hi gums;
Yes, the gang's all here, but only momentarily!Yes, I understand that, we've discussed that and I even had posted a schematic showing how AoA can be roughly approximated (while not precisely and not instantly due to lag but perhaps usefully if one is trained / skilled at such interpretation*) from the FPM / FPV and pitch angle, independent of the AoA sensors.

"Derived" in flight data work means usefully accurate and precise as well as timely and the FPM / FPV vs pitch method of "deriving AoA" in rapidly changing circumstances, is none of these.

While the FPM/FPV display is inertially-driven this still requires a working ADR (AF447s were intermittent and, in the time period available, essentially unusable) and a working AoA sensor (Perpignan, frozen sensor, erroneous stall speed display on the PFD).

The point I wished to make in regard to Lyman's statement that AoA can be derived is that it can't be in the sense that it could be used to display AoA when original sources as described, are not available.

*When the A320 first came online, we were trained that the FPV Flight Director should not be used as guidance during a go-around because of the lag in the FPV as the aircraft stops descent and begins the climb. The justification was, following a lagging display could lead to reduced climb performance. I believe that's now changed and the normal FDs are displayed automatically when the thrust levers are pushed to the TO/GA detent.

Of possible interest is the UAS table below from the A320, dated April, 1991. The table clearly provides pitch and power settings for all regimes of flight. This checklist is in contrast with what I think was and is a confusing UAS memorized drill & checklist combo. While the origins of the present mess of a drill / checklist are understandable (post Birgenair & Aeroperu), compared to this simple checklist which provides clear information on pitch/power settings for all flight regimes, the present drill remains open to interpretation as to when the safety of the flight is at risk. The present drill also requires a pitch change in cruise altitude when none is required.

While pulling a transport aircraft up to 10deg pitch while in cruise is a serious error, I think the memorized drill, if taught incorrectly or misunderstood (and it still isn't clear) can leave some pilots who may not get into the books very much, (as per DP Davies' thoughts posted earlier on 'working at the career' and learning) or otherwise just thinking about the drill and maybe asking questions, with the impression that "pulling up" somehow solves the 'problem'. Granted a 5deg pitch up at FL350 won't lead to stalling the airplane, but why destabilize the airplane in the first place?

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-bgcK...bgcKZkd-X3.jpg

Hi gums,

Quote from gums #829:
"In wings level flight, AoA can be derived from the pitch and the inertial velocity vector regardless of the air data probes/cones. The Sluf and Viper HUD had a "zero sight line" cross, and usually the flight path marker ( FPM) was below it ( negative gees was something else, heh heh). That was your AoA in wings level flight."

Three years ago (before you joined this discussion?), some of the "gang" chewed over this subject, and we gradually realised that - for various reasons - it wasn't as simple as we had hoped...

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/39510...ml#post5575204

:uhoh:

Wouldn't their Attitude Indicator showing a lot of blue sky given them a clue?

Just asking!

:bored:

Presuming the AI was integrated into a working instrument scan, yes.

Derived AoA....
 

PJ2

Howdy....From Chris Scott, post #521, "Search to Resume"

This is what I had in mind, and I recall the flightcrew doing some things in the cockpit that put me in mind of wanting the "Bird"...... for AoA? Dunno...

So sorry to get gums in the soup....took some looking.

Hi Lyman;

Yes, that's what I'd figured was in mind as I know AoA can't be derived from any other flight or system parameters.

I do think that someone "tuned in" to his/her airplane could make use of this information so in that sense it's another tool, subtle and not widely nor well-understood even in the instructing world, (in fact I know an airline that refused to authorize use of the FPV/FD and would not train or permit its use in operations).

I think had they had the FPV they would have seen this, (quickly...time yourselves... 3, 5, 10 seconds with noise, buffeting, warnings and fright, what's the AoA? What angle are we going down at? Should I pull or push?):

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-8Mjv...8Mjv5cF-XL.jpg

2 degrees nose up attitude and cruise power would have made this accident a non event. Hopefully pilots will now not make the same m
istake they did.

Once I jump, I PULL, the ripcord.....20000fpm descent, AoA +45, Pitch 8 ND.

Nope that's wrong, badly..... seven seconds. Adios.

Is this our friends?

TNX Chris and PJ for getting me back to Earth.

I realize that we had the AoA discussion way back before I started to comment, but I had read the threads with only one comment until after we saw the wreckage pattern and got into control laws and a deeply stall jet.

As several had pointed out, a derived AoA might be possible but impractible, and prolly unuseable if the pilot wasn't used to using AoA on a dail basis as Mach did coming aboard the boat.

As far as the FPV, it would likely be updated at a decent rate - maybe 50 or 60 times a second, same as the digital attitude display. The inertial velocities must be sampled at a healthy rate or your nav errors are off the chart. EDITORIAL NOTE: The current use of GPS is super, but I can see less maintenance and care for the "good old inertial" units. But back to the chase - if you are pulling and that FPV ain't moving the same direction as the stick, then you are in a heap of trouble. This is much easier to see in a HUD, as the pitch lines are "real world' and you can only see about 15 degrees total from top to bottom. However, they were extremely helpful maintaining a 3 deg descent angle or any angle you wished. A PAR was so easy it felt like cheating.

gums;

Re, "A PAR was so easy it felt like cheating." :ok:

Yessir, done them very occasionally in the DC9. Aside from Canarsies onto 31R, that was a leg to get!

I must be out to lunch as I never realized you weren't on earth all the time! The reminder re 'derived' etc was a good one and it got me going too.

bubbers;

Re, "I think I know but Airbus training needs to include how degrading automation needs to let people understand the level of automation they are at."

I trained on the A320 in 1992, the A340 in '99, the A330 a bit later and from the get-go all three laws as well as the protections were heavily emphasized, taught, practiced and checked in recurrent rides. We knew that in Alternate and Direct laws one didn't do anything rash, quickly or rough with the airplane. While it was complicated sometimes, the ECAM was / is very good and must always be done to completion. Forgive me but really, the people who do this work aren't dull or slow.

Re, "2 degrees nose up attitude and cruise power would have made this accident a non event." Well, QED. That's about what the airplane cruises at. Monitor altitude, set power, wait, do the ECAM, get out the QRH. That's why I said very early on, "do nothing, wait..." It's not an emergency.

Regarding pitch, two to 2.5deg NU is the pitch the A330 cruises at and the thrust is already in the CLB detent, so the airplane is immediately both stable and under control which is the first rule, 'aviate'. To change the pitch attitude, (arbitrarily or via the checklist), adds workload and increases the potential for loss of SA as one departs one's cleared altitude and minds the speed, heading, etc and it delays getting on with the ECAM while the PF is ensuring that the airplane remains under control. I surmise that these are the things check airmen argue about in meetings all the time. In my view the UAS drill and checklist is a mess and can, if improperly understood and taught or badly executed, reduce and not increase flight safety.

One thing to note that those who fly these airplanes may not know is, a transport airplane can depart controlled flight very gently almost languidly and smoothly, without broadcasting what it's doing. In the departure from controlled flight into a severe loss of control there was nothing violent about this accident. Even the descent would have been "languid" in terms of pitch, roll, yaw, gee despite the buffeting.

As you must know instinctively from experience, it isn't 10 or 15deg NU that would get the attention of a transport crew, it is a degree or two above nominal. So if the airplane is in stable, level cruise at 2 deg, then a pilot taking it to 3 to 5 degrees (yielding about a 1000 to 1500fpm climb), and keeping it there would require an immediate taking of control to stop a loss of control event and also regain the cleared altitude. Seven or eight degrees pitch at cruise altitude and Mach is positively frightening in my book.

When the ATs disconnect, you'd have to bring the levers back a bit to maintain the previous cruise setting but you'd never overspeed the airplane if you left the TL's alone.

Lyman;

Re, "Is this our friends?"

I don't know. I don't know why this happened. All we know is a bit of how.

HN39;

Re, "Yes, it is possible for AoA to exceed Alpha Prot in Auto."

Absolutely correct. Ask any carrier flying into Mexico City in an A320 about the sharp left turn onto the 5's from the 160R of SMO with the speed right back, landing flap out and an encounter with a bit of turbulence in the turn. It will also occur if one retracts the flaps too early, AP on or off.

PJ....
Re: your last image and questions (rhetorical though they might have been): AoA- about 23 degrees, going down at about 35 degrees and you should bleeding well push!... ?

Have I understood the display correctly? ( I don't fly, obviously)

As one image cancel the STALL Warning, temptation to pull can be strong, especially as indicated airspeed is increasing ... Suppose you was already pushing hard at this time.
Note how the big red chevrons do suggest me to pull too ...

Mexico City has the only approach I have ever seen that intercepts the localizier at more than 90 degrees. Also the automation will level you off above the glide slope so you have to TF the altitude to not be high. Trick :mad: for those curious. Also they clear you for this long arrival then turn you in short so if you don't know about it you are way too high so have to speed brake the whole arrival.

How in the world did you manage to resurrect this zombie thread again?

Massive it might be, yet it is very succinct with not much duplication or garish. Complex area, such as aviation, can not be explained in simple terms.

False. Once speeds return back to normal, AP is available even as alternate law remains latched for the remainder of the flight. Pages 85 and 86 of the English edition of the final report refer.

Of course, once aeroplane was stalled, turning on the AP was impossible and pretty pointless.

Probably nothing at all. Control inputs and cockpit audio bear no trace of anything that suggest the presence of rationality. They were panic stricken.

No. CM2 kept pulling, First significant input on the left stick was recorded merely 45 seconds before splashdown. CM1 pushed a bit but was counteracted by CM2. After that CM1 started pulling too and reversed to push in a final few seconds.

What the... for Finnegan's sake, have a look at the CM2 stick trace! That's made by a guy who believed he would die if he just lets go of the stick! Such accidents are with us ever since the aeroplanes were first stalled! With all the emphasis in Airbus discussions being on autoflight and FBW, folks tend to forget effing Airbus is still an aeroplane, it stalls if you go over alpha crit!

They moved away from full nose up, which was enough to reduce pitch and promptly provoke another pull to backstop from CM2.

It was answered more than a dozen times in 10 threads. Pity some folks could not understand or did not want to understand as it didn't fit their pet theories.

Pilot did, pilots didn't. Two sticks - two traces.

My gang also prohibited them on 737, ATR, MD-80 and Q400 also stipulated that only one pilot can be at the controls at the time, be it left, right or auto. Wonder why is that. :E

They took avoiding action. They did not fly through the storm. Where the hell does this hundred times disproved notion they penetrated the active storm cell come from?

It might come as news to some that recorders are fitted to help advance aviation safety and are not intended to be used in connection with civil trials. Even using them in criminal cases is not something aviation authorities look favourably upon.

It's not a key detail but infrared herring. Issue is not handling but having no idea of the aeroplane's energy state. CM2 stalled aeroplane pretty deftly.

Recommend reading "Use of rudder on transport category aircraft". It's applicable to almost anything, "applicable only to Boeings" is just a legal boilerplate.

If I'were to subscribe to the line of thought connecting his postings quality to experience, I would be forced to admit that experience is quite a hindrance in understanding the AF447.

They were quite correct in that respect, too. No aeroplane requires knowledge of manual flight at high altitude.

If the real world conformed to your notions, yes. Fortunately it doesn't care a bit about anyone's ideas how it ought to be. Aeroplane flying high has all the inertia, more speed and a lot less stability & damping compared to the same plane flying lower but it takes a flight of fancy to conclude just from AF447 catastrophe that high manual flight is roughly analog to tight-wire act. Unwholesome experience of TAM crew, as described in 1.16.2 refers.

If I supposed for a second this thread is indicative of the state of the aeronautics, I would have to wholeheartedly agree with you. Luckily, it isn't so.

Are you perchance suggesting it wasn't good enough for them so they went for whole 2000 ft bust?

No way I would volunteer. Would you?

OMG! F-15, F-16, F-18, Rafale, Typhoon, all of the Airbi post 320 are deathtraps, with ueberintelligent pilots required just for everyday operations!

Perish the thought.

Autotrim is just automatic trim. Any aeroplane, anywhere, anytime is properly flown with reference to attitude. Whether the residual stick force after the required performance is achieved is trimmed out manually or automatically is just a minor detail.

Eh... unlike F-16 which has G-trim, Airbus is made to be flightpath stable, so it will achieve 1G in wings level horizontal flight,not by chasing 1G but rather by trying to keep the flightpath constant. If we don't go into details and try to build theories on them, "Stick free it holds 1G" is good enough approximation. Displacing the stick commands the flightpath change with so-and-so gees, proportional to displacement.

Are you accusing BEA of forging the sidestick traces?

Not quite... it will maintain flightpath so left with nose-up, it will increase pitch as airspeed decays and alpha goes up. However, it is not as bad as some try to make it seem. Pilot needs to be quite incapacitated to leave the aeroplane wonder on her own.

Yup, up to the point where flight test data were available. A330 was intentionally stalled during flight testing (and recovered, obviously) but never driven to 40° alpha.

True, but not very applicable to AF447, which was a case of pilots unable to remember and apply basic flying lessons at 4AM, which might be partly affected by not understanding how thin is the Airbus's technological armour shielding from the elements. Precursor of AF447 was described by Wolfgang Langewiesche almost seventy years ago.

That's something you share with about every functional aviation authority in the world.

I'd rather use phrase "cowed by technology" than "having respect for technology" but basically, I agree.

Did and can. I didn't know it was an issue until I read it was supposed to be on this thread.

There were other crews in UAS that had no clue what was happening and had no understanding of the system. They sat puzzled and not doing anything. So survived.

Have a look at the pitch; it's not consistent with CM2 doing low level UAS drill at high level, but rather as if he were trying to run away at all costs from something he believed was coming from below to get him.

They absorbed roll info all right but just couldn't connect the blue on AH and rapidly winding altimeter with idea they will eventually run out of speed and stall.

Clandestino
 

Noted....

However. "Intended" is the backstop for the righteous. Pragmatically, data is data, and is available to whomever can acquire it.

You are a pilot. You by definition deal in reality, not moral judgment.

Therefore....

I direct your attention to the part of the data that is important, to me, that is the beginning, not the end.

This accident happened in twenty seconds, not four minutes. That is my opinion, and always has been.

That is not necessary. At the loss of Autopilot, with cricket and MASTER CAUTION, the aircraft was showing a loss of 370 feet in altitude, and a NOSE DOWN attitude, accompanied by eight degrees of roll, to the right.

PJ2 has posted, initially, "do nothing", which he has amended to mean, don't be precipitous, or ham handed, to which virtually all transport pilots agree.

Pilot flying input NU and RL, as he should. His inputs to me reflected a residual memory of flying in NORMAL LAW, where his inputs would have been modulated.

Big mistake, and perhaps one that caused the crash, at least partially. The next ten seconds show an acclimation to a new and degraded LAW, and an eventual settling of Roll. The PITCH axis remained in a mode that modulated his inputs, and this may have subconsciously affected his muscle memory, in that he was not sufficiently focused on PITCH.

Ninety nine per cent of the posts in this and the other threads focus on the STALL, or the CLIMB, or the CAPTAIN.

It has been established that no one knows what caused the CLIMB, except to hone in on, Pilot Error.

That is fine by me. You?

Howdy, Clanedstino, as usual your comments spice up our discussion. :ok:

A few points:
On that we are in violent agreement, but the context of my comment to jcjeant was about the passengers' fear and anxiety being presented in the courtroom as a complaint. Given that they died as a result of the crash, their 'fear and anxiety' seems nearly irrelevant to me ... in that little side bar.
CVR time tags indicate about 2:10 AM to about 2:14 AM as "when" this happened. ;)
His ex wife perhaps? Legend has it that harpies know how to fly:}. Your post made me chuckle. :ok:
At the risk of being pedantic, by "winding" do you mean increasing or decreasing? I presume the former. If you meant the latter, it would indicate "already stalled" to the discerning pilot.

EDIT:
As to "what they were probably thinking" I will mildly disagree with you.
a. Probably thinking "why's it doing that?" or "Why isn't it doing what I expect it to do?" (even though what was expected might not have been aligned with how the aircraft systems work) and then "What's it doing now?" and later on, at least from the right hand seat "WTF is going on here?" There may also have been some background thought on "Why is that stall warning going off?"

b. They indicate a crew behind the aircraft. There were reasons for some of what they did, hence a rational thought process, but those reasons seem to have been based on faulty diagnosis of their problem, faulty recall of procedures, and faulty flying skills, and faulty CRM technique.

c. In the last minute, maybe so, but in the first three, confused more than panic stricken ... unless there's more to my guess about the pursuing harpy than my wisearse comment warrants! :}

But if I wanted to, I would......

A330 has shown some eccentricities in Flight Control, to wit, uncommanded climb.....

Suppose Air France flight 447 had been victim of these "eccentricities"?

The "CLIMB" was instead a desperate attempt by Bonin to FORCE the nose DOWN, not hold it up?

If 447 had been lost to Airbus, not BONIN, what then? Can you imagine?

"AIRBUS kills 228 over the ATLANTIC" Boy Howdy. Until the boxes were found, who could say? Afterwards, and in the possession of an agency that had been accused of criminal conduct to protect the airframer prior, who could say "The pilot performed as expected in the CLIMB emergency, and all the way to the OCEAN"..."He tried the entire while to drop the nose, by pushing the Stick forward".

Without ACCESS? In the possession of those who refuse to release all the DATA?

It would seem a simple task, disclose.

What would I do? Right Wrong or indifferent, I would do the same. Keep the "DATA" secret, and a passive non emotive expression....

Pragmatic.
After ALL, they're all dead.....

3holelover;
Yessir, that's what the display says and you've understood it correctly.

It has never been my sense that an AoA indication somewhere on the forward panel or screen real estate would have made a difference to the AF447 outcome. As with the FPV, an AoA indication is part of the kit only when its information is understood within its context of high-altitude, high-speed swept-wing flight.

Lonewolf_50;
In Re the original quote, I took the use of "winding" to mean the climb, (vice the term, "unwinding" to mean a descent).

The altitude and rate of climb would have been visible on both PFDs.

Clandestino;Yes, it's not consistent certainly but merely "mostly in the direction of..." which is inconclusive as to reason and so open only to theory.

The data clearly indicates that in percentage time, the SS was in the NU position most of the time and the left and right elevators were entirely in the NU position throughout the descent:

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-GRhj...GRhjsb6-X2.jpg

PJ2

Not sure I agree with the first sentence - if HA manual handling was taught as part of basic conversion training, then there would have been a reinforced mnemonic inside the F/Os' heads that pulling up to that extent in the cruise is a very bad idea. As are large control inputs in general.

Agreed - the point I was making is that with this system, the aircraft will do it's best to go exactly where you point it until either it can no longer comply, or until you point it somewhere else. This consequently means that while handling the aircraft is a simpler process, levelling off must be a distinct and conscious act - but that's not really different than for any other type.

Then firstly, do you not think it slightly presumptuous to infer that an accident investigation service who are compelled to abide by strict standards would do the same? And secondly, with due respect, I'm damned glad you're not an accident investigator.

Hopefully this thread will shortly return to rest, 'cos there's nothing new being discussed here.

Lyman,
After lurking and reading the recent posts on this thread, it's time for a reality check. From the BEA Final Report:
The chart on Pg.96 showing PF's Side Stick Pitch Position confirms this.
One more time, It wasn't the airplane that caused this...

Before returning to the peanut gallery amongst this august group of heavy pilots, I shall once again challenge Cland.......

From A330 FCOM:



http://sluf.org/misc_pages/buspitch.JPG

So the jet "appears" to be a pitch attitude command, and the turn implementation appears to also allow for the gee involved to maintain both the established pitch AND roll. We all know that 60 degrees of bank requires 2 gees, and so forth, huh?


My point is that the sucker is a one gee jet, and the autotrim will allow the pilot to relax the stick to maintain an attitude. Our pure gee command ( gear up) resulted in us being neutral WRT speed stability, so we had to use power to maintain a constant speed. Gear down we had an AoA bias to make the jet "feel" like a "normal" jet, similar to the 'bus "flare mode"

And note the phrase in FCOM "With the side stick neutral, the system maintains one gee in pitch corrected for pitch attitude" How one can assert the jet is a pitch attitude control law still bothers me. It may appear to be an "attitude control law", but it ain't. And that's why I said the actions of the THS and such could have an "insidious" effect that some may not appreciate.

Further, my understanding of aero is that a straight mechanical system that we had long ago, and in some jets to this day, you trim for AoA, not gee, not attitude, not speed. I think most of us learned in planes like that, ya think? Ask Mach or Smilin' Ed or any Navy type, and even some of we Air Force pukes. And so...

True, we normally fly to achieve an attitude and simply keep the AoA below the stall angle. Trim to reduce the stick force requirement and so forth. However, many of us were taught to trim for a speed when climbing or descending, and especially for final approach. Not necessarily an attitude. And that's AoA, which works with thrust and the induced drag to get the "speed". Then your power controls the climb angle/climb rate, or the other way.

I do not intend to conduct the pre-flight instruction for my newbie student for most here. I just want to point out the way the 'bus is designed from looking at the manuals and such some of you presented to me.

He's not - he's saying it's a stable flightpath control (of which pitch attitude is a single factor).

And as has been pointed out, behaving like a scaled-up trainer was not part of the design specification for this system, which is why the actual behaviour and the differences from a "traditional" setup are front-and-centre in conversion training.

Accelerations are usually measured in the body-axis system: ax along the longitudinal axis, ay perpendicular to the plane of symmetry, and az perpendicular to ax and ay.

"1 G in pitch corrected for pitch attitude" probably means 1G along the earth vertical, i.e. constant vertical speed.

Dozy, Power + Attitude = performance when flying.
(For a given configuration, be it clean, flaps at x degrees, gear down, whatever ....)

To trim for G or flight path, rather than for attitude, is to add complexity to that simple performance formula. There may be good design reasons for that to include passenger comfort, optimal cruise fuel consumption, or a dozen other factors.

Once the conversion course is over, who is flying, and how often? Considering recency and frequency of training and prifociency in flying: who is flying and how, when they are flying and particularly when they are hand flying?

(regarding AF 447 and a few other UAS events, without airspeed indications, you don't have a critical performance instrument, but you do have available in this case both pitch and power information, and you have both altimeter and VSI to get a sense of "level" or '1 G' flight, or something other than that).

Last of all, if like most pilots you are initially taught the above forumula, and imbed that relationship first, how many reps of a different conceptual approach do you need in order to fly "G" or "flight path" rather than pitch using your hands and feet, and internalize that? Varies with each pilot, I suspect.

I'd be interested to hear from those who do pilot training and conversion comment on the above. When pilots actually fly the Magic Bus, are the pilots flying pitch and power?

Some apparently do. (based on various inputs from actual pilots in 3+ years of this topic)

Are they wrong to do so, since the plane as designed isn't meant (under the Normal condition) to fly attitude but rather flight path? (It was painful for me to type that, but that is where this sub genre of discussion of flight modes and laws has taken me).

HazelNuts: zero vertical speed translates to "0" on the VSI when flying, right? ;)

Lonewolf 50

right!

Understood (and I have a similar equation written down from my Air Cadet days!).

Sure - and as HN39 suggests, I think the flightpath in the y axis amounts to "this pitch, at this V/S at this airspeed". The calculations may be more complex, but the intent was to make things transparent to the pilot.

Given that Airbus supplied pitch/power data to pilots from the get-go I think that aspect works in much the same way as it does on other types as long as you stay within the envelope. Even if there were some variation I have a strong suspicion that it would be barely noticeable.

Flying the pitch and power given in the table will keep the airplane within the envelope. Small power adjustments may be necessary to maintain a given altitude.

They doubtless provided weight and balance tables as well. :rolleyes: That isn't as important is the issue of "you tend to play the way you practice."

What is practiced?

PJ reproduced an A320 pitch and power table from the 90's. If you practice using that, or resorting to it under conditions X, Y, or Z, then when you are missing that critical performance instrument, airspeed, you call that up and proceed.

If that's how you train.

Hi,

Lonewolf_50
Maybe not important or irrelevant for you ...
But it is very important for the lawyers of the victims families and judges who have to fix and evaluate the compensation to be paid to the parties concerned
Because it is precisely people died that compensation should be paid (in accordance with the laws in force governing such allowances)
And you should know that if in addition to die .. victims have suffered moral damage before death (fear of death .. anxiety .. etc .. ) .. the allowance must be increased
Ask any lawyer about it .. and he will tell you the importance of these details (irrelevant for you) for the assessment of compensation

Well, here's a link to the procedure documents in effect at the time, which PJ2 reckoned was more confusing - it's certainly more complex and involved :

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.06.en.pdf


I guess it depends what you mean by "practiced" - as far as I can tell the intent was to follow the procedures outlined in the above document in the event of unreliable airspeed, but as to whether or how often these procedures were drilled, I can't say.

I can't say either, which is why I posted:
Won't make any comments on KISS principle, and the link you provided, since we are dealing with fly by wire aircraft.

Please pardon me while I puke.
:yuk:
Thanks.

Some pilots here don't agree with my thinking their 11 degree pitch attitude which is impossible without a stall not causing this whole event. My method of flying would have been to hold about 2 degrees nose attitude up and hold altitude as would have all of my pilot friends. Adjust power as necessary to maintain altitude and everything would have been fine. But if you follow the magenta line that probably isn't possible using the FD as your pitch mode. Why do people hire these guys? It never happened in my era.

Well, the way it's set up is such that if the aircraft was relatively stable prior to UAS-induced AP disconnect, then it will remain relatively stable without intervention for longer than a more conventional type, because even without AP, the flight control system is still managing trim to keep the aircraft pointing where it was last pointed and the thrust control is locked at the last setting. Strictly speaking, this then gives the crew time to get the books out if necessary and apply the correct procedures. From a piloting perspective that's got to be as simple as it gets, no?

TurbineD

Where does it say that the pilot's inputs were not inconsistent with flight in Normal Law? Clearly, the pilot, by evidence of the SS traces, is laboring under the illusion that his stick stirring is not going to produce a problem. Has he missed something? Debatable...

The prose in the report does not jive with its own conclusion, that the SS actions of the pilot resulted in unsuitable results. They did in hindsight, but as gums tells us, this manner of control response is more insidious than many will consider.

Failing that, the results of the Pitch commands can just as easily be laid off on inattention to horizon, which is just as culpable...Any unsuitable results that are caused by a collection of miscues are not the result of just one. Do you not see the prejudice inherent in this text, this report?

Do you not recall the endless discussions regarding the pilots initial Nose Up commands interspersed with Nose Down? The discussion re: a lack of initial response of the aircraft? Sluggishness? Where is that? Only the "emphatic" and "inappropriate" NU......

As to:

That is in quotations as it is intended to be a consideration, a possibility offered to frame a possible accusation of malfeasance.

The final decisions made as to the manner and content of this report is up to......Politicians. I take it therefore, with some copious quantity of NaCl....

Bill

TD's post had no mention of flight control law, and in pitch the aircraft's response is the same in Alt2B as it is in Normal.

"Clearly" to whom? Your supposition is based on the idea that the inputs were the result of a rational thought process, and unless your skillset includes clairvoyancy - this is something that neither yourself nor any of us can know.


Except it is a fantasy. The traces are positive proof that the PF's inputs were overwhelmingly NU in terms of both degree and time.

Finally, the BEA's staff are not politicians, they are civil servants - just like their counterparts in the NTSB and AAIB. If you do not understand the difference, then I'm a little worried.

Seriously, let this one lie and focus on the B787 issues Bill - I've actually been enjoying some of your input there!

The chronic consistency of Nose UP? Very bad. The "stirring"? Not so much.

Hence my reference to the Horizon. The report condemns the movements, when it was the overall additive result that was the problem.

The results of his manipulation, the excess persistent PITCH was the problem, yet the report "abrupt and excessive" misleads, had he been abrupt and excessive Nose Down, they may have survived.

If you cannot see the nuance, the prejudice, say so. I believe it is there.

Nothing wrong with abrupt, nor excessive, if countered. No harm to the control surfaces, no complaints about the ride, only the attempt to portray the Pilot as clumsy.


TurbineD

What of the Report's mention of "machine" shortcomings, that may have exacerbated the crash's entry? No AoA, Stick invisibility, etc. ?

"It wasn't the airplane that caused this..."

Lonewolf_50;
I think these are good questions / discussions on important & relevant matters which still have lessons to teach even as AF447 has been thoroughly dissected, (same thread, for context - slight shift in focus, etc). This is about airmanship, aerodynamics, systems knowledge and, most importantly, effort, a.k.a. "keeness", in terms of what one puts into learning one's craft and profession. So this applies currently and widely.

I've numbered your paragraphs for easy reference. The following is one pilot's experience / interpretation and therefore isn't definitive. I know you know this!

1. (Note: Conversion or Transition course footprints for new types, say A320 to A330, B737 to B767 or A320 to B777 etc, are usually 56 days give or take. Line Indoctrination flying, (regular routes with passengers with a line-indoc captain in either seat depending upon if the candidate is F/O or Captain) is usually included in this footprint but factors can extend this time although it's rarely less.

With that in mind, once the transition course is completed pilots flying long-haul overseas routes in western-built B777/B747/B767/B757/A340/A330/MD11, whether new on the airplane or have been on a long time, are generally working three trips per month, sometimes with a domestic filler. Long haul monthly hour limits vary between 80 and 95hrs with slight variations either way. That usually isn't hard (stick) time as there are 'flight-time guarantees' sometimes built into the schedule. Actual, logged stick time for most of these pilots (domestic & international) is usually about 600 - 1000hrs per year depending upon the nature of the operation.

The takeoff and the late approach / landing phases are almost always hand-flown. These two phases are the only portions of the flight which are hand-flown. It is illegal to hand-fly in RVSM airspace, complicated SIDS and STARS require precise navigation and altitude/speed control and generally the crew is tired at the end and the engagement of the autoflight system is of great value. So the hand-flying portion of most all flights lasts between 8 and 15 minutes, obviously with outliers where pilots choose (and are permitted) to hand-fly the entire departure and climb to cruise altitude, and the descent, approach and landing at destination.

The breakdown is roughly three minutes for the takeoff and initial departure. Takeoff lasts less than 1 minute, initial climb and establishing enroute about six to eight minutes but the autoflight is almost always engaged right after takeoff, mainly for reasons of navigation/speed/altitude precision and crew workload. There is nothing preventing hand-flying of the departure but everyone needs to be right on top of things to do so. The workload is higher but for a good crew that is not a problem.

The descent and approach phases are almost always flown on autoflight with disconnection around 400ft above airport elevation. Autolands are rarely carried out except when required. Autoland works extremely well. Hand-flying the late approach, (FL100 or below) is rare but is usually permissable and a lot of fun as well as very good practice but the same constraints apply so if one disconnects it's later in the approach phase...8 minutes is a reasonable estimate.

This phase (FL100 / arrival), usually lasts about 12 to 17 minutes depending upon the terminal.

From the FAF / OM, (Final approach fix or Outer Marker, (for others, about 4nm to the runway)) to touchdown is usually just over 2 minutes. From 400ft to t/d is about 40 to 50 seconds.

Based on these numbers, long-haul pilots are getting about 3 minutes of hand-flying on takeoff and about 50" of hand-flying on approach. If crews fly three long-haul trips and one domestic that's usually eight legs, perhaps ten and at the most a dozen legs per month. The flying is usually shared between Captain and F/O. At some carriers the third or fourth crew members are regular F/Os or Captains while other carriers use what are known as "Relief Pilots - RPs" who occupy the front seats only in cruise and are not permitted to sit up front below cruise altitudes. This has more to do with cost than anything else but the point is, the tiny time available for hand-flying is shared between at least two pilots, possibly three.

Per trip the available hand-flying time for the crew is approximately:

Takeoff and initial departure: Max 6 minutes, min 3 minutes;
Approach and landing: Max 8 minutes, min 1 minute

Per month the time is about Max 56 minutes, minimum 16 minutes.

For 11 months approximately, (can be less, depending...), the available hand-flying time is about 10hrs 15minutes max or about 3hrs minimum.

For the discussion let us say it is shared between just the two pilots up front.

Divided between the two pilots, hand-flying time for a long-haul pilot is just over 5hrs per year max and about an hour and a half minimum. The rest is flown on autoflight.

2. My sense of "level flight" was as you have said, the IVSI and Altimeter, but definitely not 'g'. Any "g" felt always signals a transition and one always waited for stability while watching/reading the instruments, almost always for verification of expectations and not to see what the airplane was doing.

3. I don't think that for a pilot the pitch / power and performance equation governs how one flies. I think it just has to be experienced and then the intuition comes quickly in ab initio work as well as transition work. I think this kind of knowledge explains afterwards what happens when one flies and so I wouldn't know how to teach it. I think one can only teach (or cause to learn) what it looks like but one can't teach what it feels like. I think that that kind of aeronautical knowledge-building goes right back to ab-initio work when one begins to learn how to fly. Those are the connections being made when one is being taught attitudes, slow flight, stalls and forced landings, (the glide). It is very difficult to teach that stuff (pitch & power) on transport airplanes first because the same power settings can result in different speeds, (Davies) but mainly because the changes are too tiny and the outcomes too large to appreciate the real connection. That's what's meant for example, by "tiny changes in pitch result in massive climb or descent rates". You don't see that in a little airplane, you just see the speed drop off if you pitch up and don't add power or the nose drop if you reduce power and it becomes (or should!) an "aha" moment. It works the same in heavy transports but at much different scales and effects which make it very difficult to demonstrate, (and one shouldn't be demonstrating such work at that stage anyway!).

4. My experience from the DC9 through to the A340/A330 was to fly pitch and power, and both thrust levels and trim complemented this intuitive learning, aided by some very patient captains and as well as by some who weren't patient at all. The A320/A330 were flown exactly the same way but the feedback loops were different but the sound of the air going by the airplane, pitch attitude vs power setting and one's feeling in the seat were the same. Clandestino has commented that the transition back to manually-operated trim (from the AB autotrim) was a non-event and I would agree that it would be easy to pick up say on a B777 or B767, (it might be more challenging if one had never flown non-AB aircraft).

The problems to overcome while transitioning to an Airbus are twofold: The fear of disconnecting, and the fear that it will do something you don't want. Both fears are fought by disconnecting everything regularly and hand-flying where one's company's policy permits. It takes work, study and patience to learn the airplane and it's not as straightforward as the B767 or B777. One does not put the books on a shelf, sit back and wait for someone else to teach them every six months in the sim (or in the office). But I am increasingly hearing of such things as well as hearing that not many pilots disconnect anymore. I think that's a problem.

On learning, on pitch/power and bringing keenness and enthusiasm to the profession for life-long learning, others will hopefully have different views to contribute.

PJ2

No - the failure to first monitor the aircraft's behaviour *prior* to making control inputs was the problem. The correct course of action was to wait and be prepared to take the controls - but first *monitor* the change in the situation, note that airspeed was no longer available and call for the UAS checklist.

Until that was done there was absolutely no reason to start manipulating the stick.