From the point of view that the crew were trying to do their best in the conditions, and attempting to manage the situation as they saw it. Trying to replicate that line of thought, there are aspects which are unclear or not understood after reading the report transcript (thanks Steve).
Re inhibiting 'EGPWS' (TAWS - T2CAS), is there any guidance on deselecting the terrain feature. The terrain aspects require accurate navigation, which if not available, give a 'terrain fault' alert; this appears to be an automatic inhibition (button-light for info only). Alternatively are there any recommendations to press the button; either for the alert, or only to be used in other situations, e.g. QFE approach. The crew appears not to have understood the interaction of the fault alerting and inhibit functions, and misguidedly switched all functions off. Did the crews backgrounds involve EGPWS vice T2CAS, inappropriate knowledge of fault switching / inhibit procedures; TAWS was serviceable for all flights, one leg suffered GPS degrade.
What are the visual requirements for this type of approach; 'contact with the airport environment' or seeing the runway. Continuing the descent with the sea in sight could be permitted until some later point (visual descent point ?).
After visual contact, would both pilots fly 'heads-up' as indicated in the report, reducing the need to scan Rad Alt or check altitude with distance for the procedure. A 'visual' descent over the sea in poor visibility, without horizon for pitch reference is an opportunity to misjudge the true height above the surface.
Does the design of approach procedures still allow level flight after MDA - contrary to the principle of continuous descent, and / or have visual minima where it may not be possible to see the runway at MDA (cf Zurich NPA CFIT many years ago), further encouraging 'dive and drive'. Again what procedures were the crew familiar with based on previous employment / training.