Two pilots couldn't hand fly. The Pitot system failed. They did not use the loss of airspeed checklist but pulled up 11 degrees into a full stall. Everybody knows you can not pull up to an 11 degree attitude at FL350 but they did. Now they hold this full nose up attitude for over three minutes until impact with the ocean. The captain that can hand fly comes up in the last minute and sees something he has seen before. Full stall, full back side stick and it is too late. Why do airlines hire these computer operator button pushers? Botom line always says hire the low time guys because they will fly cheap. It ain't cheap when you dump an airbus in the ocean with about 250 souls on board. This crash was so avoidable with a competent crew.

@ CONF iture:
 

No speed gains for DIRECT law.

In (FCPC) DIRECT law the maximum elevator deflection depends on CG position and (in both FCPC as FCSC DIRECT law) on slat and flap position so that the load factor is limited at high speed and a minimum maneuverability is obtained at low speed.

So beside the fact that the THS would not have gone to such wild setting, any ND command would have had much more effect.
I'd really like to see 2 simulations done side by side with the same inputs, one in the AF447 Law and the other in Direct Law ...

Who cares what law it is in. Hire pilots that can fly in any law. That is what us old timers had to do. Why make it easy to be an airline pilot just because they fly cheap? Go back to when we got hired and make them show they can actually fly an aircraft without a computer pad. Cost???

CONFiture

So too would any NU command? Instead of a chronic and persistent ~1G loss of energy to Stall, the wings in DIRECT LAW, given similar pilotage, would STALL at a lower altitude, sooner, (higher airspeed), and with some actual departure, not the "Mush" that gums says, (I agree). A definite rumble, break, and drop of the NOSE.

Perhaps a spin as well? With Roll DIRECT, who could say?

But the aircraft would be in a position to regain flying speed, (Nose Down), with an alerted pilot, via the break, and three pilots aware of the STALL..... And no OVERSPEED protection to muck things up...

I'm getting that sense of recursive déjà vu again. We've been over this so many times in the previous threads, so what do we say to a little realpolitik?

CONF, Lyman - I'm sure you and others would find such an experiment interesting, and truth be told you could probably derive any conclusion you wanted from the results.

But looking at it from a practical standpoint, the only reason to make a fundamental change in the behaviour of autotrim in Alternate Law (outside of better feedback on what it's doing) would be if the crew input was a reasonable course of action and in keeping with basic aircraft handling principles and the system responded in a way that had a detrimental effect on the outcome.

Now I'm sorry, but no matter which way you slice it - based on the evidence available the reactions of the crew of AF447 were neither reasonable nor in keeping with basic aircraft handling principles (NB : This is a purely factual statement, not an attempt to apportion blame or responsibility).

@bubbers44:
The devil's in the details. In fact the PF (F/O Bonin) was a sailplane pilot with advanced qualifications, so he'd likely have been better versed in stick-and-rudder than many of his peers. The key detail is that they had no experience or training in high-altitude manual handling.

Yeah right. But wasn't Bonin flying with his feet flat on the floor? That leaves only stick skills and those were clearly not up to the task.

I don't know - I don't even know if it was established. The point I was getting at is that saying "the pilot(s) couldn't hand-fly" is inaccurate and prone to be repeated in that distorted fashion.

What is not in question is that on this particular occasion they *didn't* hand-fly correctly, and that they were never given training in high-altitude manual handling. A sorry state of affairs regardless, but it's a lot different than saying they were simply unable to hand-fly, period.

Dozy
Don't want to belabor the point, but you don't have enough experience in a cockpit to really understand the fundamental way that proper flying methods were violated. You do a pretty good job, but sometimes you draw some strange conclusions----and I attribute that to lack of hands on experience.

Generations of pilots learned to fly smoothly by a proper use of the trim controls. The Airbus architecture minimizes the value of this skill and modern flight management systems instead place a lot of importance on typing skills and staying ahead of the computers. The job is changing, but occasionally the old skills are all that stand between success and abject failure.

So .. the company that employed the pilots felt that A330 does not require knowledge of manual flight at high altitude
What knowledge and tests has proved to be able to hold an airline transport pilot certificate such as that held by the AF447 pilots?
Is that these tests contain manual flight (real ..not simulation) of widebody at high altitude ?So all time for those planes (AF) that are at high altitude ( great percentage of the flying time) .. this is a potential catastrophe in the waiting .. if a pilot touch the joystick and pedals ?
What a beautiful battlefield for lawyers :)

@ CONF iture:
 

There was a simulation done without any SS input, that would have been their best option.

Since the majority of inputs was NU, I don't think the outcome would be much different.

Well yes, but that doesn't make the Airbus FBW system bad, dangerous or worse than anything else - it's just an iterative example of how technology has changed. I don't mean to sound disrespectful, but isn't there a hint of "why can't they just do it the old-fashioned way" about that point?

That's a different issue - modern FMS is not related to how Airbus set up their FBW flight deck - indeed it's not even an Airbus-only issue!

In this case, the old "fly by trim" skill would not have helped. All they needed to do was leave the stick alone and see how the aircraft behaved after AP disconnect. Of course, they should know enough to check the trim wheel setting if things are doubtful, and correct if necessary, but you can train that in the sim.

If the majority of inputs had been NU in DIRECT? Would they? Leaving in load for pitch command whilst roll is direct sounds like a mistake a human would make. And not a pilot.

Tens of millions of people are aware that PITCH/AoA did these gents in. The pilots ignored 'assiette'?

No discussion of AoA on deck of 447? None. The single most important data in the accident, and no evidence of awareness of it in the published record?

As if Pitch and AoA are unknown in aeronautics? Not a word?

The only hint is when we hear, "Try Climb"? Three certificated pilots ignore completely the mechanism that will kill them all? I may be the only one, but it is not possible that with all the upset and LOC, assiette was not mentioned, not once.....

And their lasting legacy is the broken record from bubbers44?\

Correct, but no pilot would accept to remain steady 3 or 400 ft below in RVSM airspace ... and again, why a proper information/training was not naturally put in place as Airbus had all the data ?

That has to be seen - NU inputs are effective no doubt but the THS does not collaborate ... Maybe they still go to the stall ... but that's not that easy ... and that's not that easy to maintain ...

Some experiment has to be done.

Lyman, as has been discussed before, there isn't an AoA gauge available for reference on the instrument panel. Pages of discussion on that, as I am sure you recall, over the course of the BEA "reveal" process and on the competing philosophy of what to do with the precious square feet of display area available to the crew.

Someone posted this further, up, IIRC bubbers.
I don't know if it was too late at that point or not.
What the crucial moment was that would have allowed a nose down, restore airspeed, unstall, recover via pullout at an altitude of > 1.0 feet has been calculated by some sharper folks than me. A best guess. It may have been past that point that Captain Dubois arrived, or it may have been X seconds previous.

I question whether or not he'd "seen that before" in an A330.

My rejoinder to you is due to the general point that A330 full stall practice isn't in the training regime (based on 2-3 years of discussions on this). Thus, "stall it to get various data points" was not done during development since it is not a cert requirement. (Probably).
Until the AF 447 crew became test pilots unwillingly, some of the stall and post stall characteristics of an A330 were unknown.

How do you train someone (Captain Dubois) when the info to train him with doesn't exist? Further that lack of data points, the flight sims can't be soundly programmed to give "what it does when stalled" training.

This leaves any pilot, not just Captain Dubois, lacking a chance to be in a full stall situation in a training scenario. Granted, stall prevention is the general training focus, for good and valid reasons.

To sum up: I don't think he'd "seen that before" and thus was playing catch up from the moment he entered the cockpit. Had what he saw, as you suggest, been something he recognized as a stalled A330 -- something "he'd seen before" -- my estimate is that he'd have directed Bonin to make stall recovery control inputs rather than the directions he did give him.

It is also my estimate that CVR transcripts would have included some rather forceful language, to include such bon mots as "merde, we're stalled, get the &$^# nose down!" or words to that effect.

That's an estimate, and we can't ever know.

AoA can be derived, that too was discussed, ad nauseum. But if only PITCH (assiette), in all its extreme iterations, NOT ONE WORD?

Upon the first reading of the CVR, some Press released a comment from DuBois, as he entered the cockpit, (He had heard the STALLWARN, briefly).

"This is STALL, get the NOSE DOWN"....It disappeared from the public domain, and I cannot find it here in the earliest threads.

No word from BEA, only an abbreviated and "approved" version.

"We have lost all control"....PITCH too? No discussion of controls that continue to function.

I do not know if my conclusions make my sanity suspect, but from the very first, I have not trusted the way the discussion "evolved" to competely blame the pilots.

As a pilot, I will always doubt the slam dunk nature of the comdemnation that clouds the professionalism of this flghtcrew.

Does that mean BEA have published lies? Perhaps, but for now, it is not necessary to believe they lie.

Only that they are quiet, and sit on the only possibility of exoneration.

That's unacceptable....

thanks for your response, LW

I repeat the question; Even if such an experiment were done and your supposition were correct - which it may well be - what practical difference does it make?

It certainly would not constitute a case for changing the design and operation of autotrim in Alternate Law for the reasons I stated above.

Why not correcting something that is stupid : auto trimming to the point of stall and further into it - Let a pilot take such deadly initiative, don't do it for him.

It won't do anything unless the pilot asks it to though!

Lyman:

I see what you were pointing to a bit more clearly. Just a few extracts from the CVR from some verbal exchanges early on:
(Note: relevant CVR inputs are from after the event began, which was about 2:10:06) (PL & PR = seat position)

PL : Watch your speed Watch your speed
PR: ok ok ok I'm going back down
PL: According to the three you're going up, so you go back down
PL: You're at ... go back down

As you point out, identifying a problem with pitch is not recorded. Just for interest, added time tags to some subsequent references .... many left out ...

PR 2:10:49
We're in yeah we're in climb
PR 2 h 11 32
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane
CAP 2 h 11 min 43
what are you doing?

in the next half a minute, various points comments, actions ... then ...

CAP 2:12:15-19
I don't know we're going down
My read on this was there is a pause between "I don't know" and "we're going down"

The Captain sees descent on the instruments and verbally notifies his crew of that condition.

In the next minute, for whatever discussion and control input went on, and as we've discussed numerous times before, a correction to the person at the controls (PR) to do something with pitch is not recorded.

PR 2:13:25
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

Reference to pitch is made late in the event, though the point seems to be well after a successful recovery (unstall, pull out, climb ..) could have been initiated and achieved

2:13:40
CAP: No no no don't climb back up
PL: Go down, then
2:13:45
PL: Go give the me controls. The controls to me.
PR: Go on, you have the controls. We're still in TOGA, ok
2:14:05
CAP: Watch it, you're pitching up <-----------------
PL: I'm pitching up? <-----------------
PR: Well, we should, we're at 4,000 feet
2:14:18
CAP: Go on, pull

It ends shortly after that. (In tears :( )

Ahhhhhh..... back to the control law logic and implementation.

From Doze:
I don't think that's entirely accurate.

Best I can tell from the reversion sequence, the "autotrim" for the THS is in effect until in DIRECT law ( or maybe sub-law 2 (c) iv /sarc off). So the system will attempt to achieve 1 gee corrected for pitch attitude. Have I read that wrong? And I also see an implementation that trims the THS in order to reduce the stick inputs required to maintain the gee required to maintain the previously commanded pitch attitude. NOT A PURE ATTITUDE HOLD mode many of us were used to in A/P -assisted modes.

So relaxing stick with a positive pitch attitude would "normally" result in increasing THS until the AoA functions kick in. Their "mode" didn't have the AoA "protections", if I read that law correctly.

I must agree that manually flying a basic jet at high altitude and a mach near 0.85M is not nearly as benign as the same IAS at 15,000 or 20,000 feet. That mach doofer causes some strange things, and your TAS is much higher so you muct be gentle and use measured inputs. So being a low altitude glider pilot may not satisfy the criteria.

Still a sad, sad example of airmanship and systems knowledge and crew coordination.

LW

The Three? ASI. This is about velocity, not attitude, or altitude. This would be expected with UAS, speeds being misleading, depending on rate and simultaneity of ICE blockages....

It also clearly tells us that the crew are not cognizant of UAS; if they were, they would not be so alerted to a needed correction......they would mistrust the speeds.... not act on them.

It also sets the tone for the throttle obsession PF demonstrated on the way up...

He is seeking a speed to settle on, not a PITCH. He does not tumble to PITCH until later on....

from gums...

This crew, but especially PF Bonin, was not madly pulling on the stick from the loss of A/P, not at all. PITCH increased incrementally, and PF was not cognizant of its dangerous trend, each time he relaxed, he felt one gee...even when increasing, it was seemingly "benign"....

His "I have no control of the plane..." happened after the THS migrated to essentially full (-)....

That does not explain his lack of concern with the Attitude increase, but he was focused on speed, and Roll....

I will repeat myself for the umpteenth time, this crash started with a vengeance at loss of speeds, not with "Full aft Stick"....

We are not certain at all the crew was aware of UAS until 2:10:22, sixteen seconds after loss of a/p. By that time, and imo, the die was cast. After STALL, it's all jelly beans, and pub blather.

EDIT LONEWOLF

You and I do not know if it was recorded, or not. Only BEA know that, and they are not saying....

I guess it depends on how the phrase is interpreted. Commanding a pitch attitude with the stick will cause autotrim to maintain the pitch attitude at the point the stick was released to the best of its ability.

Put more simply, autotrim is active in all laws and sub-laws except Direct (and MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY).

Releasing the stick effectively commands attitude in Normal Law and all modes of Alternate. Releasing at a given pitch attitude will cause the flight control logic to gradually release the elevator demand used to acquire that pitch attitude as the trim takes up the slack.

It's different to other implementations, but in terms of airliner ops it makes sense. The fact that it works cannot be denied.

Salute!

TNX, Doze for confirming my understanding of the THS.

However, the big point I have trying to make for 2 years is that the flight control laws for the 'bus use the basic gee command, but corrected for the pitch attitude.

The biggie is "effectively commands attitude". In other words, it will use 0.87 Nz at a pitch attitude of 30 degrees. So without increasing power, the speed/AoA changes and the THS keeps on keeping on to maintain the 30 deg pitch attitude until the jet reaches the AoA protections - HANDS OFF!!. This has an insidious effect, as "normal" jets would require more and more back-stick to maintain the attitude due to increasing AoA as it slows down. Again, I must remind all that our first FBW system was a blend of AoA and Nz. So we noticed that we had full back stick and nothing was happening with the nose once we hit the AoA limit for that gee. At max AoA, we were one Nz gee command.

Hi Lyman;

Re your observation in Post #816 that, "AoA can be derived, . . ."

Hm, I don't think so. I'm not an aeronautical engineer but how can AoA be "derived"?

Lonewolf_50;

Re, "How do you train someone (Captain Dubois) when the info to train him with doesn't exist? Further that lack of data points, the flight sims can't be soundly programmed to give "what it does when stalled" training."

It is true that approach-to-stall recovery training isn't the same as training to get a transport aircraft out of a stall. However the guidance in FCTMs is clear, that a high descent rate that cannot be arrested indicates that the aircraft is stalled and the AoA must be reduced.


"This leaves any pilot, not just Captain Dubois, lacking a chance to be in a full stall situation in a training scenario. Granted, stall prevention is the general training focus, for good and valid reasons."

While there is little to no actual flight data on aircraft behaviour in a full stall, that does not mean that the simulator is demonstrating entirely and completely unreliable or incorrect behaviour. The degree to which behaviour is or isn't replicated may be more apparent to engineers than to pilots who must recover the airplane. What I'm saying here is, I think an A330 Level D simulator is useful and not irrelevant. Airbus and the BEA must have thought so because they replicated AF447 and in the Final Report even drew graphs in comparison with AF447's flight data.

What was missing in AF447 was the acceptance that the airplane was stalled, and the knowledge and/or comprehension that the wing must be unloaded, the AoA reduced in order to recover, and that for this to occur the only way is to point the nose down.


Re, (my bolding), "To sum up: I don't think he'd "seen that before" and thus was playing catch up from the moment he entered the cockpit. Had what he saw, as you suggest, been something he recognized as a stalled A330 -- something "he'd seen before" -- my estimate is that he'd have directed Bonin to make stall recovery control inputs rather than the directions he did give him."

Yes, I agree with you on all points. Given a full understanding of the problem (the stall), it's what flight crews would do. The puzzle is in why an altimeter reducing by a thousand feet every 3 seconds while the nose was pointed up, didn't register and that fact is purely for hindsight speculation.


Re, "It is also my estimate that CVR transcripts would have included some rather forceful language, to include such bon mots as "merde, we're stalled, get the &$^# nose down!" or words to that effect."

Yes, I have to agree that's how someone would say it!

Dozy;

It is neither practically nor philosophically merely just an "iterative example of how technology has changed." It is a far more complex human phenomenon that requires the respect of awareness. Technology changes who we are and if we are blind to that, we are blind to its dangers while lauding its benefits.

That said, I should have thought the reason obvious; - because the old-fashioned way worked and saves lives on occasions when technology gives up and hands a mess over to the human pilot who can competently, safely take over and live to enter the snag in the log book.

You already know I have no problem with automation and all technological advances just so long as one knows one's craft and can do the job when the bytes and pixels quit - in other words, one is competent at one's job as a pilot and never lets anyone think that technology should be respected. Understood, yes!, but never respected and that means knowing how to fly and think regardless of technology.

Well yes, but that's exactly what it's supposed to do, and pilots converting to the FBW Airbus series are trained on that aspect of the behaviour.

I don't know if "insidious" is the right word, as the behaviour is drilled into pilot training from the start. From a piloting perspective it's essentially "point and forget", and it applies whether commanding positive pitch, negative pitch or levelling off.

It's undoubtedly an aspect that's different than what went before, but time has shown that it's simple, reliable and works just fine.

Which makes sense for a fighter. Engineering 101 - use the right tool for the right job!

Hi PJ2, and regards!

To be certain, I was referring only to the autotrim function on the FBW Airbus system - no other aspect of it.

Agreed totally. However to the best of my knowledge the autotrim system in and of itself has never given up and handed a mess to the pilot.

*Now* we're into philosophy. To respect someone or something is not to say one should automatically defer to that which is being respected.

Conversely when an argument is made that technology should not be respected, following that path runs the risk of negating one of the biggest motivators for wanting to understand something, does it not? In my experience, learning and understanding a subject becomes much easier and more rewarding if respect for and interest in that subject already exists.

gums:
I think that the Left Seat Pilot activated that, by calling the Captain. :}:(

Lyman:
Lyman, I am not so sure about that.

PL: According to the three you're going up, so you go back down

I'd say, within the context of that passage, the gent in the left seat was referring to ALTITUDE and CLIMB, since SPEED display systems at this point weren't showing any useful information.

They were in UAS at the time, so there was no good info according to the three ASIs then available to them. Does my reasoning make sense to you?

Three being VSI, altimeter, and something related to the FD. (And I may be utterly wrong.)

PJ2:
The temptation for me to run yet again down that rat hole of "why no AoA gauge in the cockpit?" shall be resisted. :E

Roger. Perhaps at the very least this can be grown into at least some procedural training for future crews? We shall see. The original simulators I flew for instrument training some three decades ago were hardly Level D sims, but I sure got graded on my instrument flying in them anyway. Some training was indeed achieved, though I got no style points.

Thanks for the course correction, PJ2. As usual, a pleasure. :cool:

Regards, Dozy;
"The old-fashioned way" then being just a reference to the way trim is handled - okay thanks for your clarification - I hadn't read carefully enough. In other words, use the pickle-switches...manually trim all the time when one is manually flying.

Yes, I'd probably agree with the requirement when manually flying as trimming was one tactical feedback loop that I do recall on the Boeings, Douglases and Lockheeds. At the same time, I don't recall it being a transition or operational problem on the A320.

Now I never went back to manual trim airplanes so can't speak for that direction of a transition.

I wonder if the B787 is full-time auto-trim...can't recall at the moment.
No the system hasn't by itself handed over a mess, that's an autoflight function :) and of course the comment therefore doesn't apply.

Bit OT, but "respect" means trust and belief in reliability and integrity of that which one grants one's respect. That has nothing to do with interest in and / or understanding something although for some it may be a motivator. I do not and never will trust technology per se and do not unconditionally believe in it or its nature but I use it every day and for the most part understand the simpler bits within a consumer's competency.

LW;
LOL...I can assure you that a Level D sim doesn't make it look any more stylish...

Yes, I agree, I think there is a definite training advantage to seeing 15deg ND and a descent rate of 15,000fpm if only to realize that it (in extreme circumstances, much the same as other unusual attitudes), may be necessary and it doesn't break the airplane. If one is in a corner, I think overspeeding the airframe is preferable to stalling it.

There are some thoughts that recovery from this stall was possible even below FL150 had the wing been aggressively unloaded and the AoA reduced. Up higher it took about 40". Down lower I'd hazard a guess that it would take a lot less time and therefore altitude, (thicker air). The elevators were effective in the sim all the way down even against a -13deg THS, and it always wound towards the ND position with steady ND SS. The FPA would have been available at that time on this flight (IIRC) and could have shown them the descent angle. But by that time, the stick and the elevators were almost continuously full-up.

Hail, hail the gangs all here!

DOZE!!! I still don't think you understand my point about the insidious effect of the 'bus autotrim WRT the gee command and pitch attitude.

Gotta tellya, that if the AF447 crew had a gut understanding of the system, we wouldn't all be here talking about it.

I still see 'bus drivers talking about "commanding" a pitch attitude. WRONG! They command a gee and when reaching desired pitch they release the stick and the THS "autotrims" to maintain the gee for that pitch attitude. In the 'bus, these are very small pitch attitude changes and nothing like the ones we commanded in the Viper. I will grant you that. But basic aero and the controls law prevail. I am not all that sure that the basic 'bus driver understands that.

Up to me, I would demo the control laws down at 15,000 feet or so to eliminate mach effects. Pull up to 10 degrees and watch the trim wheel move as you relax the stick to hold that attitude. Hmmmm. Wait until the AoA protection displays and such kick in and let'er rip! Nose goes down and commanded gee changes, etc. etc.

No need to do a no sierra approach to stall, as the AoA protection limits seem very conservative to me when looking at the manuals.

In the Viper, we would demo the autotrim and have Joe Baggodonuts look back and observe our "THS". Pull up and relax the stick. Eventually get to the AoA limit and see the tail moving more and more until it was commanding full nose down. We commanded trim gee that was not corrected for pitch attitude like the 'bus.


@ PJ

In wings level flight, AoA can be derived from the pitch and the inertial velocity vector regardless of the air data probes/cones. The Sluf and Viper HUD had a "zero sight line" cross, and usually the flight path marker ( FPM) was below it ( negative gees was something else, heh heh). That was your AoA in wings level flight.

I'll still maintain that a HUD with the FPM displayed WRT pitch lines would have provided a big clue as to what was happening. The doggone thing shows exactly where the jet is going without regard for airspeed, altitude, attitude, roll angle, gee, AoA, ad nauseum. Also neat for final approach in crappy weather.

With back stick, the pilot would have seen decreasing FPM angle and moved the stick forward well before the AoA alarms went on. In other words, it would have been like looking out the windshield in daytime, CAVU, with nice scenery in front.

I am still disappointed that many think the 'bus stick commands a pitch attitude and not a small delta in the gee command to reach the desired pitch.

Can we not see the copilots pulled up into a 11 degree nose up attitude that obviously would stall the airplane. Then they held back SS to maintain the stall until impact with the ocean. No pilots I know would do this so why did they do it?

It could do just that - Hands off - Try to maintain 1g
Will cease at alpha prot in Normal Law but will go all the way In AF447 Law ... Find the logic ?

I think I know but Airbus training needs to include how degrading automation needs to let people understand the level of automation they are at.

That's the crux of the problem! What can anyone do when -
1.. They are told they are in ALT Law,
2.. Know the A/THR has disconnected, and
3.. Pull back on the SS, and with
4.. Stall Warning ring in their ears, they
5.. Do nothing right!

It may well all be put down to lack of appropriate training, but even then, "You can lead a horse to water, ... but?"

Just an analogy:

The FCOM says about High Angle of Attack Protection:
When I first read that, I just thought - well, that's logical, and went on reading. Prior to the two incidents, I never realized that, when this happens in cruise and the SS is not pushed forward, the airplane zooms up 3000 ft.

I don't think AF447 will happen again - until everyone has forgotten all about it.

P.S.
Had the pilots of the AF 'level bust' incident been told about the THY incident?

HazelNuts39

For how long does the AoA "stay there"? (Alpha Protection) what does it take to gain Nose Down?

"Push the stick forward"?
How far forward? Does THS freeze, or ennable the protection?

At the outset, just after loss of auto, Bonin commanded a climb. Two seconds later... "STALLWARN.....cricket, cricket, Master Caution......" and from Robert, "What was THAT?.....". Was he referring to the SW, or to BUFFET? That would qualify an exceedance of Alpha Prot, especially with an assistance from WindShear? (updraft). Is this the reason Pitch remains in gee? ALII (b)?

I think I read here that forward stick must be fully forward, something we do not see from Bonin? Once discouraged from applying forward stick by the recurrence of inappropriate STALL warn, would he desist from further attempts?

How does THY pertain to 447?

Lyman,

you're mixing things up. The FCC's weren't in normal law when Bonin took the controls. You miss the point of my post, which is about learning.

Howdy...

For purposes of discussion, say A/P had dropped, and the aircraft had remained in NORMAL LAW. Is this same circumstance then also possible? Is this protection available in ALII (b) ? Or, only "g prot" ? The "G" had reached +1.65 in the climb, at (prior to) 7000 FPM .......

Is it possible for this Aircraft AoA to exceed Alpha Prot in Auto?

One last, for now, What is the possibility that PF believed the aircraft had remained in NORMAL LAW until he heard his mate declare at 2:10:22: "Lost speeds, Alternate Law..." ??

Any possibility? If not, what was his alert to LAW change?

If I may...
... and doing a very fine job at that ! :)

Lyman,

I'm somewhat reluctant to reply to your questions, because the 'level bust' incidents have been discussed at length in various threads and have no relation to AF 447.

Since the High AoA protection is not available in ALT 2b. it can only occur if the airplane remains in Normal law.

Yes, it is possible for AoA to exceed Alpha Prot in Auto. IIRC that occurred in the Turkish level bust due to turbulence. The AP disconnects when that occurs.

Your last question - if the PF failed to notice the indications on the PFD and ECAM and did not hear the PNF's announcement, it is possible he was not aware of the law change.

AZR:
merci beaucoup (You are making me blush! :O:O)

Hazelnuts39:
I hate to agree with that, but I must agree based on the last century of manned flight. :(