Hamburt Spinkleman;

There are reasonable things upon which informed, experienced and knowledgeable speculation or assumptions may be made. This accident is no different and many very good people who have engineering, mathematical, flight safety and airline operational and piloting experience have contributed freely and added to understanding. This includes a number of pilots who have flown this aircraft, some under similar weather conditions and who know this environment.

Along the way through these eight, possibly nine threads some exceptional thinking has been offered which has helped others who are less familiar with these aircraft and these operations but who nevertheless suspend judgement and comment, in favour of an abiding curiosity and thirst for knowing how others do this work.

In keeping with discussing what may be reasonably known regarding the displays available to the crew, post-event and so as to avoid leaving false impressions for others who are also reading here and studying this accident, that there was no flight information available to the crew other than the deck angle and the seat of their pants, the displays and all information provided by the two PFDs and NDs were almost certainly available with the exception of the airspeed and that only for a period of under thirty seconds.

The IRUs, DMC's and at least two FCPC's and the FCSC's were functioning, the aircraft was fully-powered, all the data needed for controlled flight was available and no primary system losses such hydraulics, engines or engine controls had failed.

A loss of airspeed data does not result in the loss of displays and there are no data indications, ECAM or ACARS messages indicating such a loss nor are there any indicated associated failures which would cause any or all screens to go dark.

Thus, attitude information (pitch & roll), IVSI, altitude and heading information were all available. On the Systems Pages all information would be available including flight control positions. The ISIS, a somewhat independent attitude, speed & altitude (but not VSI) system was also available except for speed for a short while.

In the thirty-six other similar loss-of-CAS events no screens were blanked nor was other information normally provided on the two PFDs and NDs lost to the crew.

What did the pilots mean, then, when they reported to the Captain, that they had no displays? And when did the displays return? Did they?

I gave up reading this thread thinking everything had been discussed to death and that the primacy of the pilots in the accident had been fully understood. Unfortunately it refuses to die. All evidence and information points to a temporary malfunction which was compounded and turned into an accident by an inadequate response from the flight crew. This links into what I believe are relevant cultural issues at Air France particularly in the area of crew training. It also ties in with human reactions to unexpected situations and failures of CRM and lack of use of SOPs. But it is a human issue not a mechanical issue. As PJ2 has mentioned (nice to see you back by the way) this is not an issue with flaps or spoilers at all or with availability of information.

Old Carthusian;

Re, "But it is a human issue not a mechanical issue. [As PJ2 has mentioned...] this is not an issue with flaps or spoilers at all or with availability of information."

Given what we have, (and it isn't unreasonable to doubt that what we have is all that is available), this is a performance accident. The far more critical aspect of this accident is "Why?" At present I think it is not complicated.

Lyman;

Re, "What did the pilots mean, then, when they reported to the Captain, that they had no displays?"

The only reference to displays is when the PF states, "We haven't got a good display...", "...of speed", and the PM states, "We've lost the speeds", (IR3 p29, p74, English version). No other references to loss of attitude, or altitude information is made. Contrarily, a number of references to altitude and pitch are made which indicate that the displays were functioning:

"Reading the three instruments (the two PFD’s and the ISIS), the PNF noticed that the airplane was climbing and asked the PF several times to descend." - IR3, p74 English Version

Regarding their contributions to the captain's understanding and the captain's responses:

"In the absence of relevant information from the copilots, reading the information available on the screens (pitch attitude, roll, thrust, vertical speed, altitude, etc…) was not sufficient in itself for the Captain to become rapidly aware of the airplane’s situation. He did not then ask questions that could have helped him to understand the sequence of events." - IR3, p76 English Version

Re, "And when did the displays return?"

The displays did not disappear. But the CAS indication did and it reappeared just under 30 seconds after the initial UAS event:

"At around 2 h 10 min 34, the speed displayed on the left side became valid again and was then 215 kt; the speed on the ISIS was still incorrect.". - IR3, p74 English Version

...and from IR3, p75:

"At 2 h 11 min 06, after several attempts to call, the PNF was anxious again about the absence of the Captain. This anxiety probably increased the stress for the PNF who was faced with a situation that he didn’t understand.

A second later, the speed on the ISIS became valid again. ADR 3 being selected on the right side PFD, the speed for the PF also became valid again. It was then 183 kt and the three displayed speeds were consistent. This brought no comment from the crew." - IR3, p75, English Version

I am well aware of the underlying assumptions behind these tentative conclusions but from experience with and knowledge of the airplane they are not unreasonable.

Later, after the aircraft was stalled, the CVR could indicate that other informations were temporarily unavailable, including vertical speed, attitude on the PFDs, altitude.

• 2:11:58 J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là - J’ai plus aucune indication
• 2:12:19 Les ailes à plat - l’horizon l’horizon de secours
• 2:12:30 Je suis en train de descendre là ?
• 2:12:42 En alti on a quoi là ?

I find too little has been said in 4 minutes time, especially from the Captain when he was back. French guys after all ...
Too little said or too little published ?

Thank you.

CONF iture;

Re, "Later, after the aircraft was stalled, the CVR could indicate that other informations were temporarily unavailable, including vertical speed, attitude on the PFDs, altitude."

Yes, I can believe that. Under full stall conditions, a number of sensors, and therefore their downstream services, would not be working correctly. The NCD messages/indications and the "intermittent" stall warning are but two examples.

Hamburt Spinkleman & PJ2 : :D

The only fact I can see is that none of the traces for slat position and flap lever position is published.

It is interesting to note that the vertical speed trace never reaches the NCD status, but still the PF seems to indicate that he totally lost his V/S reading.
As long as the V/S was selected from IR the V/S trace was making sense, when the V/S was selected from ADR the V/S trace was becoming somehow erratic.
We may wonder why the V/S was occasionally selected from ADR (A33Zab said something on that, I have to find it back) does it have anything to do with the IRs capability ... what could be the consequences on the PFD's attitude display ?

CONF iture;

The best that can be said regarding a slat/flap extension theory is, it is possible that such a selection was made at some point but improbable that it actually was. I think this because that is a significant operational emergency decision and would be noted in the IR3 even if the parameter has not been provided. There is no mention of slats and only one technical mention of flaps in IR3.

As Turbine D has quite reasonably asked however, of what significance is this in relation to the accident?

Vertical speed is a baro-inertial calculation. Inertial and Air Data systems have different advantages in the calculation. IR calculation is better in dynamic maneuvers and ADR calculation is more stable over time, (no IR drift issues). Input is automatically selected in accordance with reliability. If ADR data is unreliable it returns an "NCD" status.

Perhaps this may explain comments regarding behaviour of the IVSI display, perhaps not. Various data-source selections were apparently made (can't recall what they were, and also FCPC was switched off/on as well IIRC) - as I mentioned, system behaviours in these circumstances are much less understood than in normal circumstances and, like the earlier examination and sorting out of the ACARS messages, a lot of permutations/combinations would have to be examined before a definitive sense of what was being displayed on the PFDs at any moment during the post-apogee phase. The crew does comment on (loss of) altitude and rate of descent during this phase so something was displayed.

Sensory Awareness
 

Yesterday, I foolishly posted:
A very kind and knowledgeable list-member has privately educated me on this (link my choice, not his). They didn't know WTH the airplane was doing unless the instruments were reliable on all counts.

Sensory illusions in aviation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Of course this is probably old news to experienced drivers. :oh:

That is what instruments provide. Life itself. It is uncomfortable, but very occasionally one must utterly reject what one's senses say, and rely totally on gadgets.

And that is why Flaps and slats (spoilers) are important, and why a few of us are pisssed off at BEA for witholding data. As I said, the Captain had to climb the aisle to re-enter the cockpit. Note his first comment? "Er....what are you doing?"

A Frenchman does not confront another, generally, with such a terse comment.

There is a gob of very pertinent data simply missing from the releases, end of...

Lyman/Bearfoil/Bill:
and:
I'm waiting to get pissed-off/very disappointed if the final report is missing any data. In the meantime, I don't believe it's fair to accuse them of that. 'Interim' means just that. I do agree in general that there appears to be holes in it, but guessing is, IMHO, pointless! Might you be what they call a loose cannon?

Hi,

CONF_iture
We certainly will have more knowledge about this accident when (if ever) the FDR DATA will be published ... instead of those graphics from the BEA belonging more to cartoons than technical graphics

Organfreak;

The excellent link you have provided discusses important aspects of pilots who are non-instrument-rated flying in, or into poor visual conditions. One must believe the instruments at all times because the alternative under some conditions is a loss of control.

You are right, most pilots are indeed familiar with these things...it's drilled into all pilots from very early on in ab-initio training/testing/licencing process.

Some may recall the John Kennedy Jr. accident in which control was lost at dusk, a time of day when the horizon is poorly defined.

Put bluntly (but not overly-dramatically), a non-instrument-trained or rated pilot who enters cloud or continues to fly in deteriorating visual conditions, once entered, has about a minute-and-a-half before the spiral dive develops. The way out is to immediately level the wings but if one has no horizon and doesn't know how to read the artificial horizon instrument or attitude information is missing (displays blanked), the dive will not be stopped.

Not among the accidents listed in your link is the Gulfair A320 loss-of-control accident at Bahrain in 2000. Of particular interest is the "Appendix E, Perceptual Report". Also not listed among these accidents is the Afrikiyah A330 accident at Tripoli which some have discussed these same phenomenon. But we'll probably never know given both political and infrastructural problems which began with the recent civil war in Libya around the time of the accident.

In considering the notion that has been expressed regarding AF447 that all displays were blank, (no information displayed to the crew and not just a missing speed indication for a half-minute), almost certainly the result of loss of attitude, altitude, vertical speed, airspeed, heading etc (on a cloudy, moonless night) would have been a high-speed spiral dive and an extremely high speed impact with the sea. We know that such is not the case.

It isn't direct evidence of course but given the way these things go it is again a reasonable support for the view that the PFD/NDs were displaying most if not all their information except for the CAS.

Captain PJ2.

"In considering the notion that has been expressed regarding AF447 that all displays were blank, (no information displayed to the crew and not just a missing speed indication for a half-minute), almost certainly the result of loss of attitude, altitude, vertical speed, airspeed, heading etc (on a cloudy, moonless night) would have been a high-speed spiral dive and an extremely high speed impact with the sea. We know that such is not the case. "

With great respect, Sir.

From BEA Interim Report Number 3

"At 2 hr 12 min 02 the Pilot Flying said: 'I have no more displays......'


The Pilot not Flying then said: 'We have no valid indications....' "

Now that's from page ten, and the statements are made 17 seconds after the Captain has re-entered the cockpit. Further dialogue? I would wager so...

Hi,
Dunno .. you must have a different report N°3 .. :hmm:
This is from the BEA report N°3 (downloaded from the BEA site)

http://i.imgur.com/PkDWB.jpg

Hi Lyman;

...just plain old PJ2 is fine, ;-)

Re the wager, being a pilot I don't bet on things but thank you for reminding me of the information (on page 10!).

The loss of the VS parameter & displayed information is a possibility that I discussed in a previous post in re the "baro-inertial calculation and if supplied by a malfunctioning ADR, could return "NCD" and not be displayed. From the IR3, Appendix 1, p94:

@ 02:11:45
The vertical speed is no longer
calculated by the IR (Inertial
reference) but by the ADR. It is
about -10,000 ft/min.

This is coincidental with four ACARS messages indicating events occurring at 02:11:45, (and recorded/time-stamped between 5 & 29 seconds later) which also coincides with the disruption, as discussed above, of a number of parameters including the VS traces:

02:11:45 FLR/FR0906010210 34111506EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 /1X3 (9DA),HARD
02:11:45 FLR/FR0906010210 27933406EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD
02:11:45 FLR/FR0906010211 34220006ISIS 1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION,HARD
02:11:45 FLR/FR0906010211 34123406IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD
02:11:55 WRN/WN0906010211 341200106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV
02:11:58 WRN/WN0906010211 341201106FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
02:12:02 PF states “I don’t have any more indications”; PNF, “We have no valid indications” Thrust levers to IDLE; N1s @ 55%
02:12:17 PF makes ND inputs; AoA decreases, speeds become valid again, stall warning sounds again
02:12:47 WRN/WN0906010212 341040006NAV ADR DISAGREE
02:13:32 PF: “we’re going to arrive at level one hundred”

When the PF says (likely to the captain), "I have a problem it's that I don't have vertical speed indication" and "I have no more displays" I do not think he means that his entire PFD is blank. From his comments, he still has attitude & altitude information and the altitude information is unwinding at a thousand feet every three seconds or so at that point in the stalled descent.

The overarching point, to which I am addressing my comments, that the displays were blank prior to the apogee and during the entry into the stall, and are somehow causally linked to the ensuing loss-of-control, stall and descent, is incorrect. Post full-stall and at high-pitch/high-descent rate, any number of indication & system anomalies are likely going to occur, which may lead a crew who may be continuing to believe that the aircraft (the wing) is still flying, to significant cognitive dissonance and an inability to construct a model of aircraft behaviour such that the way to a recovery could be seen. These are CRM as much as SOP matters, a subject which I expect to be dealt with in depth when the final report is issued.

jcjeant

from Interim Report #3 F-GZCP. Downloaded and copied from my Apple ipad.

At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said, “I have no more displays, and the PNF “we have no valid indications”. At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning triggered again.

//////Interim Report n°3
On the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP
operated by Air France
flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro - Paris
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
Ministère de l’écologie, du développement durable, des transports et du logement//////

Old Carthusian. Thanks, you are right, and I would include the text on the page from which this comments arrive, also. It describes a a/c severely in UPSET, but from which a recovery is made. Also, the PF's side of the panel is not recorded, as you can see, and I do not doubt him, PJ2 has inferred proper displays as you have. That is fine, but let's not forget that we have actual evidence, in the two pilot's actual voices.


jcjeant what pages are you copying from #3? Are there different iterations of the report? Mine is of 114 pages long, downloaded some while ago. Do not tell me it has been altered/modified?

Lyman
I am not sure of the relevance of your comments here. The phrases you quote are taken out of context and should be read in conjunction with the rest of the transcript (further on in the report p94-96). From the comments made it is clear that the instrument displays were providing information.

It depends on which page you read!
 

I checked page 10 as Lyman cited. Here is the pertinent paragraph as copied and pasted by yrs truly:

At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said, “I have no more displays, and the PNF “we have no valid
indications”. At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s
were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following
moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall
warning triggered again.

It can be seen that on the chart posted by jcjeant (page 94), that time point of 2:12:02 is not even mentioned.

OC I posted the comments stand alone, because PJ2 had inferred that they did not exist; context comes with chronology, certainly, but we were talking two different time frames. I don't see the problem.

PF and PNF made those comments as Captain re-entered, and I would point out the lack of further discussion as remarkable. The a/c was LOC and dropping madly. The report is to blame for the disjointed and disconnected conversations, not I. Why don't the comments I quote show up with the comments jcjeant posts? Where is the chronology, the complete record?

I rejoin the fray after PJ2 has broken silence, and A333Z continues to provide detailed diagrams and systems info. Attaboys all around. And I think some of the inputs from we non-commercial drivers have helped. At least I hope so.

While wondering what the final report will conclude, my personal feeling is it will come down to training and stall recognition/recovery by HUMANS, not the machine.

- From the data traces I see no extraordinary efforts by the crew to recover from a stall such as using flaps, spoilers, etc. In other words, I do not think the crew knew that the plane was fully stalled, and the control inputs do not reflect appropriate stall recovery techniques/procedures.

- I flew the Deuce ( F-102) early in my career and it had no obvious stall entry warnings or "feelings". All that happened was the jet began to descend rapidly ( sink rate) and it had exceptional directional stability. Seems the Concorde had similar flight characteristics.

Recovery was very easy. Move the stick forward/relax back pressure in order to reduce AoA . Additional power helped, but the underslung motors on the 'bus seem to induce a nose up moment versus the centerline motor of the Deuce. Same true for the Viper, and the thing would simply start to descend with full back stick pressure once it reached the design AoA. Unless that puppy was in a deep stall, then recovery was the same - lower the friggin' nose!

- While looking at the reports and data, I conclude that the 'bus is a very stable and well-designed jet. So a stall may not be easy to recognize, especially if the crew is trained that "you can't stall this airplane". FBW and "protections" for another time, another thread, IMHO. But it may come up in the final report.

So I will make my prediction that the final findings will conclude:

- Crew applied inappropriate control inputs for the existing flight condition when data was lost ( regardless of the failures of sensors and such)

- Flight instrument displays and aural warnings were confusing.

- Crew entered a stall and did not recognize the stall nor apply appropriate control inputs to recover. In other words, the plane did exactly what the crew was demanding.

- The report will demand better training and crew coordination during unusual flight conditions.

Am I way off base?

PJ2

02:11:45 FLR/FR0906010210 27933406EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD

Here we are again at WRG. Followed by loss of displays, as noted by the pilots seven seconds later. Comments? The time is the same as that when the Captain re-entered.

Sure seems like someone is intent on spinning the hamster wheel up to record speed.:yuk:

Lyman, re, "I don't see the problem." Nor do I, bearing in mind the broader question regarding the availability of the displays which I think is in keeping with the second of the three phases of this accident as outlined in IR3, (p72 - 76).

Re, "Here we are again at WRG. Followed by loss of displays. Comments?"

No, none.

There is nothing in the "WRG" indication in and of itself that is unarguable evidence for a loss of all displays.

Forgive me but we can go back and forth many times, as seen, and I've made my comments and asked my question.

I am entirely open to new information and would change my approach according to such new information but failing that I think it is not complicated pre-apogee, and post-apogee it is largely unpredictable (in the sense of citing cause > effect), in terms of human, aircraft and system performance. One must go where the available evidence leads, using one's experience, background and "sense of things".

Hi,

Gums
I repeat ...
You have no datas in the BEA report .. only cartoon graphics ...
For have a good idea of what was the actions of the pilots we need the FDR DATAS ! and accurate (sharp) graphics instead chalk drawings on a board like the BEA ones ...
Those will stop to a end the spinning wheel ....

Well, Lyman,
I learned a long time ago, as a Metallurgical Engineer doing failure analysis, you don't have to look at everything at 10,000X to find the defect that caused the failure. Often, most failure analysis can be determined looking at things from a much broader perspective, 1X. Analysis of an airliner crash is nothing more than a failure analysis, crudely as it may seem in these terms. Honing in on flap & slat setting or spoiler activity is looking at the problem at 10,000X or greater magnification. You need to back off and look at AF447 at 1X, once again. The BEA has graciously given you a considerable amount of data to study and understand. It is what they knew to be factual at the time they released IR #3. Not every organization charged with determining the cause of an accident would provide what you have received as of now. So begin to look at what you received as fortunate rather than incomplete.

What you should be focused on is the 1X. It starts with this from the BEA IR#3:

The Look Ahead

How did the AF447 flight crew manage their radar? Did they sense what was ahead?


The Beginning of The End


By the time the Captain returned to the flight deck, it was too late, unless he recognized the situation immediately, he didn't. What ever happened from there on was futile, there was no time given the situation.

So flaps, slats or spoilers , or not, they didn't make a difference when they left the flight envelope and were in the stall descending at 124 miles per hour without recognition of being in a stall situation. I would suggest you, one more time, read pages 87-101 of the BEA IR#3, carefully. You will see (read Pg. 94) they briefly deployed spoilers for 3 seconds before retracting them and it does show on the cartoons as jcjeant calls them. Look at the bigger picture, Training (lack thereof), knowing the airplane and rapid situation recognition.

As for the final report, I think you will be disappointed, not every little nit will be contained nor should it be, only the pertinent data.

Hi,

Tubine_D
You can call this spinning wheel or any name but the BEA no released the DATA (listings) of the FDR ( it's what I call "a considerable amount of data" )
This was a early material available to publish ...

PJ2 Turbine D Organfreak, Machinbird.

Howdy. It is an honor to be in such company, and I consider it my good fortune to be allowed to participate here. We all bring different skills, experience, and demeanor. I am a low time commercial pilot who had the good fortune of owning a small aviation business at one time. I am in awe of the quality of discourse here, and to any extent you have stayed is testimony to your patience, or masochism.

This is no ordinary wreck, it is a criminal investigation. Due negligece, and various other human shortcomings, 228 souls are dead. 447 transcends the usual, and while it is tragic, it is nothing to discard without several microscopes to hand. No one is well served by being too easily satisfied. I understand everyone's approach, and also the frustration of those who believe they know what happened. If anyone can direct me to the Court's website, I will say goodbye. Failing that, I hope you can understand MY frustration at any sign of "laissez faire".

"Standard of Care". "Duty of care". Without these, and what you all know of aviation, no one would fly. anywhere. Ever. My opinion? Air France should be shut down, and reorganized. The corporate culture there is largely to blame for the accident. How do I know? I don't have to know. They know. No one is innocent in this industry, bargains are struck daily, and competition is fierce.

It costs money to park equipment and rnr air sensors. Motive? Dough. Result? these dead souls. My family flies that airline from time to time, their people are wonderful, and their equipment is modern, and safe. Knuckleheads who think they are smart, and can game the odds, these are the enemy. You know them, and not only in aviation do they cost lives.

Hamster Wheel? Small price to pay, if the Truth is outed. Don't give up. Don't let the knuckleheads skulk away, to risk your family, next time.

Man machine interface issue? "Stressing" Human Factors?
 

Hi,

gums:

The "global picture" analysis seems correct. 1X as Turbine D properly emphasized: IMHO, under "unusual flight conditions" you need:

1) Reliable System "outputs". In your second point you put "...confusing"

2) "Graceful Degradation" and "Fault tolerance" from the System. There are indications the crew lost important (System) outputs during the "long" trajectory from apogee to SL: 3) In your point #3 the "entering into the stall", "not recognition of it and lack of "correct perception" does not (could) suggest the need for a review of certain aspects of the "man machine interface"?

4) "Unusual flight conditions" were not partly derived from "UNUSUAL conditions" PF and PNF (clearly lacking proper training) were submitted from the environment outside and INSIDE the cockpit?

My comment on your question:

Is:

The "man machine interface" will be an important factor in this accident or the training, CRM, etc. should "compensate" it's (sometimes complex) characteristics?

PS

What i mean by "characteristics" is some "well known" issues observed in these "advanced flying Systems".

PS2

"Advanced flying Systems" currently uses "RIDICULOUS DESIGN" with respect to "air speed" anomalies (by non availability of adequate sensors) during transients (like occurred in this accident) . Still applying erroneously the very basic concept of Redundancy. And relied on (non properly trained) pilots to use "band aids" in (sometimes) "possible difficult situations" typical of daily commercial flights.

PS3

For sure!

PS4

A fact!

Question:

In this case (a complex one) pilot (PF) error will be the cause? All "inputs" he received (before and during the flight) like training and System "outputs" will be considered important (for his actions)?

Synergy
 

Hi,

PJ2:

Quote:

---

The far more critical aspect of this accident is "Why?"

---

There are (yet) many (possible) and important reasons to answer "Why".

Please comment.




Old Carthusian:

Quote:

---

Unfortunately it refuses to die.

---

Why (it refuses...)?

RR NDB
The reference is to the non too disguised attempt by some to attribute the accident or parts of the accident to the machine and not the human, cultural, management and training issues. One, of course, welcomes a spirit of inquiry but one is forced to question why so many otherwise rational people are so excised by the possibility that the flight crew got things wrong and that this was the only reason for the crash. I am afraid that I keep coming back to the adage - we try to make the machine foolproof but God keeps on designing better fools (not that I think that the flight crew were fools, just that is the adage). No matter how well a machine is designed someone will find a way to evade it's safety features and wreck it. The man/machine interface strikes me as another red herring I'm afraid.

Hi Old Carthusian,
The Flight Crew Training Manual has this quote in Abnormal Attitudes Section:
"The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture, and the existence of control laws, eliminate the need for upset recovery maneuvers to be trained on protected Airbus aircraft."

I think that might be changed.

I was talking to a commercial (bizjet) pilot at the weekend, who told me that sim training has changed considerably post 447. There is now much more on approach to stall/buffet (but not into stall), and emphasis on recovering controlled flight including nose down if that is what it takes, and not on minimum height loss only as it used to be.

Second hand, I know, but there must be some AB and other ATPLs here who can say if that is a general thing.

It is part of FCOM SUPPLEMENTARY TECHNIQUES following an aural stall warning, nothing more nothing less :
If below 20000 feet and if in clean, select FLAP 1
Such action from the crew would be an indication on how they were or not understanding the situation.

That is why I would not rush to state that the CAS was the only parameter to momentarily disappear.

For now the BEA is selective ... but the Judge is withholding data from the proceedings.
Have you heard anything to the contrary ?

Hi,

BEA chalkboard graphics less FDR data is partial and inaccurate information
FDR data (listings) + sharp graphics are valuable information AFAIK and could reduce the field of speculation
I can understand that the full CVR will not be released to public for many obvious reasons .. but why not the FDR ?
What are the reasons ?
One "Why?" more ......

Hello RR_NDB;

The context of the question, "why?" is Phase 2 (as stated in IR3) of this accident: Why the pitch-up and then the continued pitch-up post-apogee? So, yes, there are remaining many possible and important reasons in answer to the question, "Why?" in this context but there are also a number of explanations which are less probable as to why. The focus on aircraft system anomalies after entry into the full stall and descent will not answer the question regarding Phase 2. The extreme stress and confusion/cognitive dissonance indicated in Phase 3 resulting from aircraft/system behaviours that were inconsistent with the crews' view that they were still flying despite the stall warnings (crew comments in IR3 regarding "high speed") and the recurring stall warning and airspeed indications, likely contributed to the significantly-decreased chances of assessment of the problem and swiftly reducing opportunity for recovery.

Well, I have been commenting all along since last May up to these series of posts on why I think this is not complicated but I will try to make that uncomplicated!

First, "not complicated" doesn't mean that details of both human and aircraft behaviour are dismissed as sidebars or non-causal factors...not at all. But some theories and notions of what happened are more in accord with what we know and therefore more relevant than others which we have seen. It is not always easy to know when one is merely jamming a notion into the small box of known facts so that a theory fits a preconceived notion, or whether one is "on to something" and just needs to ask more questions.

But as more becomes known, one is able to parse such interesting activity and ideas and then tentatively set aside some notions and turn towards others which are more plausible, at least until something else comes along which hints or even proves that one might be off-base so that one can start again. It isn't a perfect way to do things but it works.

"Not complicated" here means, this is a loss-of-control accident which resulted from stalling the aircraft. Why did that happen?

That happened because the airplane was pitched up and held there until the stall. Why? This was done immediately, without announcement, standard crew coordination, (CRM) or following SOPs. Why? The PM made no interventions. Why? One simply never pitches a transport aircraft up to 10 to 15degrees at cruise altitude and holds it there because intuitively knows what will happen...a rapid loss of energy. We have to assume the PF was earnest in his response yet the response was not correct. Why?

Some details for this exact point would be the prior crew discussion regarding climbing and the FMGC MAX ALT message. That was a clear indication that the airplane was already very near its altitude limit in terms of available thrust to maintain cruise flight. Why go higher where the available thrust would not maintain level flight let alone a zoom-climb? That would be a detail. The climb happened versus not: Why?

In Phase 3 when the "stall, stall" with Master Warning and audible warnings were heard why was the stall warning not respected as per the UAS QRH checklist? A number of ideas have been posited and discussed and may explain this but the key point is, it happened, vice not. Why?

What is going to be very complicated is understanding the human dynamics and factors which led to certain behaviours and not others. We already know that training regimes, simulator scripts, awareness of high altitude flight dynamics and swept-wing transport behaviours as well as system behaviours are being taught everywhere but we may only be able to make guesses at the psychology of the flight deck in this accident and this is where we must be extremely cautious and respectful of the crew and of our lack of knowledge.

Gratuitous Post #Billion
 

@PJ2:

Masterful summation.

:D

(I'd hire this guy!)

To characterize post apogee Pitch inputs as "mostly nose-Up" is not fair. The a/c wandered NU/ND between -3 and +17 several times.The co-pilot input ND several tmes. He had no ability to see the AoA, as we know. To constantly insert AoA in the record, knowing the pilots had no access to it, is dishonest on BEA's part. Again, several times the Nose was down well below cruise values, and continued to descend rapidly; increasing speed, and further disorienting the PF/PNF. It IS fair to ask "Why no push on the Stick to gain perhaps 20 degrees ND?"

It was PNF (LHS) who was doing the flying when the Captain entered and said "Er, what are you doing" LHS continued to fly during the initial phase of three pilot command. I can suggest that pilots reread the chronology on pp93-94 with a fair and objective viewpoint, and keep reminding yourself you have PITCH only, not AoA. It is quite clear none of the pilots had a clue as to where to put the nose, keep it, and pull out. STALL was not in the mix. And remember, the STALLWARN is WARN, not STALLED, necessarily. At one point, both sticks were to the stops, left, and the a/c was Rolled right 4 degrees, and when one stick relaxed, it immediately Rolled right to 7 degrees. I still think there was a problem with the airframe, Rudder/Lateral, that favored Right Roll, chronically.

I think it is reactionary to dismiss the possibilities of 'desperate' measures, taken by crew. Also to 'assume' 'most' displays were 'working'. If they had been, why can I not also say, "Then why the confusion on deck?" Alot of pointing, alot of statements, alot of confusion, and consternation. This includes instrumentation prior to STALL, why would that be excluded.

I would think that a fair position would be: "With so much confusion, how could the instruments possibly be working? There is no record of displays, just as there is no record of the pilots solutions. These have to be inferred, as CONFiture has pointed out in his response to PJ2. I am frankly more puzzled by the preStall record, not the utter LOC afterward. When there is no reason to say "He simply pulled up, we don't know why", then there is no reason to claim incompetence.

Especially when given the circumstances. The record of instrumentation and displays rests on the Pilot's verbal record. Relying on the DFDR to bolster an argument when no such data was available to the crew is simply dishonest. We were not there, yet so many make accustaions as if they were. And yet I am accused of Hamster Wheeling? I am suggesting the record is incomplete. WAY incomplete.