Future Carrier (Including Costs)
So why are they still cutting things pray?
and I don't think everyone has signed up to the idea that cutting amphibious support is a Good Thing
and I don't think everyone has signed up to the idea that cutting amphibious support is a Good Thing
Thread Starter
Not so many weeks ago we were involved with the Netherlands in designing the landing platforms of the future, but I think that our participation went South due to founding issues.
There is an another issue - even with lots of frigates (and destroyers) protecting amphibious forces and reinforcement shipping without carriers and their aircraft is going to be a very hard nut to crack. You cannot replicate the long range, ability to visually identify unidentified aircraft, or defence in depth with shipborne radars and missiles.
The possibility of creating a viable fleet without carriers had been examined in 1962 for comparison with the arguments in favour of CVA-01. The study group had reported that such a fleet would be very expensive to create and very limited in capability. Without AEW aircraft, the fleet’s antiaircraft missiles would be limited to engagements within the ships’ radar ‘line of sight’, making them particularly vulnerable to pop-up low-level attacks under the radar horizon. The fleet would have no defence against shadowing aircraft that remained outside missile range, and would be unable to destroy missile-firing aircraft before they launched their weapons. Sea search and probe missions like those that initiated the Beira Patrol would no longer be possible beyond the helicopters’ radius of action. A surface-to-surface missile (SSM) would have to be developed or procured to replace strike aircraft in the anti-surface-vessel role, but even this would be of limited value without AEW aircraft to provide targeting information.
From British Aircraft Carrier - Design, Development and Service Histories by Cdr David Hobbs RN (Rtd) - a PDF version is here.
Similarly you need a lot of frigates to support the same number of ASW helicopters as a carrier will operate - and even if the frigates and sailors to man them existed there are difficulties in coordinating aircraft based aboard different frigates, and you cannot centralise things like maintenance and logistics.
These are the reasons that carriers are so important to NATO, are important in dealing with anti ship attacks in the Red Sea, and the major navies with a main role of Sea Control seek to either have them or at least operate with allied ones.
Over on the thread I started about the how and why carriers needed are in the Atlantic (and elsewhere of course) for Air Defence and ASW on another site, I posed a question before the recent Exercise Steadfast Defender 24 - could anyone suggest a better alternative to what HMS Prince of Wales did?
Constant protection of the amphibious force? No - that is a carrier role. The carrier provides presence and proximity.
Timely interception of simulated hostile aircraft, such as launching jets from inside the fjord? No - speed/time/distance considerations favour having your aircraft nearer both the attacking aircraft and the force to be defended.
Constant ASW? No - you would need a lot of frigates (or other warships/auxiliaries) to operate the same number of ASW helicopters as a carrier, and support and coordination would be difficult.
With Amphibiosity as usual you've managed to misunderstand what's going on. Future Commando Force is policy and doctrine. If that policy and doctrine moves you away from traditional landing over a beach and restructures your force to match, why have a traditional amphibious shipping force?
(I forgot to click post on the 17th after being interrupted) but here's my two penn'orth anyway.
N_a_b Future Commando Force confuses the hell out of me, but my understanding is that LRG(N) should be composed of a LPD (or similar), an LSS(currently legacy RFA), escort(s) and any additional RFA SSs required, LRG(S) has an small scale anti-terrorist focus so doesn't need an LPD, so Argus and a Bay are appropriate (and Escort(s) if the operational scenario requires) troops to be drawn from Forty or Four Five as required and RW assets as appropriate. Where an LSG fits in I am not sure. Is FCF not a flexibility doctrine? In other words allowing the use of small teams for Grey Zone ops up to a full Commando plus supporting arms amphib/helo op? I also can't quite reconcile FCF with the Rangers as the SF-lite roles seem to overlap to a very large extent.
Asturias et al,
The complement of the QEs is slightly smaller than the Invincibles, the next generation of escorts will wave substantially smaller complements than the legacy ones so the increased capability didn't require increased sailors. I would think having some units that have a proper fighting role is more likely to attract potential recruits. The problem also lies in recruiting in times of high employment from a pool of individuals who have very different expectations as to Ts & Cs of employment to previous generations and with diminishing contact with, and visibility of the armed forces.
Yes, they have subsidiary police, humanitarian, ASW and showing the flag roles but Type 45 destroyers primary role is to provide the Fleet with air defence.
The 23s were primarily built for an ASW role, the end of the Soviet VMF submarine threat partly left them in search of a role - whether they are being used as oversized OPVs or under armed peacetime Cruisers is moot. What worries me is if Op Corporate had been using escorts of similar vintage they would have been Lochs/Bays and the 1944 Daring Class.
The City Class (T26) ships have been specifically designed to hunt for enemy submarines.
The Type 31 general purpose frigate will undertake missions such as interception and disruption of those using the sea for unlawful purposes, intelligence gathering, defence engagement and providing humanitarian support.
Although not finalized the T32s are clearly intended to use AVs in ASW, ASuW and MCM roles
We can't change history but a the potential T26s for Norway issue is a result of the failure to preserve warship building capacity, presumably in part a side effect of failing to build replacement escorts when due and the reduction in fleet size due to the mythical peace dividend. In the not too distant past Cammells would have been building whole T26s not supplying sections for HMS Birmingham (granted ship building techniques have changed). Although the bulk of T22s (10) were built by Yarrow, Swan Hunters built 3 and Cammell Laird 1, simiilarly T23s Marconi Marine (ex-Yarrow) 12 , Swan Hunter 4. I am not sure the move to competitive bidding (with an aim of cost reduction) replacing DCNC + Primary Contractor and a sharing out the hulls wast he best thing from a defence manufacturing sustainability perspective. Where the six cancelled T45s would have been built is pure speculation.
N_a_b Future Commando Force confuses the hell out of me, but my understanding is that LRG(N) should be composed of a LPD (or similar), an LSS(currently legacy RFA), escort(s) and any additional RFA SSs required, LRG(S) has an small scale anti-terrorist focus so doesn't need an LPD, so Argus and a Bay are appropriate (and Escort(s) if the operational scenario requires) troops to be drawn from Forty or Four Five as required and RW assets as appropriate. Where an LSG fits in I am not sure. Is FCF not a flexibility doctrine? In other words allowing the use of small teams for Grey Zone ops up to a full Commando plus supporting arms amphib/helo op? I also can't quite reconcile FCF with the Rangers as the SF-lite roles seem to overlap to a very large extent.
Asturias et al,
The complement of the QEs is slightly smaller than the Invincibles, the next generation of escorts will wave substantially smaller complements than the legacy ones so the increased capability didn't require increased sailors. I would think having some units that have a proper fighting role is more likely to attract potential recruits. The problem also lies in recruiting in times of high employment from a pool of individuals who have very different expectations as to Ts & Cs of employment to previous generations and with diminishing contact with, and visibility of the armed forces.
Yes, they have subsidiary police, humanitarian, ASW and showing the flag roles but Type 45 destroyers primary role is to provide the Fleet with air defence.
The 23s were primarily built for an ASW role, the end of the Soviet VMF submarine threat partly left them in search of a role - whether they are being used as oversized OPVs or under armed peacetime Cruisers is moot. What worries me is if Op Corporate had been using escorts of similar vintage they would have been Lochs/Bays and the 1944 Daring Class.
The City Class (T26) ships have been specifically designed to hunt for enemy submarines.
The Type 31 general purpose frigate will undertake missions such as interception and disruption of those using the sea for unlawful purposes, intelligence gathering, defence engagement and providing humanitarian support.
Although not finalized the T32s are clearly intended to use AVs in ASW, ASuW and MCM roles
We can't change history but a the potential T26s for Norway issue is a result of the failure to preserve warship building capacity, presumably in part a side effect of failing to build replacement escorts when due and the reduction in fleet size due to the mythical peace dividend. In the not too distant past Cammells would have been building whole T26s not supplying sections for HMS Birmingham (granted ship building techniques have changed). Although the bulk of T22s (10) were built by Yarrow, Swan Hunters built 3 and Cammell Laird 1, simiilarly T23s Marconi Marine (ex-Yarrow) 12 , Swan Hunter 4. I am not sure the move to competitive bidding (with an aim of cost reduction) replacing DCNC + Primary Contractor and a sharing out the hulls wast he best thing from a defence manufacturing sustainability perspective. Where the six cancelled T45s would have been built is pure speculation.
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(I forgot to click post on the 17th after being interrupted) but here's my two penn'orth anyway.
N_a_b Future Commando Force confuses the hell out of me, but my understanding is that LRG(N) should be composed of a LPD (or similar), an LSS(currently legacy RFA), escort(s) and any additional RFA SSs required, LRG(S) has an small scale anti-terrorist focus so doesn't need an LPD, so Argus and a Bay are appropriate (and Escort(s) if the operational scenario requires) troops to be drawn from Forty or Four Five as required and RW assets as appropriate. Where an LSG fits in I am not sure. Is FCF not a flexibility doctrine? In other words allowing the use of small teams for Grey Zone ops up to a full Commando plus supporting arms amphib/helo op? I also can't quite reconcile FCF with the Rangers as the SF-lite roles seem to overlap to a very large extent.
N_a_b Future Commando Force confuses the hell out of me, but my understanding is that LRG(N) should be composed of a LPD (or similar), an LSS(currently legacy RFA), escort(s) and any additional RFA SSs required, LRG(S) has an small scale anti-terrorist focus so doesn't need an LPD, so Argus and a Bay are appropriate (and Escort(s) if the operational scenario requires) troops to be drawn from Forty or Four Five as required and RW assets as appropriate. Where an LSG fits in I am not sure. Is FCF not a flexibility doctrine? In other words allowing the use of small teams for Grey Zone ops up to a full Commando plus supporting arms amphib/helo op? I also can't quite reconcile FCF with the Rangers as the SF-lite roles seem to overlap to a very large extent.
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I get your point about 3 Commando Brigade, as it appears only (the undermanned) Forty and Four Five Commandos still have a 'traditional role' to any extent, Four Two has a dog's breakfast of roles:
(RN website).
Mind you none of them seem to have a dedicated role, 40 & 45:
To my (old fashioned) way of thinking an LPD is still an essential piece of kit for landing and moving a RM force in support of the NATO Northern Flank as they and their kit and supporting arms may need to go somewhere away from landing sites or in conditions that preclude delivery by air in sufficient numbers. It appears to me, but I may be wrong, that The Royals are still a major part of the UK's purple commitment to the High North, assuming my reading of this document (The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North) published under Ben Wallace in March 2022 is correct and the policy still valid. In such a case the LPD Command facilities also come in to play, not something I believe the current RFAs can provide, and we can't afford (or man) a dedicated LCC style dedicated C4 ship.
high threat Maritime Security Operations (MSO), Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOps), Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) and Support and Influence Operations (S&I). 42 Commando is a VHR commando force capable of delivering special operations with a specific expertise in maritime operations.
Mind you none of them seem to have a dedicated role, 40 & 45:
rapid reaction, amphibious warfare, Arctic warfare, mountain warfare, expeditionary warfare, humanitarian support, and disaster relief.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Defence Minister @jcartlidgemp refuses to confirm if HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll will ever go back to sea @LukePollard
"I am committed to looking at the future of the Surface Fleet in the round and making tough but necessary decisions to ensure this transition is a success."
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans...rans#g21265.r0
"I am committed to looking at the future of the Surface Fleet in the round and making tough but necessary decisions to ensure this transition is a success."
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans...rans#g21265.r0
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A few short months after the announcement of a £500 million upgrade programme to provide T45s with Sea Ceptor anti-ballistic missile capability with a first capable ship in 2026, HMS Diamond has taken out an anti-ship ballistic missile using Aster
Thread Starter
NATO naval forces continue to work hard to keep the peace, with French, Italian, Spanish, and Turkish flattops carriers deployed in the Mediterranean.
Two Major NATO Exercises Underway - USNI News
NATO is currently conducting two major naval activities – Dynamic Mongoose 24 in the North Atlantic and Neptune Strike 24-1, which involves four large-deck strike groups and spans both the Mediterranean Sea and Adriatic Sea as well as parts of the Baltic Sea.
NATO classes the Neptune Strike series of drills, usually held twice a year, as “enhanced vigilance activity” intended to demonstrate NATO’s capabilities and strength and enhance Allied connectivity. “Ranging from the Central Mediterranean to the Black Sea region and all the way up to the Baltic Sea, STRIKFORNATO’s execution will blanket three Joint Operations Areas and assert NATO’s capability to protect every inch of Allied territory with the naval resources that are organic to the theatre,” stated the command’s release on the exercise.
Neptune Strike 24-1 began on Friday and ends on 10 May, and involves Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. According to a release by NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples, this will be Sweden’s first time participating in the Neptune Strike series since it joined NATO on Mar. 7. The release also stated that as part of the exercise, NATO will control units operating across the entire Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, along with air units flying across Europe via air-to-air refueling and carrying out live-firing missions in the Baltic Sea and on firing ranges in Poland and Romania
Two carrier strike groups and two expeditionary strike groups are taking part in the exercise along with other NATO ships and submarines. The CSGs are the French CSG and the Cavour CSG of Italy, while the ESGs are the Spanish “Dedalo 24” ESG and the Turkish Anadolu ESG, with the Anadolu ESG operating under Turkish national command rather than NATO command. The French CSG comprises of carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R91), French frigates FS Chevalier Paul (D621) and FS Provence (D652), Portuguese frigate NRP Bartolomeu Dias (F333), Italian frigate ITS Carabiniere (F593), a Greek frigate, a Spanish frigate, French fleet oiler BRF Jacques Chevallier (A725) and a French attack submarine. The Cavour CSG comprises carrier ITS Cavour (550) and escorting Italian Navy surface ships.
The “Dedalo 24” ESG comprising of amphibious assault ship ESPS Juan Carlos I (L-61) with embarked AV-8B Harrier II strike aircraft, amphibious transport dock ESPS Galicia (L-51) and frigates ESPS Blas de Lezo (F-103) and ESPS Reina Sofía (F-84). A Spanish Marine Infantry battalion is embarked on the two amphibious ships. The Anadolu ESG consists of amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu (L-400), frigate TCG Salihreis (F-246) and corvette TCG Buyukada (F-512), along with an embarked Amphibious Marine Brigade force...
Two Major NATO Exercises Underway - USNI News
NATO is currently conducting two major naval activities – Dynamic Mongoose 24 in the North Atlantic and Neptune Strike 24-1, which involves four large-deck strike groups and spans both the Mediterranean Sea and Adriatic Sea as well as parts of the Baltic Sea.
NATO classes the Neptune Strike series of drills, usually held twice a year, as “enhanced vigilance activity” intended to demonstrate NATO’s capabilities and strength and enhance Allied connectivity. “Ranging from the Central Mediterranean to the Black Sea region and all the way up to the Baltic Sea, STRIKFORNATO’s execution will blanket three Joint Operations Areas and assert NATO’s capability to protect every inch of Allied territory with the naval resources that are organic to the theatre,” stated the command’s release on the exercise.
Neptune Strike 24-1 began on Friday and ends on 10 May, and involves Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. According to a release by NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Naples, this will be Sweden’s first time participating in the Neptune Strike series since it joined NATO on Mar. 7. The release also stated that as part of the exercise, NATO will control units operating across the entire Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, along with air units flying across Europe via air-to-air refueling and carrying out live-firing missions in the Baltic Sea and on firing ranges in Poland and Romania
Two carrier strike groups and two expeditionary strike groups are taking part in the exercise along with other NATO ships and submarines. The CSGs are the French CSG and the Cavour CSG of Italy, while the ESGs are the Spanish “Dedalo 24” ESG and the Turkish Anadolu ESG, with the Anadolu ESG operating under Turkish national command rather than NATO command. The French CSG comprises of carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R91), French frigates FS Chevalier Paul (D621) and FS Provence (D652), Portuguese frigate NRP Bartolomeu Dias (F333), Italian frigate ITS Carabiniere (F593), a Greek frigate, a Spanish frigate, French fleet oiler BRF Jacques Chevallier (A725) and a French attack submarine. The Cavour CSG comprises carrier ITS Cavour (550) and escorting Italian Navy surface ships.
The “Dedalo 24” ESG comprising of amphibious assault ship ESPS Juan Carlos I (L-61) with embarked AV-8B Harrier II strike aircraft, amphibious transport dock ESPS Galicia (L-51) and frigates ESPS Blas de Lezo (F-103) and ESPS Reina Sofía (F-84). A Spanish Marine Infantry battalion is embarked on the two amphibious ships. The Anadolu ESG consists of amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu (L-400), frigate TCG Salihreis (F-246) and corvette TCG Buyukada (F-512), along with an embarked Amphibious Marine Brigade force...
Thread Starter
Two carrier related things relating to current operations in the Red Sea:
1. USS Dwight D Eisenhower (and her group) are back on station.
2. The Super Hornets which have splashed numerous UAVs and anti ship missiles (a story noteworthy in its own right) are now carrying no less than nine AAMs:
Super Hornets Now Flying With Nine Air-To-Air Missiles To Counter Houthi Drones - The War Zone
The extra Sidewinder capacity was added to the Super Hornet and Growler to provide more ‘magazine depth’ to shoot down Houthi drones. For the Navy's EA-18Gs, the AIM-9X was an entirely new option added to their armory.
The need for this expanded air-to-air capacity became clear during IKE’s months on station in the Gulf of Aden, where it’s part of a task force that is defending shipping in the region while degrading the ability of the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to continue to threaten that shipping.
I seem to remember that some pages back I posted a link to an article from CIMSEC - and quoted it.
FIGHTING DMO, PT. 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN DISTRIBUTED WARFIGHTING
Air Defense and Shooting Archers
The immutable obstacle posed by the curvature of the earth severely constricts the amount of space and time in which warships can defeat sea-skimming missiles, despite their dense defenses. Sea-skimming flight takes advantage of the radar horizon limitations of defending warships, leaving them with little choice but to engage incoming missiles at a very short distance away from the ship (typically around 20 nautical miles) and with only tens of seconds before impact.
Surface warships should be spared the burden of these harrowing missile engagements as much as possible. This will require shooting down archers instead of arrows and being able to destroy missiles that are traveling beneath the radar horizons of their target warships...
---
A handful of aircraft can therefore be enough to substantially tilt the balance of a naval salvo engagement in favor of the defending warships.
QED!
1. USS Dwight D Eisenhower (and her group) are back on station.
2. The Super Hornets which have splashed numerous UAVs and anti ship missiles (a story noteworthy in its own right) are now carrying no less than nine AAMs:
Super Hornets Now Flying With Nine Air-To-Air Missiles To Counter Houthi Drones - The War Zone
The extra Sidewinder capacity was added to the Super Hornet and Growler to provide more ‘magazine depth’ to shoot down Houthi drones. For the Navy's EA-18Gs, the AIM-9X was an entirely new option added to their armory.
The need for this expanded air-to-air capacity became clear during IKE’s months on station in the Gulf of Aden, where it’s part of a task force that is defending shipping in the region while degrading the ability of the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen to continue to threaten that shipping.
I seem to remember that some pages back I posted a link to an article from CIMSEC - and quoted it.
FIGHTING DMO, PT. 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN DISTRIBUTED WARFIGHTING
Air Defense and Shooting Archers
The immutable obstacle posed by the curvature of the earth severely constricts the amount of space and time in which warships can defeat sea-skimming missiles, despite their dense defenses. Sea-skimming flight takes advantage of the radar horizon limitations of defending warships, leaving them with little choice but to engage incoming missiles at a very short distance away from the ship (typically around 20 nautical miles) and with only tens of seconds before impact.
Surface warships should be spared the burden of these harrowing missile engagements as much as possible. This will require shooting down archers instead of arrows and being able to destroy missiles that are traveling beneath the radar horizons of their target warships...
---
A handful of aircraft can therefore be enough to substantially tilt the balance of a naval salvo engagement in favor of the defending warships.
QED!
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The diagram suggests there is only one range ........... instantaneous ............ at which detection occurs.
Whoever signed this off needs a new job.
OK so we know better, but people get paid for such nonsense.
Whoever signed this off needs a new job.
OK so we know better, but people get paid for such nonsense.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Interesting article here, by NavyLookout.
https://www.navylookout.com/diminish...-global-reach/
I'm in the RFA training pipeline for CIS Branch. Below is my first payslip. However, some IMPORTANT CAVEATS:
- This is a 3 week/month.
- Emergency tax code skews net pay.
- Am not complaining, since I knew what I was signing up for - I'm not here for the money, but most are, of course.
- Next month likely to be around £1,200 plus tax repayment.
- We get free utilities, Wifi, food and note the decent RFA pension contribution.
BUT, the key point is how to ATTRACT new recruits at a salary of £17,226 p.a., and of what quality are you attracting?
The Faststream Recruitment Group Report, discussed in the main NL article highlights disparity in the various branch and rank benchmark comparisions.
In my (elite and feared) CIS branch, as well as Systems Engineers, the difference may be as much as 40% below industry. Yet, a zero-qualification entry requirement deckhand is on the same pay scale (beloved as they are).
The RFA is 'tween military and civilian
- RN uniform, but no beret or salutes
- On military base, but no access to the RN medical centre 200m away 🤷♂️
Been here 5 weeks now, yet we have no shirts, and must walk round in either T shirts, or Gore-tex jackets.
It's not good optics, when you are publicly displayed in this way.
It's a complex subject, and as a newbie, I'll not stick my toe into retention...
Also, the 'life' and whole package is more nuanced than a simple salary comparison; and each person places different value on different things.
I was the one who obtained the referenced FoI last year, and when you look at the total £92m annual salary, NI and pension costs, it's obvious that any substantial correction is easily achieavable as an MoD budget 'rounding error'.
Remember too, that there are very many good people here, working hard to make things better.
I hope the review is swiftly acted upon.
https://www.navylookout.com/diminish...-global-reach/
I'm in the RFA training pipeline for CIS Branch. Below is my first payslip. However, some IMPORTANT CAVEATS:
- This is a 3 week/month.
- Emergency tax code skews net pay.
- Am not complaining, since I knew what I was signing up for - I'm not here for the money, but most are, of course.
- Next month likely to be around £1,200 plus tax repayment.
- We get free utilities, Wifi, food and note the decent RFA pension contribution.
BUT, the key point is how to ATTRACT new recruits at a salary of £17,226 p.a., and of what quality are you attracting?
The Faststream Recruitment Group Report, discussed in the main NL article highlights disparity in the various branch and rank benchmark comparisions.
In my (elite and feared) CIS branch, as well as Systems Engineers, the difference may be as much as 40% below industry. Yet, a zero-qualification entry requirement deckhand is on the same pay scale (beloved as they are).
The RFA is 'tween military and civilian
- RN uniform, but no beret or salutes
- On military base, but no access to the RN medical centre 200m away 🤷♂️
Been here 5 weeks now, yet we have no shirts, and must walk round in either T shirts, or Gore-tex jackets.
It's not good optics, when you are publicly displayed in this way.
It's a complex subject, and as a newbie, I'll not stick my toe into retention...
Also, the 'life' and whole package is more nuanced than a simple salary comparison; and each person places different value on different things.
I was the one who obtained the referenced FoI last year, and when you look at the total £92m annual salary, NI and pension costs, it's obvious that any substantial correction is easily achieavable as an MoD budget 'rounding error'.
Remember too, that there are very many good people here, working hard to make things better.
I hope the review is swiftly acted upon.
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Annual Salary £ 17k......................... that's pretty grim.
per hour for a 40 hour week. A qualified Comms rating will start on circa £30k. (£29,526 in 2023) c.85% of UK median full time earnings.Without wanting to appear to belittle him and acknowledging the fact that RFA Ts&Cs including salaries are clearly not attracting or retaining sufficient numbers, he is effectively a student who is being paid and not running up debts of £9k plus living costs per year.
Sadly, people are still prepared to travel on P&O ferries while some staff are only paid £4.87 per hour.
Of the 7 RFA vessels built to replenish warships at sea, just 2 are active at the time of writing.
...
Although a formalisation of an arrangement that has been practised before, the RN recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the German Navy. They will supply one of their auxiliary oilers, such as FGS Berlin or Bonn to act as FOST tanker as the RFA can no longer always be relied on to provide a vessel for replenishment at sea training serials.
...
It was confidently stated by a senior RFA officer last year that RFA Fort Victoria would be ready to support the 2025 Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Asia Pacific. Reliable sources now say that she will almost certainly not be available for CSG25 as the RFA has accepted a crew cannot be generated in time.
Solid Stores support for the carrier group will therefore be compromised. Assuming at least one of the Tide-class tankers go on the deployment, a limited amount of food and stores can be carried in TEU containers on their foredeck. They could supply some of the requirement by VERTREP but this will be a stretch and increases expensive helicopter flying hours. While the provision of fuel from allied nations’ auxiliaries would be relatively straightforward, the supply of ammunition from foreign vessels (ie US Strategic Sealift ships) is complicated and not routinely practised. Stores could also be pre-positioned at friendly ports such as Duqm, but tying the carrier to predetermined logistic stops weakens the whole independent CSG concept. (quoted Navy Lookout article)
...
Although a formalisation of an arrangement that has been practised before, the RN recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the German Navy. They will supply one of their auxiliary oilers, such as FGS Berlin or Bonn to act as FOST tanker as the RFA can no longer always be relied on to provide a vessel for replenishment at sea training serials.
...
It was confidently stated by a senior RFA officer last year that RFA Fort Victoria would be ready to support the 2025 Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Asia Pacific. Reliable sources now say that she will almost certainly not be available for CSG25 as the RFA has accepted a crew cannot be generated in time.
Solid Stores support for the carrier group will therefore be compromised. Assuming at least one of the Tide-class tankers go on the deployment, a limited amount of food and stores can be carried in TEU containers on their foredeck. They could supply some of the requirement by VERTREP but this will be a stretch and increases expensive helicopter flying hours. While the provision of fuel from allied nations’ auxiliaries would be relatively straightforward, the supply of ammunition from foreign vessels (ie US Strategic Sealift ships) is complicated and not routinely practised. Stores could also be pre-positioned at friendly ports such as Duqm, but tying the carrier to predetermined logistic stops weakens the whole independent CSG concept. (quoted Navy Lookout article)
Last edited by SLXOwft; 12th May 2024 at 21:51. Reason: Vindictive
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Navy Lookout is reporting 'The Defence Secretary will confirm in a speech today that the MRSS programme has been approved and the RN will receive up to 6 amphibious vessels'
NL are positing a ship in the region of 20,000 tons so (assuming full load) slightly heavier than both Albion and Bay classes, lighter than Argus or Juan Carlos, roughly Mistral or Ocean.
Many questions come to mind, including:
As I have said before, IMHO the ideal would be a mix of LHD and LPD(A) which might be provided by a common hull and machinery with modular systems. The denizens of the House of Darkness, however, will be happy to trade potential lost lives for saving a few quid on the acquisition cost.
2.5% or preferably 3% of GDP might be a sustainable defence budget going forward, the problem is that no politician is going to handle the short-to-medium term requirement to address filling the asset gaps caused by 24 years of deluded underspend. Especially when snake oil salesmen are selling the illusion of cheap uncrewed and AI based solutions. Here endeth the rant.
Limited detail is available at this stage but 3 main issues need to be resolved. Firstly the RN must decide what form these ships will take, whether essentially just modern, lean-manned equivalents of today’s vessels or something more radical. As the Commando Force moves towards light, agile raiding operations and with its supporting shipping pushed much further away from the coast, the new amphibious vessels need to adapt. Navy sources describe the vessels as “non-complex warships” that will have hangars, a well dock, generous storage for containerised systems (PODS) and an emphasis on the ability to deploy uncrewed systems as well as troops.
Secondly, as the government is committed to construction in the UK, industry must work to build up adequate shipbuilding capacity. Finally and most urgently, the RN must grip personnel issues right now to ensure it can generate crews for new ships as they are completed in future.
A MoU signed with the RNLN in June 2023 to cooperate on MRSS design has not survived contact with reality. In keeping with past attempts to jointly develop naval platforms with European partners, political goodwill and some common needs could not be aligned with differing requirements, philosophies and funding. A Dutch navy spokesman said “The budget is different and the concept is different. That’s why we have diverged from the British and have come to the conclusion that we cannot build identical ships”. Some coordination on sub systems, landing craft and aviation compatibility are hoped for.
Secondly, as the government is committed to construction in the UK, industry must work to build up adequate shipbuilding capacity. Finally and most urgently, the RN must grip personnel issues right now to ensure it can generate crews for new ships as they are completed in future.
A MoU signed with the RNLN in June 2023 to cooperate on MRSS design has not survived contact with reality. In keeping with past attempts to jointly develop naval platforms with European partners, political goodwill and some common needs could not be aligned with differing requirements, philosophies and funding. A Dutch navy spokesman said “The budget is different and the concept is different. That’s why we have diverged from the British and have come to the conclusion that we cannot build identical ships”. Some coordination on sub systems, landing craft and aviation compatibility are hoped for.
Many questions come to mind, including:
- How are they to be crewed? RFA, RN or RFA/RN split? Currently both would be a problem numbers wise,
- Will they have C4 capability? If so will the kit be modular and only fitted on a role specific basis?
- NL's contacts say hangars but how big a deck, full or behind super structure?
- What defensive suite will they get, sensors, weapons, decoys, datalink etc?
As I have said before, IMHO the ideal would be a mix of LHD and LPD(A) which might be provided by a common hull and machinery with modular systems. The denizens of the House of Darkness, however, will be happy to trade potential lost lives for saving a few quid on the acquisition cost.
2.5% or preferably 3% of GDP might be a sustainable defence budget going forward, the problem is that no politician is going to handle the short-to-medium term requirement to address filling the asset gaps caused by 24 years of deluded underspend. Especially when snake oil salesmen are selling the illusion of cheap uncrewed and AI based solutions. Here endeth the rant.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 14th May 2024 at 17:46. Reason: Adding RPAS and url - missing will
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Without wanting to appear to belittle him and acknowledging the fact that RFA Ts&Cs including salaries are clearly not attracting or retaining sufficient numbers, he is effectively a student who is being paid and not running up debts of £9k plus living costs per year.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1...592631019.html
”BACKGROUND
I’m a healthy 57 yr old, with previous RAF HMC&E maritime service back in the new romantic 80s.
I've just exited my own SIGINT company after 30 yrs, and handed this over to a colleague. We specialised in UK/NATO/RoW Government-only grade, niche SIGINT & processing technology; predominantly LEO/GEO satellites.
I’m not a hallowed graduate, as I was commissioned into the RAF when I was 19, without going to Uni.
I’m therefore predominantly self-taught, A Level educated, with the odd third-party cse here and there”…….
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