B737 flydubay crash
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Basta leggere e in questo caso anche ascoltare essendoci le registrazioni e senti come il tono della chiamata di go around sia un po' troppo calmo per suggerire una toccata.
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L'ultimo video e' impressionante, sono caduti balistici, nemmeno una minima variazione di traiettoria da quando escono dalla base delle nuvole, la visibilità sotto e' buona. L'angolo di impatto e' abbastanza accentuato, l'esplosione è tremenda, sicuramente il carburante presente non è a quantità ridotte. Se è stato un microburst e' stato violentissimo ed inesorabile.
Per quanto riguarda la scatola nera e le investigazioni a mio avviso la crisi in Siria, che vede opposte Russia contro il mondo arabo schierato nell'asse Arabia Saudita Turchia, crea più facilmente un ambiente fertile ad investigazioni serie. Per di più sono morti tanti russi e Putin che gioca sulla leva del nazionalismo avrebbe un ritorno di immagine più proficuo a tirar fuori responsabilità che vanno oltre a quelle dei piloti.
In ogni caso io sono sempre a priori contro ogni ipotesi complottistica, al giorno d'oggi è sempre più difficile nascondere le cose, le fonti di informazioni sono troppe, le tracce lasciate anche e le persone coinvolte direttamente sono decine se non centinaia.
Già girano le voci riguardo al fatto che sia tutta una montatura e nessun aereo si sia effettivamente schiantato.
La stupidità umana non ha fine, forse è meglio che certa gente rimanga confinata a vedere il grande fratello o la pupa e il secchione.
Un ultimo pensiero a tutte le vittime e alle loro famiglie. È sempre una cosa straziante.
Possano riposare in pace
Per quanto riguarda la scatola nera e le investigazioni a mio avviso la crisi in Siria, che vede opposte Russia contro il mondo arabo schierato nell'asse Arabia Saudita Turchia, crea più facilmente un ambiente fertile ad investigazioni serie. Per di più sono morti tanti russi e Putin che gioca sulla leva del nazionalismo avrebbe un ritorno di immagine più proficuo a tirar fuori responsabilità che vanno oltre a quelle dei piloti.
In ogni caso io sono sempre a priori contro ogni ipotesi complottistica, al giorno d'oggi è sempre più difficile nascondere le cose, le fonti di informazioni sono troppe, le tracce lasciate anche e le persone coinvolte direttamente sono decine se non centinaia.
Già girano le voci riguardo al fatto che sia tutta una montatura e nessun aereo si sia effettivamente schiantato.
La stupidità umana non ha fine, forse è meglio che certa gente rimanga confinata a vedere il grande fratello o la pupa e il secchione.
Un ultimo pensiero a tutte le vittime e alle loro famiglie. È sempre una cosa straziante.
Possano riposare in pace
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Ray , quando farete il prossimo incontro sulle FTL metti sotto il naso di qualche sapientone burocratico i turni di uno dei due colleghi della FD e chiedigli se questo tipo di impiego e' sostenibile dopo mesi e mesi se non anni, e sentiamo che cosa risponde .
Che il turno era secondo la normativa ? Benissimo allora la normativa fa c.....e e va cambiata .
https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydu...fatigue-crash/
Che il turno era secondo la normativa ? Benissimo allora la normativa fa c.....e e va cambiata .
https://www.rt.com/news/336514-flydu...fatigue-crash/
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Io non sono competente in materia investigazioni, ma dal video, un aereo che si pianta in quel modo non sembrerebbe aver molto a che fare con la fatica.
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Qui nel MiddleEast tutte le compagnie Hanno questo problema di fatigue
Se riesco vi mostrero un articolo Che parla di Emirates
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Eccola Ramones....grazie!
The following may or may not have helped to inspire AAR to conduct the upcoming meeting. At least it may serve as some food for thought. Earlier this year the report below was filed and acknowledged by EASA and the FAA. The report was also shared with the Office of HH Sheikh Mohammed with the explanation that EK’s pilot shortage is not due to global factors but home made. From there it was delivered to the GCAA. As far as I know the FAA is actively investigating.
“…as a former Emirates pilot I want to report the lack of regulatory oversight and effective labour laws in the UAE. Emirates operates its long-haul fleet with unprecedented "crew productivity" at a crew factor near 7. That is impossible to match for any major Western airline. The issue reported in the WSJ on April 9, 2015 is still not rectified. This is a ticking time-bomb for flight safety and crew health. I highly recommend that you require a rolling 12 month duty record for any Emirates crew member operating in your jurisdiction, covering flight, simulator and ground duties as well as deadheading. The UAE can not be trusted to safely regulate aviation.
The main takeaway of the following detailed information is:
• Emirates are deliberately recording false check-in times for all of their pilots on all flights. Because any duty limit or rest calculation is based on check-in time it is simply impossible to say whether an Emirates crew is operating legally or not. This is not just a problem for individual flights but also has knock-on effects on the following required rest periods, next allowed check-in time and duty totals.
• When the fact was made public the GCAA as regulatory authority promised to regulate it properly. The opposite happened. They covered this up for Emirates because they are by no means independent. Western authorities shouldn’t trust them blindly to regulate Emirates. Please see the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2014 to understand that independent control of a government-owned business is impossible under their legal system. The Chairman of Emirates Airline, Sheikh Ahmed, leads the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority but more importantly he sits on the Board of Directors for the GCAA as a Board Member (see GCAA website).
• Emirates are also using other shortcuts and bullying of their employees to make their pilots operate at an unhealthy workload level. On 03 June 2015 Emirates Captain Jim Jacobs (54) died from a heart attack at JFK when boarding the flight to Dubai. He was exhausted and wanted to retire that year.
• As a result of these illegal practices Emirates are achieving great savings by operating at a crew factor of 7 where flight safety dictates a crew factor of 11 in similar operations at regulated Western Airlines (e.g. AirFrance A380 fleet). Emirates presently operates about 250 aircraft (number from open sources) with about 3,850 pilots (from EK seniority list as of 12-2015), some of whom are in training, in management or on sick leave.
1 False Check-in Times
Every Emirates pilot is forced to report for duty significantly prior to the legally registered reporting time. In other words: Emirates is extending their pilots’ flight duty times by registering false reporting times for each and every flight.
Pilots’ flight time limitations are obviously safety relevant and in the case of Emirates Airline the operations manual is approved by the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) in the United Arab Emirates. According to the Emirates Operations Manual the Standard Reporting Time for pilots is 1 hour before a flight. So a pilot is legally required to report for duty only 1 hour before the flight departs.
But the operational reality is very different. Emirates pilots are picked up at their residences by a company chauffeur and arrive at the Emirates HQ at least 1 hour and 45 minutes before departure. The timing of the company transport is set by Emirates and can not be delayed by the pilot. The pilot will then proceed through Passport Control and Customs and he will check in his baggage. He will then conduct a preflight briefing with the other pilot on his flight. The flight crew briefing ends at 1 hour 25 minutes before departure as documented in the Flight Crew Departure Timeline. After that the pilots will join their cabin crew and proceed to the aircraft.
So the pilot has completed all of the outlined tasks at 1 hour and 25 minutes before the flight and yet his reporting time is registered at only 1 hour before the flight. Why doesn’t Emirates adjust the Standard Reporting Time? Even Emirates Cabin Crews’ Standard Reporting Time is set at 1 hour and 30 minutes but Cabin Crew Flight Time Limitations are less limiting than those for pilots.
I am attaching a sample Flight Crew Departure Timeline (Part of the Briefing Pack). It is an example of a 2 Pilot Crew Turnaround. EK 544 and EK 545 Dubai-Chennai-Dubai. B773, A6-EMR on April 25th 2014.
Pickup by Company Car 00:30 Dubai Local Time
Flight Crew Briefing End 01:20 Dubai Local Time
Reporting Time 01:45 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Departure 02:45 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure DXB 02:57 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival MAA 06:37 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure MAA 08:02 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival DXB 12:06 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Arrival DXB 12:30 Dubai Local Time
After the WSJ reported this issue on April 9, 2015 Emirates removed the internal document “Flight Crew Departure Time” from the process. But that’s the only change.
“The GCAA’s Mr. Al Balooshi said reporting requirements for duty time should be “black and white” and begin when a pilot is expected to report for work and finish when his or her last flight taxies into the gate. Emirates said it abides by state-approved flight-time limitations. “(WSJ article).
This is clearly not the case. Please see the following evidence:
Attachment 1: Flight Crew Departure Timeline for EK544 on 25 April 2014
Attachment 2: Pilot Transport Pickup Schedule
Attachment 3: Internal Memo ‘The Waves’ Flight Crew responsibilities page 6
Attachment 4: Signage at the Crew Terminal outlining that the combined Pilot & Cabin Crew briefing finishes at Standard Departure Time minus 80 (20 minutes before the pilots’ legally registered check-in time).
Attachment 5: EK Pilot Recruitment Video @5:00 runtime. Quote: "I get picked up 2 hours 30 minutes before departure.” http://youtu.be/A53VRz_KhnY
Attachment 6: Emirates OM-A Section 7
Attachment 7: Wall Street Journal Article, April 9, 2015
Attachment 8: Internal email by the Manager Regulatory Affairs telling the related parties in Emirates to remove the Flight Crew Departure Timeline document from the briefing pack, 22 April 2015
2. Further Issues
Here are some of the other issues that I can also back up with evidence and further witnesses:
• Pilots are bullied not to report sick. They receive warning letters if their annual sick days go above a fairly low threshold and may not receive the annual bonus. The first thing is usually to withdraw the right for self-certification of sickness, meaning you can’t call in sick for a single day without a doctor’s certification (not very practical giving the nightly duty schedules).
• the process for reporting sick fatigue is a lot more complicated than just calling sick.
• the Emirates Clinic is overcrowded and understaffed with doctors. Long waiting times are the result.
• the process for cabin crew to report sick is completely prohibitive now. They must drag themselves to EK HQ at any time of the day or night where they only get the sick note but no treatment.
• there is no proper East-West time-zone curfew applied to the rosters
• on Ultra-Long-Haul flights there is now a factoring for 'stick time', meaning you only get half the credit for a flight if you are on the augmenting crew that didn’t do the take-off and landing. This has implications for the following rest times etc.
• No credit for time in a certified full-flight simulator. That’s another 22hours of flight duty per year that just disappear from the records.
• No proper leave allocation. Out of 42 contractual leave days only 30 days are
The following may or may not have helped to inspire AAR to conduct the upcoming meeting. At least it may serve as some food for thought. Earlier this year the report below was filed and acknowledged by EASA and the FAA. The report was also shared with the Office of HH Sheikh Mohammed with the explanation that EK’s pilot shortage is not due to global factors but home made. From there it was delivered to the GCAA. As far as I know the FAA is actively investigating.
“…as a former Emirates pilot I want to report the lack of regulatory oversight and effective labour laws in the UAE. Emirates operates its long-haul fleet with unprecedented "crew productivity" at a crew factor near 7. That is impossible to match for any major Western airline. The issue reported in the WSJ on April 9, 2015 is still not rectified. This is a ticking time-bomb for flight safety and crew health. I highly recommend that you require a rolling 12 month duty record for any Emirates crew member operating in your jurisdiction, covering flight, simulator and ground duties as well as deadheading. The UAE can not be trusted to safely regulate aviation.
The main takeaway of the following detailed information is:
• Emirates are deliberately recording false check-in times for all of their pilots on all flights. Because any duty limit or rest calculation is based on check-in time it is simply impossible to say whether an Emirates crew is operating legally or not. This is not just a problem for individual flights but also has knock-on effects on the following required rest periods, next allowed check-in time and duty totals.
• When the fact was made public the GCAA as regulatory authority promised to regulate it properly. The opposite happened. They covered this up for Emirates because they are by no means independent. Western authorities shouldn’t trust them blindly to regulate Emirates. Please see the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2014 to understand that independent control of a government-owned business is impossible under their legal system. The Chairman of Emirates Airline, Sheikh Ahmed, leads the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority but more importantly he sits on the Board of Directors for the GCAA as a Board Member (see GCAA website).
• Emirates are also using other shortcuts and bullying of their employees to make their pilots operate at an unhealthy workload level. On 03 June 2015 Emirates Captain Jim Jacobs (54) died from a heart attack at JFK when boarding the flight to Dubai. He was exhausted and wanted to retire that year.
• As a result of these illegal practices Emirates are achieving great savings by operating at a crew factor of 7 where flight safety dictates a crew factor of 11 in similar operations at regulated Western Airlines (e.g. AirFrance A380 fleet). Emirates presently operates about 250 aircraft (number from open sources) with about 3,850 pilots (from EK seniority list as of 12-2015), some of whom are in training, in management or on sick leave.
1 False Check-in Times
Every Emirates pilot is forced to report for duty significantly prior to the legally registered reporting time. In other words: Emirates is extending their pilots’ flight duty times by registering false reporting times for each and every flight.
Pilots’ flight time limitations are obviously safety relevant and in the case of Emirates Airline the operations manual is approved by the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) in the United Arab Emirates. According to the Emirates Operations Manual the Standard Reporting Time for pilots is 1 hour before a flight. So a pilot is legally required to report for duty only 1 hour before the flight departs.
But the operational reality is very different. Emirates pilots are picked up at their residences by a company chauffeur and arrive at the Emirates HQ at least 1 hour and 45 minutes before departure. The timing of the company transport is set by Emirates and can not be delayed by the pilot. The pilot will then proceed through Passport Control and Customs and he will check in his baggage. He will then conduct a preflight briefing with the other pilot on his flight. The flight crew briefing ends at 1 hour 25 minutes before departure as documented in the Flight Crew Departure Timeline. After that the pilots will join their cabin crew and proceed to the aircraft.
So the pilot has completed all of the outlined tasks at 1 hour and 25 minutes before the flight and yet his reporting time is registered at only 1 hour before the flight. Why doesn’t Emirates adjust the Standard Reporting Time? Even Emirates Cabin Crews’ Standard Reporting Time is set at 1 hour and 30 minutes but Cabin Crew Flight Time Limitations are less limiting than those for pilots.
I am attaching a sample Flight Crew Departure Timeline (Part of the Briefing Pack). It is an example of a 2 Pilot Crew Turnaround. EK 544 and EK 545 Dubai-Chennai-Dubai. B773, A6-EMR on April 25th 2014.
Pickup by Company Car 00:30 Dubai Local Time
Flight Crew Briefing End 01:20 Dubai Local Time
Reporting Time 01:45 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Departure 02:45 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure DXB 02:57 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival MAA 06:37 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure MAA 08:02 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival DXB 12:06 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Arrival DXB 12:30 Dubai Local Time
After the WSJ reported this issue on April 9, 2015 Emirates removed the internal document “Flight Crew Departure Time” from the process. But that’s the only change.
“The GCAA’s Mr. Al Balooshi said reporting requirements for duty time should be “black and white” and begin when a pilot is expected to report for work and finish when his or her last flight taxies into the gate. Emirates said it abides by state-approved flight-time limitations. “(WSJ article).
This is clearly not the case. Please see the following evidence:
Attachment 1: Flight Crew Departure Timeline for EK544 on 25 April 2014
Attachment 2: Pilot Transport Pickup Schedule
Attachment 3: Internal Memo ‘The Waves’ Flight Crew responsibilities page 6
Attachment 4: Signage at the Crew Terminal outlining that the combined Pilot & Cabin Crew briefing finishes at Standard Departure Time minus 80 (20 minutes before the pilots’ legally registered check-in time).
Attachment 5: EK Pilot Recruitment Video @5:00 runtime. Quote: "I get picked up 2 hours 30 minutes before departure.” http://youtu.be/A53VRz_KhnY
Attachment 6: Emirates OM-A Section 7
Attachment 7: Wall Street Journal Article, April 9, 2015
Attachment 8: Internal email by the Manager Regulatory Affairs telling the related parties in Emirates to remove the Flight Crew Departure Timeline document from the briefing pack, 22 April 2015
2. Further Issues
Here are some of the other issues that I can also back up with evidence and further witnesses:
• Pilots are bullied not to report sick. They receive warning letters if their annual sick days go above a fairly low threshold and may not receive the annual bonus. The first thing is usually to withdraw the right for self-certification of sickness, meaning you can’t call in sick for a single day without a doctor’s certification (not very practical giving the nightly duty schedules).
• the process for reporting sick fatigue is a lot more complicated than just calling sick.
• the Emirates Clinic is overcrowded and understaffed with doctors. Long waiting times are the result.
• the process for cabin crew to report sick is completely prohibitive now. They must drag themselves to EK HQ at any time of the day or night where they only get the sick note but no treatment.
• there is no proper East-West time-zone curfew applied to the rosters
• on Ultra-Long-Haul flights there is now a factoring for 'stick time', meaning you only get half the credit for a flight if you are on the augmenting crew that didn’t do the take-off and landing. This has implications for the following rest times etc.
• No credit for time in a certified full-flight simulator. That’s another 22hours of flight duty per year that just disappear from the records.
• No proper leave allocation. Out of 42 contractual leave days only 30 days are
DOVE
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URRR 190030Z 24012G19MPS 6000 -SHRA SCT018 BKN036CB OVC100 06/04 Q0998 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE741/0988
URRR 190100Z 24014G22MPS 3800 -SHRA BKN014 BKN033CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/a...6-fdn/#922b3bd:
Al parcheggio:
DISTANCE 2,807 km AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME 3:56 ACTUAL FLIGHT TIME 6:05
FROM Dubai (DXB) TO Rostov-on-Don (ROV) TIME 18:20 UTC
SPEED 10 KTS TRACK 209° ALTITUDE 0 FT
Decollo:
TIME 18:38 UTC SPEED 175 KTS TRACK 301° ALTITUDE 325 FT
Finale (G.A.):
TIME 22:42 UTC (Flt time: 4h 04') SPEED 119 KTS TRACK 224° ALTITUDE1,775 FT
Lascia la holding per il 2° avvicinamento:
TIME 00:28 UTC (dopo 1h 46') SPEED 216 KTS TRACK 341° ALTITUDE 10,250 FT
In finale stabilizzato:
TIME 00:37 UTC SPEED 119 KTS TRACK 223° ALTITUDE 2,750 FT
Tutto continua normalmente:
TIME 00:40 UTC SPEED 120 KTS TRACK 226° ALTITUDE 1,700 FT . La deriva, se c'è è minma (w/v 240/28G44)
Succede qualcosa di strano, aumentano quota e velocità:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED 150 KTS TRACK 222° ALTITUDE 2,700 FT
Una manciata di secondi dopo:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED 185 KTS TRACK 227° ALTITUDE 3,975 FT
E:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED197 KTS TRACK 229° ALTITUDE 925 FT
Non sò se e quanto siano attendibili le registrazioni di flightradar24, ma i suddetti valori non si discostano molto dalle immagini raccapriccianti della traiettoria della discesa finale e dello schianto dell'infelice volo FZ981 del 19/03/2016
Al simulatore dell'M80 avevamo un paio di scenari ripresi dal vero, che mostravamo agli allievi, durante una lezione mirata, per metterli in guardia dal wind-shear.
In ambedue si verificava, in corto finale, un improvviso... "Vuoto d'aria" (non c'è immagine migliore per descriverne gli effetti) che li risucchiava a terra.
Forse se:
- Avessero creduto un po' di più ai bollettini (già nei primi voli alla volta di Mosca ricevevamo ...8Cb/2000; e poi c'era tempesta di sereno),
- Avessero potuto avere una migliore 'Situational awareness' (come dicono i bravi) e cioè avessero potuto sentire le comunicazioni in inglese anziché in russo tra ATC ed aerei che dirottavano,
- Non fossero stati 'sderenati'
Le cose sarebbero andate diversamente.
Signori miei
Fatene tesoro.
Il vostro
URRR 190100Z 24014G22MPS 3800 -SHRA BKN014 BKN033CB OVC100 06/04 Q0997 R22/290046 TEMPO 25017G25MPS 1000 SHRA BR SCT003 BKN020CB RMK QFE740/0987
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/a...6-fdn/#922b3bd:
Al parcheggio:
DISTANCE 2,807 km AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME 3:56 ACTUAL FLIGHT TIME 6:05
FROM Dubai (DXB) TO Rostov-on-Don (ROV) TIME 18:20 UTC
SPEED 10 KTS TRACK 209° ALTITUDE 0 FT
Decollo:
TIME 18:38 UTC SPEED 175 KTS TRACK 301° ALTITUDE 325 FT
Finale (G.A.):
TIME 22:42 UTC (Flt time: 4h 04') SPEED 119 KTS TRACK 224° ALTITUDE1,775 FT
Lascia la holding per il 2° avvicinamento:
TIME 00:28 UTC (dopo 1h 46') SPEED 216 KTS TRACK 341° ALTITUDE 10,250 FT
In finale stabilizzato:
TIME 00:37 UTC SPEED 119 KTS TRACK 223° ALTITUDE 2,750 FT
Tutto continua normalmente:
TIME 00:40 UTC SPEED 120 KTS TRACK 226° ALTITUDE 1,700 FT . La deriva, se c'è è minma (w/v 240/28G44)
Succede qualcosa di strano, aumentano quota e velocità:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED 150 KTS TRACK 222° ALTITUDE 2,700 FT
Una manciata di secondi dopo:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED 185 KTS TRACK 227° ALTITUDE 3,975 FT
E:
TIME 00:41 UTC SPEED197 KTS TRACK 229° ALTITUDE 925 FT
Non sò se e quanto siano attendibili le registrazioni di flightradar24, ma i suddetti valori non si discostano molto dalle immagini raccapriccianti della traiettoria della discesa finale e dello schianto dell'infelice volo FZ981 del 19/03/2016
Al simulatore dell'M80 avevamo un paio di scenari ripresi dal vero, che mostravamo agli allievi, durante una lezione mirata, per metterli in guardia dal wind-shear.
In ambedue si verificava, in corto finale, un improvviso... "Vuoto d'aria" (non c'è immagine migliore per descriverne gli effetti) che li risucchiava a terra.
Forse se:
- Avessero creduto un po' di più ai bollettini (già nei primi voli alla volta di Mosca ricevevamo ...8Cb/2000; e poi c'era tempesta di sereno),
- Avessero potuto avere una migliore 'Situational awareness' (come dicono i bravi) e cioè avessero potuto sentire le comunicazioni in inglese anziché in russo tra ATC ed aerei che dirottavano,
- Non fossero stati 'sderenati'
Le cose sarebbero andate diversamente.
Signori miei
Fatene tesoro.
Il vostro
DOVE
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Almeno ai piloti non tolgono il passaporto quando entrano nei confini nazionali come fanno con tutti gli altri 'lavoratori'.
Essi non possono scioperare perché lo sceicco è contemporaneamente: datore di lavoro-tutela sindacale-Autorità legiferante ed esecutiva.
Ma noi?
Romano
Essi non possono scioperare perché lo sceicco è contemporaneamente: datore di lavoro-tutela sindacale-Autorità legiferante ed esecutiva.
Ma noi?
Romano
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Eccola Ramones....grazie!
The following may or may not have helped to inspire AAR to conduct the upcoming meeting. At least it may serve as some food for thought. Earlier this year the report below was filed and acknowledged by EASA and the FAA. The report was also shared with the Office of HH Sheikh Mohammed with the explanation that EK’s pilot shortage is not due to global factors but home made. From there it was delivered to the GCAA. As far as I know the FAA is actively investigating.
“…as a former Emirates pilot I want to report the lack of regulatory oversight and effective labour laws in the UAE. Emirates operates its long-haul fleet with unprecedented "crew productivity" at a crew factor near 7. That is impossible to match for any major Western airline. The issue reported in the WSJ on April 9, 2015 is still not rectified. This is a ticking time-bomb for flight safety and crew health. I highly recommend that you require a rolling 12 month duty record for any Emirates crew member operating in your jurisdiction, covering flight, simulator and ground duties as well as deadheading. The UAE can not be trusted to safely regulate aviation.
The main takeaway of the following detailed information is:
• Emirates are deliberately recording false check-in times for all of their pilots on all flights. Because any duty limit or rest calculation is based on check-in time it is simply impossible to say whether an Emirates crew is operating legally or not. This is not just a problem for individual flights but also has knock-on effects on the following required rest periods, next allowed check-in time and duty totals.
• When the fact was made public the GCAA as regulatory authority promised to regulate it properly. The opposite happened. They covered this up for Emirates because they are by no means independent. Western authorities shouldn’t trust them blindly to regulate Emirates. Please see the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2014 to understand that independent control of a government-owned business is impossible under their legal system. The Chairman of Emirates Airline, Sheikh Ahmed, leads the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority but more importantly he sits on the Board of Directors for the GCAA as a Board Member (see GCAA website).
• Emirates are also using other shortcuts and bullying of their employees to make their pilots operate at an unhealthy workload level. On 03 June 2015 Emirates Captain Jim Jacobs (54) died from a heart attack at JFK when boarding the flight to Dubai. He was exhausted and wanted to retire that year.
• As a result of these illegal practices Emirates are achieving great savings by operating at a crew factor of 7 where flight safety dictates a crew factor of 11 in similar operations at regulated Western Airlines (e.g. AirFrance A380 fleet). Emirates presently operates about 250 aircraft (number from open sources) with about 3,850 pilots (from EK seniority list as of 12-2015), some of whom are in training, in management or on sick leave.
1 False Check-in Times
Every Emirates pilot is forced to report for duty significantly prior to the legally registered reporting time. In other words: Emirates is extending their pilots’ flight duty times by registering false reporting times for each and every flight.
Pilots’ flight time limitations are obviously safety relevant and in the case of Emirates Airline the operations manual is approved by the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) in the United Arab Emirates. According to the Emirates Operations Manual the Standard Reporting Time for pilots is 1 hour before a flight. So a pilot is legally required to report for duty only 1 hour before the flight departs.
But the operational reality is very different. Emirates pilots are picked up at their residences by a company chauffeur and arrive at the Emirates HQ at least 1 hour and 45 minutes before departure. The timing of the company transport is set by Emirates and can not be delayed by the pilot. The pilot will then proceed through Passport Control and Customs and he will check in his baggage. He will then conduct a preflight briefing with the other pilot on his flight. The flight crew briefing ends at 1 hour 25 minutes before departure as documented in the Flight Crew Departure Timeline. After that the pilots will join their cabin crew and proceed to the aircraft.
So the pilot has completed all of the outlined tasks at 1 hour and 25 minutes before the flight and yet his reporting time is registered at only 1 hour before the flight. Why doesn’t Emirates adjust the Standard Reporting Time? Even Emirates Cabin Crews’ Standard Reporting Time is set at 1 hour and 30 minutes but Cabin Crew Flight Time Limitations are less limiting than those for pilots.
I am attaching a sample Flight Crew Departure Timeline (Part of the Briefing Pack). It is an example of a 2 Pilot Crew Turnaround. EK 544 and EK 545 Dubai-Chennai-Dubai. B773, A6-EMR on April 25th 2014.
Pickup by Company Car 00:30 Dubai Local Time
Flight Crew Briefing End 01:20 Dubai Local Time
Reporting Time 01:45 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Departure 02:45 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure DXB 02:57 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival MAA 06:37 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure MAA 08:02 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival DXB 12:06 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Arrival DXB 12:30 Dubai Local Time
After the WSJ reported this issue on April 9, 2015 Emirates removed the internal document “Flight Crew Departure Time” from the process. But that’s the only change.
“The GCAA’s Mr. Al Balooshi said reporting requirements for duty time should be “black and white” and begin when a pilot is expected to report for work and finish when his or her last flight taxies into the gate. Emirates said it abides by state-approved flight-time limitations. “(WSJ article).
This is clearly not the case. Please see the following evidence:
Attachment 1: Flight Crew Departure Timeline for EK544 on 25 April 2014
Attachment 2: Pilot Transport Pickup Schedule
Attachment 3: Internal Memo ‘The Waves’ Flight Crew responsibilities page 6
Attachment 4: Signage at the Crew Terminal outlining that the combined Pilot & Cabin Crew briefing finishes at Standard Departure Time minus 80 (20 minutes before the pilots’ legally registered check-in time).
Attachment 5: EK Pilot Recruitment Video @5:00 runtime. Quote: "I get picked up 2 hours 30 minutes before departure.” http://youtu.be/A53VRz_KhnY
Attachment 6: Emirates OM-A Section 7
Attachment 7: Wall Street Journal Article, April 9, 2015
Attachment 8: Internal email by the Manager Regulatory Affairs telling the related parties in Emirates to remove the Flight Crew Departure Timeline document from the briefing pack, 22 April 2015
2. Further Issues
Here are some of the other issues that I can also back up with evidence and further witnesses:
• Pilots are bullied not to report sick. They receive warning letters if their annual sick days go above a fairly low threshold and may not receive the annual bonus. The first thing is usually to withdraw the right for self-certification of sickness, meaning you can’t call in sick for a single day without a doctor’s certification (not very practical giving the nightly duty schedules).
• the process for reporting sick fatigue is a lot more complicated than just calling sick.
• the Emirates Clinic is overcrowded and understaffed with doctors. Long waiting times are the result.
• the process for cabin crew to report sick is completely prohibitive now. They must drag themselves to EK HQ at any time of the day or night where they only get the sick note but no treatment.
• there is no proper East-West time-zone curfew applied to the rosters
• on Ultra-Long-Haul flights there is now a factoring for 'stick time', meaning you only get half the credit for a flight if you are on the augmenting crew that didn’t do the take-off and landing. This has implications for the following rest times etc.
• No credit for time in a certified full-flight simulator. That’s another 22hours of flight duty per year that just disappear from the records.
• No proper leave allocation. Out of 42 contractual leave days only 30 days are
The following may or may not have helped to inspire AAR to conduct the upcoming meeting. At least it may serve as some food for thought. Earlier this year the report below was filed and acknowledged by EASA and the FAA. The report was also shared with the Office of HH Sheikh Mohammed with the explanation that EK’s pilot shortage is not due to global factors but home made. From there it was delivered to the GCAA. As far as I know the FAA is actively investigating.
“…as a former Emirates pilot I want to report the lack of regulatory oversight and effective labour laws in the UAE. Emirates operates its long-haul fleet with unprecedented "crew productivity" at a crew factor near 7. That is impossible to match for any major Western airline. The issue reported in the WSJ on April 9, 2015 is still not rectified. This is a ticking time-bomb for flight safety and crew health. I highly recommend that you require a rolling 12 month duty record for any Emirates crew member operating in your jurisdiction, covering flight, simulator and ground duties as well as deadheading. The UAE can not be trusted to safely regulate aviation.
The main takeaway of the following detailed information is:
• Emirates are deliberately recording false check-in times for all of their pilots on all flights. Because any duty limit or rest calculation is based on check-in time it is simply impossible to say whether an Emirates crew is operating legally or not. This is not just a problem for individual flights but also has knock-on effects on the following required rest periods, next allowed check-in time and duty totals.
• When the fact was made public the GCAA as regulatory authority promised to regulate it properly. The opposite happened. They covered this up for Emirates because they are by no means independent. Western authorities shouldn’t trust them blindly to regulate Emirates. Please see the U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2014 to understand that independent control of a government-owned business is impossible under their legal system. The Chairman of Emirates Airline, Sheikh Ahmed, leads the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority but more importantly he sits on the Board of Directors for the GCAA as a Board Member (see GCAA website).
• Emirates are also using other shortcuts and bullying of their employees to make their pilots operate at an unhealthy workload level. On 03 June 2015 Emirates Captain Jim Jacobs (54) died from a heart attack at JFK when boarding the flight to Dubai. He was exhausted and wanted to retire that year.
• As a result of these illegal practices Emirates are achieving great savings by operating at a crew factor of 7 where flight safety dictates a crew factor of 11 in similar operations at regulated Western Airlines (e.g. AirFrance A380 fleet). Emirates presently operates about 250 aircraft (number from open sources) with about 3,850 pilots (from EK seniority list as of 12-2015), some of whom are in training, in management or on sick leave.
1 False Check-in Times
Every Emirates pilot is forced to report for duty significantly prior to the legally registered reporting time. In other words: Emirates is extending their pilots’ flight duty times by registering false reporting times for each and every flight.
Pilots’ flight time limitations are obviously safety relevant and in the case of Emirates Airline the operations manual is approved by the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) in the United Arab Emirates. According to the Emirates Operations Manual the Standard Reporting Time for pilots is 1 hour before a flight. So a pilot is legally required to report for duty only 1 hour before the flight departs.
But the operational reality is very different. Emirates pilots are picked up at their residences by a company chauffeur and arrive at the Emirates HQ at least 1 hour and 45 minutes before departure. The timing of the company transport is set by Emirates and can not be delayed by the pilot. The pilot will then proceed through Passport Control and Customs and he will check in his baggage. He will then conduct a preflight briefing with the other pilot on his flight. The flight crew briefing ends at 1 hour 25 minutes before departure as documented in the Flight Crew Departure Timeline. After that the pilots will join their cabin crew and proceed to the aircraft.
So the pilot has completed all of the outlined tasks at 1 hour and 25 minutes before the flight and yet his reporting time is registered at only 1 hour before the flight. Why doesn’t Emirates adjust the Standard Reporting Time? Even Emirates Cabin Crews’ Standard Reporting Time is set at 1 hour and 30 minutes but Cabin Crew Flight Time Limitations are less limiting than those for pilots.
I am attaching a sample Flight Crew Departure Timeline (Part of the Briefing Pack). It is an example of a 2 Pilot Crew Turnaround. EK 544 and EK 545 Dubai-Chennai-Dubai. B773, A6-EMR on April 25th 2014.
Pickup by Company Car 00:30 Dubai Local Time
Flight Crew Briefing End 01:20 Dubai Local Time
Reporting Time 01:45 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Departure 02:45 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure DXB 02:57 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival MAA 06:37 Dubai Local Time
Actual Departure MAA 08:02 Dubai Local Time
Actual Arrival DXB 12:06 Dubai Local Time
Scheduled Arrival DXB 12:30 Dubai Local Time
After the WSJ reported this issue on April 9, 2015 Emirates removed the internal document “Flight Crew Departure Time” from the process. But that’s the only change.
“The GCAA’s Mr. Al Balooshi said reporting requirements for duty time should be “black and white” and begin when a pilot is expected to report for work and finish when his or her last flight taxies into the gate. Emirates said it abides by state-approved flight-time limitations. “(WSJ article).
This is clearly not the case. Please see the following evidence:
Attachment 1: Flight Crew Departure Timeline for EK544 on 25 April 2014
Attachment 2: Pilot Transport Pickup Schedule
Attachment 3: Internal Memo ‘The Waves’ Flight Crew responsibilities page 6
Attachment 4: Signage at the Crew Terminal outlining that the combined Pilot & Cabin Crew briefing finishes at Standard Departure Time minus 80 (20 minutes before the pilots’ legally registered check-in time).
Attachment 5: EK Pilot Recruitment Video @5:00 runtime. Quote: "I get picked up 2 hours 30 minutes before departure.” http://youtu.be/A53VRz_KhnY
Attachment 6: Emirates OM-A Section 7
Attachment 7: Wall Street Journal Article, April 9, 2015
Attachment 8: Internal email by the Manager Regulatory Affairs telling the related parties in Emirates to remove the Flight Crew Departure Timeline document from the briefing pack, 22 April 2015
2. Further Issues
Here are some of the other issues that I can also back up with evidence and further witnesses:
• Pilots are bullied not to report sick. They receive warning letters if their annual sick days go above a fairly low threshold and may not receive the annual bonus. The first thing is usually to withdraw the right for self-certification of sickness, meaning you can’t call in sick for a single day without a doctor’s certification (not very practical giving the nightly duty schedules).
• the process for reporting sick fatigue is a lot more complicated than just calling sick.
• the Emirates Clinic is overcrowded and understaffed with doctors. Long waiting times are the result.
• the process for cabin crew to report sick is completely prohibitive now. They must drag themselves to EK HQ at any time of the day or night where they only get the sick note but no treatment.
• there is no proper East-West time-zone curfew applied to the rosters
• on Ultra-Long-Haul flights there is now a factoring for 'stick time', meaning you only get half the credit for a flight if you are on the augmenting crew that didn’t do the take-off and landing. This has implications for the following rest times etc.
• No credit for time in a certified full-flight simulator. That’s another 22hours of flight duty per year that just disappear from the records.
• No proper leave allocation. Out of 42 contractual leave days only 30 days are
DOVE
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Uhm!!!
A proposito di riattaccate e di accanimento homitico - The Federal Air Transport Agency, on its behalf, said the plane attempted to land three times before crashing. - Oltrechè di presenze ingombranti a bordo - two political passengers were on board, "Aleksandr V. Antonov, 56, the regional head of Russia’s Federal Security Service, and Irek Minnikhanov, 24, a son of the president of the Tatarstan region, Rustam Minnikhanov," -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=vKHpUEHY2tI
Avveniva alla Tartarstan Airlines 363, un B 734, in Kazan il 17 Novembre 2013.
UWKD 171600Z 24008G12MPS 5000 -RASN OVC008 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0978
UWKD 171530Z 23008G11MPS 5000 -RASN OVC007 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0979
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ash-kazan.html
Credo che:
- Stanchezza accumulata dell'equipaggio,
- Home-itis,
- Complacency da eccesso di extra-fuel,
- Difficoltà di pilotaggio di un 737 leggero coi motori alla spinta di decollo piena,
non bastino a spiegare i due eventi con esito fotocopiato.
Deve esserci dell'altro!
A proposito di riattaccate e di accanimento homitico - The Federal Air Transport Agency, on its behalf, said the plane attempted to land three times before crashing. - Oltrechè di presenze ingombranti a bordo - two political passengers were on board, "Aleksandr V. Antonov, 56, the regional head of Russia’s Federal Security Service, and Irek Minnikhanov, 24, a son of the president of the Tatarstan region, Rustam Minnikhanov," -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=vKHpUEHY2tI
Avveniva alla Tartarstan Airlines 363, un B 734, in Kazan il 17 Novembre 2013.
UWKD 171600Z 24008G12MPS 5000 -RASN OVC008 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0978
UWKD 171530Z 23008G11MPS 5000 -RASN OVC007 03/03 Q0993 R29/2/0055 NOSIG RMK QFE734/0979
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ash-kazan.html
Credo che:
- Stanchezza accumulata dell'equipaggio,
- Home-itis,
- Complacency da eccesso di extra-fuel,
- Difficoltà di pilotaggio di un 737 leggero coi motori alla spinta di decollo piena,
non bastino a spiegare i due eventi con esito fotocopiato.
Deve esserci dell'altro!
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Vedendo ultimo video ho pensato ( e' solo una mia considerazione) ad uno stab trim runaway a picchiare o un problema allo stabilizzatore.
Le due ore di holding erano in ice condition ?
Non so non so troppe cose strane bisogna sentire il cvr
Le due ore di holding erano in ice condition ?
Non so non so troppe cose strane bisogna sentire il cvr