RAF Rivet Joint
Probably something to do with the centre of gravity shift rearwards on rotation of the rations and canteen area, as everyone except the front end crew aim to get fed...
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"At 500ft? on lift off??"
Didn't both the B-47 and the B-52 have attitude issues on take off?
And somewhere I've still go a copy of the first ed. of "handling the Big Jets" where people are being warned (in the '70's still
) to pay serious attention to attitude
With all the add-ons I'd be amazed if it flew like a 707 TBH
Didn't both the B-47 and the B-52 have attitude issues on take off?
And somewhere I've still go a copy of the first ed. of "handling the Big Jets" where people are being warned (in the '70's still
) to pay serious attention to attitudeWith all the add-ons I'd be amazed if it flew like a 707 TBH
Did anyone notice the rather marked nose down shove it was given as it passed through around 500'? I watched it take off (no option, waiting for the runway lights to change)
? practice engine failure after takeoff ?
? flap retraction schedule ?
? noise abatement ?
LFH
? flap retraction schedule ?
? noise abatement ?
Last edited by Lordflasheart; 26th May 2014 at 15:47. Reason: added to quote for clarification
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Other than it being ~500'AGL instead of ~2,000', that does sound like the "low noise" take-off the B737, & B727 I flew in (as passenger) out of John Wayne Int'l (Orange County, CA) in 1985 & 86.
A max-power max climb-rate take-off followed by a leveling-off and major power reduction as the aircraft passed over a large housing development.
And since the same profile was flown both times I flew out from there (Republic and Western), it was intentional.
A max-power max climb-rate take-off followed by a leveling-off and major power reduction as the aircraft passed over a large housing development.
And since the same profile was flown both times I flew out from there (Republic and Western), it was intentional.
Last edited by GreenKnight121; 27th May 2014 at 05:23.
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In the latest news statement on Rivet Joint MoD's Chief of Materiel (Air), Air Marshal Simon Bollom states "We have procured an aircraft with a proven track record". Now let us see what H-C stated after reviewing the Nimrod safety case;
Reliance on past data cannot be considered a substitute for critical hazard analysis as to the risk of a catastrophic event in the future. In simple terms, whilst an incident database may tell you what has happened in the past, it does not tell you what might, or could, happen in the future. It should be remembered that the day before Piper Alpha disaster itself in 1988, and the Challenger in 1986, the platforms involved were 'safe' based on an analysis of past incidents alone. [And Nimrod XV230 was considered 'safe' on the morning of 2nd Sept 2006 --- My addition]
You have to prove a platform is safe by producing a valid safety case. This means developing a properly structured Hazard Log, which looks at what could happen. Several people, including two very senior officers, were "crucified" in the H-C review for not doing this. By releasing Rivet Joint for operational use MoD/MAA has learned nothing from H-C and the loss of Nimrod XV230.
DV
Reliance on past data cannot be considered a substitute for critical hazard analysis as to the risk of a catastrophic event in the future. In simple terms, whilst an incident database may tell you what has happened in the past, it does not tell you what might, or could, happen in the future. It should be remembered that the day before Piper Alpha disaster itself in 1988, and the Challenger in 1986, the platforms involved were 'safe' based on an analysis of past incidents alone. [And Nimrod XV230 was considered 'safe' on the morning of 2nd Sept 2006 --- My addition]
You have to prove a platform is safe by producing a valid safety case. This means developing a properly structured Hazard Log, which looks at what could happen. Several people, including two very senior officers, were "crucified" in the H-C review for not doing this. By releasing Rivet Joint for operational use MoD/MAA has learned nothing from H-C and the loss of Nimrod XV230.
DV
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Other than it being ~500'AGL instead of ~2,000', that does sound like the "low noise" take-off the B737, & B727 I flew in (as passenger) out of John Wayne Int'l (Orange County, CA) in 1985 & 86.
As Lord Flasheart says, it may have been a practice something or other. I was merely commenting on the odd departure.
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Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said:
"These highly specialised aircraft and their supporting ground systems, bought off-the-shelf,
"These highly specialised aircraft and their supporting ground systems, bought off-the-shelf,
The 3 aircraft, converted by L-3IS in Greenville, Texas, from a Boeing KC-135 tanker,
Surely it's not really COTS (or MOTS) if you buy 50 year old airframe and then spend years converting them, making a complete cock-up of it in the process.
UK's Rivet Joint Wins Interim Approval To Fly | Defense News | defensenews.com
Says...
Britain’s new Rivet Joint RC-135W aircraft has secured an interim release to service
What does "interim" apply to? That means the RAF are not permitted to rely on part or all of the aircraft. When will that be lifted?
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NoVANav, as PPRuNe's Mr Rivet Joint can you give us an idea of what the endurance level is of the RJ. The Mildenhall-based ones have been heading off the Baltic each day but are only up for six/seven hours tops which doesn't seem very long. Is that about right for ops from a 9,000 ft runway or can they go for longer unrefuelled?
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RJ Endurance
My info is a bit dated and is based on TF33 engine burn rates. The F108s give about a 20%, or so, decrease in burn rate and more thrust.
Going off Mildenhall and using the overrun there for takeoff, we could put a good 8-9 hour sortie length on the mission. But, we never did as we always had a tanker top us off over the North Sea, prior to crossing Denmark on our way into the Baltic. Usual missions there were about 12-13 hours in duration, with all but 2.5 in the "operating area". We flew until the numbers crossing Bornholm island matched the flight plan fuel load to get us to EGUN with required overhead reserves.
Flying un-refueled out of Athens we would usually brakes release at 0700 and be back over the beach on final at 1530 local.
Going off Mildenhall and using the overrun there for takeoff, we could put a good 8-9 hour sortie length on the mission. But, we never did as we always had a tanker top us off over the North Sea, prior to crossing Denmark on our way into the Baltic. Usual missions there were about 12-13 hours in duration, with all but 2.5 in the "operating area". We flew until the numbers crossing Bornholm island matched the flight plan fuel load to get us to EGUN with required overhead reserves.
Flying un-refueled out of Athens we would usually brakes release at 0700 and be back over the beach on final at 1530 local.
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What Is Cocked-Up about the RAF RJs?
Dervish,
What is "cocked up" about ZZ664? Please explain exactly what is meant by this comment.
Please, no broad generalizations, just specific facts that are in evidence and not just wild-eyed conjecture on your part.
What is "cocked up" about ZZ664? Please explain exactly what is meant by this comment.
Please, no broad generalizations, just specific facts that are in evidence and not just wild-eyed conjecture on your part.
novanav
As a UK taxpayer I regard this programme, and the reason it was necessary, as a xxxx-up. I refer you to MoD's own admission that it let a contract that delivered an aircraft that didn't meet its own regulations. That's a xxxx-up in anyone's book.
About Hammond's statement. The bit I quoted doesn't make sense. What is "commercial" about a military aircraft from the US and what is "off the shelf" about an aircraft that has to undergo years of conversion? It's spin and something stinks.
As a UK taxpayer I regard this programme, and the reason it was necessary, as a xxxx-up. I refer you to MoD's own admission that it let a contract that delivered an aircraft that didn't meet its own regulations. That's a xxxx-up in anyone's book.
About Hammond's statement. The bit I quoted doesn't make sense. What is "commercial" about a military aircraft from the US and what is "off the shelf" about an aircraft that has to undergo years of conversion? It's spin and something stinks.
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Originally Posted by Distant Voice
In the latest news statement on Rivet Joint MoD's Chief of Materiel (Air), Air Marshal Simon Bollom states "We have procured an aircraft with a proven track record". Now let us see what H-C stated after reviewing the Nimrod safety case;
Reliance on past data cannot be considered a substitute for critical hazard analysis as to the risk of a catastrophic event in the future. In simple terms, whilst an incident database may tell you what has happened in the past, it does not tell you what might, or could, happen in the future. It should be remembered that the day before Piper Alpha disaster itself in 1988, and the Challenger in 1986, the platforms involved were 'safe' based on an analysis of past incidents alone. [And Nimrod XV230 was considered 'safe' on the morning of 2nd Sept 2006 --- My addition]
You have to prove a platform is safe by producing a valid safety case. This means developing a properly structured Hazard Log, which looks at what could happen.
Reliance on past data cannot be considered a substitute for critical hazard analysis as to the risk of a catastrophic event in the future. In simple terms, whilst an incident database may tell you what has happened in the past, it does not tell you what might, or could, happen in the future. It should be remembered that the day before Piper Alpha disaster itself in 1988, and the Challenger in 1986, the platforms involved were 'safe' based on an analysis of past incidents alone. [And Nimrod XV230 was considered 'safe' on the morning of 2nd Sept 2006 --- My addition]
You have to prove a platform is safe by producing a valid safety case. This means developing a properly structured Hazard Log, which looks at what could happen.
Challenger blew up because engineers, giving a warning based on a known defect for the specific conditions of that specific launch, were ignored in that case.
In other weather/temperature conditions the launch would have been safe.
Any time you ignore a clear engineering limit and an accident occurs, saying the air/spacecraft is unsafe, rather than saying it was operated in an incorrect and unsafe manner, is a bullshiite cop-out.
The US Space Shuttle program HAD identified what would be the cause of the Challenger disaster - well over a year in advance!
The manufacturer of the boosters (Morton-Thiokol) had identified the gasket leak from a couple of previous launches, the cause (ice forming in the joint forcing the sections of the booster casing apart, allowing hot gasses to escape out the side of the booster), and that it could cause a catastrophic event.
Specific guidance had been provided to NASA about weather conditions in the 12 hours preceeding a launch, and on the morning of the Challenger launch the booster engineers at M-T, when polled as part of the standard pre-flight process, unanimously declared "unsafe to fly due to the overnight freezing rain and ice remaining on the launch vehicle".
However, since the procedures (later corrected) allowed for a "consensus go" report, rather than a "unanimous go", the NASA engineering head reported "the engineers say go" because the majority of all engineers for all systems thought it was safe as soon as the air temperature rose above a certain level.
The failure that caused the explosion would not have occurred if the launch had been postponed for 6 hours or so - to allow the casing of the booster to heat above that level, as that would have melted the ice, and the booster sections would have properly reseated.
It was operator error, not an unsafe vehicle, that caused the Challenger explosion.
I wouldn't run a sweet shop (or a candy store) using the Haddon-Cave Report as my guide, let alone as an Air Regulator. It was just as subverted a piece of work as the very regulations it was supposedly seeking to reinforce, and for the MAA to base its very being on makes one think of the parable of houses built upon sand.
Rather than using Haddon-Cave as our guide we should see it as part of the problem, in that it was given clear evidence of the deliberate and co-ordinated attack upon UK Military Airworthiness provision by VSOs and chose to ignore it, preferring instead to characterise that time as a 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. Given such a brazen perversion of the facts one should be wary of accepting anything it says at face value without poking it repeatedly with the proverbial stick.
Am I suggesting that the Haddon-Cave Report was suborned by the very MOD that suborned the Airworthiness Regulations? Yes, I am. Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. They are certainly not safe within the MAA and MAAIB as presently formed. Both must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect them to start doing their respective jobs unhindered.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
Rather than using Haddon-Cave as our guide we should see it as part of the problem, in that it was given clear evidence of the deliberate and co-ordinated attack upon UK Military Airworthiness provision by VSOs and chose to ignore it, preferring instead to characterise that time as a 'Golden Period of Airworthiness'. Given such a brazen perversion of the facts one should be wary of accepting anything it says at face value without poking it repeatedly with the proverbial stick.
Am I suggesting that the Haddon-Cave Report was suborned by the very MOD that suborned the Airworthiness Regulations? Yes, I am. Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. They are certainly not safe within the MAA and MAAIB as presently formed. Both must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Only then can we expect them to start doing their respective jobs unhindered.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 29th May 2014 at 08:42.