The sole objective (of BEA's investigation) is to draw lessons from this occurrence which may help to prevent future accidents. Obviously it needs to be selective in presenting the data that have a bearing on that objective, both in the interim reports and in the final report. I know nothing about the Judge's actions, and why would you blame BEA for those - perhaps you can explain?

Hi,

HazelNuts39 .. as you are (mostly) located in Françe .. this will give you some light about the judges action
Hope it's help .....
Some news there: (audio included)
Rio-Paris : les familles réclament une enquête transparente - RTL.fr

jcjeant,

That's about the lawyers request (Les principaux extraits...), nothing about the judge's response, nor about BEA's responsibility in this. Doesn't the judge makes his or her own decisions, independent of BEA's investigation?

BEA's responsibility is non-existent, vis-a-vis the Court case. One must read the Mission statement, and realize that there is sufficient discretion in it to frustrate even the most Liberal Magistrate, imho.

If there is a superior authority to both the Judge and BEA, that is where disclosure reposes.......Even then, the Judge can frustrate disclosure. Monkeys play football.

BEA simply describes the condition of the airplane, and doesn't in any way suggest that the pilots had that information.

Between 02:11:00 and 02:11:45 PF applied nose-up and nose-down inputs to maintain a pitch attitude of 15°, which required full travel of nose-up SS at 02:11:45. He then pulled the thrust levers back to idle, which caused the airplane to pitch down to -10° against full NU SS maintained until 02:12:15. Did I refer to AoA?

HazelNuts39

"Between 02:11:00 and 02:11:45 PF applied nose-up and nose-down inputs to maintain a pitch attitude of 15°, which required full travel of nose-up SS at 02:11:45. He then pulled the thrust levers back to idle, which caused the airplane to pitch down to -10° against full NU SS maintained until 02:12:15. Did I refer to AoA?"

If I ask you who was PF during this time frame who would you say was flying?

Bonin from the RHS?

Open minded
 

Hi Captain

PJ2:

I understand your rationale and must admit, it is robust. HF (being addressed) probably is the major "component" of this accident.

When investigating something "different from our expectations" (i started to learn long time ago doing corrective maintenance in a powerful NDB (RR 375 Kc/s :)) we must be open minded to all possibilities.

Your thinking (on why's) i understand is concentrated in the crew (unexpected behavior) and considers the machine "performed as expected". As a designer i always question the design. It can have 'flaws". Better when we detect first. Cost less.

I understand your thinking that crew actions were "unexpected" before and after facing the consequences of the "inadequate inputs=large stimuli to the plane, zoom climb, etc." An "entire group failure": PF, then PM and finally CPT being unable to deal with the issues and not showing any useful timely "response".

Considering the "effective aircraft" (Machine+PF) failed VERY FAST (degraded) without any "useful reaction" (showing ZERO resilience) and considering (probably) there are some (perhaps important) factual information we don't have, I prefer for now (as safer):

To consider the man machine interface "performance" as a possible important contributing factor why the crew failed completely (acting unexpectedly).

There are some reasons for this.

I sincerely hope the lessons of this case (all possible) are learned and implemented with no "trade offs".

The user wants to travel not just in "competitive carriers" operating "competitive machines". The user really need "Uncompromised Quality". Safety as a direct result. This is what the users expects indirectly (or directly).

This case, a complex one presents a great opportunity to advance further toward the objectives of every one professionally conscious on these issues.

IMHO the man machine in these "advanced flying systems" should be reviewed specially when working under "unusual conditions". Exactly when you need most it's resources.

With the information we have so far in this case we have reasons to consider this as a possible and probable important factor.

Actually the authorities should pursue this objective, in the interest of all involved in the industry.

I am anxious to see the results of the HF study and the role of the man-machine interface on crew (lack of) "performance".

Hi,

HazelNuts39
We should try to make an effort to understand what the lawyer says in this interview
It simply says that BEA has passed the entire FDR to Airbus company
He also said that Airbus is one of the parties named in the lawsuit .. as are other civil parties that is to say the associations of families of victims and people with right
Also it is not normal in terms of law that either party has the intelligence and the other does not ...
And it's even more weird that the judge handling the case should not take a decision to correct the imbalance .. as she refused to join the FDR in the instruction process (so far)
The families associations have the right (as civil party) to have their own experts ... but how they can make expertise with no datas ???
Hope it's help to understand what happen there ...

RR_NDB;

I try very hard to leave hindsight bias behind and go where the available evidence and my experience and knowledge of the airplane take my thoughts. It doesn't always work, so disagreement, based upon further information and not just opinion, is always part of the process.

Believe me it is not pleasant to contemplate what has happened to this crew but as so many have said, it is crucial to find out what happened and why so that prevention takes place. In fact many things have already changed in the past year as a result of the available data in the form of recurrent training and so on.

It is a fact that airplanes, their systems and engines rarely fail mechanically, that navigation is extremely accurate, that autoflight is very good, that CFIT's and mid-air collisions are rare thanks to GPWS/EGPWS and TCAS, that satellites have made communications over vast areas of ocean almost routine, (though not here even though such wasn't likely an important factor), and that SOPs, CRM and things like checklist design have all contributed to the remarkable safety record of the industry.

It is therefore a fact that a very high percentage of accidents are HF accidents.

This is a primary reason for safety programs such as FOQA/FDM, which also have a crew-contact element (by a pilot's peers, not by management!), which is designed to address human factors issues and prevent untoward events.

So it is extremely important to understand what happened here and why, especially in Phase 2, and with two first officers and the ill-defined command and experience gradients which, I am sensing, may possibly also had had a cultural aspect.

These are SMS, HF and organizational areas of accident investigation and prevention. So, with reference to your comment, "Your thinking (on why's) i understand is concentrated in the crew (unexpected behavior) and considers the machine 'performed as expected'. ", I was not so much focused on the crew so much as it is where the available data is drawing attention. That means that new information, when or if it arises, always has the capacity to draw attention. This does not mean that design, and the machine is not the focus but that one places such attention in the context of the man-machine interface.

Designers cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate everything that will occur in an aircraft either by mechanical incident or crew action so it must be designed to fail gracefully as some have pointed out here, and this airplane failed gracefully - a loss of speed information does not necessarily result in a loss of control or loss of the aircraft. I don't think it is at all reasonable to expect that a designer will, in the course of such anticipatory processes, design against all outcomes that may or may not obtain in a fully-developed high altitude stall by line crews.

That said, even with a full NU THS, there was sufficient elevator authority and upwards force on the horizontal stabilizer and aft fuselage to lower the nose and un-stall the airplane albeit likely over as much as a 20,000ft loss of altitude. I think that is a remarkable bit of engineering. A level D simulator may not have the exact algorithms for post-stall behaviour but nor is it entirely without data and fidelity in such conditions.

Crew confusion must be examined very closely in both Phase 2 and 3. Post-pitch-up the PM was confused by the initial two very short stall warnings for example. Who knows how that may have influenced subsequent perceptions and input? The other aspect which I expect will be examined in the final report is the behaviour of the stall warning system below 60kts but this has been widely discussed.

It remains a concern as a former transport pilot that potentially irreversible actions were swiftly, unilaterally taken without adhering to SOPs, CRM communications standards and the handling of abnormals. Cockpit discipline and TEM (Threat/Error Management) processes are drilled into crews in each simulator session and are causes for failure of the ride if not executed to high standards. These processes intervene to prevent rushed actions while providing a basis for calm, measured and coordinated responses by both crew members. This isn't some elusive ideal, this is the normal standard by which transport aircraft are flown, so any unexpected divergence from this standard requires explanations and a willingness to closely examine crew actions where the data supports that kind of an approach. That is why I seem focused on the crew.

Heavens to Betsy, is this still going on?

Yes it is. When talking about average positions over time the inputs were *overwhelmingly* NU.

Yes - in response to the stall. Speed decays, nose comes down, speed increases but the aircraft pitches up and stalls again due to elevator/THS position.

Not enough, and for nowhere near long enough. When we ran the scenario in the sim, the SS needed to be emphatically forward and held there for at least 8-10 seconds to correct the THS position and control the aircraft. This is speculation on my part, but having seen the PFD myself I suspect the PF was "chasing" the ADI indication in the same way he'd follow the FD.

The key aspect is that in order to perform the correct recovery procedure, the pilot in control needs to first understand what the problem is, and then perform a recovery based on the information they receive. For whatever reason the flight crew of AF447 didn't even get to understanding the problem, and the PF's responses were instinctive and consistently reactive.

No, he was never in control for more than a few seconds at a time, because the traces show the PF taking back control almost immediately without announcing his intent to do so.

I'd say if it's been sounding for a minute, there's a good chance that you're in the stall regime. This is immaterial however, as there's no acknowledgement that they ever even heard it.

I don't know how much more simply I can put this. Lateral control via the ailerons is not reliable when this or any other aircraft is in the stall regime. Basic aeronautics - ailerons work by directing the airflow over a section of the wing. If a wing is stalled, it cannot produce lift, ergo if an aileron encounters stalled air it will not respond as expected. This is why full stall training at PPL level has the pilot use the rudder to level the wings via the side-effect of roll if necessary.

Simple - these were FOs trained in the glass cockpit era. Most of their airline hours have in fact been with autopilot engaged. On the occasions they've flown manually, it has been done with the FD engaged and with the speed tape on the left clearly marking the safe range. They've not done any manual handling on basic instruments in that type other than possibly in canned simulator scenarios. It's like riding a bike or playing an instrument - the knowledge will always be there, but unless it's practiced regularly you will not be able to perform at your best in a scenario where you're suddenly called upon to do so.

I believe that when he says "we don't have any displays", he is referring to the displays that he has come to rely on for the entirety of his time in manual control of that type, namely the FD and max/min speed tape. I believe that the basic instruments were still available, but that he had come to rely on the electronic guides to the point that he was afraid of having to go back to basic panel flying.

I believe that the initial NU demand was an overcorrection to the turbulence that left them a touch ND in pitch, which started a series of instinctive panic reactions, complete breakdown of instrument scan and failure to calmly assess the situation. I don't believe this was entirely his fault because he was not properly trained for the situation that confronted him.

Dozy,
Hell, we're just warming up!

:bored:

Lyman,

You are still concentrating on the examination at 10,000X magnification.

Does it really make a difference who was piloting the aircraft between 2 hr 11 min 00 and 2.hr 11 min 45 and which seat they were seated in? The BEA made it clear on Page 20 of IR#3 the AoA was not directly displayed to the pilots. Further, if you read Pages 29-31 you will see some of the data you say was not presented to the pilots that was presented as they referenced it in their conversations. I will let it up to you to decide which ones, although it is pretty clear.

PJ2 & RR_NDB,

You both have hit on some very important aspects of this event IMHO. The question of "Why?" is of paramount importance in problem solving any situation or event that is out of the ordinary. The machine - human interface is always an important aspect to look at and review. There is a technique to be applied when asking "Why" to get at a root cause. It is a matter of asking it five times, giving a response between each "Why". At level five is generally found to be the root cause from which corrective action can be taken. It is a process that works. However, it is more complicated when you can't interview a key person in the problem loop. When this happen, you have to make a list and go through the process. So PJ2, lets take your first question and explore: "Why, when the autopilot disconnected, and manual flying was demanded did the PF pull the sidestick back commanding a continuing climb, Why? Well, there can't be an interview, so we have to provide multiple answers for consideration:

a. He was shocked it happened, the "Startle Factor".
b. He responded based on his training and SIM experiences
c. He responded based on his recollection of the "Memory List".
d. He --- --- --- ---

For each of these you ask "Why" four more times and what you will come up with is a rather concise short list, sometimes, one item that defines the root cause. Now I can't contribute to this as only experienced personnel intimately familiar with the aircraft (the pilots) need to compile the list and ask "Why". Once you have determined (or think you have) the root cause, you can then turn the root cause over to experts to begin the process of providing the solution, along with your input as to the quality of the solution decided as being best.

A simplified example would be this:

The power failed on climb out at 1,700 feet on a Boeing 767, Delta's Flight 810 from Los Angeles to Cincinnati on June 30, 1987.
The Captain with 29 years of commercial flying experience failed to coordinate with the First Officer and reacting to an amber light, warning him of a fuel-flow problem, pulled two round knobs cutting off fuel to the plane's two engines instead of pushing square buttons two inches away that would have corrected the problem.
"Why"?
To make a long story short, he had flown the B-727 for years and had transferred to the then, new B-767. When this event occurred shortly after liftoff, he applied from his "experience and memory", without looking, exactly what was required on the B-727 but not the B-767. The initial fix was to cover the knobs and square buttons with a plastic cover that you had to "look at" to open, but the real solution was to move the engine control panel to the overhead console. Training was also found to be defective at the time at Delta regarding entry into the B-767 which was corrected.

TD

A friend drives FBW, not Bus. He was cruisin along, sippin coffee when the a/c started a sweet turn to the right. Both pilots noticed immediately, and switched off the data drive, and flew HDG to the destination. He bird dogged the event with others in company, and no one could explain what happened. He did run across others it had happened to.

So this a/c will climb "unexpectedly" and Uncommanded, (to QUOTE Airbus) when UAS happens. Instead of "Inferring" proper instrumentation for 447, and without any conclusive rejection of "AUTOZOOM", I'd like to keep an open mind. In the meanwhile, the HF, which I have been trying to discuss (from a defensive pov, I'll admit), wants a clear and microscopic overview.

So far we have a too quick PU from RHS, a consequent loss of orientation (both airframe and crew) and that's it. This wreck can be argued to have happened within several seconds of autoflight loss, since all sense of PITCH and AOA slithered away through the fingers of our impatient pilot. POSSIBLY. The entire public perspective misses that fact. For want of a breath, and a count to five, the flight was lost. Fully half of the culpability for the crash after this time frame belongs to AF training, AIRBUS complacency and overconfidence, plus an arguably criminal case against AF for deferring a non deferrable.

I haven't even cranked up the dark field, or the scanning EM. Not to mention the gas chromatography room. Sometimes it is simple. Did I just frame the dilemma, simple to impossibly obtuse?

Graceful Degradation of the "effective aircraft"
 

Hello PJ2,

Thank you for your very good answer. Sincere and constructive.

Concerning this segment:

Quote:

---

Designers cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate everything that will occur in an aircraft either by mechanical incident or crew action so it must be designed to fail gracefully as some have pointed out here, and this airplane failed gracefully - a loss of speed information does not necessarily result in a loss of control or loss of the aircraft. I don't think it is at all reasonable to expect that a designer will, in the course of such anticipatory processes, design against all outcomes that may or may not obtain in a fully-developed high altitude stall by line crews.

---

I would like to comment something now (and think and elaborate later):

It seems very, very important to have ALWAYS available a basic set of resources in order to allow the very basic need to just aviate when facing extreme conditions. This is mandatory for a "Graceful Degradation" of the "effective aircraft" (A/C+PF/PM). The incomplete factual information we have suggests the crew may not had this may be adding to the difficult conditions they entered (by their own errors, e.g. "entering WX", lack of perception after AP and A/THR quit leading ultimately to stall, etc.). IMHO the interface design (a real challenge due the complexity of the Systems) may be improved (using lessons from this case) if the HF study being developed and the analysis shows that. The AoA indication may be a result of this process. I am not expecting the need (or possibility) of a major redesign or change in Airbus SAS FBW "protections philosophy", obviously.

Important facts that were "important inputs" to the crew (and their perception).

Well put, i agree with you. This "organizational aspect" is paramount.

I must admit your "focus" seems correct.

Please, regard my "man machine emphasis" as a very important input to the crew "output". (e.g. the stall warning system below 60kts, etc.). And very probably to be considered as a "contributing factor" in the final report.

Despite having a "technically oriented mind" (:8) i learned very early the importance of the "organizational aspects", certainly with "higher hierarchy".

If a pilot can follow each "degrade", well and good, otherwise "Graceful Degradation" can be a plot in the cemetery. Think about it. It sounds wonderful, but to synch each degrade with its counterpart, its replacement, describes a dance, no less. Here, the pilot should have hesitated to suss Attitude (so we are told). What was graceful about a cavalry charge, Master Caution, and a maneuvering a/c? ECAMS? Turbulence? Duff speeds? Say PF got it right, there followed three more instances of UAS, at a time when Airbus had not decided what to tell each crew. Reselect Autopilot? Or NOT? Careful, one chance only.

Arthur Murray can teach dancing in the studio, but two years hence, when the music is still, and the orchestra on leave, will John remember what to do with his hands? With his feet? Dancing is not natural to most pilots.

A fading away of a/c response must be synchronized with a building skill set from a pilot? Each gentle nuance recognized and bade farewell? It's a freaking machine. Fix the wrong stuff, train the right stuff, and let's keep moving. ffs.

Interesting approach
 

Hi,

Turbine D:

:ok:


Will use the tool to test with some problems. :8

Please, references on it. Thank you.

The old gang comes together again, huh?
 

Long time, and long time for many of us.

I salute Doze for actually trying the profile in a sim, and I think that another here has access to the sim.

RR and PJ and Doze and others have conferred on PM's, so my observations are for others.

The human factor aspect of this tragedy is a big factor. Why is that, Gums?

- "You can't stall the jet, but you can overspeed the jet". Need inputs here from Okie and Rudderrat and maybe PJ2. So maybe the PF was more worried about mach than stall. And my personal choice when airspeed goes FUBAR is to not worry too much about overspeed as much as under speed. Of course, a valid AoA indication is immensely helpful, but the 'bus seems to ignore the sensors if airspeed is below "x".

Before exploring all the manuals those here have made available, I was not aware of the small AoA margin that the 'bus has between cruise and stall. I have to admit that I was shocked at the low AoA values I saw, as my experience in bent wing jets exhibited much higher AoA values before getting into trouble, the VooDoo being the big exception ( ask me about that beast offline, heh heh).

Ditto for mach limits when at 35K and above.

- The stall warning was there, but for some reason was not given attention by the crew. Did I read all those paragraphs and recordings correctly? Could they have been more concerned with overspeed than a stall? Remember, "you can't stall this jet", but there's no "protections" concerning overspeed. Hmmmm.....

- Some old pilots here harp on attitude and power to stay where you were when things went FUBAR. I am one. But seems like the jet has this auto-throttle feature, and I am not sure when the pilot can tell the "system" that throttle position commanded by the human in the cockpit should be obeyed.

Make no mistake, I flew the Viper with the electronic engine control that did things when we were real fast or slow ( not for us, but for the engine!). It was NOT an auto-throttle, and our PLA ( power lever angle) command was just that. It commanded a level of power that we mortal pilots desired/commanded.

Is there a way to tell the "system" that you want the throttle(s) to provide a direct power command and not be connected to all the flight control modes?

- "TOUCH" ----- I mean that sometimes your "touch" or your "feeling" counts as much as all the fancy indicators and displays( apologies to Doze, but trust me, I had/have touch). I flew thousands of hours with Joe Baggadonuts in three different jets and had many that could not "feel" the jet entering a stall. "Can you feel that?", I would ask. "Nope". So I then trained them to be "mechanics" and read the instruments and not horse the jet about.

I get the impression that many of the low-time 'bus drivers have never been close to overspeed or a stall. As Retired and 'bird and Smilin' and others here will attest, the plane always talks to you. The "feeling" of the jet and the gauges/indicators come together so you can confirm what your state is.

But you have to train the crews to "feel". If they can't "feel" then you must help them to interpret the gauges and such.

Hi dozywannabe,

Good to read you back again and I agree with your post.

Additionally from the present A320 FCTM:
"The so-called "abnormal attitude" law is :
• Pitch alternate with load factor protection (without autotrim)
• Lateral direct law with yaw alternate
These laws trigger, when extreme values are reached:
• Pitch (50 ° up, 30 ° down)
• Bank (125 °)
• AOA (30 °, -10 °)
• Speed (440 kt, 60 kt)
• Mach (0.96, 0.1).
It is very unlikely that the aircraft will reach these attitudes, because fly-by-wire provides protection to ensure rapid reaction far in advance. This will minimize the effect and potential for such aerodynamic upsets.

The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture, and the existence of control laws, eliminate the need for upset recovery maneuvers to be trained on protected Airbus aircraft."

I think the last paragraph may have to be changed.

Thanks, RRR - thanks guys. Although I must confess that I thought we'd be talking about something different by now and that the hamster would be having a snooze until the final report appears.

With 20/20 hindsight, I'd agree - with the caveat that the airframe never reached an orientation sufficient to trigger ABNORMAL ATTITUDE law, and to the best of my knowledge, not many have, if any. I think that the FCTM was written referring to the kind of "jet upset" that tended to happen in the early days of jet airliners, whereas what happened here was an aircraft ever-so-slightly askew but basically stable being handed to the PF, who then proceeded to control it into a stall.

@rudderrudderrat:

Whose FCTM is this? Stating that
is IMHO criminally negligent. FBW has known degradation and failure modes, insisting that they will always work properly when proverbial hits the fan is ignorant at the best. Chances of having to perform GPWS maneuvre in direct law are so small they can be ignored but Airbus pilot must absolutely know when to rely on protection and when it is not available.


Could be but it's not necessarily so as a few AF crews have previously successfully negotiated temporary loss of all airspeeds. Question is what made crew act so differently form every other crew facing the same problem. That HF group report will be a bomb is quite safe bet.

Graphic presentation of AF447 DFDR readout is accurate, consistent and informative enough for anyone able to read it. Airline pilots of sub-average grade and above should be able to understand what is drawn. Of course, there are lot of PPRuNers who are either unable to understand BEA data or insist on misunderstanding it as graphs contravene their pet notion of Airbus being intrinsically evil. "Why" is good question.

You are correct but it's even worse; CM2's reaction to stall warning was surprisingly consistent and fatally wrong; first time stall warning goes off as the nose is jerked up, he just keeps pulling, second time, as the energy bled off, he pulls inanely. Third and fourth times as he released the stick, AoA decreased and air data became valid again, he pulled again, sealing the flight's fate, never commenting what and why he was doing.

If that's indeed so, it's a good thing there's synthetic voice shouting "STALL STALL" at A330 pilots. Cricket too.
That A330 or any other FBW Airbi cannot be stalled is severe misunderstanding and if the crew were really officially told so, then their trainers should be taken off duty until retrained. There's not magical about FBW alpha protection, it's just a mechanical-electronical device which limits pitch control in order to keep alpha below critical. Just like on 'Vark or Viper. It needs valid sensory input, computer and output to elevator. Something gets banged up in the chain - it doesn't work and it's easy to promptly see if it dropped offline, if one pays attention to his artificial horizon, that is. Nothing startrekkish about it.

I sincerely hope this is not the whole story.

IMHO it won't hurt to repeat what must be readily understandable to any pilot at any time of day or night: there is a whole world of difference between low and high level aerodynamic and engine performance. People who keep insisting that maybe CM2 was trying to replicate extremely low level manuever at FL330 are maybe onto something but usually go tangential when they go on blaming the training for it. For Finnegan's sake, any pilot must be fully and correctly aware at any time of what his aeroplane is capable of doing - if not, he has no business being at the controls. What was so far trained was avoidance of stall at low level because final turn stall was quite common killer and still is in the general aviation. What is commonly misunderstood in PPRuNe discussions is that airliner pilots are trained to recover from approach to stall, not fully blown stall recovery. That's because the only thing that can extract any aeroplane from low level, low energy stall is excavator.

High altitude stalls were never of concern because it was assumed that pilot would readily understand that they need to keep the speed up to avoid stall and trade altitude (of which there's abundance at typical cruise level) for speed if they got on the back of the power curve. Real life with lack of high altitude stalls seemed to confirm the notion. Than we had Pinnacle 3701. That accident was quickly forgotten as it was ferry flight, so no public outrage over passengers' deaths, and ascribed to cowboyishness of the deceased pilots. Heck, on PPRUNe there was ever-present "blame it on the technology" brigade who insisted that core-lock phenomenon was main culprit in the crash. It is correct that pilots undid themselves but they were not suicidal, they were just ignorant and that killed them. Did the powers to be push for better pilot selection and training post Pinnacle and Colgan? No. Just more hours that should serve as panacea for all the holes in the pilots' knowledge. Learn as you go.

IMHO, no amount of unusual attitude or high altitude full stall recovery training is going to prevent AF447-like (or Colgan, Armavia, Gulf Air, Ethiopian, Kenyan....) accident form recurring! We are not discussing about aeroplane being thrown form the sky with crew failing to recover, we are dealing with disoriented and confused crew that kills itself and everyone on board by doing the exactly wrong thing while believing it is right! It is not about recovery, it is about recognizing one is confused and getting to grips with reality ASAP. If this is dealt with soon enough, no radical recovery actions are needed, if not, it might be too late for airframe strength or altitude available anyway.

...and yet no airliner falls from the sky because of it. There are a lot of things common to all aeroplanes but some fine details are either applicable to subsonic, stable transport, some to supersonic, maneuverable interceptor bot not to both.

Normally, there is high speed protection which, very unsurprisingly, doesn't work without valid airspeed.


To be pedantic: it's called autothrust and unlike autothrottle doesn't have servos that physically move the trust levers. It dropped off as speed become unreliable and anyway it can be disconnected by using the red button on either thrust lever. With ATHR off, it acts just as you wrote:

PJ2's reference to IR3, (p72 - 76) made me read those pages again. I was puzzled by the following reference to the FPV, since the trace on page 107 shows that HDG-VS selected all the time (my bolding):
There also seems to be a translation error further down on the same page, where "nose-up" should read "nose-down" (à piquer in the french original):

On both sides?

Hi,

Clandestino
Do you have the FDR listing for support the BEA graphics ?
The answer is NO
Information is not complete .....
FDR data are not "emotional" like CVR (with all the speculations about each words) ... that's just technical data .. factual information
Why release fragments of the CVR and some graphics but nothing about FDR listing ?

Hi DozzyWannabe,
The crew didn't selected their FDs off - the bars simply parked out of view when the Airspeed was considered invalid. When the airspeed became valid again, the FDs would reappear.

I can't find the FCOM reference - but I think on reappearance they default to the aircraft's present HDG & VS until reprogrammed.

Dozy, I can't speak for the 330, but the narrowbodies only have one button on the FCP for FD type. If you select FPV, it applies to both sides.

Other than that, I concur with, "Heavens to Betsy, is this still going on"

Maybe not. Too much AOA on a surface can have the opposite effect and it can "lose its grip" and allow the aircraft to develop a pitch rate in the opposite direction. Then as AOA decreases, it would normally regain its "grip" and start pitching the nose back up creating the nose up and down bobble, but if the crew then relaxed their back stick at the bottom of the maneuver, the nose might continue further down than its normal range and allow airspeed to become valid and reactivate stall warning.

@TTex600:
Same on A330: Picture and description of FCU are on page 45 of IR#2.

@Machinbird:
Maybe so, but that doesn't make the English version a correct translation of the French original text.

Oops, so you were basing that on the French original.:O
Google translate was no help.

RRR; (like the handle...)

After one's initial PPC on a new type, approach-to-stall training is not required by the CARS (Canadian Air Regs):

(e) Manoeuvres
(i) At least one steep turn in each direction with a bank angle of 45° and a change in heading of at least 180° but not more than 360°;
(ii) Approaches to stalls

For the purpose of this manoeuvre the required approach to a stall is reached when there is a perceptible buffet or other response to the initial stall entry.

The following approaches to the stall are required during initial and upgrade PPC's:
(A) one in the take-off configuration, except where a zero-flap take-off configuration is normally used in that model and type of aeroplane;
(B) one in a clean configuration; and
(C) one in a landing configuration.
One of the approaches to stall shall be performed while in a turn with a bank angle of between 15° and 30°.
(iii) Steep turns and approach to stalls are not required when the PPC is conducted using either a LOFT scenario, a scripted PPC or a fly-by wire aeroplane; and
(amended 2000/12/01; no previous version)
(A) for an initial PPC on aeroplane type, steep turns and approach to stalls have been satisfactorily demonstrated during initial training;
(B) for a semi-annual or an annual PPC:
(I) steep turns and approach to stalls that are required in the applicable annual training syllabus have been satisfactorily demonstrated during this training; or
(II) steep turns and approach to stalls are not required in the applicable annual training syllabus.

More hamstering!
 

Post #1690 in AF447 - Thread No.5.

The hamster has also noted that a certain contributor is still swearing blind that the climb was uncommanded, despite all evidence to the contrary, and the hamster is heartily sick of it.

thanks mm43. Takata's #1692 is also interesting in that it touches on the baro-inertial vertical speed parameter! HtB...wait!...there's more! ;-)

Dozy, gums, nice to see you back for a visit and contributions. I look in once in a while and this time decided to join in for a bit but need to return to standby mode.

un sytème dynamique doit être observable et gouvernable
 

"Effective aircraft" does not mean that you have, from left to right, a box for "human", an other independant "man-machine interface" box, and a third independant box "machine/system".

The three are mixed inside the effective aircraft. It is the interest of this concept to say that. The study of instabilities as Aviation SAfety and Pilot Control (so early as 1997) shows how it is wrong to imagine the system is well or faulty and the man is faulty or well, and shows it is the best way to continue with oscillations and divergences, and to never improve.

As any dynamic system, the AF447 effective aircraft has mandatory two qualities :
1. it must be observable :ooh:
2. it must be controllable :ooh:

1. To be observable the matrix describing the effective aircraft must include all the men-parameters, and all the system-parameters, it is a very big matrix, much bigger than this one from an non fbw aircraft. The correspondant sensors have to be connected.

To be controllable, the determinant of this matrix is not allowed to be zero. Correspondant actuators must be connected.

The man-machine interface is not an isolated box, but concerns many functions of the big matrix who must not be faulty, and allows the effective aircraft to be always observable and controllable.:eek:

The human factor is very much more complicated that a short description of psychologically confused crew in one isolated box It has his place in any of these many functions of the effective aircraft matrix.:*

The designers of the aircraft have to analyse very closely if all these many functions do what is expected from them.:sad:

For instance, if it is only the system who "observes" the AoA ("incidence" in french) (AoA present in the traces) , but the pilot has to take decision, to control the aircraft, we doubt about his real ability to control the effective aircraft without these information, and we can guess something is wrong in this architecture. Then the pilot is no more able to achieve his pilot task. :bored:

It has also to be said that the law does the airline who sells the ticket, responsible, is it directly or through his agent failure.

roulishollandais;

Re, "As any dynamic system, the AF447 effective aircraft has mandatory two qualities :
"1. it must be observable
"2. it must be controlable"

Je'm'excuse - Please forgive me if I misunderstand, but it is already this way in transport aircraft.

I'm not sure what you mean by "effective aircraft", but having flown Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed from 1973 and now the Airbus aircraft since 1992 these aircraft (A320 series, A330/A340 series) are eminently, (éminemment), "observable and controllable". They do not present unusual difficulties which require greater skill or knowledge than other transport aircraft today.

Nor do the accident rates indicate a large difference between aircraft types.

However, no aircraft, no design I know of is controllable or observable when it is taken into a full stall.

AF447 was recoverable even after entry into the stall but it required that the stick be pushed fully forward and held there until the wing began flying again. That would take between 15,000 and 22,000ft (I've flown this in the sim many times). This is Machinbird's "unloading of the wing" to which he referred some pages back.

Any transport aircraft in which the controls were moved in a way so that the stall of the wing is maintained as they were in AF447 would remain stalled.

Said another way, a B777 pulled up in the same manner and handled the same way as this aircraft was would also crash.

Also, I do not buy the sidestick vs control column argument one bit. Any pilot watching the pitch attitudes seen here does not need sidestick or column position to tell him/her that something extremely serious is about to happen if control of the aircraft isn't taken over immediately and the nose lowered to normal cruise attitudes.

This is the part that is very definitely not complicated.



Quite frankly, when I started, I flew with WWII guys who, if that kind of flying was ever done with the airplane he might break your arm while taking control from you. These guys were not pleasant to fly with but they knew how to stay alive in marginal conditions and made sure everyone else learned, one way or another.

Thank goodness those days are gone (because they also did stuff that scared the living daylights out of me), but today we talk about "managing" an airplane through the FMGCs and Autopilot instead of flying it. I recall watching someone actually try programming the Stadium approach to 31 at LaGuardia because he was uncomfortable flying it and that was a long time ago now.

In the present system, 99.9% of flights work well with SOPs, CRM, appropriate use of automation (according to enlightened airline policies which permit hand-flying), but the loss of such skills is nevertheless no longer a blip but a trend.

Now it's the Expressway visual to 31. As in the Long Island Expressway. Sadly, many guys build a place/bearing/distance off of DIALS and link it to the course fix for 31. Cross DIALS at 180kts, gear down and flaps 2, dial in some vertical speed, drop the rest of the flaps, manage the speed and all you have left to do is click the AP off on final. The techno savvy FO's look at me like I'm a fossil when I click off everything at DIALS and just fly it by the seat of my trousers. :eek:

Clandestino
If I can perhaps explain further the situation is a lot more complex than my sentence indicates at first glance. A significant factor in all this is that the training and cultural deficiency doesn't necessarily manifest itself in a series of similar or repeated incidents and also that most pilots will not be affected by it. I suspect that every airline has pilots who whilst not being inadequate are not up to the skill levels of their counterparts. Most airlines are adept at weeding these out or conducting training in such a way that those individuals never become a threat. However, occasionally it seems an airline develops a culture which neglects training and develops a casual culture allowing a threat to develop. Examples where this can be identified would be Pan Am, Korean Airlines and China Airlines.
The incidents that happen do not occur in the same area but rather manifest themselves as lapses of judgment which a well trained pilot would not make. An airline in this situation may well have many competent and professional pilots but a laissez faire attitude. One thinks here of Pan Am's flight attendants unofficial blacklist of captains to avoid. Air France seem to have fallen into this situation - the past years incidents suggest that training is deficient and that culture is also an issue. The Air France safety audit report makes disturbing reading and what I note is that the terminology used to refer to the culture is similar in nature to the other airlines. It may be that we can consider this crew exceptionally unable but the A380 incident for example shows a disregard for basic standards at Air France that suggests otherwise.

Selected Items, Part 25—airworthiness standards: Transport category airplanes
 

Granted the A330 was not certified initially under US guidelines, but I thought it interesting to see how well it met US standards. As the title says, this is selected information by me.:)
It would seem that the A330 meets this standard very well...............until it gets into Alt2 Law. Then in is not heavily damped in roll.
§ 25.201 Stall demonstration has some interesting specifications:
AF447 seems to have demonstrated #1 and #3 a number of times during the prolonged stall.
#2 Buffeting apparently was not a strong and effective deterrent to the crew of AF447 and the Captain back in the cabin apparently did not recognize it either.

Is this knowledge well known among crews in general?:confused: Shouldn't it be? Suppose your stall warning system fails?
§ 25.207 Stall warning.

It has been discussed a number of times in the AF447 threads, but the amazingly minimal response of the crew to the audible stall warning indicates to me that the concept of stall warning needs better human interface engineering in general.

For example, Colgan overrode his stick pusher! Maybe what is needed is not more force, but something that is harder to ignore. I really liked my pedal shaker in the Phantom, but the stick shaker is more applicable to the airline environment. Has anyone seen a better warning system? We do not seem to have quite the correct solution yet.
Here is your link to the reference: Electronic Code of Federal Regulations:

Unloading the wing
 

Hi,

PJ2,

Quote:

---

unloading the wing is used to prevent entering a stall, even when the aircraft is well below its normal level flight stall speed.

---

TTex600;

Yes, Expressway 31, thank you. We used the FDM program to monitor these approaches (de-identified) and then picked a gold standard, hand-flown approach, turned it into an animation and showed the troups, the idea being "the window". The numbers were as you say.

It's not a matter of being a whiz with the automation - that's easy stuff. It's a matter of thinking ahead two to six miles and keeping an eye on the guy you've been cleared the visual behind, at night, against NY city lights.

O.C., good thoughts - in my view you do capture some of the factors which I think are at the heart of this accident. I also agree with you on the Op-Safety Review - despite the caution not to view the document as connected in any way to the accident, the document means something...not everything, but it is a reasonable part of the mix.

Thanks, Old Carthusian, fully concur.

Seemingly the stall warnings in both Colgan and AF447 cases were not ignored but the reactions to them were terminally wrong. We are not necessarily looking at perception but rather cognition malfunction.

It is. trick is knowing it so well it could be remembered easily at 4 am.