Leaping Passengers
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Leaping Passengers
North Sea oil workers leap from helicopter - The Scotsman
Sounds interesting. Perhaps over played by the Scotsman me thinks.
Sounds interesting. Perhaps over played by the Scotsman me thinks.
OFFSHORE workers were forced to jump from a hovering helicopter yesterday after the crew encountered problems with the aircraft’s landing gear.
The Bond-operated Super Puma EC225-L is thought to have been heading to an installation off the west of Shetland when the crew noticed a suspected technical issue.
The aircraft was north of Orkney when it looped back over the island and came down to hover at Kirkwall Airport.
A total of 15 offshore workers were then made to jump from the helicopter before it flew back to Aberdeen.
A coastguard spokeswoman said: “There was an issue with the landing gear. They were unable to land. So they had to hover and allow the passengers to jump off at Kirkwall.
“The helo was then routed to Aberdeen Airport.”
Passengers made the dramatic exit from the helicopter, on contract for oil giant BP, at Kirkwall at around 1pm. The flight is believed to have originally been heading for the Foinaven deepwater oil field, 120 miles west of the Shetland Islands.
A police spokeswoman said: “Police Scotland can confirm that emergency services were involved in an incident at Kirkwall airport on the Island of Orkney
The Bond-operated Super Puma EC225-L is thought to have been heading to an installation off the west of Shetland when the crew noticed a suspected technical issue.
The aircraft was north of Orkney when it looped back over the island and came down to hover at Kirkwall Airport.
A total of 15 offshore workers were then made to jump from the helicopter before it flew back to Aberdeen.
A coastguard spokeswoman said: “There was an issue with the landing gear. They were unable to land. So they had to hover and allow the passengers to jump off at Kirkwall.
“The helo was then routed to Aberdeen Airport.”
Passengers made the dramatic exit from the helicopter, on contract for oil giant BP, at Kirkwall at around 1pm. The flight is believed to have originally been heading for the Foinaven deepwater oil field, 120 miles west of the Shetland Islands.
A police spokeswoman said: “Police Scotland can confirm that emergency services were involved in an incident at Kirkwall airport on the Island of Orkney
Non-story
Overplayed by a 'coastguard spokesman' unfortunately!
Nobody was disembarked 'from the hover'. The helicopter was on the ground, with power applied to keep it light on the wheels. The step down from the cabin was higher than normal.
But obviously that sounds far less dramatic!
Nobody was disembarked 'from the hover'. The helicopter was on the ground, with power applied to keep it light on the wheels. The step down from the cabin was higher than normal.
But obviously that sounds far less dramatic!
Regardless of how dramatic the exit was, it's a strange story with something missing. Why were they not deplaned in the same way in Aberdeen - their destination?
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Maybe they had diverted from a rig before landing with an incorrect gear indication and at the alternate they didn't have enough fuel to get back to Aberdeen. If they could have gone direct to Aberdeen I imagine they would have. Didn't take a lot of thinking through but I agree that your theory of hidden information, conspiracy, spinning yarns is far more sexy 212.
It's a pity pilots continue to make this sort of mistake, based on a lack of understanding of how the landing gear works and how the indication system works. Presuming there was no rupturing of jack cylinders or other major loss of fluid, the gear will be fully down once the emerg lowering has run its course (and in fact probably before that!). The indication system is the weak point. If the gear is down enough to land lightly on it, it is down. No need to be all dramatic about it and keep it light on the wheels etc. That shows a lack of understanding.
Not having a go at Bond particularly, there have been a few at Bristow like that and in every case the gear was of course fully down even though the indications were missing, but lots of drama ensued.
Not having a go at Bond particularly, there have been a few at Bristow like that and in every case the gear was of course fully down even though the indications were missing, but lots of drama ensued.
Maybe they had diverted from a rig before landing with an incorrect gear indication and at the alternate they didn't have enough fuel to get back to Aberdeen. If they could have gone direct to Aberdeen I imagine they would have. Didn't take a lot of thinking through but I agree that your theory of hidden information, conspiracy, spinning yarns is far more sexy 212.
HeliComparator,
I realise I am just extending the short shelf-life of this non-story, but.....
Are you saying that the pilot should have just discounted what the indication system was showing, discounted the notes in the Emergency Checklist, ignored the L/G caption as the speed reduced, landed on and lowered the collective fully - without taking the option of seeking engineering assistance?
All because he understands the system?
There was no 'drama' - only The Scotsman thought that.
212 man - when passengers have been safely disembarked from an aircraft that has a potential problem with the undercarriage, why on earth would you want to try and get them back on board again. Surely that would be odd logic and safety behaviours!
I realise I am just extending the short shelf-life of this non-story, but.....
Are you saying that the pilot should have just discounted what the indication system was showing, discounted the notes in the Emergency Checklist, ignored the L/G caption as the speed reduced, landed on and lowered the collective fully - without taking the option of seeking engineering assistance?
All because he understands the system?
There was no 'drama' - only The Scotsman thought that.
212 man - when passengers have been safely disembarked from an aircraft that has a potential problem with the undercarriage, why on earth would you want to try and get them back on board again. Surely that would be odd logic and safety behaviours!
Last edited by Ed Winchester; 22nd Nov 2015 at 14:21. Reason: Saw 212man's comments after replying.
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Safety behaviours.
If you think that oil companies allow "reloading" of passengers after a fault has been identified no matter how trivial then you haven't flown the NS in the past few years.
HC, I bow to your superior knowledge of the Puma gear. However, I think the OEM should state that clearly if it is the case. L/G warning illuminated, emergency undercarriage selected and run, L/G warning still illuminated, land anyway. Not everything can go in a procedure but if this is definitely the case, then it should. I would suggest that with a leg light missing, the travel light illuminated and L/G flashing at you then you might be a little circumspect. We all know that is likely to be a ground/flight logic fault but a small inspection does no harm in my opinion.
It would be even better if the manufacturer supplied a system that kept working for a little longer than a couple of months! Having flown fixed wing, I can't remember having so many erroneous gear indications as I have seen on the Puma fleet. It should be a simple system a little like the Puma heating system
If you think that oil companies allow "reloading" of passengers after a fault has been identified no matter how trivial then you haven't flown the NS in the past few years.
HC, I bow to your superior knowledge of the Puma gear. However, I think the OEM should state that clearly if it is the case. L/G warning illuminated, emergency undercarriage selected and run, L/G warning still illuminated, land anyway. Not everything can go in a procedure but if this is definitely the case, then it should. I would suggest that with a leg light missing, the travel light illuminated and L/G flashing at you then you might be a little circumspect. We all know that is likely to be a ground/flight logic fault but a small inspection does no harm in my opinion.
It would be even better if the manufacturer supplied a system that kept working for a little longer than a couple of months! Having flown fixed wing, I can't remember having so many erroneous gear indications as I have seen on the Puma fleet. It should be a simple system a little like the Puma heating system
Of course I am not saying to take no heed of the warnings. I would land cautiously but as weight came on the wheels it would be obvious that the gear was down. The main gear is held in that position by hydraulic lock which is established in the absence of pressure from the aircraft side. The gear operates like a motorbike swinging arm so if it was asymmetrically down (it wouldn't be!) that would be obvious, like a sloping ground landing.
Once there is a bit of weight on the wheels it becomes obvious that the gear is down, and the collective can be lowered fully. I would even say that if the gear was of a different type, keeping some weight on the gear is a bad idea because if one leg were to suddenly give way, dynamic rollover would be a likely consequence, which is worse than just falling over.
Dropping passengers off from a low hover / light on wheels is a bad idea because there is a good chance of an injury from the high step-down, a lot of downwash blowing stuff around (maybe the stuff that the pax thought they were holding on to adequately) not to mention the publicity which, whilst of no consequence in itself, does nothing to help the nervousness of offshore passengers.
As to seeking engineering assistance, that is only possible at bases where there are engineers. In the past we have had flybys for ATC to have a look, HLO's opinions etc and normally these are wrong or non-commital simply because no-one wants to risk saying everything is OK and then be held accountable if it isn't.
Just to add that in the entire history of the N Sea on the AS332L, L2 and EC225 (which all have the same type of landing gear) and in fact probably in the world, there has never been a case of gear not being down, following emergency activation, unless there were additional indications of hydraulic system problems (and not even sure if then). So when balancing the risk of people "leaping out of the helicopter" with doing a normal but cautious landing, the latter wins.
Many years ago when I was a co-pilot I had the nose leg of a SA330J collapse during a running landing (capt was PF I hasten to add!). The Capt recycled the gear in the hover (idiot) and lots of red fluid splooshed out everywhere and we lost AP hydraulics. So on that occasion, it was obvious that we didn't have a leg down.
Once there is a bit of weight on the wheels it becomes obvious that the gear is down, and the collective can be lowered fully. I would even say that if the gear was of a different type, keeping some weight on the gear is a bad idea because if one leg were to suddenly give way, dynamic rollover would be a likely consequence, which is worse than just falling over.
Dropping passengers off from a low hover / light on wheels is a bad idea because there is a good chance of an injury from the high step-down, a lot of downwash blowing stuff around (maybe the stuff that the pax thought they were holding on to adequately) not to mention the publicity which, whilst of no consequence in itself, does nothing to help the nervousness of offshore passengers.
As to seeking engineering assistance, that is only possible at bases where there are engineers. In the past we have had flybys for ATC to have a look, HLO's opinions etc and normally these are wrong or non-commital simply because no-one wants to risk saying everything is OK and then be held accountable if it isn't.
Just to add that in the entire history of the N Sea on the AS332L, L2 and EC225 (which all have the same type of landing gear) and in fact probably in the world, there has never been a case of gear not being down, following emergency activation, unless there were additional indications of hydraulic system problems (and not even sure if then). So when balancing the risk of people "leaping out of the helicopter" with doing a normal but cautious landing, the latter wins.
Many years ago when I was a co-pilot I had the nose leg of a SA330J collapse during a running landing (capt was PF I hasten to add!). The Capt recycled the gear in the hover (idiot) and lots of red fluid splooshed out everywhere and we lost AP hydraulics. So on that occasion, it was obvious that we didn't have a leg down.
Last edited by HeliComparator; 22nd Nov 2015 at 15:13. Reason: Added a bit
While there may have not been any 332 landing gear collapses there have been two nose gear collapses on the 365's which use a similar system.
Firstly the hydraulic pressure to the nose gear disipates and the gear is locked down by a claw system built into the retraction/extension actuator. This is the same for either normal or emergency extension.
My first hand experience of a failure of this system is as follows.
Post maintenance we were carrying out retraction checks using both normal and emergency systems. After several retractions we lost the nose down green. Initially we were looking for an indication problem as the gear was clearly down and could be heard going into lock.
After numerous further retractions we were no nearer an answer. We put the gear down again and by chance after about 10 seconds I thought I saw the nosegear move.
A further retract extend cycle was carried out and it was confirmed that after 10 seconds the nosegear began to move and was not physically locked.
The internal claw mechanism had failed and once the pressure disipated the gear was free to move.
If the crew had a nose gear unsafe indication then I believe what they did was correct.
Out of interest we had gags which could be clamped around the actuator (in the hover!!) to prevent a collapse.
Firstly the hydraulic pressure to the nose gear disipates and the gear is locked down by a claw system built into the retraction/extension actuator. This is the same for either normal or emergency extension.
My first hand experience of a failure of this system is as follows.
Post maintenance we were carrying out retraction checks using both normal and emergency systems. After several retractions we lost the nose down green. Initially we were looking for an indication problem as the gear was clearly down and could be heard going into lock.
After numerous further retractions we were no nearer an answer. We put the gear down again and by chance after about 10 seconds I thought I saw the nosegear move.
A further retract extend cycle was carried out and it was confirmed that after 10 seconds the nosegear began to move and was not physically locked.
The internal claw mechanism had failed and once the pressure disipated the gear was free to move.
If the crew had a nose gear unsafe indication then I believe what they did was correct.
Out of interest we had gags which could be clamped around the actuator (in the hover!!) to prevent a collapse.
Last edited by ericferret; 22nd Nov 2015 at 17:14.
I had a novel experience with a 332's undercarriage. On landing on a platform our attention was drawn to an oil leak coming from the starboard sponson area. I shut the aircraft down and investigated.
There was a small pool of hydraulic oil on the deck and the undercarriage had streaks of oil on it. I wiped everything in sight with absorbent paper and that cleaned it up. There was now no evidence of the whereabouts of the leak.
I got on the blower to engineering and they asked my to have another go at finding the leak as it would narrow down the bits they had to bring out. I went out and as there was still no sign of the origin I thought that I would put some pressure in the system.
I switched on the power, confirmed that there were three greens, inserted the emergency pump handle so as to manually pump some pressure into the system. It was quite stiff and after four or five pumps there was a commotion at the back of the aircraft as the undercarriage collapsed to the kneeling position.
I had always thought that an aircraft on the ground with three greens was sacrosanct; apparently not so.
The engineers knew about it; it was a dodge for lowering the aircraft to pack it into a 747 but nobody had told me or any other pilot I knew.
Now you all know.
There was a small pool of hydraulic oil on the deck and the undercarriage had streaks of oil on it. I wiped everything in sight with absorbent paper and that cleaned it up. There was now no evidence of the whereabouts of the leak.
I got on the blower to engineering and they asked my to have another go at finding the leak as it would narrow down the bits they had to bring out. I went out and as there was still no sign of the origin I thought that I would put some pressure in the system.
I switched on the power, confirmed that there were three greens, inserted the emergency pump handle so as to manually pump some pressure into the system. It was quite stiff and after four or five pumps there was a commotion at the back of the aircraft as the undercarriage collapsed to the kneeling position.
I had always thought that an aircraft on the ground with three greens was sacrosanct; apparently not so.
The engineers knew about it; it was a dodge for lowering the aircraft to pack it into a 747 but nobody had told me or any other pilot I knew.
Now you all know.
I had a novel experience with a 332's undercarriage. On landing on a platform our attention was drawn to an oil leak coming from the starboard sponson area. I shut the aircraft down and investigated.
There was a small pool of hydraulic oil on the deck and the undercarriage had streaks of oil on it. I wiped everything in sight with absorbent paper and that cleaned it up. There was now no evidence of the whereabouts of the leak.
I got on the blower to engineering and they asked my to have another go at finding the leak as it would narrow down the bits they had to bring out. I went out and as there was still no sign of the origin I thought that I would put some pressure in the system.
I switched on the power, confirmed that there were three greens, inserted the emergency pump handle so as to manually pump some pressure into the system. It was quite stiff and after four or five pumps there was a commotion at the back of the aircraft as the undercarriage collapsed to the kneeling position.
I had always thought that an aircraft on the ground with three greens was sacrosanct; apparently not so.
The engineers knew about it; it was a dodge for lowering the aircraft to pack it into a 747 but nobody had told me or any other pilot I knew.
Now you all know.
There was a small pool of hydraulic oil on the deck and the undercarriage had streaks of oil on it. I wiped everything in sight with absorbent paper and that cleaned it up. There was now no evidence of the whereabouts of the leak.
I got on the blower to engineering and they asked my to have another go at finding the leak as it would narrow down the bits they had to bring out. I went out and as there was still no sign of the origin I thought that I would put some pressure in the system.
I switched on the power, confirmed that there were three greens, inserted the emergency pump handle so as to manually pump some pressure into the system. It was quite stiff and after four or five pumps there was a commotion at the back of the aircraft as the undercarriage collapsed to the kneeling position.
I had always thought that an aircraft on the ground with three greens was sacrosanct; apparently not so.
The engineers knew about it; it was a dodge for lowering the aircraft to pack it into a 747 but nobody had told me or any other pilot I knew.
Now you all know.
You were famous for that one! Yes, if you put pressure onto the hydraulic locking valves, the hydraulic lock is released and with weight on the aircraft the gear will partially retract. Best not to be under the helicopter looking for leaks at the time!
