RAF Rivet Joint
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I understand one of the stumbling blocks is in the maintenance - How can you guarantee that the replacement parts match the original items the safety case was drawn up against?
Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens.
As to the reason for going down the RJ/Airseeker route instead of the original Helix upgrade plan - I'd guess that when Helix became unaffordable (due to them realising that extending the R1 was not solely it's current running costs because of the infrastructure support it enjoyed from the maritime variant?). It looks like they revisited earlier, pre-Haddon-Cave, proposals without fully considering the implications.
Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens.
As to the reason for going down the RJ/Airseeker route instead of the original Helix upgrade plan - I'd guess that when Helix became unaffordable (due to them realising that extending the R1 was not solely it's current running costs because of the infrastructure support it enjoyed from the maritime variant?). It looks like they revisited earlier, pre-Haddon-Cave, proposals without fully considering the implications.
Am I the only one that finds it amazing that someone would spend many millions for an airplane and them get into a huge argument with themselves over whether they can actually fly the airplane ?
Last edited by Rick777; 19th Apr 2014 at 05:11.
Ricky,
no, you're not. if the RAF has bought this aircraft and then decides its never going to be safe to fly i wouldn't bother wasting money on a 'happy 100th Birthday' card for the RAF...
nobody minds the RAF nut-stranglers sitting down and saying that an aircrafts history, or non-existant history, means it should never leave the ground again. they do however mind if the RAF has just bought it, and persuaded ministers to make public pronouncements on the cleverness of buying this particular aircraft.
would you go car shopping with a bloke who only last week had taken a car for a test drive, bought it, and then - upon getting home - decided to send it off for scrap as it would never pass an MOT? no, and neither will ministers.
Nimrod, RJ, F-35B/C/B - all these embarrassing episodes under one government and that government is going to start doubting the competance of the people supposedly managing those programmes...
no, you're not. if the RAF has bought this aircraft and then decides its never going to be safe to fly i wouldn't bother wasting money on a 'happy 100th Birthday' card for the RAF...
nobody minds the RAF nut-stranglers sitting down and saying that an aircrafts history, or non-existant history, means it should never leave the ground again. they do however mind if the RAF has just bought it, and persuaded ministers to make public pronouncements on the cleverness of buying this particular aircraft.
would you go car shopping with a bloke who only last week had taken a car for a test drive, bought it, and then - upon getting home - decided to send it off for scrap as it would never pass an MOT? no, and neither will ministers.
Nimrod, RJ, F-35B/C/B - all these embarrassing episodes under one government and that government is going to start doubting the competance of the people supposedly managing those programmes...
Just a reminder that this situation didn't just suddenly happen. It is the inevitable and logical consequence of the actions of certain RAF VSOs almost 30 years ago and of the subsequent cover up of those actions since, let alone any serious effort by the RAF High Command to correct them.
As you say cokecan, hardly the setting for any celebration in 4 years time, unless of course it bites the bullet, admits what happened, and sets about putting things right, starting with calling for the MAA and MAAIB to be freed from the MOD and from each other.
Now, deep breath in and hold....
As you say cokecan, hardly the setting for any celebration in 4 years time, unless of course it bites the bullet, admits what happened, and sets about putting things right, starting with calling for the MAA and MAAIB to be freed from the MOD and from each other.
Now, deep breath in and hold....
Rick777 and cokecan,
I realize that this thread is getting quite long, and 500+ posts is a lot to read. However, if you go back and read my post 433, and some of the replies, especially 434, you will see a partial explanation of the situation you refer to - i.e. buying an aircraft that your own procedures then won't let you operate.
Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.
While this doesn't excuse the situation, and the problem (risk) should have been seen coming and mitigated earlier, it does help explain how it occurred.
I have used the phrase "rules" quite generally. tucumseh and others are far more knowledgeable on these issues and the many sins that appear to have been committed, and are still being committed, in this area for the past 25 odd years. Their posts are more enlightening about the situation in general.
I realize that this thread is getting quite long, and 500+ posts is a lot to read. However, if you go back and read my post 433, and some of the replies, especially 434, you will see a partial explanation of the situation you refer to - i.e. buying an aircraft that your own procedures then won't let you operate.
Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.
While this doesn't excuse the situation, and the problem (risk) should have been seen coming and mitigated earlier, it does help explain how it occurred.
I have used the phrase "rules" quite generally. tucumseh and others are far more knowledgeable on these issues and the many sins that appear to have been committed, and are still being committed, in this area for the past 25 odd years. Their posts are more enlightening about the situation in general.
oh absolutely, these problems are the result of actions/decisions decades old, but they are to the outsider (and i include the rest of the government in that..) all coming together at the same time.
it looks, again, to the outsider, like the RAF (collectively, regardless of how unfairly) couldn't find its arse with both hands.
while i've seen individuals blamed, it can only be the truth that a whole generation or more of senior RAF officers have conspired in this airworthiness abortion - as happened with Chinook ZD576 and the subsequent cover up, Nimrod XV230 etc...
on the evidence, you wouldn't trust the RAF to run a welk stall without killing the saturday girl.
it looks, again, to the outsider, like the RAF (collectively, regardless of how unfairly) couldn't find its arse with both hands.
while i've seen individuals blamed, it can only be the truth that a whole generation or more of senior RAF officers have conspired in this airworthiness abortion - as happened with Chinook ZD576 and the subsequent cover up, Nimrod XV230 etc...
on the evidence, you wouldn't trust the RAF to run a welk stall without killing the saturday girl.
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Documentation
Wensleydale's post about documentation revived memories of the E-3D trial programme.
Apparently when the Boscombe Down team set about planning the E-3D trial programme it looked at the agreed contractual method of testing for the respective aircraft and mission systems.
Against some items it read "PV" meaning it had been previously verified and did not need to be tested. This had been agreed by the civil servants managing the project in the then MOD PE.
When the team asked for proof of how the systems had been tested the reply was that proof of verification was not part of the contract. I believe this led to a separate contract having to be set up for the documentation to be provided.
Apparently when the Boscombe Down team set about planning the E-3D trial programme it looked at the agreed contractual method of testing for the respective aircraft and mission systems.
Against some items it read "PV" meaning it had been previously verified and did not need to be tested. This had been agreed by the civil servants managing the project in the then MOD PE.
When the team asked for proof of how the systems had been tested the reply was that proof of verification was not part of the contract. I believe this led to a separate contract having to be set up for the documentation to be provided.
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"Cutting through this sorry saga to the chase - does anyone have the remotest idea when/if this aircraft will fly again?"
According to local television which has picked up on the story, the MOD has stated that the aircraft will be "operational" by the end of the year.
According to local television which has picked up on the story, the MOD has stated that the aircraft will be "operational" by the end of the year.
Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.
Are you 100% sure of this? Not arguing but I'm not convinced. Nimrod was scrapped after Haddon-Cave, who reported end 2009. The MAA is 4 years old this month. As tuc mentioned above, one of the main problems was probably the announcement that RJ was to be exactly the same as a US aircraft, then they realized the advice it couldn't be was correct all along. Over a year between delivering an "off the shelf" aircraft and entering service means something is wrong. Smells like someone just assumed the safety case would be a box tick and they parked it in a corner.
“No documentation” and “no configuration control” were major contributory factors in the deaths of many of our UK servicemen
What I'd want to know is what work the company charged with stripping, inspecting, making good, rebuilding, testing, trialling our 3 aircraft has to do to achieve this; especially the making good bit.
Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them.
Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears).
I understand one of the stumbling blocks is in the maintenance - How can you guarantee that the replacement parts match the original items the safety case was drawn up against?
).
Lonewolf
I agree with your assessment, except;
That would be a fair assumption if talking about an organisation that understands that CC is mandated and a fundamental pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case.
However, this is MoD we're talking about, and it is well over 20 years since our airworthiness leaders pulled the plug on funding and the need for staff to implement these regulations. In March 1999, our Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star, Sir Robert Walmsley, retired Admiral) confirmed in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that CC was lacking on whole aircraft fleets (the specific question was on Chinook) and then made his position on this quite clear by upholding disciplinary action against staffs who dared to insist it be carried out. This remains MoD's formal position.
Following the original 1991 policy, these issues became standing risks on any MoD aviation programme. That is, the policy meant you must assume you WILL hit problems. At first, perhaps minor; but as time progressed and gaps in CC increased, they would become major showstoppers. Regulations governing approvals require such risks to be mitigated. It is one reason why one cannot insert "100%" against the probability of occurrence in a risk register. If it is 100% you CANNOT seek approval to proceed. You MUST deal with it beforehand.
The situation on Rivet Joint would seem to be that MoD recognised the risk but did not do anything about it; at least not in a timely fashion or before seeking approval to proceed. This may sound like a simple case of deciding to deal with it in parallel with the main programme - in MoD's words, "proceed at risk". However, the dangers are obvious. MoD's risk management strategy has, for many years, been; By all means identify the risk, but wait to see if it becomes a problem before doing anything. This policy, enthusiastically implemented by many VSOs, has killed many. 7 on the Sea King ASaCs. 2 on Tornado ZG710. 29 on Chinook ZD576. And many more. The chances are that, once approval was granted, risk management was off-loaded onto some untrained junior; as it was on Nimrod MR2. On that programme, the hapless individual was named and shamed by the **** Haddon-Cave, but the VSOs who consciously denied him the training and resources to do the job were praised. That ethos has not yet changed for the better.
I agree with your assessment, except;
So long as the configuration record is sound, I'd reckon on the MoD staff being able to reconcile.
However, this is MoD we're talking about, and it is well over 20 years since our airworthiness leaders pulled the plug on funding and the need for staff to implement these regulations. In March 1999, our Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star, Sir Robert Walmsley, retired Admiral) confirmed in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that CC was lacking on whole aircraft fleets (the specific question was on Chinook) and then made his position on this quite clear by upholding disciplinary action against staffs who dared to insist it be carried out. This remains MoD's formal position.
Following the original 1991 policy, these issues became standing risks on any MoD aviation programme. That is, the policy meant you must assume you WILL hit problems. At first, perhaps minor; but as time progressed and gaps in CC increased, they would become major showstoppers. Regulations governing approvals require such risks to be mitigated. It is one reason why one cannot insert "100%" against the probability of occurrence in a risk register. If it is 100% you CANNOT seek approval to proceed. You MUST deal with it beforehand.
The situation on Rivet Joint would seem to be that MoD recognised the risk but did not do anything about it; at least not in a timely fashion or before seeking approval to proceed. This may sound like a simple case of deciding to deal with it in parallel with the main programme - in MoD's words, "proceed at risk". However, the dangers are obvious. MoD's risk management strategy has, for many years, been; By all means identify the risk, but wait to see if it becomes a problem before doing anything. This policy, enthusiastically implemented by many VSOs, has killed many. 7 on the Sea King ASaCs. 2 on Tornado ZG710. 29 on Chinook ZD576. And many more. The chances are that, once approval was granted, risk management was off-loaded onto some untrained junior; as it was on Nimrod MR2. On that programme, the hapless individual was named and shamed by the **** Haddon-Cave, but the VSOs who consciously denied him the training and resources to do the job were praised. That ethos has not yet changed for the better.
Thanks for that explanation. The old problem of "doing more with less" generally leads to crap outcomes in some way.
Hoping that the research into the condition of the aircraft proceeds apace and they get to serve their intended purpose. It's a great capability.
Hoping that the research into the condition of the aircraft proceeds apace and they get to serve their intended purpose. It's a great capability.
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For consideration by the United Kingdom’s
Military Aviation Authority (MAA)
Military Aviation Authority (MAA)
Subject: The Airseeker Program.
When I made a protected disclosure to the United States Congress in 2008, I was unaware of a proposal by the United Kingdom to purchase three retired KC-135 aerial refueling tankers from the United States. The old U.S. tankers would be converted into RC-135 Rivet Joint spy planes, under contract by L-3 Communications, as a replacement for the UK’s own faltering spy plane known as the Nimrod. The non-airworthy condition of Rivet Joint 62-4127, as described in my disclosure to Congress, was strikingly similar to the non-airworthy condition that led to the 2006 destruction of Nimrod XV230 over Afghanistan. Suspending my security clearance and covering-up the RC-135 maintenance problems were despicable acts, possibly orchestrated by senior defense officials to secure a 1.3 billion dollar aircraft purchase by the UK, and to supplement the United States’ own intelligence-gathering fleet utilizing British funds.
I intended to post the remaining sixty-three pages of my Congressional disclosure to this chapter, but the remaining sixty-three pages contain aircraft technical data protected by either the Export Administrations Act of 1979 (Title 50) or the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22). Absent this technical data, the remaining sixty-three pages would inaccurately reflect the other substantiated aircraft maintenance problems of the 55th Wing and the RC-135 program.
Now that I have retired and the blackmail has ended, I’m providing this book to demonstrate how harassment, intimidation, and reprisals are used to control the Federal workforce when management fears that it has been caught doing something unethical or illegal, thus the title, “Cowardice in Leadership”.
I am willing to post a link to the book "Cowardice In Leadership" if it is permitted by this forum.
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Rivet Joint Aircraft "Safety"
At the risk of "stirring the pot", all the questions about the C-135 airframes, conversions, records, etc. is what we call BxxxSxxT!
I have about 4000 hrs in both KCs and various RCs in ops; survived a KC mid-air collision with an F-4C that took our boom off, smashed the rear fuselage and dented/damaged the left horizontal and elevator; was Air Staff program manager for one of the RC versions (RC-135U, Combat Sent); and have remained familiar with new block versions, L-3 COMM operations at the Greenville, TX support facility and how the Big Safari office manages the program after retiring from USAF and moving to the space recce realm.
To say that there is anything "wrong" with the airframe, conversion to RJ standard, testing, understanding airframe problems or documentation is totally unacceptable. The particular KC airframes converted to RJs 18, 19, 20 come from the last block of KC-135s built, in the batch just before the RC-135Bs, from which the current RC-135Vs and Us are derived.
The Greenville facility (Majors Field) has had cognizance of the RC-135 program since the late '60s when the original aircraft were modified (then under E-Systems Corp). A very expert location, with a workforce dedicated to developing, integrating and supporting special missions aircraft. This same facility is responsible for many other modifications, including E-4 airborne command posts and others, Bundes Marine 'Peace Peak" SIGINT Atlantiques, and Saudi RE-3s. In fact, during my last visit a few years ago I glimpsed an RAF Canadair Sentinel on the ramp.
The RJs are modified and upgraded every three years in what is called Phase Depot Maintenance. PDM is a complete major parts removal inspection, repair, upgrade and re-wire of aircraft and mission systems. For example, I have even seen entire aft fuselage skin panels replaced due to urine corrosion from the aft loo due to poor crewmembers' "aim" during airborne ops. The process of converting a KC to RC configuration is even more detailed. Boeing work in the past decades has mostly been confined to wing skin replacement in the 1980's (entire C-135 fleet mod) and re-engining to the CFM F108-201 fanjets.
This is all to say that these aircraft are not safe due to some paperwork plans floated to correct MoD/RAF internal problems over the years is wrong. There is a very valid reason the MoD/RAF bought the jets "to the same standard" as the USAF. Interoperability is one, but more importantly, there are fewer problems when the jets are the same as the rest of the fleet. Fleet-wide maintenance, problem identification, upgrades all flow smoothly. The RAF RJs will become part of a fleet of 20 and enter the upgrade cycles in the same flow as the USAF jets, with the exception of UK life support (life rafts, etc,) and putting the galley water heaters back in for "brew ups".
I recently heard the Australian ambassador speak on defence issues "down under". The one thing he emphasized, when asked about the recent order for Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft was, "You get the best equipped, lowest maintenance, highest operational rate from equipment bought from the U.S. IF you buy the exact same version the U.S. is also operating."
I would hope the U.K. has finally figured this out after the Spey-powered Phantoms (costing 3 times a regular F-4) turned out to be slower at a lower max altitude. The Aussies learned the lesson with the Collins boat fiasco.
After the decades-long tail of the Comet-derivatives, Comet, Nimrod, Nimrod AEW (a 'good' one there) and finally the MRA.4 total waste, I believe the RAF is getting the best bank for the buck in the -135. After all, Boeing designed and built it to '50s standards ("overbuilt" I'd say) and it has been modified, humps added, trailed 5-mile long aerials, had more sections cut-out for sensors, added B-47 wing racks for jammer pods, long noses, bulbous noses, round noses, extended fuselage tails, more than four different engines, chin bulges and just about every other external indignity added. "Flying" through the flak of UK bogus paperwork will be, as you say from the BoB book, "A Piece of Cake"!
This long post is to attempt to set the record straight, Having engaged in long, enjoyable nights debating aircraft with many Brit friends, I am under no illusion that this will end the petty back and forth. I do enjoy the blather. Additionally, I would discount the previous post as from someone with a very bad personal ax to grind about 55th maintenance. Usually individuals on this track have many other personal issues.
Bill
I have about 4000 hrs in both KCs and various RCs in ops; survived a KC mid-air collision with an F-4C that took our boom off, smashed the rear fuselage and dented/damaged the left horizontal and elevator; was Air Staff program manager for one of the RC versions (RC-135U, Combat Sent); and have remained familiar with new block versions, L-3 COMM operations at the Greenville, TX support facility and how the Big Safari office manages the program after retiring from USAF and moving to the space recce realm.
To say that there is anything "wrong" with the airframe, conversion to RJ standard, testing, understanding airframe problems or documentation is totally unacceptable. The particular KC airframes converted to RJs 18, 19, 20 come from the last block of KC-135s built, in the batch just before the RC-135Bs, from which the current RC-135Vs and Us are derived.
The Greenville facility (Majors Field) has had cognizance of the RC-135 program since the late '60s when the original aircraft were modified (then under E-Systems Corp). A very expert location, with a workforce dedicated to developing, integrating and supporting special missions aircraft. This same facility is responsible for many other modifications, including E-4 airborne command posts and others, Bundes Marine 'Peace Peak" SIGINT Atlantiques, and Saudi RE-3s. In fact, during my last visit a few years ago I glimpsed an RAF Canadair Sentinel on the ramp.
The RJs are modified and upgraded every three years in what is called Phase Depot Maintenance. PDM is a complete major parts removal inspection, repair, upgrade and re-wire of aircraft and mission systems. For example, I have even seen entire aft fuselage skin panels replaced due to urine corrosion from the aft loo due to poor crewmembers' "aim" during airborne ops. The process of converting a KC to RC configuration is even more detailed. Boeing work in the past decades has mostly been confined to wing skin replacement in the 1980's (entire C-135 fleet mod) and re-engining to the CFM F108-201 fanjets.
This is all to say that these aircraft are not safe due to some paperwork plans floated to correct MoD/RAF internal problems over the years is wrong. There is a very valid reason the MoD/RAF bought the jets "to the same standard" as the USAF. Interoperability is one, but more importantly, there are fewer problems when the jets are the same as the rest of the fleet. Fleet-wide maintenance, problem identification, upgrades all flow smoothly. The RAF RJs will become part of a fleet of 20 and enter the upgrade cycles in the same flow as the USAF jets, with the exception of UK life support (life rafts, etc,) and putting the galley water heaters back in for "brew ups".
I recently heard the Australian ambassador speak on defence issues "down under". The one thing he emphasized, when asked about the recent order for Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft was, "You get the best equipped, lowest maintenance, highest operational rate from equipment bought from the U.S. IF you buy the exact same version the U.S. is also operating."
I would hope the U.K. has finally figured this out after the Spey-powered Phantoms (costing 3 times a regular F-4) turned out to be slower at a lower max altitude. The Aussies learned the lesson with the Collins boat fiasco.
After the decades-long tail of the Comet-derivatives, Comet, Nimrod, Nimrod AEW (a 'good' one there) and finally the MRA.4 total waste, I believe the RAF is getting the best bank for the buck in the -135. After all, Boeing designed and built it to '50s standards ("overbuilt" I'd say) and it has been modified, humps added, trailed 5-mile long aerials, had more sections cut-out for sensors, added B-47 wing racks for jammer pods, long noses, bulbous noses, round noses, extended fuselage tails, more than four different engines, chin bulges and just about every other external indignity added. "Flying" through the flak of UK bogus paperwork will be, as you say from the BoB book, "A Piece of Cake"!
This long post is to attempt to set the record straight, Having engaged in long, enjoyable nights debating aircraft with many Brit friends, I am under no illusion that this will end the petty back and forth. I do enjoy the blather. Additionally, I would discount the previous post as from someone with a very bad personal ax to grind about 55th maintenance. Usually individuals on this track have many other personal issues.
Bill
Last edited by NoVANav; 19th Apr 2014 at 01:35.
Two very interesting posts there by cpants and NoVANav.
The former goes much further than MoD has been prepared to admit. Please do post a link. If such information was presented to Congress in 2008, before the RJ contract was let, then I think MoD's commercial director will be very interested if it wasn't disclosed as part of negotiations. If it WAS disclosed, MoD are in the clag - again.
And MoD have actually admitted what NoVANav says is wrong. (It isn't a rumour started here on pprune; we are simply discussing the issues MoD have revealed). That doesn't mean NoVANav is wrong. Far from it. The problem could be MoD doesn't understand the information provided from the US. Perhaps the breakdown is in the link between Boeing and L3(?). Immaturity of understanding is itself a good reason not to release the aircraft. In fact, it is mandated.
The one thing I'd say is I wouldn't be so dismissive of something that, at face value, is utterly outrageous. MoD claimed the Chinook and Nimrod were airworthy. Independent Reviews accepted the fact they were not, known not to be by senior officers and this fact covered up. No one would believe these senior officers would lie about this to the bitter end, but they did. And no one would believe the MAA would continue this deceit, but they do.
The former goes much further than MoD has been prepared to admit. Please do post a link. If such information was presented to Congress in 2008, before the RJ contract was let, then I think MoD's commercial director will be very interested if it wasn't disclosed as part of negotiations. If it WAS disclosed, MoD are in the clag - again.
And MoD have actually admitted what NoVANav says is wrong. (It isn't a rumour started here on pprune; we are simply discussing the issues MoD have revealed). That doesn't mean NoVANav is wrong. Far from it. The problem could be MoD doesn't understand the information provided from the US. Perhaps the breakdown is in the link between Boeing and L3(?). Immaturity of understanding is itself a good reason not to release the aircraft. In fact, it is mandated.
The one thing I'd say is I wouldn't be so dismissive of something that, at face value, is utterly outrageous. MoD claimed the Chinook and Nimrod were airworthy. Independent Reviews accepted the fact they were not, known not to be by senior officers and this fact covered up. No one would believe these senior officers would lie about this to the bitter end, but they did. And no one would believe the MAA would continue this deceit, but they do.
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A lot of people - the Great British Public, the press, MP's, the Treasury..... - are going to have a lot of questions if the RAF ground Rivet Joint on the basis it "is not airworthy" when dozens of the damn things are swanning around the sky and have been for years without serious problems
No doubt people of the "Common Sense party" & "Health & Safety gone mad" views will also be heard
From the outside it seems that the MoD is saddled (or saddled itself) with a Safety system that impedes the acquisition of anything but new aircraft documented to UK Standards
I leave it to wiser men and women to decide whether this is a good thing or not.........................
No doubt people of the "Common Sense party" & "Health & Safety gone mad" views will also be heard
From the outside it seems that the MoD is saddled (or saddled itself) with a Safety system that impedes the acquisition of anything but new aircraft documented to UK Standards
I leave it to wiser men and women to decide whether this is a good thing or not.........................
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Indeed. Sometimes it is easier to present reasons for saying 'no' than finding ways of saying 'yes'.
I'll go back a few years when I was presented with a particular task where we needed to paint a nice Red Cross on the side of one of the RAF's finest support helicopters. The helicopter det EngO decided to ring Hels back in the UK to get approval; the answer was no. A quiet, 'offline' chat with EngO resulted in a nice pair of red crosses, a completed task and no dead puppies (or even pilots).
I'll go back a few years when I was presented with a particular task where we needed to paint a nice Red Cross on the side of one of the RAF's finest support helicopters. The helicopter det EngO decided to ring Hels back in the UK to get approval; the answer was no. A quiet, 'offline' chat with EngO resulted in a nice pair of red crosses, a completed task and no dead puppies (or even pilots).