Airbus Official Urges Major Pilot Training Changes
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Hi RAT 5…
Sorry for the “almost” compliment – it really was meant sincerely. Also, I am familiar with what you term a “monitored approach” – where “primary” airplane control is managed by the A/P until the designated pilot makes the decision to disconnect and assume control. However, I would have expected that the person (Capt or F/O) who would ultimately disconnect the A/P and assume control for the actual landing, would have had his/her hands and feet on the appropriate flight controls, including the throttles, for at least long enough to have a good idea of where those controls are being "held" by the "automatic" systems … which would have allowed both a physical and mental monitoring of the inputs being made by the automatic systems … however, I gather, that is not what is done, nor is expected in all cases.
Also, and in all sincerity, I’m not saying that “I know better” and I’m not saying that “my way is a better way.” What I am saying is that every pilot (including “George”) manages the flight, and makes and “holds” control inputs differently – including me. If one has sufficient experience in the way a specific, individual pilot typically manages those controls all the way down to just short of touchdown, that knowledge and experience may well go some distance toward providing a clue as to what kind of control positions/pressures, accelerations/decelerations (in all axes) might be waiting for the person assuming control at any given point, when he/she actually takes over the actual control of the airplane.
I’m sure that every pilot here has experienced the “hidden” autopilot control inputs made by the automatic systems prior to reaching the point where the automatic trim systems would allow neutralizing the pressure on the physical control positions – and when disconnecting the automatic systems, finds themselves with varying amounts of control adjustments that are required to either maintain, or return, the airplane to the state having been maintained by the automatics. It is these kinds of experiences, in combination with taking control away from more than a few students, and recognizing similar “out-of-trim-conditions,” that are behind my words of caution regarding “changing controls” at critical phases of flight – and, of course, just prior to touchdown can be one of these critical points.
It is my opinion that there may well be accelerations already imparted to the airplane through the other pilot – or the autopilot – and may be more – or at least different – from what may be expected by the pilot assuming control. The best way I know of to minimize such “last-second adjustments” is to physically, mentally, and visually “monitor” the controls, including throttle position (and by “physically monitoring” I mean having your hands/feet on those controls) prior to disconnecting and/or assuming direct control of the airplane.
Sorry for the “almost” compliment – it really was meant sincerely. Also, I am familiar with what you term a “monitored approach” – where “primary” airplane control is managed by the A/P until the designated pilot makes the decision to disconnect and assume control. However, I would have expected that the person (Capt or F/O) who would ultimately disconnect the A/P and assume control for the actual landing, would have had his/her hands and feet on the appropriate flight controls, including the throttles, for at least long enough to have a good idea of where those controls are being "held" by the "automatic" systems … which would have allowed both a physical and mental monitoring of the inputs being made by the automatic systems … however, I gather, that is not what is done, nor is expected in all cases.
Also, and in all sincerity, I’m not saying that “I know better” and I’m not saying that “my way is a better way.” What I am saying is that every pilot (including “George”) manages the flight, and makes and “holds” control inputs differently – including me. If one has sufficient experience in the way a specific, individual pilot typically manages those controls all the way down to just short of touchdown, that knowledge and experience may well go some distance toward providing a clue as to what kind of control positions/pressures, accelerations/decelerations (in all axes) might be waiting for the person assuming control at any given point, when he/she actually takes over the actual control of the airplane.
I’m sure that every pilot here has experienced the “hidden” autopilot control inputs made by the automatic systems prior to reaching the point where the automatic trim systems would allow neutralizing the pressure on the physical control positions – and when disconnecting the automatic systems, finds themselves with varying amounts of control adjustments that are required to either maintain, or return, the airplane to the state having been maintained by the automatics. It is these kinds of experiences, in combination with taking control away from more than a few students, and recognizing similar “out-of-trim-conditions,” that are behind my words of caution regarding “changing controls” at critical phases of flight – and, of course, just prior to touchdown can be one of these critical points.
It is my opinion that there may well be accelerations already imparted to the airplane through the other pilot – or the autopilot – and may be more – or at least different – from what may be expected by the pilot assuming control. The best way I know of to minimize such “last-second adjustments” is to physically, mentally, and visually “monitor” the controls, including throttle position (and by “physically monitoring” I mean having your hands/feet on those controls) prior to disconnecting and/or assuming direct control of the airplane.
Last edited by AirRabbit; 26th Apr 2015 at 02:31.
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Greetings AirRabitt: All well said. We are in violent agreement. I was only having a joke; almost. No, really; I think more thought and understanding of your comments should be given to this manoeuvre. The airlines who use it assume all will be hunky dory on the day, and the perceived increase in safety is sufficient. Sim training, in the general sense, should be an opportunity to experience events that are not ideal/simple/normal but might well happen and take you by surprise. Events where you might have to work it out for yourself. Having experienced these in the sim you will be better prepared for that ugly day. Sadly, IMHO, simulators are under used in this way. Back to 'extra training = extra cost' argument. If the checking confirms a satisfactory standard for all the hoops that have been jumped through then the crews are to XAA's level of competence and job done.
After Sully we practiced a total flame out and ditching: both pilots, no briefing; What we didn't practice was the single engine failure at 200', climb away followed by the 2nd one going AWOL at 1500'. It was a simple double bang at 2000' over the sea. Fun value high, training value low. Box ticked for various items of the 3 year systems cycle all in one exercise.
After Sully we practiced a total flame out and ditching: both pilots, no briefing; What we didn't practice was the single engine failure at 200', climb away followed by the 2nd one going AWOL at 1500'. It was a simple double bang at 2000' over the sea. Fun value high, training value low. Box ticked for various items of the 3 year systems cycle all in one exercise.
AirRabbit and Rat5, if I may interject regarding "monitored approaches". There appears to be some talking at cross purposes on this and other threads where this is discussed. Can I try to offer some clarification here?
I have used this procedure approximately 8000 times, as both Captain and First Officer, in types ranging from primitive large turboprops to the A320 and B747-400, for non-precision to cat 3b approaches, and would have used it with a HUD if BAW had taken up its initial plan to buy CRJs in 1992. I was trained by WG Baillie, who I believe first formalised use of the term "monitored approach" - but not the idea which goes back probably to the 1930s. Rat5 refers to the BAW (BEA/BOAC) usage and I drafted much of the wording for BA's operational policy which I believe remains unchanged since I retired.
What many people on PPRune seem to be familiar with are specific PARTIAL implementations of the "monitored approach" procedure, as interpreted by individual operators: for example only WITH autopilot, only WITHOUT autopilot, only in Cat 2 or 3, only with certain other weather conditions, only if it's the Captain landing, etc ........
These different partial applications have generated huge amounts of misunderstanding. If that's what you're told it is, then naturally you end up thinking it's "the whole thing". But it can end up very confusing when someone who's been told it's a "manual flight only" procedure is trying to discuss the pros and cons with someone who thinks it's only used in Cat 3 for fully automatic landings, and the Captain takes control at 1000ft ! (I am not saying those specifics apply to either of you, but there are lots of others reading this and an academic survey in 2004 demonstrated exactly that problem.)
To take a step back and look at the whole subject, a good simple overall definition is found in for example the ICAO/FSF/FAA Controlled Flight into Terrain Training Aid, published about 10 years ago. Recommendation 2.1.6 describes it, correctly in my opinion, in these terms: "the First Officer will fly approaches and missed approaches. The Captain will monitor approach progress and subsequently land the aircraft after obtaining sufficient visual reference". Note, no reference to autopilots or other technology.
For relevant environmental conditions, it says "The majority of CFIT incidents/accidents are known to occur in IMC and at night, when the pilot flying the approach also lands the aircraft....... It is recommended that operators consider adopting a monitored approach procedure during approaches and missed approaches conducted in these conditions [i.e. in IMC and at night]. No mention of Cat 3/2/1, ILS/NPA or other instrument approach types, etc.
If that "in IMC and at night" recommendation were adopted then it becomes the normal SOP, and concerns about training for it as a "different" or "additional" procedure, or that there is an assumption that everything is 100% serviceable, simply evaporate. That said, AirRabbit's concerns about "feel" etc. on taking control are perfectly understandable, but from my experience turn out not to be significant factors compared to the many other benefits, and go away after training and a very little on line practice.
The specific topic of this thread is training and continued familiarity with manual flying in automated aircraft. Where managements need to deal with the dilemma of "autoflight is safer - but manual flying is still needed", the use of PMA procedures as standard could provide part of the solution.
Manual flying for pilot practice and familiarity provides a long term safety benefit, but it needs to be done in benign conditions, when the notional reduction in safety levels of not using the automatics can be balanced against the greater error tolerance of having fewer "threats". Even so, this may not be acceptable to many managements, unless additional safety measures are put in place. The demonstrated greater effectiveness of monitoring using PMA is exactly the sort of additional precaution needed. For example, during a normal sector in benign conditions the Captain would have good visual cues, etc., and plenty of "spare capacity".
Under these circumstances the First Officer could safely concentrate on flying a MANUAL instrument approach, in the full knowledge that the Captain will be taking control himself either approaching DH/DA minima, or at a higher altitude and with full visual reference, in the event that the F/O experiences difficulties.
All these issues are discussed at some length in a website dedicated to the subject, but I can't give you more information here as references to it seem to result in the post being deleted. You can PM me for details if you want.
I have used this procedure approximately 8000 times, as both Captain and First Officer, in types ranging from primitive large turboprops to the A320 and B747-400, for non-precision to cat 3b approaches, and would have used it with a HUD if BAW had taken up its initial plan to buy CRJs in 1992. I was trained by WG Baillie, who I believe first formalised use of the term "monitored approach" - but not the idea which goes back probably to the 1930s. Rat5 refers to the BAW (BEA/BOAC) usage and I drafted much of the wording for BA's operational policy which I believe remains unchanged since I retired.
What many people on PPRune seem to be familiar with are specific PARTIAL implementations of the "monitored approach" procedure, as interpreted by individual operators: for example only WITH autopilot, only WITHOUT autopilot, only in Cat 2 or 3, only with certain other weather conditions, only if it's the Captain landing, etc ........
These different partial applications have generated huge amounts of misunderstanding. If that's what you're told it is, then naturally you end up thinking it's "the whole thing". But it can end up very confusing when someone who's been told it's a "manual flight only" procedure is trying to discuss the pros and cons with someone who thinks it's only used in Cat 3 for fully automatic landings, and the Captain takes control at 1000ft ! (I am not saying those specifics apply to either of you, but there are lots of others reading this and an academic survey in 2004 demonstrated exactly that problem.)
To take a step back and look at the whole subject, a good simple overall definition is found in for example the ICAO/FSF/FAA Controlled Flight into Terrain Training Aid, published about 10 years ago. Recommendation 2.1.6 describes it, correctly in my opinion, in these terms: "the First Officer will fly approaches and missed approaches. The Captain will monitor approach progress and subsequently land the aircraft after obtaining sufficient visual reference". Note, no reference to autopilots or other technology.
For relevant environmental conditions, it says "The majority of CFIT incidents/accidents are known to occur in IMC and at night, when the pilot flying the approach also lands the aircraft....... It is recommended that operators consider adopting a monitored approach procedure during approaches and missed approaches conducted in these conditions [i.e. in IMC and at night]. No mention of Cat 3/2/1, ILS/NPA or other instrument approach types, etc.
If that "in IMC and at night" recommendation were adopted then it becomes the normal SOP, and concerns about training for it as a "different" or "additional" procedure, or that there is an assumption that everything is 100% serviceable, simply evaporate. That said, AirRabbit's concerns about "feel" etc. on taking control are perfectly understandable, but from my experience turn out not to be significant factors compared to the many other benefits, and go away after training and a very little on line practice.
The specific topic of this thread is training and continued familiarity with manual flying in automated aircraft. Where managements need to deal with the dilemma of "autoflight is safer - but manual flying is still needed", the use of PMA procedures as standard could provide part of the solution.
Manual flying for pilot practice and familiarity provides a long term safety benefit, but it needs to be done in benign conditions, when the notional reduction in safety levels of not using the automatics can be balanced against the greater error tolerance of having fewer "threats". Even so, this may not be acceptable to many managements, unless additional safety measures are put in place. The demonstrated greater effectiveness of monitoring using PMA is exactly the sort of additional precaution needed. For example, during a normal sector in benign conditions the Captain would have good visual cues, etc., and plenty of "spare capacity".
Under these circumstances the First Officer could safely concentrate on flying a MANUAL instrument approach, in the full knowledge that the Captain will be taking control himself either approaching DH/DA minima, or at a higher altitude and with full visual reference, in the event that the F/O experiences difficulties.
All these issues are discussed at some length in a website dedicated to the subject, but I can't give you more information here as references to it seem to result in the post being deleted. You can PM me for details if you want.
Last edited by slast; 26th Apr 2015 at 11:44.
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slast and RAT 5 … good day to you both! It is abundantly clear to me that, except for the possibility of some very minor exceptions, the 3 of us are, as RAT 5 put it, “in violent agreement” and I think there is a good probability that this “agreement” may well extend to a significant number of other participants on this particular thread.
My primary concern has been and continues to be – and I believe both of you feel exactly the same way – the singular importance of maintaining control of this multi-thousand pound combination of metal and combustible fuel, where ever a given flight takes it … but particularly so when we deliberately bring it, and ourselves, closer to the usually unforgiving earth at speeds and momentums that would (and usually does) generate an increased heart rate and at least some increased perspiration tendency.
I share your opinion, RAT 5, about the “under use” (and when used, it is often “missed used”) of a properly equipped and qualified airplane flight simulator – and to this I add what I believe to be a hugely important requirement … which is that ALL simulator training and/or evaluation sessions should be conducted by a completely and competently trained instructor or evaluator, thoroughly trained on and experienced in the application of the capabilities … and the limitations that have to be applied … to the specific flight simulator to be used for either type of session.
The aspect of discussing these issues here is, at least for me, largely satisfying and certainly relieving … as I recognize that there are others who share my concern for having all of our colleagues completely and competently trained for all the circumstances that anyone one of them might encounter – no matter how frequently or infrequently. This is the primary reason that in the past I have recommended and I continue to recommend that this industry establish a legitimate and professional process where there is a regular meeting of all of those involved in the responsibilities and endure the consequences of any of those issues and/or circumstances that might not be or were not handled as well as they could have or should have been handled.
Further, I believe that the “full-blown,” “everyone present” kinds of sessions this approach might suggest would only have to be held – perhaps – as infrequently as once every other, or every third year. The participation for these “all out” meetings would likely include regulatory authorities (from as many nations as possible), pilots and/or pilot groups (again, from as wide a spectrum as possible), airline management (with the same kind of wide spectrum participation), training specialists, educational specialists, and simulation equipment manufacturers/developers
During the intervening time, representatives from each of these groups should meet as frequently as once or twice a year – changing the location of such meetings if that might encourage a wider participation. Of course, without having checked previously, I would suspect that international organizations – such as the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society or ICAO – might well consider hosting such efforts – where the facilities for such meetings would be immediately available – virtually at any time.
I truly believe that the more we talk about what we need and what we want – the more others hear about and discuss those needs and desires, the more complete any training and qualification effort actually mounted and delivered might become.
My primary concern has been and continues to be – and I believe both of you feel exactly the same way – the singular importance of maintaining control of this multi-thousand pound combination of metal and combustible fuel, where ever a given flight takes it … but particularly so when we deliberately bring it, and ourselves, closer to the usually unforgiving earth at speeds and momentums that would (and usually does) generate an increased heart rate and at least some increased perspiration tendency.
I share your opinion, RAT 5, about the “under use” (and when used, it is often “missed used”) of a properly equipped and qualified airplane flight simulator – and to this I add what I believe to be a hugely important requirement … which is that ALL simulator training and/or evaluation sessions should be conducted by a completely and competently trained instructor or evaluator, thoroughly trained on and experienced in the application of the capabilities … and the limitations that have to be applied … to the specific flight simulator to be used for either type of session.
The aspect of discussing these issues here is, at least for me, largely satisfying and certainly relieving … as I recognize that there are others who share my concern for having all of our colleagues completely and competently trained for all the circumstances that anyone one of them might encounter – no matter how frequently or infrequently. This is the primary reason that in the past I have recommended and I continue to recommend that this industry establish a legitimate and professional process where there is a regular meeting of all of those involved in the responsibilities and endure the consequences of any of those issues and/or circumstances that might not be or were not handled as well as they could have or should have been handled.
Further, I believe that the “full-blown,” “everyone present” kinds of sessions this approach might suggest would only have to be held – perhaps – as infrequently as once every other, or every third year. The participation for these “all out” meetings would likely include regulatory authorities (from as many nations as possible), pilots and/or pilot groups (again, from as wide a spectrum as possible), airline management (with the same kind of wide spectrum participation), training specialists, educational specialists, and simulation equipment manufacturers/developers
During the intervening time, representatives from each of these groups should meet as frequently as once or twice a year – changing the location of such meetings if that might encourage a wider participation. Of course, without having checked previously, I would suspect that international organizations – such as the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society or ICAO – might well consider hosting such efforts – where the facilities for such meetings would be immediately available – virtually at any time.
I truly believe that the more we talk about what we need and what we want – the more others hear about and discuss those needs and desires, the more complete any training and qualification effort actually mounted and delivered might become.
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Bus Driver Man posted
The only one to blame are the airlines that prohibit or discourage pilots to fly manually.
So does that mean the crews have become so sheepish, compliant and robotic and the unions of nearly no use at all? Sheep being led to the slaughter with the SLF obviously along for the ride, comes to mind. Maybe it is time to hear from the unions and pilots. Maybe it time to exercise the right to be PILOTS in COMMAND.
The only one to blame are the airlines that prohibit or discourage pilots to fly manually.
So does that mean the crews have become so sheepish, compliant and robotic and the unions of nearly no use at all? Sheep being led to the slaughter with the SLF obviously along for the ride, comes to mind. Maybe it is time to hear from the unions and pilots. Maybe it time to exercise the right to be PILOTS in COMMAND.
What if you work in a certain part of the world where there are no unions and where one mistake can cost you your job? Would you still disobey?
In the glare of the violent agreement above, the discussion might have overlooked the likelihood of achieving more or improved training, even with some reduction in ‘checking’.
Also, whether this training would achieve the desired safety improvements; can we ever be sure that training aimed to improve human performance will always result in improved performance during challenging events?
I would argue that the industry is max-out, no more training time / money. Improvements have to come from within – less checking as per Airbus; more learning, but what and how. A premise of learning is first learned, best remembered, thus initial type rating training for understanding may be of greater value than recurrent checking. However, more time during recurrent training on generic awareness and decision making could have even greater learning value (generating experience), particularly if supported with everyday refreshment – debriefing.
In a very safe industry rare events standout; yet each event differs. Similarities can be identified but often this depends on who looks and what is sought – agenda bias.
The initiating scenarios often involve the man-machine interface in normal operation opposed to the oft cited manual flight. All of which must be viewed against the complex backdrop of modern operations; man, machine, environment.
Projecting accidents back from result to identify a cause can easily focus on the last activity – manual flight (hindsight bias); however viewing a range of ‘most likely’ initiating situations which lead to a result might identify contributions including man-machine interface in normal operations – awareness and decision making. In this there is little or no association with manual flight until the event has developed, thus for these rare and demanding events avoidance must be the priority; avoidance requires understanding.
Recent accidents also have indications of systematic failure, where all levels of the industry contribute, more often with latent factors, which when these come together present situations which pilots have not been, nor can be trained for.
For this the industry needs to consider alternative paths to improvement or at least maintaining safety levels, not just training.
Also, whether this training would achieve the desired safety improvements; can we ever be sure that training aimed to improve human performance will always result in improved performance during challenging events?
I would argue that the industry is max-out, no more training time / money. Improvements have to come from within – less checking as per Airbus; more learning, but what and how. A premise of learning is first learned, best remembered, thus initial type rating training for understanding may be of greater value than recurrent checking. However, more time during recurrent training on generic awareness and decision making could have even greater learning value (generating experience), particularly if supported with everyday refreshment – debriefing.
In a very safe industry rare events standout; yet each event differs. Similarities can be identified but often this depends on who looks and what is sought – agenda bias.
The initiating scenarios often involve the man-machine interface in normal operation opposed to the oft cited manual flight. All of which must be viewed against the complex backdrop of modern operations; man, machine, environment.
Projecting accidents back from result to identify a cause can easily focus on the last activity – manual flight (hindsight bias); however viewing a range of ‘most likely’ initiating situations which lead to a result might identify contributions including man-machine interface in normal operations – awareness and decision making. In this there is little or no association with manual flight until the event has developed, thus for these rare and demanding events avoidance must be the priority; avoidance requires understanding.
Recent accidents also have indications of systematic failure, where all levels of the industry contribute, more often with latent factors, which when these come together present situations which pilots have not been, nor can be trained for.
For this the industry needs to consider alternative paths to improvement or at least maintaining safety levels, not just training.
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alf5071h: Improvements have to come from within – less checking as per Airbus; more learning, but what and how
An interesting lengthy review, and one which takes some digesting. the statement above is singularly interesting in that is suggests the initiative for improving piloting standards is coming from the manufacturers. That is a disappointing reflection on the role of the XAA's. I had, perhaps the naive thought, that the XAA's were the over see-ers of standards. Sadly they seem to have set their sights quite low and left them there. The companies need to up their game. Training and checking to minimum standards is legal but not ideal IMHO. I hear many management people say that everything is "approved & legal", therefore all is acceptable. SOP's cover 90% of eventualities. This argument covers everything from SOP's to rostering schedules. Approved & legal seems to be back-side covering rather than standards setting. Why? More = cost. Risk management = necessity. It'd be nice but is it really necessary? Car manufacturers do not teach guys how to drive. They teach them how best cooperate the car, but basic techniques are generic. Standards come from the ministry who design the tests. The difference with us is that each company can raise its standards above the minimum. Driving schools & examiners should be national standard.
Our 6 monthly checks are so mundane and basic , and have been for years. Are they really checks that define a modern necessary standard? Is that debate even open & active?
This is a discussion that could/should go on for quite a few years, because the solution to the perceived problems is not a quick easy one to firstly define and then execute. We are chatting in the pub about this one: where are the people who matter in this debate? Are they even awake and considering anything, or is the status quo going to continue.
Recent accidents also have indications of systematic failure, where all levels of the industry contribute, more often with latent factors, which when these come together present situations which pilots have not been, nor can be trained for.
For this the industry needs to consider alternative paths to improvement or at least maintaining safety levels, not just training.
I think this is a very telling last sentence. Could it be that the manufacturer's solution to improving safety levels is more technology, back up systems and more bells & whistles; and the operator's solution is maximum use of that technology and more rigid SOP's?
An interesting lengthy review, and one which takes some digesting. the statement above is singularly interesting in that is suggests the initiative for improving piloting standards is coming from the manufacturers. That is a disappointing reflection on the role of the XAA's. I had, perhaps the naive thought, that the XAA's were the over see-ers of standards. Sadly they seem to have set their sights quite low and left them there. The companies need to up their game. Training and checking to minimum standards is legal but not ideal IMHO. I hear many management people say that everything is "approved & legal", therefore all is acceptable. SOP's cover 90% of eventualities. This argument covers everything from SOP's to rostering schedules. Approved & legal seems to be back-side covering rather than standards setting. Why? More = cost. Risk management = necessity. It'd be nice but is it really necessary? Car manufacturers do not teach guys how to drive. They teach them how best cooperate the car, but basic techniques are generic. Standards come from the ministry who design the tests. The difference with us is that each company can raise its standards above the minimum. Driving schools & examiners should be national standard.
Our 6 monthly checks are so mundane and basic , and have been for years. Are they really checks that define a modern necessary standard? Is that debate even open & active?
This is a discussion that could/should go on for quite a few years, because the solution to the perceived problems is not a quick easy one to firstly define and then execute. We are chatting in the pub about this one: where are the people who matter in this debate? Are they even awake and considering anything, or is the status quo going to continue.
Recent accidents also have indications of systematic failure, where all levels of the industry contribute, more often with latent factors, which when these come together present situations which pilots have not been, nor can be trained for.
For this the industry needs to consider alternative paths to improvement or at least maintaining safety levels, not just training.
I think this is a very telling last sentence. Could it be that the manufacturer's solution to improving safety levels is more technology, back up systems and more bells & whistles; and the operator's solution is maximum use of that technology and more rigid SOP's?
We have seen three landing accidents in the last month with the A320, fortunately without loss of life. Air Canada, Asiana and Turkish aircraft all seriously damaged, quite possibly written off. The lack of fatalities testimony to how solid modern aircraft are. But the crashes are interesting in that in all cases the aircraft were (or according to procedure should have been) in manual flight.
We have major carriers on three continents most probably writing off aircraft. Did erosion of manual flying skills play a role? It is clearly too early to be sure. But it must be an issue that is being investigated.
Will more emphasis on manual flight help? I am sure it will. Equally as others have pointed out that brings its own problems. My co-pilot yesterday demonstrated how not to fly a raw data departure. Low risk and a good learning experience, but not something I would do if I was an expat skipper in the far east. In fact I might not even be allowed to let him land.
We have major carriers on three continents most probably writing off aircraft. Did erosion of manual flying skills play a role? It is clearly too early to be sure. But it must be an issue that is being investigated.
Will more emphasis on manual flight help? I am sure it will. Equally as others have pointed out that brings its own problems. My co-pilot yesterday demonstrated how not to fly a raw data departure. Low risk and a good learning experience, but not something I would do if I was an expat skipper in the far east. In fact I might not even be allowed to let him land.
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Maybe it’s time we examine the language we use … for example, there seems to be an acknowledged understanding that the terms “flight training” and “flight testing” are 2 very different things that generate very different expectations. Even more evident is that there are very different levels of acceptance of each – to the extent that some believe that what may be needed is “more training” and “less testing” … but, unfortunately – and truthfully – only if these are 2 very different things can we have more of one and less of the other. Perhaps it might be appropriate to wonder if we might have misunderstood the goals of these 2 actions, which, although seemingly different, have, at their basic levels, an identical purpose. How could I say this?
Well, what is it that an instructor does to determine whether or not the student has “learned” what was being taught? Of course, the instructor applies his/her own set of “standards” with respect to the “satisfactory” accomplishment of the expected task … and does so, task by task. Good instructors eventually change the circumstances – perhaps gradually at first – and just as gradually, reduces the amount of “continuing dialog/instruction” as the student progresses through the accomplishment of each successive task. Eventually, the instructor comes to the conclusion that the student has reached a level of understanding and performance ability to be able to accomplish each of the assigned tasks without having to rely on a continuing set of verbal instructions.
Really good instructors have had his/her student(s) accomplish each assigned task under sufficiently differing introductions and circumstances to better ensure that the task in question would be regularly and routinely recognized and accomplished, despite any variation with which the task is, or may be, initiated. Routinely, learning these assigned tasks comes at different times for each student … and often that learning comes in what could be described as “spurts” of tasks, as each task is eventually “mastered.” Time budgeting and recency of review for those tasks learned early in the training sequence are 2 of the major issues that must be dealt with successfully by each instructor for each student they train.
Unfortunately (and I DO mean unfortunately), I’m personally quite familiar with how the US Regulations and the US Training and Testing Standards are written; including how these documents describe the tasks that are to be trained and how pilot proficiency is to be determined. The Training and Testing Standards are published and are available … but, what is regularly and routinely missed, is that there is NO regulatory requirement to use or apply those “training standards.” The only things that pilots are required (by regulation) to do, are the items listed in the regulations, and those regulations do not include a description of what is or is not satisfactory performance.
Clearly, the representatives of the US regulatory authority act as though the regulations, as currently written, including all the “companion documents” (even though these “companion documents” are NOT regulatory – nor are they published in accordance with what would be required were they to be considered as regulatory) contain all that is necessary to train, evaluate, and qualify pilots for their jobs as airline flight crew members. Unfortunately (again) to reach this conclusion, those US regulatory authority representatives, must depend on those seeking to comply with the necessary requirements to reach the same kind of illogical and/or incomplete understanding of these two sets of documents.
I keep saying that obtaining well trained flight crew members is not, nor should it be, “rocket science.” But it DOES take an intelligent, factual, and committed desire to determine what is necessary, determine how to best achieve that level of training, understanding, and performance ability … and once this is accomplished, there should be ample time and capability to determine when, where, how, and how much of this kind of training is minimally necessary to ensure the safety of each flight operation that is conducted. Of course, all of the above is still just my opinion … but I’ll say it anyway … anything less than this … will be just that … LESS.
Well, what is it that an instructor does to determine whether or not the student has “learned” what was being taught? Of course, the instructor applies his/her own set of “standards” with respect to the “satisfactory” accomplishment of the expected task … and does so, task by task. Good instructors eventually change the circumstances – perhaps gradually at first – and just as gradually, reduces the amount of “continuing dialog/instruction” as the student progresses through the accomplishment of each successive task. Eventually, the instructor comes to the conclusion that the student has reached a level of understanding and performance ability to be able to accomplish each of the assigned tasks without having to rely on a continuing set of verbal instructions.
Really good instructors have had his/her student(s) accomplish each assigned task under sufficiently differing introductions and circumstances to better ensure that the task in question would be regularly and routinely recognized and accomplished, despite any variation with which the task is, or may be, initiated. Routinely, learning these assigned tasks comes at different times for each student … and often that learning comes in what could be described as “spurts” of tasks, as each task is eventually “mastered.” Time budgeting and recency of review for those tasks learned early in the training sequence are 2 of the major issues that must be dealt with successfully by each instructor for each student they train.
Unfortunately (and I DO mean unfortunately), I’m personally quite familiar with how the US Regulations and the US Training and Testing Standards are written; including how these documents describe the tasks that are to be trained and how pilot proficiency is to be determined. The Training and Testing Standards are published and are available … but, what is regularly and routinely missed, is that there is NO regulatory requirement to use or apply those “training standards.” The only things that pilots are required (by regulation) to do, are the items listed in the regulations, and those regulations do not include a description of what is or is not satisfactory performance.
Clearly, the representatives of the US regulatory authority act as though the regulations, as currently written, including all the “companion documents” (even though these “companion documents” are NOT regulatory – nor are they published in accordance with what would be required were they to be considered as regulatory) contain all that is necessary to train, evaluate, and qualify pilots for their jobs as airline flight crew members. Unfortunately (again) to reach this conclusion, those US regulatory authority representatives, must depend on those seeking to comply with the necessary requirements to reach the same kind of illogical and/or incomplete understanding of these two sets of documents.
I keep saying that obtaining well trained flight crew members is not, nor should it be, “rocket science.” But it DOES take an intelligent, factual, and committed desire to determine what is necessary, determine how to best achieve that level of training, understanding, and performance ability … and once this is accomplished, there should be ample time and capability to determine when, where, how, and how much of this kind of training is minimally necessary to ensure the safety of each flight operation that is conducted. Of course, all of the above is still just my opinion … but I’ll say it anyway … anything less than this … will be just that … LESS.
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Lederhosen: We have major carriers on three continents most probably writing off aircraft. Did erosion of manual flying skills play a role? It is clearly too early to be sure. But it must be an issue that is being investigated.
That last sentence is a nice dream, but.... in all the accident reports I've seen the closest there has been to saying the pilot couldn't handle the a/c and thus crashed it is .."pilot error", "perhaps contributed to by spacial disorientation or lack of situational awareness." I've not seen the conclusion that lack of manual flying skills was a causal factor and that such training should be increased, or that the XAA should redefine its test manoeuvres or standards.
AirRabitt: Again an interesting piece. Your philosophy about 'training to an acceptable standard' by spending time on an exercise and changing the degree of difficulty and allowing the student to progress & learn; effectively teaching themselves, is a great one. It sounds very much like the way my basics were taught at PPL level. There was plenty of time, not too much box ticking, and reletively low cost. Sadly, very much so, the self-funded type rating course in a jet doesn't have that luxury. There is fixed time and a very tight syllabus. Often the student will get only 1 shot at an exercise, today; "we'll try again tomorrow, if there's time." Remembering there are 2 students, paying themselves, and each need their fair share of the session. With cadets, 150hrs total, this is very tough. The SFI is aware that any extra training will be a big financial blow to a large debt already running wild. As a result many manoeuvres are 'just good enough' so let's move on to the next box. This is doubly hard on the ethics of the SFI if there is quite a cockpit gradient in capability between the 2 cadets. Each need attention, but one more than the other. It is sad to say that passing the test, and its rudimentary manoeuvres, may take priority over educating to a higher level about the a/c and to a higher level of ability.
That to me is one source of the dilution of skills; a 'just good enough standard through self-funded training and let them sort it out on line training' attitude. It's not the fault of the SFI & TRE, but the pressure of the factory cadet - airline pilot system all at their own cost.
If there was a progressive route up through smaller multi-pilot a/c to smaller jets and then larger versions the necessary skills, both in CRM, MCC, SOP's and handling, could be attained and maintained. If this route is not readily available then the MPL training straight into an airline jet might need to be more in-depth and thorough. Today, the TQ syllabus, IMHO, is more suitable for a jet conversion course from one jet type onto another with full airline multi-crew experience and a proper captain + F/O as crew. To expect 2 cadets from small piston a/c, perhaps not having flown for 12 months, 150hrs total to achieve a solid foundation in a short time at first attempt is perhaps too much.
Perhaps there needs to be another XAA designed course for the now common cadet entry pilot, and especially with 2 at the same time. The course as designed and approved IMHO is not suitable for the students taking it.
To enter university to do an engineering degree you need a high enough level from school in maths & physics at least, perhaps applied mechanics as well: a high level in economics & history won't cut it and you would be rejected. Or, the course would be redesigned to accommodate the student making a change in educational direction.
I'm astonished, when teaching cadets, their low level grasp of mental arithmetic. Ask a simple question and out comes the japanese brain. It's a bit late on approach or takeoff to pull out a chart to determine the head & cross wind; or time & distance, or descent profile. The FMC is a tool not a commander. But that's a discussion already been thrashed. However, it does address the entry level knowledge of a student to the TQ course and how the syllabus needs redesigning to match the cadet's abilities.
That last sentence is a nice dream, but.... in all the accident reports I've seen the closest there has been to saying the pilot couldn't handle the a/c and thus crashed it is .."pilot error", "perhaps contributed to by spacial disorientation or lack of situational awareness." I've not seen the conclusion that lack of manual flying skills was a causal factor and that such training should be increased, or that the XAA should redefine its test manoeuvres or standards.
AirRabitt: Again an interesting piece. Your philosophy about 'training to an acceptable standard' by spending time on an exercise and changing the degree of difficulty and allowing the student to progress & learn; effectively teaching themselves, is a great one. It sounds very much like the way my basics were taught at PPL level. There was plenty of time, not too much box ticking, and reletively low cost. Sadly, very much so, the self-funded type rating course in a jet doesn't have that luxury. There is fixed time and a very tight syllabus. Often the student will get only 1 shot at an exercise, today; "we'll try again tomorrow, if there's time." Remembering there are 2 students, paying themselves, and each need their fair share of the session. With cadets, 150hrs total, this is very tough. The SFI is aware that any extra training will be a big financial blow to a large debt already running wild. As a result many manoeuvres are 'just good enough' so let's move on to the next box. This is doubly hard on the ethics of the SFI if there is quite a cockpit gradient in capability between the 2 cadets. Each need attention, but one more than the other. It is sad to say that passing the test, and its rudimentary manoeuvres, may take priority over educating to a higher level about the a/c and to a higher level of ability.
That to me is one source of the dilution of skills; a 'just good enough standard through self-funded training and let them sort it out on line training' attitude. It's not the fault of the SFI & TRE, but the pressure of the factory cadet - airline pilot system all at their own cost.
If there was a progressive route up through smaller multi-pilot a/c to smaller jets and then larger versions the necessary skills, both in CRM, MCC, SOP's and handling, could be attained and maintained. If this route is not readily available then the MPL training straight into an airline jet might need to be more in-depth and thorough. Today, the TQ syllabus, IMHO, is more suitable for a jet conversion course from one jet type onto another with full airline multi-crew experience and a proper captain + F/O as crew. To expect 2 cadets from small piston a/c, perhaps not having flown for 12 months, 150hrs total to achieve a solid foundation in a short time at first attempt is perhaps too much.
Perhaps there needs to be another XAA designed course for the now common cadet entry pilot, and especially with 2 at the same time. The course as designed and approved IMHO is not suitable for the students taking it.
To enter university to do an engineering degree you need a high enough level from school in maths & physics at least, perhaps applied mechanics as well: a high level in economics & history won't cut it and you would be rejected. Or, the course would be redesigned to accommodate the student making a change in educational direction.
I'm astonished, when teaching cadets, their low level grasp of mental arithmetic. Ask a simple question and out comes the japanese brain. It's a bit late on approach or takeoff to pull out a chart to determine the head & cross wind; or time & distance, or descent profile. The FMC is a tool not a commander. But that's a discussion already been thrashed. However, it does address the entry level knowledge of a student to the TQ course and how the syllabus needs redesigning to match the cadet's abilities.
RAT, I agree with the direction of your argument (#170), but also consider that whilst the ‘Agency-level’ defines the requirements, the implementation is delegated to national authorities, who in turn can delegate to operators. This increases the distance between intent and action enabling misbelief and assumptions to erode safety arguments. In order to understand safety, regulators need to get out of the office and use double loop learning.
Note that beliefs and assumptions are the primary aspects which should be considered in double-loop learning.
See systems thinking and learning and OODA including ‘5 whys’, all aspects of awareness and decision making.
A systematic approach to safety would consider many aspects other than the sharp end operations and the human entity. A new approach would not profess a solution; instead provide opportunity via a wider view to consider small interventions which might enable improvement whilst not disturbing what has already been achieved. We need to encourage thoughts about safety from different viewpoints.
One example is that the human is a resource for improving safety, not a hazard to avoid, be constraining by SOPs, or continually checked for consistency (humans are naturally inconsistent).
We should review the safety attitudes used in discussions of accidents – often human error, a hazard, blame, train; but for a few major success, Sioux City, Baghdad, The Hudson, the human is a hero, the provider of safety, yet the underlying behaviours are the same for success and failure. It’s only the outcome of an event which differs, which we often use to erroneously judge performance opposed to looking at wider is issues of managing surprise, workload, and the environment (see ASAGA study as an example).
Note that beliefs and assumptions are the primary aspects which should be considered in double-loop learning.
See systems thinking and learning and OODA including ‘5 whys’, all aspects of awareness and decision making.
A systematic approach to safety would consider many aspects other than the sharp end operations and the human entity. A new approach would not profess a solution; instead provide opportunity via a wider view to consider small interventions which might enable improvement whilst not disturbing what has already been achieved. We need to encourage thoughts about safety from different viewpoints.
One example is that the human is a resource for improving safety, not a hazard to avoid, be constraining by SOPs, or continually checked for consistency (humans are naturally inconsistent).
We should review the safety attitudes used in discussions of accidents – often human error, a hazard, blame, train; but for a few major success, Sioux City, Baghdad, The Hudson, the human is a hero, the provider of safety, yet the underlying behaviours are the same for success and failure. It’s only the outcome of an event which differs, which we often use to erroneously judge performance opposed to looking at wider is issues of managing surprise, workload, and the environment (see ASAGA study as an example).
Rat you make a fair point that lack of handling skills has not been highlighted much in the past. The Colgan captain's training history though certainly pointed in that direction if I remember the report correctly.
Asiana have now crashed two planes in ways that seem relevant to this debate. But probably you are right the issue will be glossed over.
Asiana have now crashed two planes in ways that seem relevant to this debate. But probably you are right the issue will be glossed over.
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Originally Posted by RAT 5
AirRabitt: Your philosophy about 'training to an acceptable standard' by spending time on an exercise and changing the degree of difficulty and allowing the student to progress & learn; effectively teaching themselves, is a great one. …
Originally Posted by RAT 5
Sadly, … the self-funded type rating course in a jet doesn't have that luxury. There is fixed time and a very tight syllabus. Often the student will get only 1 shot at an exercise, today; "we'll try again tomorrow, if there's time." … any extra training will be a big financial blow to a large debt already running wild. …
Originally Posted by RAT 5
As a result many manoeuvres are 'just good enough' so let's move on to the next box. This is doubly hard on the ethics of the SFI if there is quite a cockpit gradient in capability between the 2 cadets. Each need attention, but one more than the other. It is sad to say that passing the test, and its rudimentary manoeuvres, may take priority over educating to a higher level about the a/c and to a higher level of ability.
That to me is one source of the dilution of skills; a 'just good enough standard through self-funded training and let them sort it out on line training' attitude.
That to me is one source of the dilution of skills; a 'just good enough standard through self-funded training and let them sort it out on line training' attitude.
The responsibilities for “graduating” students with such diverse competencies is rather widely distributed – first to the students themselves … but the instructors, the evaluators, the management officials of the training facilities, and the (usually) governmental regulatory authorities … ALL of whom must accept a portion of that responsibility – good or not so good. And to take something that currently allows substandard levels of competency and modifying it for overall improvement … will very obviously take the willing, and the completely understood, participation of ALL of those groups of persons.
I have attempted to maintain an attitude of cautious optimism that this might occur … but after having been involved in this industry for close to half a century – and seeing the kinds of errors that are made … the effort to maintain that optimism becomes increasingly problematic. Unfortunately for my own sense of comfort and relaxation … I doubt that I’ll change my basic makeup … but the longer I’m out of the day-to-day grind for making these arguments where they might generate a more significant notice, the more likely the arguments against my opinions are likely to flourish. To me, this is a wholly regretful circumstance … but one that I must sadly begin to accept. Maybe, on the optimistic side, the constant stirring of my inner objections and the pressure to express my thoughts, may provide an increase in whatever it is that allows aging individuals to remain around for an even longer time … who knows?!
Last edited by AirRabbit; 28th Apr 2015 at 20:10.
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I wonder if too much too much effort is being made to fly a complex modern aircraft rather too soon in a new pilot's career. Learning with just the basic instruments (preferably without A/P or radio, so you can get lost.. And it is your own fault !).
Filling that up with as much as can be done on an old Link Trainer. Suitable exercises can teach and practice precision and mental arithmetic.
To have to use an expensive simulator plus a valuable Instructor much too soon must be wasteful.
As a new F/O I knew that IF SIR DROPS DEAD... I would be expected to and MUST CONTINUE to operate safely, just on my own.
Filling that up with as much as can be done on an old Link Trainer. Suitable exercises can teach and practice precision and mental arithmetic.
To have to use an expensive simulator plus a valuable Instructor much too soon must be wasteful.
As a new F/O I knew that IF SIR DROPS DEAD... I would be expected to and MUST CONTINUE to operate safely, just on my own.
Last edited by Linktrained; 29th Apr 2015 at 00:26. Reason: punctuation
We have major carriers on three continents most probably writing off aircraft. Did erosion of manual flying skills play a role? It is clearly too early to be sure. But it must be an issue that is being investigated.
From the time a new airline pilot flies his first type rating simulator it is universally accepted that 90 percent of his "training" will be how to operate the automatic pilot. His whole concentration is on the flight director especially when he is pounded by his trainers with "Fly the flight director". "Engage the autopilot asap to reduce your work load" is another oft-heard phrase. Much of the monitoring of the PF demanded of the PM will consist of verbalising the information that comes up on the various mode annunciators. Trainers love it because in their eyes more talking equates to better CRM. I have news for them. More talking often leads to a human factors irritant.
Nowadays, and recommended by the manufacturer, a glance at a mode annunciator is considered insufficient evidence that the pilot knows what he is seeing. He is required to prove he saw an annunciation and that can only be done by talking. Cynical though it may sound, the next thing we will see an SOP where the pilot must not only glance at an annunciator, tell the other pilot what he witnessed and finally point to the annunciator. All the while as SOP's of this sort are hammered home during type rating and recurrent training, the pilot hasn't a clue how undertake a basic crosswind landing since he last flew a Cessna single.
When you observe as I have on numerous occasions in simulators, a type rated but inexperienced pilot that has never operated his aircraft without using his flight director, without ever having practiced an all flaps up landing, had never done a non flight director non-precision approach, had never landed a jet transport without PAPI or ILS guidance, had never done a low altitude bad weather circuit, had never practiced a high altitude stall recovery in IMC and finally had never undertaken simulator training on unusual attitude recoveries in IMC - then is it no wonder these people who have paid big money up front to learn to fly a jet simulator, simply cannot fly to save their lives - literally, in some cases.
Think of the time saved in simulator practice if long winded, checklist intensive LOFT exercises were reduced by half and replaced with manual non automatics handling in the circuit. Scan rates would improve dramatically and self-confidence restored.
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From the time a new airline pilot flies his first type rating simulator it is universally accepted that 90 percent of his "training" will be how to operate the automatic pilot. His whole concentration is on the flight director especially when he is pounded by his trainers with "Fly the flight director".
Centaurus: lots of good stuff. Many of us are on the same page. Reference above; I encourage the students to turn off the FD when using A/P. The FD tells you nothing when A/P is in CMD. It will always be centred. I often ask the student who just flew an A/P + A/T manoeuvre what they attitude and thrust setting was. What was the attitude at climb out to flap retraction; what was the attitude during acceleration; what was the attitude clean 250kts to FL100, what was the attitude thereafter at 280kts; what was the attitude & power settings at FL350. They had never looked but followed the mother hen like a chick. Flying an NPA with the automatics, but FD OFF, was met with trepidation, but they quickly realised the FD 'got in the way' of appreciating what the a/c was doing. They then understood that the FD was very useful when flying manually, but ti needed a good scan to determine if it was sensible & correct. They now knew where to scan.
AirRabitt: A misunderstanding of 'teach themselves'. What I meant is a training situation where the instructor has given a thorough briefing and guidance to a student, allowed them to practice, they've achieved solid understanding and then you tweak it a little. They apply what they have learnt to handle the new slightly altered scenario on their own initiative and then comes the "ah ha" moment and the clouds lift.
Centaurus: lots of good stuff. Many of us are on the same page. Reference above; I encourage the students to turn off the FD when using A/P. The FD tells you nothing when A/P is in CMD. It will always be centred. I often ask the student who just flew an A/P + A/T manoeuvre what they attitude and thrust setting was. What was the attitude at climb out to flap retraction; what was the attitude during acceleration; what was the attitude clean 250kts to FL100, what was the attitude thereafter at 280kts; what was the attitude & power settings at FL350. They had never looked but followed the mother hen like a chick. Flying an NPA with the automatics, but FD OFF, was met with trepidation, but they quickly realised the FD 'got in the way' of appreciating what the a/c was doing. They then understood that the FD was very useful when flying manually, but ti needed a good scan to determine if it was sensible & correct. They now knew where to scan.
AirRabitt: A misunderstanding of 'teach themselves'. What I meant is a training situation where the instructor has given a thorough briefing and guidance to a student, allowed them to practice, they've achieved solid understanding and then you tweak it a little. They apply what they have learnt to handle the new slightly altered scenario on their own initiative and then comes the "ah ha" moment and the clouds lift.
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Originally Posted by RAT 5
A misunderstanding of 'teach themselves'. What I meant is a training situation where the instructor has given a thorough briefing and guidance to a student, allowed them to practice, they've achieved solid understanding and then you tweak it a little. They apply what they have learnt to handle the new slightly altered scenario on their own initiative and then comes the "ah ha" moment and the clouds lift.
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I've not seen the conclusion that lack of manual flying skills was a causal factor and that such training should be increased, or that the XAA should redefine its test manoeuvres or standards.
the BEA recommends:
that EASA review the content of check and training programmes and make mandatory, in particular, the setting up of specific and regular exercises dedicated to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at high altitude.
that EASA review the content of check and training programmes and make mandatory, in particular, the setting up of specific and regular exercises dedicated to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at high altitude.
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You must be talking about older reports there, because aside from the NTSB, the majority of western accident investigatory boards are not permitted to use the term "pilot error" and leave it at that these days.
One thing the NTSB offers, compared to, say, the BEA, is transparency. On the other hand, there's a 'great big sign' at NTSB HQ that states "when in doubt, blame the pilots,," proof of which was demonstrated as recently as this new century.
I think this is a very telling last sentence. Could it be that the manufacturer's solution to improving safety levels is more technology, back up systems and more bells & whistles; and the operator's solution is maximum use of that technology and more rigid SOP's?
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The promise was better SA, but the automation is taking us further out of the loop
It is probably a bit of both, when you think about it.