As am I, my friend. But to broad brush the media, in this case, puts BEA on a Pedestal....

Ordinarily, your case would be persuasive, but BEA leave the entire product in doubt, imo.

I don't expect the info to ever come out. Therefore, Que Sera Sera. I feel that I now know enough to deal with the "it flies like any other airplane" airplane when it quits flying like any other airplane. That's all I wanted to know when I started looking for info.

Whatever will be with the investigation, or with the PPrune discussion, will be.

xxxx will still pretend to be unbiased. xxxx will still pretend to be the best pilot ever. xxx will still pretend that it will never happen again because it happened once to AF447. etc, etc, etc, but we don't seem to be adding to the body of knowledge. In the mean time, Airbus birds will fly and I'm content with my ability to fly mine. Whatever else happens, so be it.

How? By not printing a remark from the crew that was once alleged by the press and therefore may not have been accurate?

Look - if we combine the more colourful language used in the book with the CVR transcript in the report, I think it's fair to say you've got probably 98% of the total CVR content in the two, and if you use the book to determine language that the BEA omitted it quickly becomes apparent that only non-pertinent language was omitted (as the report itself makes clear).

@DW:
Sigh. How is "We are in STALL" non-pertinent??? I shouldn't have to point out to a smart fellow like you that what is pertinent, or not, is a subjective matter that has been decided in a closed room.

:ugh:

@Organfreak - The point I'm making is that there's a good chance those words were never said, given the origin of the claim.

Also given that the transcripts we do have show no cognizance on the part of the Captain that they were stalled at any point - not just in the BEA report, but also in the controversially- published book on the subject. How likely is it that the captain would enter, immediately diagnose stall and appear to forget that he'd diagnosed a stall for the remainder of the sequence?

I seem to remember that you have already conceded that A33Zab's proposal that the PRIMs prevented any further NU of the THS after the ADRs returned NCD at around 02:11:50 [or while they returned NCD].

If that was correct, the alternative may also apply to SS ND in the same circumstances, whereby the THS may not follow the ND demand until the PRIMs allowed it. In that case, the use of the Manual Trim Wheel would be needed to resolve the situation quickly.

This situation was apparently not foreseen, and the clarification you are seeking would be welcome.

At long last....

"Also given that the transcripts we do have show no cognizance on the part of the Captain that they were stalled at any point - not just in the BEA report, but also in the controversially- published book on the subject. How likely is it that the captain would enter, immediately diagnose stall and appear to forget that he'd diagnosed a stall for the remainder of the sequence?"


I think you are on to something......

Yes, I'm on to the likelihood that the press report you refer to is incorrect.

Are you seriously suggesting that they'd rewrite the entire transcript for the Captain?

The time has come, the walrus said, to talk of many things
 

Ladies and gentlemen, dear fellow PPRuNers.

First I'd like to remind you that "blame" and "pilot error" are not phrases included in any properly made accident report, (except in the legal notice clearly stating it is not the job of investigation board to blame anyone or anything). Fault is also seldom used and then only in mechanical or electronic sense. Accident reports only state that pilots did so-and-so and occasionally can add it was in contravention of such-and-such rule or procedure. This is what folks not very well acquainted with aviation safety, or more often with aviation at all, wrongly condense into term "pilot error", which by itself wouldn't be so wrong if it didn't always come with the notion that they who erred are the ones to blame for the calamity. Such a ignorance-based mistake usually comes from media or lately, bless internet, from anonymous fora.

Since AF447 crashed into international waters, BEA was appointed as the official investigator as the country of registration was France. In its final report, it has thoughtfully provided CVR transcript from the autopilot disengagement till AoA went over 40°, superimposed on some FDR parameters (page 60 English report, page 64 French), to make it more readable than it would be the case if one would need to constantly switch from CVR transcript to DFDR graphs in order to get exact chronology of who said and did what. NTSB style animation would be even better but I guess we have to do with what we have for the time being.

What can be seen is interesting, to say the least. CM2 has promptly arrested the roll, while unnecessarily pulling and properly announced he has controls. Next thing CVR recorded is stall warning, followed by exclamation of surprise from the CM1, next both pilots commented they have no display of speeds. To digress a bit: there was a theory put forward that they were unconcerned about sudden massive indicated speed drop but rather with characteristic protection speeds being removed from from the displays. To accept it as plausible, one has to be massively unaware of the importance of the IAS in any flying, let alone airline one. Basically: speed is life. For advanced users: while in itself it is life, we can live without it being properly measured and displayed.

So far so good, there are two pilots who promptly and correctly diagnosed the problem so what should have ensued is application of proper procedure, life goes on, no one notices except perhaps FDM, etc.

However, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight we know that it took less than five minutes form the first sign of trouble till the aeroplane impacted the ocean.

Ten seconds after he concluded there are no good indications of speed CM1 warns CM2 to watch his speed. CM2 replies with "Okay, I'll redescend" as if he were warned of climb but he doesn't. CM1 now realizes they are climbing and only then prompts CM2 to descend. CM2 agrees but doesn't reduce the pitch enough to stop climb so busts practical ceiling. Aeroplane loses energy, stall warning goes off, CM2 attempts to pitch the aeroplane even more up so seals his and 227 other fates.

Not a reaction expected from professional pilots. Perfectly understandable if we assume ones acting so are scared mindless.

There was an occasional "we steam gauges pilots did so-and-so while these new EFIS kids on the other hand..." which usually made some sense but was more often than not garnished with a plenty of nonsense as it would compare theoretical perfect pilot of yesterday with the tragically underperforming modern crew, while the unspoken but presumed narrative would be that what was discussed were the average representatives of both species. There was many a classic cockpit crew who lost the situation awareness and ended smashed against the mountain or at the bottom of the spiral dive following disorientation as there is many a wonder-electric-jet crew that turned potential catastrophe into incident (e.g. QF32). So yes, there are still pilots flying those machines overhead us and given the number of incidents that did not end up tragic (or in newspapers or PPRuNe at all) I'd venture a guess they still outnumber mere system operators by quite a large margin. Now take this statement with a grain of salt: circumstances can catch any pilot out of his depth. Trick is to be so skilled, knowledgeable, conscientious and calm to make chance of it astronomically small.

It was mentioned there was thirty-something other incidents very similar to AF447 that ended without any damage or injury. While it can be used as a definite proof that Airbus is not lethal by design, conclusion that other crews knew what happened and what they are supposed to do is so far-fetched to be patently untrue. This is the tragic part: not every did but they did manage to avoid the traps that AF447 failed into. Many survived by doing nothing while trying to figure out what is going on and so exited the area of ice that clogs the Thales pitots in the process. There were those who pulled but they didn't ignore stall warning so pushed. There were those exposed to brief stall warning as they hit updraft. After every updraft must come a downdraft so they, wrongly but not fatally, assumed warning was false.

There was many a heated argument of how this or that automated feature should have been incorporated into Airbus to prevent the CM2 from wrecking the aeroplane. Well, Einstein once observed that the good thing about thought experiments is that they always succeed. In real life, safety devices have to be designed (and demonstrated) to acceptably cope not just with the occurrences thy are supposed to deal with but also the two failure modes: 1) failure to work when required 2) activating when not required. Number 2 is dealt with by system being overridable (stickpusher) or shutting itself down when risk increases (Airbus protections and control laws). Certification authorities assume that even the crew that has barely passed the obstacles of the type rating course has good situational awareness and will recognize failures and react to them properly. There is never an assumption that crew will get totally incapacitated for prolonged period. Pilots that get detached from reality are faced with simple choice: timely regain SA and act correctly or meet thy maker. Airbus protections (which incidentally started with A300, only got more sophisticated with introduction of FBW) can only buy a bit more time for crews to regain their wits but it was repeatedly demonstrated that you can still crash while staying away from protection parameters.

What are the chances that the pilot who gets so freaked out to forget just about all the basics of flying - pitch & power, performance ceiling, that heavy buffet and failure of the aeroplane to respond to controls is indicative of stall (since warning just got ignored) would pay attention to AoA gauge or use manual pitch trim? In real world: zilch. We can indulge in wishful thinking if we find it emotionally satisfying but it won't prevent the recurrence of AF447.

There was even mention that there is no feedback from aeroplane to pilots in Airbus as sticks are not backdriven and this is supposed to be major design flaw. Well, we have mostly abandoned the feedback fifty years ago when we made the switch from power-boosted to power-operated controls. If you fly aeroplane with hydraulically operated controls and believe what comes through yoke is feedback, I am sorry to disappoint you but you have been lied to. It is synthetic pitch feel. It is there to prevent you from overstressing the airframe. It can provide clue how far you are from the trimmed state but it is not by design or purpose and folks who are mislead to believe they can use it to tell the speed error can get bitten when things get a bit pear shaped as almost was the temporarily hapless crew of G-CPAT. They were so concentrated on yoke feel they at one point believed they had unreliable airspeed - despite all three indications agreeing. Good thing they maintained healthy respect towards GPWS.

ECAM complications are another red herring. No abnormal checklists, no ECAM actions, no memory items, there's nothing that has be done before positive control is established (to be nitpicky: except items that prevent loss of control such as overcoming control jam or feathering the propeller that went into ground fine, nothing similar was involved in AF447) which seemingly never was.

It was mentioned that AF447 is a proof modern pilots have insufficient manual skills and that we should practice raw data manual flight more often. While I agree with the recommendation, I don't think it can be derived from the accident we are discussing. Indeed, most common contemporary accident scenario is not involving a crew that knows what goes on and what needs to be done but lack of manual flying skills prevents it from carrying out the plan. More common is the crew who loses SA, often through some minor and trivial distraction and does exactly the wrong thing (sometimes with astounding manual dexterity) so loses control. I am afraid manual flying when everything goes right does exactly nothing to prevent such a calamity and introducing distraction during simulator won't be much helpful either as basic limitation of it is that it is still a sim, it cannot simulate the feeling that you are flying for your life. IMHO problem here is the pilot that has many an hour and many a simulator session under his belt. He goes to the sim, does the motions, passes the checkrides while secretly harbouring deep mistrust of what he has been taught as he "knows" better than some manual written by the lawyers for the aeroplane made by the pilot-haters. So one day proverbial hits the fan and that's when he realizes that he has nothing to fall back upon.

Question that remains is how to prevent AF447 from recurring. Human factors are definitively the key but methinks in that aspect, BEA report leaves a lot to be desired. While I'm no expert in psychology so I can't meaningfully comment some findings from that aspect, I do know that notion that night makes maintaining attitude in passenger jet more difficult through lack of outside horizon to be utter tosh. You can combine it with the best psychological expertize and still you won't get anything true out of it. Even worse is lack of background data for the pilots involved except the very basic information. BEA should really follow the NTSB example with its background checks. We got informed that F/O of AA587 really misunderstood AAAMP to imply that it is proper to use rudder for any disturbance, was already warned by a captain on one of his previous flights, but was unable to comprehend. NTSB told us that captain of Aloha Islandair 1712 regularly scud-ran, he made wrong estimate of his position only once and that was enough. As for AF447 pilots, we have no idea whether there were precursors noted during their careers that would make their reactions more comprehensible or - far more scary option - their de-structurization and consequent disaster struck out of the blue.

@Clandestino - I agree with 99% of what you are saying, however there's one point that needs to be addressed -namely that the NTSB has a further-ranging remit when it comes to identifying cause than most other agencies. Usually, civil service investigation agencies such as the AAIB and BEA are restricted to determining cause from the immediate evidence, and their write-ups consequently tend to read more drily.

Thanks for the reminder, I had forgotten that one.
Nothing was for certain in his answer but it was making sense. I didn't have and still don't have the knowledge or the tools to confirm or dispute his theory.

But for sure, such explanation should have already been part of a Final Report ... ?

Quote:
Originally Posted by mm43
"I seem to remember that you have already conceded that A33Zab's proposal that the PRIMs prevented any further NU of the THS after the ADRs returned NCD at around 02:11:50 [or while they returned NCD]."


Sorry, that does not make sense to me. The reason for Alternate Law2b in the first place is duff ADRsX3. What difference does it make if they are duff or merely NCD?

Another thing, if the THS freezes with NCD ADR, why did it move at all after AL2b latched, never to be changed? If the THS did move, then the Controls Law should have reverted to Alternate Law 2, since ADR would have been reliable?

perhaps?

Sorry Sir, not my call.

AF447 - Thread 6, Post #962 by A33Zab may help when working out whether NCD data had an affect on the PRIMs.

Then it is cultural or political issue. After FI acquaintance of mine perished in training accident, BFU traced his former students and their testimonies about the way he performed and taught the fatal manoeuvre made it into the final report.

DozyWannabe,
In a reply to Clandestino you stated:
Perhaps you can explain what is meant in your quote as my interpretation would lead me not to agree. Here is the intro into how the NTSB does its investigations:
Is what I have bolded the difference you are identifying?
You can read the entire investigative process of the NTSB by going to this link:

Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board

Proper training
 

But the best tool I know to attain competency is proper training.

This is where Airbus has to question its lethargy - When it became obvious that UAS were adding up in cruise, especially after the Air Caraibes note, Airbus had to do something.


A red OEB had to be published :

Lately, multiple cases of UAS in cruise have been reported and seem to be related to ice crystals in the vicinity of CBs, temporarily obstructing pitot probes.
The situation can be stressing as AP and A/THR disconnect, ECAM messages pill up, and multiple visual or audio warnings interact such as :

• MASTER WARNING
• MASTER CAUTION
• CAVALRY CHARGE
• SINGLE CHIME
• C-chord
• STALL

Possible sequence of ECAM messages :

http://i35.servimg.com/u/f35/11/75/17/84/ltop_a10.gif

Additionally :

• Sudden decrease of a few hundred feet of the indicated altitude
• Characteristic speeds may disappear.
• Sudden increase of the TAT

Crews have also reported :

• St-Elmo fires
• Smell of ozone

Recommended procedure :
At first signs of deterioration, suspect UAS and call for the UAS Memory Item :

• AP OFF
• A/THR OFF
• FD OFF
• PF maintain wings level + pitch of 2.5 deg
• PNF call any deviation and set thrust to 80% N1

This phenomenon is of short duration, 3 minutes at most according to recorded events, airspeeds are then back to normal.

Notes :

• Possibly Alternate 2 Law activates, pitch remains a load factor demand but roll is in Direct Law.
• Due to turbulence, brief STALL warnings have been triggered - Maintain recommended attitude + thrust setting except if Stall warning persist in which case the STALL procedure has priority and must be followed.
• Disregard the STATUS MSG : RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING

We still investigate and bla bla bla ...


Even better if a simulator experience can be provided.
Proper training is a good tool to make us competent.

Dear clandestino,
Thank you for your post from 3.oct.I trully hope you do believe me,when i tell you something you mentioned in your post was in my mind for a long time.
Why did`nt i post it ? wll it may be because english is not my native language and i was`nt sure that i`m able to do oi right.
You mentioned the missing backgrounds ckecks.I`m just a Slf with interest in aviation and i have reed a few hundreds of accident invest.reports.So that`s my experience and i think i know a little bit more about aviation than the common man on the street.
in ca.90% of these reports there had been a background check of the pilots and i was always thinking that the cause of the accident of AF 447 may lay in the personal structure of the PF.
How was his behaviour on duty,to colleagues,how did he react earlier in stress situations in the cp.How was his behavior to friends or relatives,how did he conduct his private life.
I`m quite sure that it is possible there is maybe something in his past that could explain why he did react that night the way he did.

Hi Clandestino,

Thanks for the link to Aviation Investigation Report A08Q0051.

The report mentions:
"2.6.4 Spatial Disorientation and Interpretation of Indications of an Airspeed Indicator Error

From the start of the descent until the reduction in power, the somatogravic illusion due to the aircraft’s acceleration could have suggested that the aircraft had a nose-up attitude when in fact it had a nose-down attitude. The false impression of a nose-up attitude combined with the increase in aircraft speed may have prompted the captain into diagnosing an airspeed indication error."

Yet you say Suppose AF447 crew experienced a similar somatogravic illusion, and the deceleration of the aircraft caused PF to "feel" a nose down sensation. It may help explain why PF was reluctant to believe his PFD.

Isn't that more or less what the Air France "info OSV" of november 2008 contained?

Quote:
Originally Posted by rrat
Suppose AF447 crew experienced a similar somatogravic illusion, and the deceleration of the aircraft caused PF to "feel" a nose down sensation. It may help explain why PF was reluctant to believe his PFD.

- indeed it might, but do we not expect 'average' pilots to associate rapidly climbing altimeters (x3) with a loss of speed? The essence of ALL instrument training is to believe the instruments where they appear to be reliable and IGNORE 'somatogravic illusion'.

Hi BOAC,
Very true. But throw in the lowest circadian body clock time & no natural horizon. The simultaneous loss of 3 air speeds, and an apparent Altimeter drop of 400ft (due loss of Mach correction). Now which instrument is still telling the truth?

From 2:10:08 until impact the a/c was in AL2b. (BEA)
...perhaps sooner, but it was annunciated at :08. And even then, crew did not know which AL....

AL2b latches when none of three ADRs is available.
.....which was immediate, and the reason the THS stopped moving

At no time was a/s available to the crew, from 2:10:08 on.... By definition.
...There was no way for them to get whether subsequent speeds were valid. It took the DFDR to explain it, after they were dead.

Whether or not the a/s was demonstrably "accurate" at any time, the pilots could not have known, by definition.

The THS is inhibited when 3ADRs are unavailable, by design...
.....after it started up again, was the LAW changed? The Protections? The DFDR showed it hadn't. Again, after they were dead.

Yet the THS was moving prior to STALL... Whether the crew knew it was moving or not, they had no reason to want to stop it.

By definition, the a/c was demonstrably in the incorrect flight control LAW when the THS was moving... If it moves, Alpha prot must be available, according to Flight Law. So why stop it? Protection applies.

I was taught never to maneuver with trim, trim is trim, not a flight control....

As the aircraft was dissipating energy rapidly, the THS was not trimming, it was flying the aircraft...Once STALLED, the airstream never allowed valid speeds?

So if the ADRs are never available, the crew have no airspeed, ever, by definition. It is unlikely this was trained, 330 pilots here were unfamiliar with 2b.

At times in the critical path, airspeed was "valid" (BEA).
......excellent, how was the crew to know?

NO, it was not valid, not in any useful way. "vitesse feu".

next, Flight Directors....

The FDs were not turned off, nor was A/P, shouldn't this be part of automatic disconnect, along with Thrust? If leaving them active prevents autoflight, how does leaving them on, help recovery? Especilly when they return intermittently, to resume random modes?

I’m operating the A-330 … but I’m not airfrance.
That’s the Airbus responsibility and duty to publish such stuff.
An OEB has a DIRECT entry in our QRH.
What is an info OSV in the middle of the box letter of an AF pilot …

Well, if the info OSV was still in their letter box, and they never got the QRH out, ...

Gotta admit it, but Lyman has a point:

As many of we human factor folks and at least one experienced FBW pilot from over 30 years ago ( yep, 30+ steenkeeng years), there is no substitute for a clear, straightforward reversion sequence for the flight control system and same for the displays that the "monitors" seem to use all the time nowadays.

So I give Airbus a "D minus" in that regard. Training and attention to the previous airspeed problems is a whole other topic, and seemed to be ignored by the company/ Air France. I cannot forgive them.

I agree with what you are saying gums.

If the PF had done his part with the UAS immediate actions he would have verified AT off AP off and FD off, pitch 5 degrees and climb power. They didn't do that so crashed.

Not everything was AB's fault and training inadequacy's, a great deal was due to pilots not doing their job after thousands of hours experience.

There was no UAS SOP, none. Every incident was a fresh abnormal, subject to the unquantifiable readiness of the AF crews to instantly interpret what was happening, and deal with no airspeeds, until the Controls Law changed, which it never did.

Straightforward does not mean simplistic, and STALL training should never have become an issue. STALL TRAINING? At the flight levels?

you have got to be kidding.

It was not UAS at the time, it did not have the familiarity it attained on this epic website.

ALTERNATE did not appear until the fourth screen, and the descriptions given here by professionals are not necessarilt the waynit was. Everything in the reort is an interpretation, subject to after the fact pause, and weighing this against that, including politics, and personalities.

The Pilots are quite naturally at the center, and it is exquisitely frustrating to see the slow and measured sculpture of a new urban myth.

NO ONE knows what the screens showed, and that is why the regulators now require CVVR format in future.

If there were usable honest cues on the panel, do you think they would have said nothing about the Attitude until GPWS?

These crew had a dozen seconds or so to get it right, up to the point the cueing got unsussable, imo.....

UAS recognition
 

bubbers44 wrote:
IF... !

But we do know, with more than 36 UAS events, that it seems difficult to recognize such an event (Thread 7 #1321) :
It seems to me that we must go to "Machine-Man Interface" Thread, rather than "HF" Thr.



Lyman
But we have some idea:

- PF Erroneous airspeed display between 02:10:07 and 02:11:37 (Final, page 93), PNF between 02:10:07 and 02:10:37

- Fantastic FD pitch orders till 02:11:40 AND stall warrning since 02:10:51 (Final, p 96)

- FD1 + FD2 mostly not available between 02:10:08 and 02:10:47,
and disapeared again at 02:11:40 (IR 3 CVR transcript and Final report)
We know(?) that PF was following FD and pulling up (Final, p 96).
But why NU SS inputs after 02:11:40 ?

- CAS/ISIS CAS out of duty (NCD) beginning 02:12:14 (and computerized again btw 02:13:00 and 02:13:24 (IR 3 CVR transcript),

- Invalid AOA beginning at 02:11:40.

And plenty of "may be", "perhaps" in Final report.

Hi NeoFit, nice to see you.

Take a closer look at your excellent review of DFDR determined data. Those data cannot be assumed to have been displayed!

Especially not AoA....:ok:

Let me introduce something from what is on another thread. Having to do with displays, let's look at what the pilots were experiencing in the cockpit on the way down. The PITCH was consistently around 16 degrees, the a/c was falling at about 1g, and the airstream is assumed to have been LOUD.

Cover the panel with a tarp, and put hoods on the pilots. No cues, save kinesthetic. The pilot, standing, is on his feet on a 1g floor at an angle of 16 degrees, quite uphill. The pilots, both seated, sense the angle of the a/c in their back and buttocks, also 16 degrees uphill. This continues for two minutes.

And none of these experienced airmen are aware of the deck angle? Of course they knew their Pitch was unacceptably high. No Comment, at all? They ignored it?

To believe the BEA report is to believe in the Mad Hatter, and Rumplestiltzkin

And they had VSI to corroborate their kinesthetics! And Instruments! But, dumbfounded, they descended to their death, unaware of their condition?

nonsense.

Hello

Regrettably!

The proposed OEB here is not to be visited when things happen - Too late for that - It is to be known - It is to be prepared.
On the 4 red OEB I have in my QRH right now, 2 are of that type.

30 known events of UAS in cruise prior AF447 - I feel cheated Airbus kept me in the dark.
Today the average pilot I am is certainly more prepared, not because Airbus informed me, but because AF447 happened ... What a shame !

Impossible. Somatogravic illusion means longitudinal acceleration or decelaration gets interpreted as pitch-up or pitch-down. AF447 was flying steadily when CM2 pulled first time and subsequent deceleration was not very quick anyway, mushing around 0.05 and peaking at 0.1G prior to stall (annex3, page 6)

By the time the aeroplane stalled, each and every instrument in the cockpit was telling the truth.

While the UAS was going on, there was no indication any inertial reference was not available or any display unit failed, so with three attitude displays agreeing, it wasn't supposed to be difficult to fly the attitude.

They knew it was inaccurate. They said it so and then it is not overly difficult to deduce if your speed indication as dropped below minimum needed for sustained flight and you are still flying pretty normally, then the indication must be false.

Fact that in every manual, I've used, from C-150 to A320, trim is listed under flight controls. There are proper ways to use it, blanket "don't use it to manouever" just isn't one. It might be applicable for turning the Cessna 172, though.

70 kt indicated (appx 118 true) over a minute.

As commanded by the pilot. Per design. Certified. Proven.

True, but reversion sequence on FBW Airbi is totally straightforward. No matter what law you are in, as long as you have flight controls continuity and are within envelope's lift limit, behaviour of the aeroplane is strictly conventional, nose & wings follow the stick displacement. Now there's another clue you have stalled; if you can't rise the nose with nose-up input or full stick in roll can't help you pick up the wing. Sadly, crew missed even that.

Based on PPRuNe hearsay.

Report explicitly says otherwise.

AF crews did experience UAS before AF447. Their control laws did degrade to alternate. They survived. What's your point, again?

Who cares! As long as proper control of the aeroplane is not achieved, no ECAM actions are to be done! If crew just did nothing aeroplane would have continued to fly of its own accord, it would not have not gone anywhere near the parameters that would trigger the normal law protections. Unfortunately, picture is messed up in the English version but French report, page 96 refers.

OTOH, constantly reproducing the old one about the-guy-whose-name-I-forgot being serious when mentioned that concierges can fly an Airbus is not even funny anymore.

Display units integrity is monitored for the benefit DFDR. Guess what fault was recorded. Yup, none. Anyway, roll disturbance was quickly stopped by CM2, proving he was looking at the functioning attitude display. Also there were references to altimeters recorded on CVR.

They said something about the altitude well before GPWS.

This crew would be far better off with going-into-fear-induced-stupor option than with what they did. Tragic part is that CM2 believed he was saving himself and everyone else on board with his actions, while they were what killed them.

Well, IAS shows 274 kts one moment and 52 kt next. What could it be? Hitting the anti-gravity field, therefore remaining airborne at speed well below Vs1g?

There were crews that didn't recognize UAS. They did nothing. So survived.

It was not. Are DFDR traces really so difficult to read?

Believing kinesthetic cues is certain to get one killed when flying in IMC. Proven again and again.

Weirder things can happen when one is scared mindless.

Would you be so kind to provide us with plausible alternative?

Lyman, I am so sorry, but I don’t agree with your #590 add-on.

I wonder if we have read the same other thread!
I need to read it again because I had understood all the opposite of what you wrote.
.

Pitch is not relevant
Liners Pilots are not flying with their pants since a long time, and furthermore, they have order to distrust their sensations (which are often erroneous). The internal ears (semi-circular canals) are not precision gyroscopes.
Watch instruments!

The fall of about 1g
does not seem to me an appropriate remark, because we are only perceiving the speed variations, thus only accelerations change ( positive or negative). 1 g is the earth acceleration, nothing abnormal !!
That to say, when speed is constant, you can’t feel it, flying at FL350 with G/S 550 kt or stalling with V/S 160 kt.

the airstream is assumed to have been LOUD
Yes, of course: “j’ai l’impression” … “crazy speed”


As you wrote previously: “NO ONE knows what the screens showed ...”

Clandestino:

"By the time the aeroplane stalled, each and every instrument in the cockpit was telling the truth."

Possibly, maybe probably. And the crew were to know this exactly....HOW?

Oh, that's right, the large green bulb, center panel:

"We're valid now, trust me!!"

as if.......


Clandestino:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lyman
"If there were usable honest cues on the panel, do you think they would have said nothing about the Attitude until GPWS?"

You say:
"They said something about the altitude well before GPWS."

I referenced Attitude, something they never mentioned, and I find that bizarre.



NeoFit:

Quote: Quoting Me....
… what the pilots were experiencing in the cockpit on the way down.
The PITCH was consistently around 16 degrees,
the a/c was falling at about 1g,
and the airstream is assumed to have been LOUD."


After "stabilised" in final descent. Yet they do not reference attitude (NU), only altitude. This to me means they actually did, and the CVR is not released with this data. I simply cannot fathom no mention of PITCH, they have no AoA, and PITCH is all they have to start with, in any recovery. Altitude is fascinating, and informative, but a SYMPTOM, not the CAUSE. How can they have been silent, hint, they were not.....



Clandestino, HERE:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Lyman
NO ONE knows what the screens showed.....

YOU SAY:
Display units integrity is monitored for the benefit DFDR. Guess what fault was recorded. Yup, none. Anyway, roll disturbance was quickly stopped by CM2, proving he was looking at the functioning attitude display. Also there were references to altimeters recorded on CVR.

I am not talking FAULT, you misunderstand. And what the instruments display is decidedly NOT recorded. Only that they are functioning...... That is obvious, NO?

I disagree ...
Bonin and his co-pilot are telling (to Dubois) that they don't understand what happen and they don't control the plane anymore .. and be sure ...they know what it means !
I don't think someone think he is saving everyone with such arguments !
Actually they hope that Dubois will save everyone (Robert call him frantically) .....

My bad, I misread.

Oh yes, they referenced attitude, just not explicitly pitch. CM1 mentions "Horizon" at 2:12:25 and both CM1 and Captain urge CM1 to "get the wings level" from 2:12:54. First GPWS alert is recorded at 2:14:16.

It seems we have to dumb down this discussion down to non-pilot level. By crosscheck. There are three independent pitots, feeding three independent displays, two of which can be switched to fourth source (ADC3). If they agree at the realistic value, and 183kt after one zoom climbs from cruise altitude is realistic, it works. If they don't, check that all three AIs agree and fly any of them. When I trained for PPL, pitch and power circuits were part of PPL syllabus and it was not fifty years ago, it was in 1996.

What overwhelmed the crew of AF447 is very similar to (and IMHO probably the same thing) that which wiped the crews of KAL 8509 and Birgenair 301 out of existence. First time they were faced with a bit more serious anomaly in flight was when they first really realized that the air is a dangerous place to be and they had no clue how to get out of their predicaments. As was predicted long time ago:

Are you accusing BEA of deliberate falsification?

Of course they weren't but CVR mostly recorded the utterances consistent with being confused and clueless.

They are the instruments that work reliably for thousands of hours and all of a sudden they fail simultaneously, at the exact time airspeed goes unreliable, with bizarre fault that doesn't trigger DU monitoring. Yeah, right. For the record: I wasn't the one that first mentioned "Mad Hatter" in this thread.
How come?

Get the French report, go to page 96. If you are struggling with French: blue line is DFDR readout, red line is produced by simulator fed by winds and control inputs from DFDR. Blue and red are match. Magenta is simulator without any input on the stick.

Do you get it?

They are right; they didn't control the aeroplane anymore because CM2 has chased it away out of control and CM1 did not stop him! Both were pretty clueless from the start of the event.

Airborne equivalent of "Help, daddy, help!". It is tragic that when they realized that flying is no children's play they were left with only minutes to live. Not unprecedented, though.

Clandestino..

"Oh yes, they referenced attitude, just not explicitly pitch. CM1 mentions "Horizon" at 2:12:25 and both CM1 and Captain urge CM1 to "get the wings level" from 2:12:54. First GPWS alert is recorded at 2:14:16."

Pitch is all they had to refer to, they had no AoA. Of course it was not wack as AoA, but it was well out of cruise values?

And even AoA was not extreme until after the a/c STALLED....

I appreciate your patience, I stopped flying before you started. 1996?

I agree ....
I admire your honesty and do not use convoluted language to say that these two pilots (maybe three pilots) were qualified to fly an Airbus A330 that only when all goes well
The only thing that could invalidate this constatation would know at least one of these pilots had already in the past saved a aircraft in disarray
Unfortunately it seems that the BEA (human factors) have not investigated it .. or find nothing .. or does not echo in the final report
It is the responsibility of training schools .. the regulator and Air France that is committed

Somatogravic illusion
 

The PF on AF447 attempted to recover the Altitude loss of 400 ft (due loss of mach correction), but for some unexplained reason he continued to pull achieving 7,000ft per min RoC. According to the final report http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.03.en.pdf the graph of ground speed shows a reduction from about 500 kts to 400 kts in 30 seconds (between times 02:10and 02:10:30). i.e. about 3 kts per second. Apparently you don't believe that rate of deceleration could cause a somatogravic illusion.

Yet from the incident report of Air Transat Airbus A310-308 C-GPAT (to which you posted the link happless crew), says
1.11.4 “At about 1440:44,” (I think they meant 19:40:44)“ at the end of the climb, the perceived attitude reached greater than 30° whereas the actual attitude was about -3°.” (Due to Somatogravic illusion).

The table in Appendix A shows the aircraft speed and time base.The aircraft accelerated from 0 at 19:39:38 to 209 kts by time 19:40:44 (i.e. 66 secs or about 3.1 kts per second) and produced a somatogravic illusion of 30 degs error in perceived pitch.
The fastest acceleration I can see is between times 19:40:44 at 209 kts and 19:41:29 at 345 kts (VMO) i.e. 136 kts in 45 secs again about 3 kts per second.

Please explain why the crew of C-GPATcould have suffered from Somatogravic illusion with an acceleration of 3 kts per second, but according to you, the crew of AF 447 could not have.
Impossible?

We needed from BEA a total description of the differents laws ; why, how, rejection, etc. We are here trying to guess details to rebuild analogy.

Why could the BEA not provide that analysis ???

The BEA report (s) does not apply on scientific method (thesis), nor on juridic method. The result is that increases the role of the Court(s) in Aviation. Who wants that ? :(