-worms).

I suspect you may be right that in the third world there are a great many other Adam Airs who are neglecting just as much basic maintenance and yet getting away with it (for now). Unfortunately the consequences for the directors of these companies in sanctioning this kind of active wilful negligence are never serious enough. If they were likely to go to jail for 10 years or more (actually in jail that is) for signing off policies that led to such a tragic and fatal outcome then most of them would never think the risk was worth taking.

Coming back to the pilots surely the truth of the matter is that there are many journeymen poorly trained and only moderately competent pilots (especially in the third world) who may lack the intelligence and the training to be able to cope with these highly unusual and unexpected situations out of left field that only the most able pilots will immediately spot and take action to correct. Yet fortunately for most of the mediocre pilots the situation that will really trip them up will never occur on their aircraft in their pilot lifetime and so they may pass through a whole career without their mediocre airmanship skills causing any tragic outcome.

In the case of Adam Air its very doubtful these guys were exceptionally bad pilots (in Indonesian terms) but because of the risks AdamAir was taking with both their and their passengers lives only very good pilots could probably have survived the terrible risks the airline was regularly casting in to their path.

On the scale of pilot errors the error made here was clearly disappointing but nowhere near the same level of basic lack of competence and good sense displayed by the Helios 737 pilots who had minutes to realise their mistake and yet still continued to their doom.

The bottom line is that there are some kinds of insidious equipment failures on each aircraft type that will always present a risk of misdiagnosis by the pilot and a consequent tragic outcome. With this being so the only solution is surely to maintain the aircraft better so that fewer journeymen pilots make such mistakes in the first place. Of course training the pilots yet better too would help but there is only so much good that can do if aircraft maintenance is being criminally neglected.

In the much longer run aircraft can clearly be designed better to prevent most pilot induced crashes so that eventually the main causes of aircraft failure should be only sudden mechanical failure, extreme weather conditions or terrorist action. However that day when pilots are possibly no longer needed is probably still a good 20 to 40 years away.........

[FrequentSLF]

Well it certainly is highly recognised just like Helios and SilkAir despite the small sizes of both those airlines

I would not put Adam Air and Helios on the same level of SilkAir

[Capvermell]

I would not put Adam Air and Helios on the same level of SilkAir

I suppose you are right. The SilkAir disputed suicide is much more like a directly parallel case to the similarly disputed EgyptAir suicide.

Both are somewhat larger and generally better run airlines that are still in business today. And in each case a rogue suicidal pilot is the main apparent causal factor.

[EMIT]

Having read the reports from the Adam Air at Sulawesi and Garuda at Yogyakarta accidents, I must applaud the frankness with which the causes have been brought forward. If you compare these reports with the reports on the 2 Egyptian accidents (Egypt Air 990 near New York and Flash Air at Sharm), there is no attempt by the national investigators to keep insisting on some mysteryous technical deficiencies.
Of course, the publication of the reports will not improve the situation in Indonesia overnight, but the openness may be a beginning. Compliments to PK-KAR on his excellent postings on this subject.

[zxcui]

Is the priliminary Report KNTT/07.01/01.01 available?

I want to know what had expressed in its paragraph 1.18.3 as mentioned in recommendation 5.1

[PK-KAR]

What do the security guys do? Do/did they threaten to attack the families of any pilots who were minded to not take off in an especially dangerous aircraft?

add cabin crew, flight ops, airport ticket counter staff, journalists, and passengers to that list.

In my opinion, the insidious nature of partial IRS failures in B737 aircraft can catch even the best trained pilots off-guard.

Yes, pilots here are re-checking the manual. We had a coffee get-together the other weekend between enthusiasts, 737 crew, and an investigator, and this was one point raised. The NTSC in the end decided that for the benefit of moving our aviation forward, that they do not put the abovementioned point as a question or recommendation to Boeing. One factor is the fear that someone might try and divert attention from the prevalent systematic deficiencies and purport an argument that Boeing is deficient.

In the case of Adam Air its very doubtful these guys were exceptionally bad pilots (in Indonesian terms)

Well, throw the words "doubt" and "exceptionally" out of that sentence and you get the sentiment of the country's crew pool. We got airlines who refused to accept former Adam pilots for "deficient standards" after they got the good ones, and then the bad ones started applying. Others have decided to accept them on condition of "full retraining".

----------------------
For those who have followed the Adam Air story since my post on "the flying circus nightmare", this accident, and whatever else, I'm putting the following as a "thank you" for those who have followed this, gave me support, or simply, participated with a cool head instead of just slagging of us "Indons" as silly idiots...

*Disclaimer: I have no direct knowledge that the following is >0% accurate, but these are just information I have received.

I had an interesting afternoon with two former Adam Air staff (they personally asked for help in this mess, especially on the career front, but that's a different story). After the usual discussions on the deficiencies in the ops, we went on to deficiencies in other parts of the company. Apparently, it looks like Mr. Adam himself is the victim of his family. Although he is the CEO, the mother calls the shots and she only talks in one language... money. The auntie made a huge sum by collecting ticket money from agents and never gave it to the airline (it is said she burnt the ticket audit coupons to eliminate the evidence), and the brother, well, now I have heard stories from several different sources in Adam Air that he was the one who drove Adam into ruin from day one. According to the information, this is the guy who literally made Adam into an operational nightmare. Apparently, his hand not only screwed up maintenance by deciding to delay maintenance, or forced pilots to fly (and told his mother to force them, or the "monkeys" to do the job, leaving Adam out of the loop), he also overrode recommendations for training, and again, got his mother to override everyone else. God knows how much he made out of the cargo (and since he's in charge of ops, we can guess how much was not reported in the manifest). He seems to have followed his auntie as well in selling tickets to agents, making them pay the money into his account, and never gave the money into Adam Air, and... oh yes, audit coupons were said to have been burnt.

So, the behaviour of certain members of the family really opened the way for corruption, misconduct, and other misdeed to occur within the company. Reservations control was one story that confirmed my suspicion on how Adam flew itself into the ground (and the airplanes followed suit), for one flight, there was an occasion where a 737 had 600 ticketed passengers booked on that flight!!!

The director of safety is now chain smoking continuously outside the HQ everyday, wondering, hopelessly. This was a guy who was stuck between doing good, bad, and the ridiculous, and he staked his career on it and is now paying for it.

Staff haven't been paid their salaries for the past 2 months, due to disputes between the family and the other investor, and no one wants to appoint a liquidator. It looks like the family now is deciding whether to liquidate the company and move on and take whatever is left, or standing their ground and prevent the other investor from taking over Adam Air. The family versus the investor = Two wrongs don't make a right.

The afternoon also revealed how Adam Air managed to keep selling tickets despite the mess, and survive. The way the ticketing offices operate is simply amazing, and they developed many breakthroughs in the airline industry here regarding branding, distribution, and marketing. It is a pity that these brilliant ideas were not supported by a safe and reliable product.

One disturbing fact though. It was revealed to me that my real identity has been known to Adam Air for a long time. I am told that I am fortunate that those in Adam Air who knows my identity hasn't divulged such information to the family. The reason being, that until the very last minute, Adam Air was a continuous battle between the good and the evil. Several wants to get rid of me, several thought it might have been a better idea to pay me for my silence, and several thought that I should have been recruited to join the now lost struggle for the good.

So, enough with the gloom, here's one good bit. The allegations on Adam Air's conduct in 2006 that was put on PPRuNe has been requested to be given to the authorities for further investigation for the NTSC to put recommendations to the industry and the regulator, on how to further address systematic deficiencies in maintenance, incident and serious incident surveillance. Basically, if it does end up as we wish, the recommendations address the questions raised by the National Evaluation Team for Transportation Safety and Security (NETTSS/TimNas EKKT) in early 2007 on, "Why does the DGAC, DCAT and NTSC miss out on so many of the alleged violations and incidents/occurences while certain members of the public (read: not the press) can know and put those information out in a coherent, timely and systematic manner?"

The inability for the DGAC and DCAT and NTSC at the time resulted in the heads of those agencies to be replaced by those who do care about these stuff and want to use all available channels to make the information available to them.

So, thank you guys for all of these so far, now let's hope this ends up the way we want it, that is a better aviation safety where I am. On the other end, I'll have to stay quieter/smarter now. The last thing I want is the "status quo" forces to end up on my doorstep.

PK-KAR

[Capvermell]

PK-KAR I would imagine that you must have had some reason for picking your forum name and therefore also some vague connection with Kartika Airlines that might well allow some in Indonesia to speculate as to your identity? I note that this Kartika B737 has been stored/decommissioned since December 2006.

See

www.airliners.net/search/photo.search?regsearch=PK-KAR&distinct_entry=true

and

www.planesregister.com/aircraft/b737-23796.htm

Your information has certainly been illuminating, although the scale of the corruption revealed in your latest post certainly helps confirm that Adam Air was most definitely a Banana Republic type airline.

No matter how bad things may be over here in the Western World at places like Ryanair and South West Airlines they clearly don't even begin to compare with the old style nepotistic mismanagement and corruption at Adam Air.

[PK-KAR]

Capvermell,
The reason for picking the registration is correct. However,almost no one in the Kartika Air (then, and now) know me. But anyways, they found me through other means, and several "friends" also leaked certain documentation

Anyways, interesting developments. The family has lodged an application for a new airline yesterday. "King and Queen Air" This was revealed by the DGAC yesterday.

All I can say to King and Queen Air is...

PK-KAR