Landing Flaps request
 

On a recent check ride, during the debrief it was mentioned that during the approach, I requested gear down and shortly after Flaps 25, without waiting for three greens to make it. My rationale is that the PNF is aware of the undercarriage status and, therefore, will not command the flaps until it is the proper time to do so. I accepted the criticism and made a mental note, but, to be honest, I don't think this is outright wrong, maybe just not usual (I have been in the exact situation as PNF couple of times).

While checking the books I could not find any reference mentioning that final flaps must be requested only after the undercarriage is down and locked, maybe good airmanship dictates it. Anyway, would like to hear some opinions on the subject.

I don't fly what seems to be the Boeing you fly, but it seems the instructor was splitting hairs over technique. On the airplanes I've flown, if that was the criticism at the end of the session, it means you did very well.

Normally when PF calls for flaps (or anything really, say gear up after takeoff), they should first check themselves whether the conditions allow for the action to be taken (say speed below Vfe), then call it out (flaps xx), then the PM will check whether conditions allow (speed checked), and then perform the requested action.

In your case, you seem to be relying just on the PM/PNF check, thus eliminating the human redundancy in the process. Now, I don't know what implications would extending flaps before the gear is down on your type are, or what the company policy is, but as a matter of airmanship, I'd agree with the checker.

I will concur though, if that's the only thing they had to say, you've done very well :)

did you get the gear horn? If not, smile thru gritted teeth and when capt fartpants dribbles on say, “I’ll take that onboard” and move on with your life.

It’s years since I flew the 737 Classic but, wasn’t the reason you were advised to wait until the gear was down and locked (before selecting flaps) in order to reduce the hydraulic system workload?

No type mentioned, so I can approach this from 757 perspective. Gear down, Flaps 20 at the same time is normal. Asking for F25 while the LG is still moving is asking for a landing config warning. So that’s an ASR and paperwork that could be avoided by waiting another couple of seconds.

Edited to add. Our part B does indeed put a responsibility on PM to check gear is down before selecting landing flap but why put them in that position?

Same on a couple of the bigger Boeings - selecting F25 or F30 with gear still travelling, not indicating down, meant it got very noisy....

You wouldn't fail a check ride for doing it accidentally as long as the gear was on the way but you'd get a :rolleyes: and it would be a point for the debrief.

Quote:

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PM will check whether conditions allow (speed checked), and then perform the requested action.

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Use of the term "Speed Checked" is often used by the PNF when directed by the PF to select various flap settings. Seems a superfluous thing to say each time a new flap setting is called for. After all you don't say "Speed checked" when the landing gear is selected up or down. While it is normal airmanship for the PNF to check the speed but why state the obvious? And the PF doesn't say "Flap 5 Speed checked" etc every time he asks for another flap.

Centaurus, indeed and our part B tells PM to check the speed and respond to the request for Flaps X with ‘Flaps X’ meaning ‘I’ve checked the speed, it’s in limits and I’m now selecting Flaps X’.

Flaps 25 is a takeoff setting on the 737 so the config horn wouldn't sound (provided throttles are above idle).

Incorrect. See below. Not sure where 20 degrees is. But it’s more than idle.

steady warning​ horn is provided to​ alert the Flight Crew whenever a landing is​ ​
attempted and any gear is not down and locked. The landing​ gear warning horn is ​
activated by forward thrust lever and flap position as follows
....
Flaps 15 through 25 –​
•​ either forward thrust lever set below approximately 20 degrees or an ​
engine not running, and the other thrust lever less than 34 degrees; the ​
landing​ gear warning horn cannot be silenced​ with the landing gear ​
warning HORN CUTOUT switch.
.....

sorry 737 for reference.

It all depends on type and what the manufacturer and operator have specified in the "books".

On a 737CL/NG there is absolutely no need for this "invented" check, I would not even know why there would be a limitation. It is absolutely true there is some "airmanship" that goes beyond procedures, but that airmanship in this case to me only relates to the gear "initiation", meaning: the indication of a correct release of the gear. The gear down sequence takes way too long time to complete and having pilots focus on the gear indicators while flying just seems waste of time. It is much more "safe" to create a gentle idle slowing down while the flaps are extending focusing on correct pitch changes and glide tracking, than asking pilots to increase thrust all of a sudden because one apparently needs to see 3 greens and creating only extra workload. Keep it simple.

For what it's worth, if it was simply a B737, there is a lot more to say about decelerating to correct speeds when asking for flaps to be extended than waiting for 3 greens... And that is a Boeing demand mentioned in the FCTM. The 3 greens requirement is not a Boeing demand.

I didn't invent the SOP, I just follow it. I believe many other airlines have the same.

The speed checked is simply heritage from old school analog speed indications and a perfect example of how old dinosaurs neglect to evolve and adapt to the fantastic displays right in front of them. How many checks do you need while we are flying the aircraft?

In the same philosophy, a PM is "monitoring" silently and only needs to talk when necessary. Sterile cockpit, because the cockpit talks more and more to you. Keep your eyes open to what that flightdeck is telling you.

Don't worry, it's just me. But aviation needs to learn from mistakes, old deficiencies, grow with new technology and evolve. Again, we are all here to learn to use systems to our own advantage, and that advantage is (1)safety. Keep it simple.

The term dynasor is applicable to 737 itself. But you are wrong even latest FBW Air bus the call is same. If everyone starts tinkering with SOPs then you are recreating the dynasor days atmosphere when every captain had his own way of doing things. Line pilots should not be making SOPs but following them.

C mon guys get a grip.

Calling for gear AND flaps is no big deal on the 737.

Gear down, flaps 15. Landing checklist , was SOP in my days, albeit many years ago.

Who on earth taught me that on my 737 course?

Boeing in Seattle.

Our call is Gear down, Flaps 20.
Which means flaps are extending while the gear is still in motion.
74

* just spoke with a 76 buddy and he waits for three green to avoid the warning horn.
Same company.

Done this on more than one occasion on more than one aircraft type. Does it cause anything other than a feeling that you could have arranged it bit differently to avoid a brief bit of noise, which you immediately knew full well the cause of? No? What’s the problem? It’s there to alert you that you may be attempting to land with the gear up, which you are obviously not doing having initiated the lowering of the gear.

If I was the PM, was asked for a landing flap setting and I was on the ball enough to see the gear was still in transit, I might mention this fact and enquire if I should possibly delay the flap for a bit to avoid a temporary aural distraction. Most often, I think I’d do it then giggle at the result...

There exists a faction in aviation that tries to make everything as complex and full of unnecessary rules as possible. We must fight back! ;)

FullWings, re ;)
‘There exists a faction in aviation that tries to make everything as complex and full of unnecessary rules as possible.’
Yes, as indicated by this thread and other instances involving blind adherence to SOPs.
A critical aspect missing in modern aviation is both knowing when and how to adapt. Instructors hold significant responsibility for discussing adaptation, but they too appear to be bound by rules. In addition to issues of airmanship, so too a lack of common sense and flexibility - or at least a willingness to evaluate the aspect after flight, a balanced debrief.

The threat from this ‘SOP mindedness’ is that it can generate precursor situations for accidents; a false belief that following the rules will provide legal protection, whereas in our very safe industry it is more likely to reduce safety. :sad:

Thanks for adding some more technical details.
But in context, it's still valid what I wrote. You won't trigger the horn just by going from F15 to F25 with the gear still up.

411A. Thanks for that. So it would be helpful from the OP which type he’s on. From Wiggy and me we can see that 74 75 76 77 would all generate a landing config warning if F25 selected without gear down.

Approaching HNL, called for Landing Check and when reaching the item "Flaps" ,the flaps were lowered as required but associated leading edge flaps didn't respond. Co-pilot and Flt. Eng. went through all the check list drills and actions but still no L.E. flaps, so initiated a go- around, during which the L.E. flaps worked ! ( Murphy's Law ? ) so requested another approach which went to plan.

Subsequently told by management that HNL ATC had reported us as approaching with no gear, and ignored two reminders of ABC 123 " No gear". Why ?

I explained that we hadn't heard any such call from ATC. but may well have missed them due concentration on the various calls and actions to try to establish the L.E. flaps, but having called for Landing Check, and experienced a failure of the flaps, we had not proceeded further with the check list at that point, and Gear Down came after confirmation of the correct flap setting on the check list, we had not passed that point and so had not completed the check list, hence no gear.

QED.

interesting observations. “Speed Checked” is a current Airbus SOP call designed by the manufacturer. It’s in the unadulterated Airbus FCOM.

I also stated that in my post. This channel is used by some pilots just express their disgruntlement to procedures. I don't think anyone changes his way of operating reading suggestions here. In an article in Airbus Safety First on Constraints to Decision Making they discussed personality types. Three of them are at play in some of the post.
1. Invulnerability: It won't happen to me. (Take it here as nothing will happen my way also)
2. Anti authority: Don't tell me. (I know what I am doing)
3. What's will be the use of doing this? (Don't see any merit in not doing my way)
These are negative traits that need to be guarded against.

There you go, exactly, "gear down, flap 15, landing checklist", all in one breath. I remember that like it was yesterday. But the landing checklist cannot be completed until landing flap is selected, normally 30 or 40, so what was the point of starting the checklist if it could not be completed? Yeah, I know, complete to the line, on some types.

Never heard of hydraulics consideration, even with gravel protect skids on 737-200

I guess you are referring to me as well, but I guess you are biased. People who know me know I love manuals, former engineer, and VERY keen on procedures. The interesting thing in the training I do is that in 90% of "conversion" training, procedures pop up from everywhere. From other companies, and from inside the company (captain, LTC/TRI and even the safety FO on the jumpseat). The big problem of the ’fear’ in aviation is that there is no distinction between good practices and procedures.

We all function differently, and it is extremely important to look at ourselves. Good practices are there to help you in area's where you stugge. Some People ie like mnemonics. That is a good thing if it helps YOU. But they are not SOP. And making them an SOP for everybody is the creation of workload for People who don’t need it.

As for the speed checked... show me the correct Airbus manual where it is a CALLOUT and not a silent monitor action. Same for Boeing. It is NOT a callout, it is silent monitoring.

To get back OT, my presumption was it is a b737 because after LG F15, there is a follow up with silent monitoring of speeds for F25 and further, and a landing checklist call to close the deal. We don’t "up to the flaps" because history has shown blablabla. Let’s learn.

It’s all about the lowest common denominator. Take the worst pilot you have in your airline, face them with an extremely challenging situation and the outcome still has to be safe flight.

At the end of the day, the SOP has to cater for us in the bottom spectrum when it comes to ability. An above average pilot surely has the extra capacity to handle an extra callout or two, or perhaps even an acronym?

It doesn’t matter one bit what is written in the Boeing or Airbus FCOM. The FCOM/OM approved by your regulator will tell you how them and your airline expect you to operate. Any decent airline will run an SMS-fed SOP, and if the data suggests a modification of SOP is required to increase safety, then I don’t see how any of us can disagree on that.

That is very true, however SMS fed SOPs don’t always relate to pilot abilities, they can also show training deficiencies... in that case training programs need to be adapter. Not SOPs.

Here it is. Obviously you haven't read Airbus manual. There are no incorrect manuals. Fly Boeing Boeing way.
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....0ba4f47162.png

You are correct, guess I own an apology. I am a Boeing guy, I’ve never flown Airbus only seen company manuals at a glance so I jumped to conclusions wrongly from memory as I don’t even have those manuals here with me. So thanks for the info.

On some Boeings, the flap will trigger the GPWS Mode IV, and it won't be cancellable. As stated, depends if the flap is defined as a landing flap config. If there are hydraulic issues, it can be a bad idea, as Ansett found on a B743 at SYD, which did a 16 point landing, which saved on brakes and TR wear, not so much for the NLG doors. The plane had an engine out and the related ADHP was low output, so the uplock pressure to release got messed with every time it got close to releasing the uplock. The crew under some stress were confumbulatorised bigly, and rationalised the red gear light with the number of gear lights on the engineer's panel. 4/4 instead of 5/5... oops.

In today's situation where Kovid-19 has kept pilots who always have different skill levels off flying for varying periods. Coming back from storage if everybody starts doing his own thing it won't take long before something unpleasant happens. Making/changing SOPs is not a line pilot's job. You can always approach the designated department which can check with the manufacturer. FCOM doesn't tell you everything.

Regarding looking after your hydraulics, if you do so, they may look after you. Years ago, when I was flying the Boeing 737 Classic 300 series, we had hydraulic system “A” fail (the contents emptied somewhere over Lyon). That resulted in Autopilot A failed, Thrust reverser Eng 1 failed, Gear: Emergency (Gravity) lowering, “A” system Spoilers failed, NWS failed.
We continued to Nice, in accordance with the QRH you can do so. On final approach to 04L we experienced what I presume was asymmetric up float of the failed Spoiler(s), because when speed reduced the control yoke needed to be moved further and further to the right. We touched down on 04R (having been refused 04L by the Tower) with the control yoke at an angle of 90 degrees i.e. 6 o’clock position. Aileron trimming made no difference.
So, look after the strain on your hydraulics and they may look after you!

If I’m the PM and the PF asks for a flap setting that generates a warning before the gear is down I just wait until it is showing 3 green then select the requested setting, probably wouldn’t say anything


If I’m PF I try not to request or do anything that would generate a warning, that includes checking we have 3 greens before requesting more than F20 (767)


In 727 days it wasn’t uncommon to request ‘flaps 25 gear down, 30 with the green’ not officially endorsed but we all did it

Procedures are made to avoid pitfalls by average pilots. But even experienced who are also human, in the air under pressure have behaved like zombies. Then a human factor is mentioned as an epitaph. So just stick to Procedures in day to day situations unless there's no procedure for the situation. What I do, you do, we all do doesn't help just follow the recommended procedures. If something is ridiculously unbearable refer it to the manufacturer. After all people who make aeroplanes should have more knowledge of what they made.

becoming an expert has a beginning, but it doesn’t have an end
 

vilas, no argument with your view of the ‘follow procedures’ theme. However this, and other discussions on SOPs, overlook the ability to know when to deviate from the norm, and what action to take in unusual, beyond the norm situations.

The primary skills are of situation awareness and its ‘sense making’ component - understanding.
These are aspects of airmanship, difficult to describe, even more difficult to teach due to the tacit nature of the knowledge required; the situations have to be ‘experienced’ and judged in context.

This can be related to expertise, and how expertise is achieved.

Expertise *:- ‘you are demonstrably extremely good at what you do, having spent a long time learning your craft; that you can pass your knowledge on to other people; and that you are recognised by other people as being extremely good at what you do.

A weakness of modern aviation is ‘a long time learning’ and infrequent opportunity for learning; thus in some, non SOP situations, pilots lack the necessary expertise - even if they are expert in normal operations.
Noting that ‘the most valuable aspect of expertise – the wisdom based on experience about what to do and what not to do, … it isn’t just about knowing stuff and being able to do stuff, but about having the judgement to apply that knowledge in the right way’. i.e. when there is no procedure.

* The link is short review - ‘how to be an expert’; the levels of expertise can be correlated with pilot training and behaviour - apprentice, journeyman, master. Note the views on error, and how to improvise; ‘in being able to respond to the unexpected, and to bring into play all the knowledge and experience you’ve gained to make a sensible response to an unpredicted situation. That’s the sort of wisdom in expertise we’re looking for now’.

https://www.newscientist.com/article...er-your-trade/

Really? What I am reading for last few months is just opposition to procedures, it includes even people who are just making a beginning. Take the present case a wrong assumption was made that no FCOM demands something till I posted FCOM to show indeed it does. Another thread assumed reject takeoff is recommended after V1 for certain failures while truth was it recommended after 100kt and not after V1. Or the insistence that Aircraft are to be manually flown every day as a preparation for failure of automatics. Gosh! It sounds almost religious like this life is preparation for eternal life.

Vilas, honestly, you are taking this way too far to prove a point. First, this topic is not Airbus, that's clear. The assumption was corrected, which does not "delete" some companies from existence that are apparently not requiring the procedure. It is what it is. Same happens on Boeing aircraft. That's what you and I both say, there is no difference.

The whole topic here is about the limits of SOPs. I don't know your background, I do work in a training environment, and it is vital to limit the value of SOPs black on white. Instructors or check people don't need to force "idea's" as SOP. Because while the SOP do form a very solid good line of defence against "possible weaknesses" or good capabilities deteriorated by fatigue or even ego, they are not the end line in what is called threat management. Very often a company that allows SOPs to "explode" with the idea that it is the one and only form of defence against anything bad that could happen, it also has a side-effect on the "capable" that they are overloaded with a requirement to follow a set of rules, which takes away the liberty to actually think and act in the real world. Exploding SOPs usually deteriorate situational awareness. Because the mind is occupied with the SOP, not with the reality. Just something I noticed from hours on a jumpseat...

You can give tricks, reminders, helpfull notes, but if the guy uses it is his freedom. And a lot of that is related to the different characters found on the flightdeck. We all have our own way of working, one is therefore not better than the other, but our own methodology allows us to work more efficient. We are all different. Sounds more "heavy" than it actually is... sorry for that

In short: in training the SOPs are black/white. Easy. But unfortunately I have to tell someone more often than I would like that what they just did, is not an SOP. But they learned it somewhere. Which is why I referred to training deficiencies. Was it mentioned to help them? Or was it said as an invented SOP because the person correcting him had that idea?

Anyway... I'll leave it at that.

BBSince you asked, on Airbus I have trained 15 Asian carriers from India to Japan and that included a dozen nationalities from Canada, both Americas, across Europe to Japan. Also I was line trainer on B747 classic and A300. That is not important. First thing Airbus is not Boeing. I feel you are mixing up the two types and also techniques with SOP. An instructor can suggest techniques that can differ but SOP is same. Instructors ideas are not SOPs. SOPs and call outs are in the manual in black and white. It's a strange statement that SOP interfere with situational awareness. We cannot work differently inside the cockpit. For heaven's sake think of the other guy in the right hand seat he will go crazy. The environment and examples you are stating are not SOPs but individual quirks. If you are suggesting enlightened anarchy there's no such thing in the air. In the air we are in a habitat that's not ours. There are no instincts. Developing your own way is asking for trouble. Especially in Airbus you cannot develop procedures. We don't and can't know the software logics to do something better than the manufacturer. I am sorry but I totally disagree with you.

When I read your message I think we agree more than you think. Read again, every word this time. You almost repeat my words but write them in a different way.

However I've also seen more than enough people lost in the sky following SOPs blindly. I think many of us have. That's what I mean with situational awareness. You need time to create the "picture", and you do that on your own. There are no SOPs for that. It is you looking at your instruments.