You're welcome TTex - yeah, I recall the 320 was quite different than the 330/340.

Like gums says, tiny movements on the stick are all that are needed.

Let me rephrase, incorporate this:

"PJ2 Like gums says, tiny movements on the stick are all that are needed."


and ask, Would a degrade to DIRECT LAW have been more in tune with what we know of Airbus FBW?

As In:

Tiny movements on the stick are not available Only tiny trim originated inputs....

Sorry Lyman I don't understand your question or point about "being in tune with what we know of Airbus fbw", or your observation, "Tiny movements on the stick are not available Only tiny trim originated inputs....".

I think Airbus philosophy in general is excellent, but only ask that in the condition of 447, where complete authority in Pitch is retained, that here, specifically, a Default to Direct Law would involve caging the Pitch within strict limits eg: available, but in small doses.

Bonin must be the only pilot who would have acted this way? It depends on what one would expect from the pilot population as a whole, whether the risk to the aircraft with poorly trained airmen would warrant a scheme that went to Direct Law when the Airspeeds were lost. imo.

Whether you like it or not, the aircraft reverted to ALT2b.

Consider the pilot knows what's best and demands NU on SS, hence the Elevators follow and as the airspeed is bled off and the 'g' commanded is not being met, the THS commences its journey. It knows no better, only that the pilot knows best.

The point of all this is that if the aircraft during this UAS event had actually gone into Direct Law, and the THS was limited at 3° NU, the aircraft when handled the way it was would still have stalled. Owain Glyndwr has pointed out many times that the Elevators [alone] were quite capable of providing whatever NU/ND was requested.

Since when has an airframer been responsible for the actions of poorly trained airmen/women? I'm not talking about the 'deep pockets' litigation that seeks to make them responsible, but rather the expectation that the aircraft will be flown by properly trained and competent personnel.

You can argue until the 'cows come home' [in your grassy valley], but in the case of AF447 the expected procedures were not followed, CRM was lousy, and if there was any acknowledgement of the situation they were in, it must have been done with 'sign language'.

AB will most likely make changes to the way problems with faulty air-data is revealed to the crew, but this is to be expected in line with progressive improvements to the software. Now this could also be construed as further 'dumbing down' of the competency levels required to fly their aircraft. If its in the interest of 'safety', then I believe most will manage to live with it.

Now where is the concierge?:}

Illogical in its excessive amplitude and in its duration yes, but certainly not illogical in itself, what do you do suddenly 400 feet below your cruising FL and your aircraft pitching 2 or 3 degrees under a normal cruising attitude ?

Mention the 'O' bird as you wish, but the initial response of PF in pitch was not fatal, it was far to be ideal, but things had stopped to deteriorate before the FD came back and everything started again for the worse.

Much emphasis on the PF case but I find you guys almost too unconcerned by :

1. The lack of awareness given by the system to the crew
2. The FD logic
3. The THS logic
4. The stall warning logic
5. The sidestick concept

Those 5 technological elements played against the crew that night.
Change one of those and chances to disrupt the deadly sequence are improved.

I take that opportunity to link a comment by Sullenberger on the sidestick versus …

And where in the final report does it say that "only the pilots" are to blame?

[Hint : it doesn't.]

CONF - Sully says it's his opinion (to which he is welcome) - he doesn't try to present it as fact.

The only certain fact is that I know is that AF447 crashed into the sea and there killed 228 people
This fact is indisputable (100%) and is recognized by the BEA
Other facts known by the BEA are not a 100% certainty and therefore logically BEA provides only conclusions based on the opinions (which are welcome) of investigators about those "facts"
Final BEA conclusion after years of investigations:
We don't know why the pilot made climb the plane to finally keep it in a stall position
BEA (as us) also know that the pilot (s) actions give as result 228 people killed
It's certainly not caused by the plane as the BEA state that the plane and systems acted as per design
And as the Airbus A330 design is good (proof is the sooo many hours of flights with no problems .. even in same situations like AF447) .. so the plane can be discarded as culprit ...
Evidently (they can't) the BEA don't blame the crew ... only "conspiracy nuts" think that the BEA blame the crew ...

Hi jcjeant,
I fully agree. The BEA drew in other agencies and information sources, examined the pertinent evidence, published a factual report listing causes or probable causes and made recommendations to EASA to follow up on. Everyone is entitled to an opinion as to the content of the BEA report, but it become obvious to most when facts turn into fiction such as your statement suggests...

jcjeant wrote:

I don't entirely agree, nor does the BEA. Aviation is not for the simple-minded; it's complicated. It depends upon if your view of cause is black-and white or not. A number of recommendations were made for improvements to the aircraft, based on reasonable suspicions (I guess we could call it) as to causation/confusion in the cockpit (flight director behavior, stall warning architecture, etc., etc.: see CONF iture's post). "As per design" may not be good enough, even if said design was approved by the authorities. Learning is on-going, not fixed. There is room in almost any design for improvement. Without, of course, having proof, it is entirely reasonable to speculate that some of the proposed improvements to the A330 might have broken the deadly chain-of-events.

I love Swiss cheese if I'm eating it, but I don't want to ride in it! :uhoh:

cvr, certification
 

1. I personaly cannot agree the CVR and said it since months. The language is not tbe language used by French professionnal pilots.Not sure that BEA was the redactor . To much sterilized? Not only.
For instance, when you write in (correct) French : "tu montes", we do not know if it means : "tu montes?" ,or "tu montes!"
Listening the text it is not said the same manner and we can understand the correct meaning : the first has "mon" climbing, the second has "mon" climbing and descending.
BEA knows that and would not write a non-pilot used text.
The Captain briefing is really unrealistic.
Did the "human factor" team write that? Not impossible , as the final report describes the sequence in a manner everyday flight would be psychedelic, not only AF447.
Has the CVR been translated to bresilian, then to german, then to english, then to french,with indian or tunisian translators? (In modern decision making they call that "consensus"!)
There is a CVR bug. Do without it.
2 . When you buy a ticket to an airline, you don't buy it to A or B or C. It belongs to :suspect:certification autority to verify that the aircrafts are safe enough for public transport. Certification autority has to verify that airline pilots' selection and trainning by the airline is adequate for that aircraft, that simulator t eaching is conform to that aircraft. The airline has not the means to verify that, major airline or not. Certification administration is alone to be able to do that and have autority and RESPONSABILITY to do that job. It is THEIR JOB.

That would be the EASA...

In the 1950s and 1960s there were far more aircraft accidents as a proportion of the world transport fleets. Many then seemed to have a number of causes or contributing factors, often three or more. Many of these contributing factors have been "designed out". Systems have become more reliable, enabling very high and profitable utilisations.

" Simple things", like Checklists and Weather Minima, better landing aids, Flight Time limitations, Aquaplaning, Aircraft Performance calculation graphs were some of the items which only ultimately were to reach my level of knowledge as a First Officer. Some of this may have been known elsewhere in a Company, but prior to photocopying, much would have been kept in a Head Office drawer !

Flying training required, then, for a F/O was 6 T/Os and Landings, by day.
A Captain only had to do 5, some at night and with an engine failure.
( With this level of training......... !)

(If I exceeded 125 hours flying in a month, I would require a further medical ("to see if I was fit for a further 125 hours," it was said. !))

I'll agree with pitch and power and regular practice. Can't agree about the fly it like a conventional airplane, especially when things are abnormal. Auto trim for "g" and flight path make the airbus unlike a conventional aircraft.

Mixing and matching points
mm
That is a sound basic design philosophy.
I note a few points from CONFiture that what the pilot "knows" when he is in "knows best" mode depends upon two things:
how in depth his aircraft systems knowledge is,
and what info he has available to establish his event particular knowledge.

They go hand in hand.

Another point made was that to get to
"I need to use the UAS procedures"
certain key bits of knowledge are needed. This folds into mm43's point.

While one is sorting that out, it would seem to me that basic airmanship includes a scan that would alert you to the fact that one is changing state.
"Heh, while I'm getting this squirrely little roll problem sorted out and regaining a few hundred feet, I need to get back to my desired/assigned altitude."
The above is a standard, novice level instrument flying problem. What AF447's crew had as an added twist was that airspeed as a cross check performance indication was missing. Since the AH/attitude indicator was working (as best as we can tell, supported by PF initially relying on AH/attitude indicator to get a grip on his roll excursions, eh?) ... that should not be too big of a problem.

Basic pilot skills tell you that if you have not yet changed power, nor configuration, your speed and altitude are trade offs for one another. Set an attitude, see what changes, adjust, see what changes, adjust, and so on. You are back to straight and level soon enough.

Basics.

Even though the pilot of the day has lost his speeds, he could know that with no power change, increase of altitude was going to slow him down. (and vice versa). Once the power changed as the problem proceeded, the above isn't the simple adjustment problem, but change in altitude still ought to be telling the flying pilot something about his flying performance.

I get the impression that flying the bird/FPV seems to have replaced a basic instrument scan. Maybe just in this case.

One cannot lay the blame for something like that at the foot of Airbus, or of Boeing, or any single design bureau. Such aids to instrument flying have been in the aviation business for decades, and very handy they are! They are an aid to an already developed skill, the instrument scan, and do indeed reduce cockpit workload.

This takes me back to: how often does the average pilot actually fly / practice his instrument scan with fewer features enabled?

For a given pilot, how long will it take to get you to restart your instrument scan when the standard (and generally reliable) features take some time off?
How prepared are you?
How often do you get to practice? <-- Does airline management understand why that last question is so important?

Some infos (real world)
G1 - Justiça do RN condena Air France a indenizar família de vítima do voo 447 - notícias em Rio Grande do Norte

Lonewolf 50;
Yes - and this is what the FCTM on Unreliable Airspeed describes; small adjustments, wait...etc
Possibly. Not all transport pilots are familiar with the indication and so it requires training to use effectively and safely. It's a trajectory indicator as we know, (which is why it is removed upon selecting TOGA on a G/A) and while useful in some circumstances it has to be used in conjunction with energy awareness and not used alone to fly the aircraft. I still find it difficult to accept that pilots at this level would follow the flight directors and compromise the energy level of the aircraft but I think a valid point has been made during these discussions.

On your last comment, no, I don't think airline managements comprehend the value of raw data/manual flying practise. I think management awareness atrophies as financial constraints and complex simulator scripts combine over time to push out "that which pilots ought to know already", to concentrate on the competent management of autoflight systems in normal and abnormal flight circumstances.

In my experience, mere "practise" was sometimes given by individual instructors who knew its value but only when the script had been finished. Box-ticking has its value if the boxes are appropriate to training requirements and ensuring standards are met but manual flight and raw-data approaches are usually left out of the session. I think the need has been amply demonstrated and hopefully a refocus on the basics, as you describe them, is occurring. I've been away from it now for five years and no longer have a close sense of these sets of priorities.

Thank you jcjeant

Tomorrow a french decision about possible no competence of french penal court for ocean pollution in the international waters. The lawyer is Daniel Soulez Lariviere who could ask that for the AF447 case:confused:

PJ2

Airline management frankly does not care about how pilots fly, that is what Operations Management headed by the chief pilot is for. Do you really think that the management of an airline discusses how to fly the crates? Not a single second!

The real culprits for these factors are the operations management, therefore pilots with management functions who promised a certain budget and now have to prove it. Or who believe that their flying skills are so good they do not need more training and therefore that is the way for all. In the end it is someone from the pilot community who introduces all this, not 'management'.

I believe not even MOL cares but he vividely repeats what comes from the crownies in the pilot ranks that wanted to be close to him...

@Hunter58:

I'm certain that PJ2 is well aware of the distinction, but chose to use a broader definition for the benefit of us laypeople. :)

I'm sorry, I just don't get it!
 

@Hunter58:

What part of "Operations Management headed by the chief pilot" is not management???

Your "point" has no point.

Hunter58;

Thanks for your response.

Regarding "management" and "Flight Operations Management" - First, as the CEO goes so goes the airline's corporate culture and priorities. If the CEO broadcasts that he or she will not tolerate compromise in safety standards and demands a healthy safety reporting culture, it will happen. If the CEO broadcasts the view that cost-control-at-all-cost is the priority, his lieutenants will ride out and do the CEOs bidding. It is the way bureaucracy, job security, promotion, and egos, work. The airline/corporate culture adopts the approach that the CEO broadcasts.

If the CEO does not have a comprehension of the aviation business and, more importantly, what keeps it safe, then there is little that operations, the safety department or the broader culture can do to counter picayune priorities that are set by the executive leadership.

The unspoken but not subtle belief conveyed is, "the business has to stay in business", and where there is normalization of deviance (cutting corners, "doing the right thing according to corporate values especially where there are no untoward outcomes), that is the corporate culture that will grow and which becomes "invisible" because it is "the way we do things." In such a culture, a serious incident or accident is unexpected and therefore is always a complete surprise, and blame not comprehension is the usual outcome in such cultures.

Now within that structure, certainly senior management, even operations management, can retard the retreat towards pure cost control, (which takes safety for granted). In fact in my experience that's how it works, to a greater/lesser degree. Those in the business know that a perfectly safe operation isn't possible without staying on the ground but running the business does not afford the time to understand..."there's a business to run". I have known CEOs who had absolutely no clue how flight safety actually worked to keep their aviation business safe - the apparent comprehension appeared in discussion and in print from the executive offices to be at the very rudimentary "have everyone wear safety vests while on the ramp" level. There was little understanding at senior management levels of the notion of the organizational accident, threat-and-error management and the importance of the basics, (as per Lonewolf_50's post).

Operations may be at the coal face and may be the only ones who truly comprehend what is required in an ongoing safety culture but if Operations does not have the active, involved support of the CEO, then they are limited, primarily by stature, (meaning, Marketing is more privileged than Operations or Maintenance), within the corporation and by budget contraints (and the subtle pressures which attend such dynamics) in their effectiveness and ability. In such cultures, flight safety departments are usually viewed as dead-end career-path choices.

These situations aren't static of course. People change with new awarenesses and I saw that too. The flight data program, very late in coming, was ignored for years until that kind of behaviour actually became a liability. When something showed up in the data they wanted to know "who that pilot was" so they still didn't get it. In this particular example data is slowly being valued and makes changes in SOPs so change does occur.

What is obvious to those who do flight safety work is not at all obvious to those who must run the business, and vice versa. That's neither good nor bad, it's a challenge...for both groups.

Law in non territorial Waters
 

Today the Cassation Court of France said in a definitive decision going against the General Prosecutor opinion, on Request from international lawyer Daniel Soulez Lariviere, that France Court could judge a criminal case who happened out of the French Waters.
All the men of the chain have been said culprit.

This decision is an important point for AF447 and the future aviation crashes.

The law of the "for" finds an important and safe precision, with safe independance of Judges for transport cases

roulishollandais;

Thank you for this information.

"This decision is an important point for AF447 and the future aviation crashes."

Indeed.

I would have been much surprised had they ruled otherwise.

(sotto voce ... do you think they want to cede jurisdiction to someone else? :E )

Strictly speaking, Lonewolf, it is not "theirs" to "cede".

Imo

Lyman, I see your point, but I was looking at it thusly:

if they assert jurisdiction, someone else has to take the time and effort to show that it isn't theirs.

Conversely, if they don't assert jurisdiction, who has it? :confused:

The following Reuters Article refers to the Cour de Cassation ruling which held the giant French oil company Total responsible in both the criminal and civil domains for damage caused when the Italian oil tanker "Erika" split in two in 1999 and sank off the French coast, but in international waters. The environmental damage was severe, but Total had argued that it had only chartered the vessel and was therefore not responsible.

The judgement helps to confirm the jurisdiction of the French courts where incidents happen in international waters, and which ultimately covers wet leased aircraft registered outside of France, but operating a French airline service.

None of this is directly related to AF447, though it does confirm the jurisdiction the French courts have over this accident.

Thank you mm43.

International private criminal law :
It is important to have in sight that international cases concerning private actors are judged by national Courts with national laws.The first difficulty is to know if some Court has the competence to judge. The second is to know wich national law must be applied on the case and for the different actors. The third great difficulty is to get effective execution of the decision in another country.
The concept of "Jurisprudence" has generaly no interest, as international cases are very specific. But they are uses who have been established, and who are respected in any country in the world "democratic" or not, "capitalist" or "communist". That does International Law is a reality.
Force of "res judicata" ("force de la chose jugée" in French) does that a country will not judge a second time the same case.
Damage have to be repared : it is an old global law of the trade to be trustful.
Very often the law which is used is not always the law of the state of the Court.
No mention to sworn translators, and lawyers who have to travel from continent to continent..., and the high cost...
The case may be shared in different parts in different countries if special international treaties allow that, like ICAO, IATA conventions, aso.

The intention of Me Soulez-Lariviere concerning the Erika/Total case, and Aviation crashes :
It has been well explained by Me Soulez-Larivière (defending FRANTZEN the Civil Aviation Director), and also some Air France and Airbus lawyers in the Ste-Odile A320 Air Inter Crash (20.jan 1992) I could listen them as I was present at the both trials. Aeronautical crossover Atlantic lobbye hope to change the law,to avoid possibility of criminal charge in the air disasters... As Soulez-Larivière asked it to the Cassation Court. He tried and failed ! Why did he try that?
Remember that Soulez-Larivière became a star lawyer in France since he was the defender of the two DGSE agents who put a bomb on the Greenpeace ship in the Auckland Port. He obtained the false couple Turenge to plaid guilty, and France had to pay some billions to New-Zealand help state secret negociations (and french people have to eat a lot of muttons, and tons of kiwis !). After a time in New-Zealand jails, Mafart and Prieur could fly away toward HAO island for some years. That french typical conspiration story killed a men and destroyed the ship in the Port. It has been said later from well informed sources, that the DGSE's teams had been betrayed by others... Someones said Mafart would not have to phone to a DGSE number. But that helped to consider Prieur as a french agent aswell they officialy had no women... Soulez-Larivière got the benefit to be considered as a specialist of international difficult cases. But that was a Public International Law case...

BEA did say that ,with some recomandations done to EASA.

BEA added the FAA, as they have seen the EASA certification was depending on FAA certification.

But did the latter depend on Vietname's once by a french DGAC agent as it was the case for A320 systems?

Court will have hard work.

It is worthwhile pointing out that establishing jurisdiction is essential to France, as France won't necessarily be bound by a judgement of the International Court of Justice.

This was the very reason in the "Rainbow Warrior" case (roulishollandis mentioned), of international terrorism committed by agents of the French state in New Zealand, that NZ sought the mediation of the UN Secretary General, and to which France ultimately agreed to the terms negotiated. There was a technical breach of those terms when the two DGSE agents (under house arrest on Hao Island for 3 years) were repatriated to France a year earlier than agreed due to claimed "ill health".

At the end of the day, all law is the result of political action, and the application of International Law is often open to political rejection when an affected state feels offended.

Hi,

Do not forget the last and extreme resort that is the international justice court of human rights based in Strasbourg
When it is entered and the case is admissible .. it can make (if any) notice very opposite even to that of a supreme court of any country

-@jcjeant
To go to CEDH (Strasbourg-F) allows Total to get time. But CEDH will never say they had no right to "equitable" justice, which is the only thing they could try to plaid
@mm43
CIJ is the Court for public international law, which is not the case for TOTAL/ERIKA nor AF447 who are concerned with private international law.
Negociated solutions are possible between States in public international law despite criminal cases. So was the Rainbow Warrior case in the second part.
But in french law in national or private international criminal case it is not possible.
(You are right mm43 , France was not loyal with the health problems!!, and was really unloyal with New-Zealand with state terrorism, aswell as international law and relations conception).

It is time that law gets respected everywhere in France to improve air safety. As a french pilot i discovered that since 1980.:E

But the logic is biased here as in Normal Law the pilot can keep pulling on the stick and still the THS will stop moving further up as speed reaches alpha prot. The system does not permit the pilot to know better, but on known sick data, the system is allowing the pilot to know better by "assisting" him when actually it should simply retract as it did by commanding AP A/THR and FD to withdraw.
Of course it would have stalled, but never to that extent, and with much better chance to get an exit point.
Give a reason why it would be indicated to trim further up approaching the stall or already in it ?

The advantages of Direct Law were significant.
Sophistication helped to set the trap.

There is no need of fundamental autoflight or system design changes, there is a need of transparency or how to call a cat a cat.
The THS behavior and influence in this accident must be detailed, not hidden.
On the sidestick concept, it is a very first time the BEA is commenting, but still, the comment seriously lacks of character.

Which is why pilots are trained on the differences between Normal Law and the others.

Actually the system is deferring to the human pilot because it knows that it does not have the information to make that call.

In your opinion.

I know you feel differently, but the fact is that in almost every respect Autotrim is not automation in the same sense as AP and A/THR - it is simply a dumb load-balancing device and does not require the inputs that AP, A/THR and FD do.

Again, that's your opinion. The fact is that the difference related to a matter of seconds, and that proper corrective action on the sidestick would have caused the autotrim to *assist* in recovery if necessary.

The flight control system does not understand "stall" as a concept - we've been through this.

Again - in your opinion.

The THS behaviour *is* precisely detailed in the report. The "influence in this accident" is not proven and simply conjecture on your part.

How so?

Dozy,
I know it has been a long time since you have flown, but did you ever learn how to trim up an aircraft?

You seem to not appreciate the significance of trim in aircraft control, particularly, speed control. In the old days, before everything became automated, that was the foundation for getting an aircraft to behave. It is also one of the skills that can deteriorate with disuse.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but this isn't the old days.

Because the flight surfaces do not have force feedback to the PFCs in the Airbus design, trimming the aircraft by feel is not possible in the same way as older designs. This is the main reason why autotrim was developed.

Clandestino pointed out a while back that it can be done visually, but I suspect that you wouldn't want to be doing it all the time.

Dozy,
There is more to the art of trimming than you indicate. It is a two step process. First, get the trim into the ball park (An airbus that hands itself to you should already be in rough trim).

The second step is to make small adjustments to get the final aircraft performance desired (that is the perishable skill part). In the F-4, C-1, A-4, or F-9, it was done with quick clicks on a "Coolie Hat" switch. At that point, you are not so much getting rid of force on the controls as getting an aircraft parameter such as roll rate, rate of climb, or airspeed stabilized. In an aircraft with a trim wheel, it involves small inputs to get the aircraft to fly hands free. You let go of the stick to make the final corrections.

I'll bet that works well in the 'Bus in Direct Law. You would just have to remember what control to use for trimming roll (Rudder trim).

Can be .. but
All men learn in one of three ways:
1. Some learn by being told.
2. Some learn by being shown.
3. Then there are those that learn by experience. They just have to urinate on the electric fence
I think that the men of the AF447 are those of the option N°3 .. but unfortunately they can't anymore use the experience (if any) acquired

DW
That's interesting
Not understanding "stall' is for a "flight control system" a serious mistake
What do you think of a pilot (the human flight control system) who does not understand the concept of "stall" ?
What do you think of the designers of a "flight control system" who do not understand the stall as a concept ?