F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[MSOCS]

TurbineD,

There are indeed many Performance Parameters in the F-35 Program; only a handful are "Key". None of the ones you've stated are key and certainly don't amount to hundreds either.

Of the ones that are key, rest assured they are being watched very attentively. A KPP bust invokes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) which is a pretty messy and bad situation to be in. Nonetheless, you are right - cost is not a KPP; rather, it is an independent variable. IMHO, there have been no breaches of KPP in the last 8 or so years - minor clarifications perhaps but no breaches.

By that reasoning, it is only right that KenV has a decent answer to his question:

My I inquire as to which KPPs the F-35 "failed to meet?"

Because I'm also very interested to hear what you have to say when you get around to answering the specific question concerning the F-35's Program Of Record "KPPs" rather than what you think should be a KPP.

[LowObservable]

There are indeed very few KPPs (at least in the unclass realm), and few of them define an exciting aircraft.

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf (page 50)

I don't think SGRs have been demonstrated yet, and I'm fairly sure that the reliability numbers have not been met.

[NITRO104]

Originally Posted by MSOCS

Because I'm also very interested to hear what you have to say when you get around to answering the specific question concerning the F-35's Program Of Record "KPPs" rather than what you think should be a KPP.

Transonic acceleration (SEP) and consequentially climb, turn, etc. aren't 'Key' parameters?

[LowObservable]

Nitro - AFAIK, they are not, at least in the unclass version.

[ORAC]

New Pentagon Report: F-35 Performance Problems

y Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) Stephen Welby has published his FY2013 Annual Report addressing the systems engineering capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) and systems engineering activities relating to the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP)..........

Stephen Welby reports that:

The program is on track to meet seven of the eight KPPs. An issue with incorrect analysis/assumptions is hampering the attainment of the Sortie Generation Rate (SGR) KPP. The program office is examining the sensitivity of the SGR KPP to establish more operationally realistic ground rules and assumptions. As a result, the program plans to reassess SGR.

This is remarkable, because the JORD (requirement specifications) of the F-35 the key performance parameters (KPP) specifies about the (minimum) sortie rate:
- Sortie rate F-35A: 3 sorties per day
- Sortie rate F-35B: 4 sorties per day
- Sortie rate F-35C: 3 sortie........


OTHER KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

One could say: Key Performance Parameters (KPP) is the basic performance requirement by the F-35. Back in February 2012 the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) ordered the JSF Program Office to reconsider KPPs that some versions of the F-35 were to miss. This resulted in:
- F-35A combat radius target (objective was 690 miles, down to 580 miles)
- F-35B longer run allowed for short take-offs
- F-35C higher maximum landing speed

However, at this moment in time DASD(SE) concluded that:

Although on track, the combat radius, STOVL performance, and CV recovery KPPs have limited margins.

The sortie generation KPP is not as contracted; the logistics footprint KPP is in danger. The mission reliability KPP (minimum 93%), at this moment, has a long way to go.

The DOT&E report FY2013 (January 2014) found “Reliability is poor and ranges from 30 to 39 percent behind the current objective. The “availability” of the existing fleet is getting worse and has never reached, is receding from, its quite modest threshold of 50 percent at this stage in the program. The amount of time needed to repair failures “has increased over the past year. ........

[Hempy]

Gotta love 'management speak'...

The program is on track to meet seven of the eight KPPs. An issue with incorrect analysis/assumptions is hampering the attainment of the Sortie Generation Rate (SGR) KPP. The program office is examining the sensitivity of the SGR KPP to establish more operationally realistic ground rules and assumptions. As a result, the program plans to reassess SGR.

i.e The rules that we set and agreed to meant that the playing field is too long, so we are in the process of resetting the goalposts to ensure that we can get within scoring distance.

[a1bill]

Orac, do you have the outcome of the 2013 report? Perhaps the 2014 report or even a mid 2015 update?

[NITRO104]

Originally Posted by LO

Nitro - AFAIK, they are not, at least in the unclass version.

But why would LM seek approval for extended acceleration time, if it wasn't contracted in some form?
Why not just declare test results and move on? It doesn't make sense.

[a1bill]

AFAI have read, LM didn't ask for any extension. JPO makes the requirement decisions.
From ORAC's link "Already in the 2003 Selected Acquisition Report to the US Congress on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program of Record, the Pentagon warned: "

“Some non-KPP Threshold Requirements will not be met for all variants.”

[Engines]

Perhaps I can help a little here, as there is some understandable confusion over how the F-35 programme's requirements process worked. Sorry if this repeats some of my earlier posts.

The F-35's requirements were developed over a period of many years from around 1994, via a document called the Joint Interim Requirements Document, the JIRD. As in any requirements document, there are two main types of things that drive its content.

First, what the user(s) want the system to do operationally. This is the stuff that pilots are comfortable with. However, it also needs to reflect such areas a logistics, personnel, etc. This will also include any hard constraints (e.g has to fit in a certain hangar)

The second, and less obvious area, is what the technology can deliver. Clearly, one can write a requirement asking for a Mach 5 jumbo with an invisibility cloak, but it's unlikely to be met. However, some level of technology risk will always have to be carried - you could write a very low risk requirement for an armed Chipmunk, but it might not be very effective. (I exaggerate to make my point here - sorry for that).

The operational side of the JIRD was built via a number of iterations (JIRD I, JIRD II...) using information gleaned from hundreds of scenario model events, war-games, and other studies. This process was rigorous, and subjected to external reviews and assessments. It was also internationally supported, and I know that some contributors to this thread were involved. (Not me, by the way). Experience from previous US use of LO aircraft was definitely factored in.

The technology side was guided by evidence from the UK/US ASTOVL work, plus US 'black programmes like SSF, and other (very) high level technology reviews and assessments. Key elements of that were engine performance targets and LO technology.

The end product of this was the JSF Joint Operational Requirements Document, the JORD. It was a fairly succinct document, given the size of the programme. It ran to around 160 discrete requirements, plus annexes, and was trying to reflect then current thinking on acquisition reform, particularly the need for the requirement to spell out 'what' was required, not 'how' to achieve it. The aim was to give the biggest possible 'trade space' for the designers to work in. The annexes gave some ground rules for interpreting and calculating performance against the requirements, plus key technical information on any constraints.

Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) were those requirements that were going to have the biggest impact on the overall system design. They were going to drive cost, and were absolutely vital to operational efficiency. In UK speak, they are KURs (Key user Requirements). And KPPs cannot be traded away without very high level attention. The small number of KPPs reflected the desire for a large trade space. There were just 19 in all, covering the three variants. The 'Joint' KPPs applied to all three variants and comprised RF signature, combat radius, SGR, Logs footprint, mission reliability and interoperability. The F-35B had two unique KPPs for STOVL TO distance and vertical lift bring back. The F-35C had a single KPP for approach speed to the carrier.

The JORD included other items such as turn rate, sustained g, key dimensions, key weapon loads and so on. However, as MSOCS has pointed out, these weren't KPPs, and were inside the anticipated 'trade space'.

Once the contract was awarded, LM began the job of taking the JORD and building the much (much) more detailed set of requirements that would be used for the design of the system. This process is sometimes called 'requirements management', and it's a systems engineering discipline. The result (for a complex job like F-35) is literally tens of thousands of requirements, usually built using database tools like DOORS. This, sadly, was an area where the LM team did not perform well. Instead of a disciplined (and long) process of building the requirements down from the top level JORD, in many cases LM teams, short of time, reached for existing specs, or were given 'requirements' by US military SMEs. In many cases, this worked OK. In some, it didn't.

In my view (alert - Engines opinion - not a fact) this was a major contributor to the weight crisis in 2004. The design was, in some areas, being driven by SME 'wants', not actual requirements 'needs'. I can't give details, but at some point in the future, there is a decent book (or PhD study) to be written on this angle of the programme. To this day, it's probably the source of much of the comment of the programme.

I hope that this has given some useful background on how requirements are supposed to work, and what KPPs are and aren't.

Best Regards as ever to those doing the requirements management task - thankless but essential,

Engines

[FODPlod]

The latest on F-35B IOC for the USMC:

USMC expects F-35B IOC 'soon'

Originally Posted by IHS Jane's 360 27 July 2015

An initial squadron of 10 Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters met all the requirements for a declaration of combat readiness during a recent review, the US Marine Corps' (USMC's) top aviator told reporters on 27 July. USMC commandant General Joseph Dunford will likely make a final decision about F-35B initial operational capability (IOC) "soon", said Lieutenant General Jon Davis. Lt Gen Davis said results of this month's F-35B operational readiness review were positive and the commandant is now completing the final paperwork for IOC...

F-35B Lightning II Initial Operating Capability (IOC)

Originally Posted by US Navy Oct 2014

“USMC defines IOC as a squadron of 10 F-35B aircraft capable of executing close air support, limited offensive and defensive counter air, air interdiction, air support escort, armed reconnaissance and limited suppression of enemy air defenses.”

Lt. Gen. Jon Davis,
U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation

[NITRO104]

Originally Posted by Engines

The JORD included other items such as turn rate, sustained g, key dimensions, key weapon loads and so on. However, as MSOCS has pointed out, these weren't KPPs, and were inside the anticipated 'trade space'.

Thx and perhaps this is technically true (I'm not privy to such things, only public leaks where Bowman's doc showed performances being KPPed), but this is a fighter aircraft.
Wouldn't it be much cheaper and faster to evolve the F117 then, since apparently there is no supersonic KPP, either?
You see, where's the line?
Who's determining what goes and what doesn't and based on what criteria and why is traditionally crucial stuff solved ad-hoc, instead of being contracted?

I don't know, but this particular aspect the program doesn't make any sense to me.

[KenV]

The design was, in some areas, being driven by SME 'wants', not actual requirements 'needs'.

This sounds very familiar. The early C-17 program was bedeviled by USAF/SPO "Subject Matter Experts" who drove the detailed design in all sorts of different directions, running up costs and stretching out the schedule. It was a mess and almost killed the program.

As for the numerous KPPs F-35 was claimed to have violated, that claim was apparently once again an exaggeration based on false assumptions that led to a wild conclusion.

[Engines]

Nitro,

Perhaps I can help make some sense of it for you, and I apologise for not being clearer earlier.

You ask 'where's the line'? Very good question. Essentially, it is where it ends up once all the various trades (performance, cost, time) have been made, measured, assessed and decided. As an example, say the customer wants Mach 2 capability (again, I'll exaggerate to make the point).

Getting the Mach 2 will drive the design - bigger engines, more fuel, larger wing, higher weight, lots more cost, probably extra time to develop the engine performance required within a lower weight, and so on. So, if the answers are outside the budget/time envelope, the team will start to trade. In a simple world, they would look at M1.9, and generate the figures. Then M1.8. Then M1.7. And so on.

Just to make it a little more complex, this speed trade study could be combined with other parameters being traded. (In fact, it almost certainly would be).

On F-35 the decisions on these trades rested with the customer. There were literally hundreds, if not thousands of such decisions being made in the early years of the programme, with LM briefs, plus very detailed input from the customer's technical and operational specialists. The outcome of that work is what has shaped the aircraft we see today. It certainly wasn't 'ad-hoc'. It may seem that way, but honestly it's not.

As KenV correctly identifies, an aggressive SME can make a big difference to the process. If you agree with the SMEs, then you say 'they did a great job'. In other cases, you could say that the design was driven the wrong way by SMEs. (This is, I understand, called 'the attack of the killer SMEs'). (Attempt at humour there). On F-35, both happened.

The F-35 is, as the title says, a 'strike fighter'. The customers never wanted a pure F-16 replacement, but an aircraft that could attack in a high threat environment, and defend itself as required. Personally, i believe that it should be the 'F/A-35', but there you go.

The F-117 would actually be a really bad place to start if you wanted a fighter. the 'F' designation was. I understand, a cover for the aircraft's main role, as a bomber.

I hope this helps a bit,

Best Regards as ever to those having to make the calls,

Engines

[NITRO104]

Originally Posted by Engines

The F-117 would actually be a really bad place to start if you wanted a fighter.

I over-exaggerated a bit here, too.

The F-35 is, as the title says, a 'strike fighter'. The customers never wanted a pure F-16 replacement, but an aircraft that could attack in a high threat environment, and defend itself as required. Personally, i believe that it should be the 'F/A-35', but there you go.

And this is probably the fairest F35 assessment I've seen so far and would like to see something like that come from LM, instead of superlatives across the board.
Might do wonders for their credibility and deescalate animosity their PR developed towards the public, so far.

[Lyneham Lad]

Just came across this link on the Reuters site:-
Podcast: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be the future, but is that a good thing?

[FODPlod]

Sorry Lyneham Lad but I stopped listening after all three participants in the 'discussion', including the chairman, immediately agreed that the "fancy-named" Lightning II was "...one of the worst weapons systems an American company has ever devised", everyone who has flown it hates it and the gun doesn't work.

Hardly a balanced or factual discussion. At least the podcast had the good grace to forewarn that the opinions expressed were those of the participants, not Reuters itself.

[KenV]

And this is probably the fairest F35 assessment I've seen so far and would like to see something like that come from LM, instead of superlatives across the board.

It seems to me that the opinion that LM only dispenses "superlatives across the board" is as much based on assumptions and wild conclusions as the opinions regarding KPPs not being met.

Might do wonders for their credibility and deescalate animosity their PR developed towards the public, so far.

I doubt that "deescalating animosity" towards the F-35 is possible on this forum. It's been pointed out for some time by multiple forum members and a four star general in charge of the program that the F-35 was designed as an attack aircraft with a "good enough" self defense capability, and not as an air superiority fighter. Such statements just served to escalate the animosity on this forum, not deescalate it.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by KenV

It's been pointed out for some time by multiple forum members and a four star general in charge of the program that the F-35 was designed as an attack aircraft with a "good enough" self defense capability, and not as an air superiority fighter. Such statements just served to escalate the animosity on this forum, not deescalate it.

More an A-7 than an F-15, eh?

I am reminded of the great furor that erupted over the F-18, and the later F-18E/F (is it still an F-18?) and discover that the Hornet has done pretty well over its years in the fleet.

It was trying to be both attack and fighter, to replace the A-7 but still be able to perform Fighter roles.

Seen through that lens, F-35, or A-35, or F/A-35 seems to be arriving with furor, and the burden of multi role requirements. Something don't change.

What's in a name?

@Kbrockman:

Which again leads to the question, what's in it for us, how can we make it
work ? We might need a couple of squadrons of F35A's but not the wings our top brass is currently dreaming of. Also makes anyone wonder on why they decided to make it look like a 9G fighter in stead of something a little more relevant and cheaper.

Because the requirements folks did like was done for the F-18: it has to perform multiple roles.

[LowObservable]

I don't wish to start an endless feedback loop, but the idea that the F-35 is a bomber with secondary strike capability is not, from my perspective, new or controversial.

However, it's not how the aircraft has been sold.

http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...ml#post9033295