Question that came up in my last recurrent...
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Question that came up in my last recurrent...
Hi guys...
A few days ago I did my recurrent (737NG) and during my "pilot flying" phase of the session, I was given a Reverse Unlocked...
No big deal !
We went thru the ENGINES -> REVERSE UNLOCKED NNC steps and, as per the checklist, later to the ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN NNC.
That checklist says: "Thrust lever....Affected engine....CONFIRM...Close" ! That was exactly what I did, but my examiner told me that this step should be done by the pilot monitoring ?!?
The following quote comes from the "Checklist Instructions":
"With the airplane in flight or in motion on the ground:
• the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring take action based on each crewmember’s Areas of Responsibility.
After moving the control, the crewmember taking the action also states the checklist response."
Am I crazy, or the good fella was completely mistaken on that one ?
A few days ago I did my recurrent (737NG) and during my "pilot flying" phase of the session, I was given a Reverse Unlocked...
No big deal !
We went thru the ENGINES -> REVERSE UNLOCKED NNC steps and, as per the checklist, later to the ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN NNC.
That checklist says: "Thrust lever....Affected engine....CONFIRM...Close" ! That was exactly what I did, but my examiner told me that this step should be done by the pilot monitoring ?!?
The following quote comes from the "Checklist Instructions":
"With the airplane in flight or in motion on the ground:
• the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring take action based on each crewmember’s Areas of Responsibility.
After moving the control, the crewmember taking the action also states the checklist response."
Am I crazy, or the good fella was completely mistaken on that one ?
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My friend was taking off from MIA one day in one of our B727 aircraft with the FO flying and just before rotation the number 3 thrust reverser deployed one of it's clam shells with no reverser light indication. He took control when the FO lost directional control and used full left rudder to maintain heading with some left bank. Climb was severely restricted so he reduced #3 thrust lever and regained some performance and some directional control. He continued to idle and was able to make a very wide circuit to the right and return for landing. He was told by fire rescue that his right engine reverser top half was fully deployed.
He did a flawless job of handling a critical situation that none of his checklists addressed. The pilot flying should always make initial power changes because only he can feel what the power changes are doing to the control inputs required, especially the rudders.
He did a flawless job of handling a critical situation that none of his checklists addressed. The pilot flying should always make initial power changes because only he can feel what the power changes are doing to the control inputs required, especially the rudders.
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Is he saying the confirmation should be by the PM or the thrust lever to be closed by the PM?
In my mob it goes something along the lines of:
PM (from the NNC): "Thrust lever (affected side)..confirm......idle"
PF: "Left thrust lever" (with hand on the left thrust lever)
PM: "Left confirmed"
PF: Closes left thrust lever
So, it is the PM that is actually confirming the correct thrust lever is being closed but the PF that is actually doing the closing.
If you just said:
PF: "left thrust lever....confirmed....closed" then I can see where your examiner is coming from because, for obvious reasons, it needs the other pilot to confirm the actions as opposed to the PF just saying "confirmed" and then doing them.
In my mob it goes something along the lines of:
PM (from the NNC): "Thrust lever (affected side)..confirm......idle"
PF: "Left thrust lever" (with hand on the left thrust lever)
PM: "Left confirmed"
PF: Closes left thrust lever
So, it is the PM that is actually confirming the correct thrust lever is being closed but the PF that is actually doing the closing.
If you just said:
PF: "left thrust lever....confirmed....closed" then I can see where your examiner is coming from because, for obvious reasons, it needs the other pilot to confirm the actions as opposed to the PF just saying "confirmed" and then doing them.
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Yeap... He told me that the PM should be the one to retard the affected engine throttle. Never heard of that !
By the way, let's say that after starting the engine number two (engine stabilized in idle) you notice that the oil pressure is decreasing, and after few seconds, you get the LOW OIL PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR Aon the EIS.
Would you request the LOW OIL PRESSURE NNC or THE ABORTED ENGINE START NNC?
All the best, folks.
By the way, let's say that after starting the engine number two (engine stabilized in idle) you notice that the oil pressure is decreasing, and after few seconds, you get the LOW OIL PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR Aon the EIS.
Would you request the LOW OIL PRESSURE NNC or THE ABORTED ENGINE START NNC?
All the best, folks.
I work for an airline where the PM will close the throttle, cut off fuel etc with the PF looking over to confirm. Whatever your FCOM says is what you do.
In regards to the oil pressure question. If it's not a memory item then call for the checklist. Common sense would dictate otherwise but these days that's not allowed in a flight deck anymore.
In regards to the oil pressure question. If it's not a memory item then call for the checklist. Common sense would dictate otherwise but these days that's not allowed in a flight deck anymore.
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For us, the PF would be the one to do anything with the trust levers. Similar to a post above the PM would read "Thrust lever number 1 confirm close" the PF would put a hand on no 1 and ask "Confirm", the Pm would "Confirm" and then the PF would close and say "Close". Lots of lovely confirming.
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Same here, autothrottle and thrust levers are PF items, the rest has to be done by the PM. Confirmation is always done by the other pilot of course.
Actually, it is the same on the bus for us, except you don't need to worry about authothrust there.
For the oil pressure stuff on the ground? Ask for either checklist or just shut it down, it is not critical on the ground anyway.
Actually, it is the same on the bus for us, except you don't need to worry about authothrust there.
For the oil pressure stuff on the ground? Ask for either checklist or just shut it down, it is not critical on the ground anyway.
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For the oil pressure stuff on the ground? Ask for either checklist or just shut it down, it is not critical on the ground anyway.
It was an oil line that maintenance had not tightened, made a terrible mess.
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PF closes the thrust lever usually, however if your SOP is different then so be it.
Having said that, with the malfunction that you experienced the thrust lever "should" have retarded itself anyway, so nobody should have needed to move it anywhere>
Having said that, with the malfunction that you experienced the thrust lever "should" have retarded itself anyway, so nobody should have needed to move it anywhere>
This was a bit of a discussion item some time ago with a TRE I was chatting to. I asked if the thrust lever would actually retard to idle, as on another type I fly it snatches back violently if a reverser unlocks.
The FCOM is silent about it, but if you dig into the QRH, the first step gives you this:
1 Check movement of the forward thrust lever on the
affected engine.
The EECs prevent power above idle if the related
thrust reverser has moved from the stowed
position.
The TRE I was chatting to tried it in the sim and nothing happens. When you think about the AT behaviour this makes sense - with the AT disengaged, the T/L servos are disengaged so cannot attempt to move the thrust lever. With the AT engaged, the servos are commanding a T/L position to meet the demanded speed. I suspect for fear of unpleasant failure modes Boeing decided not to have the thrust levers retard automatically for failures.
It does make sense to have the EEC limit thrust, as Reverser status goes directly into the EEC anyway.
The FCOM is silent about it, but if you dig into the QRH, the first step gives you this:
1 Check movement of the forward thrust lever on the
affected engine.
The EECs prevent power above idle if the related
thrust reverser has moved from the stowed
position.
The TRE I was chatting to tried it in the sim and nothing happens. When you think about the AT behaviour this makes sense - with the AT disengaged, the T/L servos are disengaged so cannot attempt to move the thrust lever. With the AT engaged, the servos are commanding a T/L position to meet the demanded speed. I suspect for fear of unpleasant failure modes Boeing decided not to have the thrust levers retard automatically for failures.
It does make sense to have the EEC limit thrust, as Reverser status goes directly into the EEC anyway.
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At least on the NG I've always been told (during my initial course) that this is one of the differences between this acft and previous models (Classics), there is no kind o mechanical connection between the thrust levers and the engine itself !
So, as long as I know, the lever is supposed to remain exactly where it was at the time of the failure.
I'm not sure if the FCOM says something about that, but I'll search...
By the way, the "Engine Limit, Surge or Stall NNC contemplates this kind of failure" (Loss of Engine Control).
So, as long as I know, the lever is supposed to remain exactly where it was at the time of the failure.
I'm not sure if the FCOM says something about that, but I'll search...
By the way, the "Engine Limit, Surge or Stall NNC contemplates this kind of failure" (Loss of Engine Control).
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PF moves the lever after confirmation from PM. I think your trainers wrong unless your airline has a different procedure than the norm. Email your fleet/training manager... should take minutes to clear up.
I recall from many years ago, our company hired several B737-200 captains from Indian Airlines, on a short term contract. They were astounded at what they perceived was unnecessarily superfluous and complicated SOP with regards to engine failure shut-down procedure where the actions were shared between PF and PM as described in previous posts. Even in those days there were various opinions of who says who and who makes the selections.
The Boeing FCOM/FCTM made no mention of who did what and whose paying the rent as it were - leaving it to the operator to complicate things as much as it wished. And man! Were they complicated with all that talking between PF and PM for a simple shut down. Reading the previous posts I see things haven't change over the years..
As I said, the newly recruited Indian captains wouldn't have a bar of the sharing of the engine failure/ shut down procedures. The policy of their airline was the captain does all the drills even if he was PF. In fact he would take over control if the failure occurred while the first officer happened to be flying. If an engine failed or needed to be shut down, the captain would say something like "No 2 has failed - do you agree?" Then he would proceed in an un-hurried manner to close the dead throttle, cut the dead start lever, pull the fire handle (if it was an engine fire) and fire the bottles. The first officer merely watched (monitored is the modern term) and kept an eye on things.
There was no talking about who does which and certainly no areas of responsibility. The captain flew and fixed everything; after all the drills were very few so no drama. I must say it was refreshing to see how well it worked with the minimum of fuss and talking. Contrast that era with what we see in previous posts here, where different management pilots have different views about who says what and who does what and obvious setting up a potential for confusion. The KISS principle is ignored nowadays
The Boeing FCOM/FCTM made no mention of who did what and whose paying the rent as it were - leaving it to the operator to complicate things as much as it wished. And man! Were they complicated with all that talking between PF and PM for a simple shut down. Reading the previous posts I see things haven't change over the years..
As I said, the newly recruited Indian captains wouldn't have a bar of the sharing of the engine failure/ shut down procedures. The policy of their airline was the captain does all the drills even if he was PF. In fact he would take over control if the failure occurred while the first officer happened to be flying. If an engine failed or needed to be shut down, the captain would say something like "No 2 has failed - do you agree?" Then he would proceed in an un-hurried manner to close the dead throttle, cut the dead start lever, pull the fire handle (if it was an engine fire) and fire the bottles. The first officer merely watched (monitored is the modern term) and kept an eye on things.
There was no talking about who does which and certainly no areas of responsibility. The captain flew and fixed everything; after all the drills were very few so no drama. I must say it was refreshing to see how well it worked with the minimum of fuss and talking. Contrast that era with what we see in previous posts here, where different management pilots have different views about who says what and who does what and obvious setting up a potential for confusion. The KISS principle is ignored nowadays
Last edited by Centaurus; 16th Nov 2014 at 12:43.
