From the number of posts concluding 'blame and train' or prosecute individuals there should be greater concern about the effectiveness of HF training, what is taught, remembered, how applied. The opinions are without justifying evidence, only based on outcome - valueless; should all adverse outcomes suffer the same critique and action - who judges.
We learn little from this approach, apart from the frailty of human behaviour and inability to identify the limits of performance (the posters suffer the same weakness, particularly with hindsight).
In addition, there is an apparent lack of technical knowledge about the aircraft, operation, situation, the context.
Mea culpa; but with a little research, a pilots guide for TAWS re post #31
ATR72 - Sea collision - Terrain inhibit (one function) vs TAWS Inhibit (all functions) can be viewed @
http://uaecis.com/files/T2CAS/T2CAS%...ide%20Rev4.pdf 2008, see sections 9-10.
Example of inappropriate use in incident 8 in the ICAO link in
GPWS-GS Button callouts A319/320
Also, if the earlier Terrain Fault annunciation was due to GPS, this was for info only; except checking GPS might have identified an aspect which would suggested not using GPS for navigation or the approach.
What might we learn from this accident;- how do we learn from what we don't know.
Ask questions, seek answers; never assume, nor allocate blame unless we were there.