Machinebird
Sorry for the delay in responding but I would submit that what you were writing about is the perception not the actuality. Some commentators are adopting a them and us approach - pilots and airline companies. It more suggests to me a misunderstanding of just what it takes to run an airline than an actual perception of reality. It also ties in with a common human perception that things were better in the past whether it is true or not. It may indeed be that some things were better in the past but it is also true that some things weren't.
When you actually study some of the older accidents (and you don't even need to go back to the 70s to see this) you realise that there have always been pilots who have lacked the necessary skills. What automation has done is allowed a massive increase in the number of flights with a concomitant increase in the level of safety needed to sustain this. Of course you will find some negatives in the introduction of automation and the way it is used but this is due to the humans involved NOT the machines. It is clear that the skills of this particular crew played the significant role in the accident but this is not a general malaise as this accident is unique and other crews have dealt successfully with similar incidents. This alone should be sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is not indicative of a general problem.

Hi,

Maybe not a general problem ..
Not related with this particular accident .... but the fact is that for decades .. automatism or not .. the human part of the plane does not seem to increase in security ... it remains stagnant in the statistics .. even with all the progress
Accident statistics
1001 Crash - Airplane accidents statistics - Crashes causes and aeronautical terrorism

I think it is a reach to even call this tragedy an accident.

If all standards, precautions and minima had been met, this wreck does not happen. End of.

The population of UAS incidents was low, 32 I think, 6 involving AF. Including them in 2 Sigma is a breach of courtesy. The very availability of Back up Speed Scale on Airbus suggests an awareness of the problem, plus the AD on Thales, and the mandated r/r. The threatened RTF by the pilots shows they thought along those lines.

This crash doesn't belong in the gross numbers, it skews the reality like a bookie having a bad and "middled" day.

Flying is far safer than this c/f suggests.

PJ2, thanks for your time - it's a pleasure.

Jcjeant
But as a function of the number of flights - human error is decreasing. The number of HE accidents remains fairly consistent but the number of flights have grown significantly. Partially automation but also partially better standards and culture.

Pilots need to know how to hand fly when the autopilot disengages. Usually just holding present attitude and power will handle it while figuring out the details. We have known for decades pulling back at 35,000 ft will stall any airplane so why do it? If you can't remember what your attitude and power settings were just set attitude about 2.5 degrees up and power to where it normally is until you figure out what you want to do.

I have no idea why these guys did what they did but no competent pilot would do it.

Turbine D;

No worries, I understood what you were explaining and am somewhat familiar with Six Sigma - it was actually quite a good explanation, thank you.

In response to your important comment: Yes, I think so - we're thinking along the same lines and in fact I worked on a design change of this drill last summer, (July, 2011). I have always considered the Unreliable Airspeed memorized drill poorly designed and confusing primarily for those circumstances in which I considered the safety of the flight "not impacted". Here is why:

The UAS memorized drill has a primary decision point, "If the Safe Conduct of the Flight is Impacted", which requires that the crew decide "are we safe or unsafe?" In my view, this primary decision point which is intended to lead the crew into one drill or another, is too imprecise. The "one way or the other" is either to pitch up to certain degrees and set power to TOGA or CLB, or to not execute these memory items and instead "Level Off > Troubleshoot > QRH Pitch and Power tables". In other words, don't pitch up. To my knowledge this crew never experienced this kind or level of training in their recent sim sessions, (and I can categorically say that I have never even encountered the UAS drill in all my Airbus A320/A330/A340 initial or recurrent ground or sim training.)

In a recent and much more detailed description of this drill than I have seen before, a note in the PPT indicates that the meaning of safe conduct will be defined in training. Then it goes on to explain how the drill is done. The presentation is dated 2006.

In other words, "when" the safety of the flight "is/is not" impacted has a definite meaning but this is not defined in any SOP/QRH/FCTM with which I am familiar.

But this isn't the important point. The important point is, no matter what phase of flight, the primary "bifurcation" point...the point where the memorized drill launches one way or the other, applies to all altitudes and all phases of flight - climb, cruise, descent...and, as you have suggested...there is no defining of "cruise", or "above FL200", etc etc.

So I thought why not base the primary "bifurcation" or decision point on phase of flight rather than the very subjective and individual assessment, which defines the "safe conduct of the flight"?

Clearly, the safe conduct of the flight is impacted at/during the takeoff phase...the closer to the ground, the higher the risk. This is a direct result of the two loss of airspeed & altitude information accidents we are now familiar with, the Birgenair and Aeroperu B757 accidents, (which, for others, please see).

So immediate pitch and power numbers need to be memorized and instantly applied until "at/above MSA or Circuit Altitude" and then the aircraft is to be leveled off for troubleshooting. Leveling off includeds selecting the GPS Altitude on the FMC/MCDU, and getting out the QRH pitch and power tables.

In the memorized drill, there are three sub-decision points depending upon where the airplane is in the takeoff/early climbout phase.

For information purposes, the Airbus thrust reduction altitude in force at the time was 1500ft AGL. I believe it has since been changed to 1000ft AGL, but no matter.

The three conditions of the memorized portion of the drill (and after the decision is made that the "safe conduct of the flight is impacted") state:

Pitch/Thrust:
- Below THRUST REDuction ALTitude..................15°/TOGA
- Above THRUST RED ALT and Below FL100........10°/CLB
- Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL100.........5°/CLB

The FCTMs I've seen further confuse the issue by saying first of all, if you've chosen 5deg of pitch because you're above FL100, (thinking the "safe conduct of the flight is impacted"), then very quickly get out the tables to ensure speed stability, (specifically, the overspeed sitution is mentioned...nothing is said of the opposite problem...loss of speed if pitched up too much). But then the FCTMs state that if the safe conduct of the flight is NOT impacted, the crew will not apply the memorized items but get out the QRH pitch and power tables while maintaining stable flight.

So the potential for applying the wrong procedure is there, but the potential is largely molified by the actions described in the QRH and as such reduce risk providing the crew gets out the tables quickly and establishes stable, level flight.

The difficulty comes when the subjective assessment of the "safe conduct" of flight is made...some would consider the loss of all speed indications a clear and present danger to the flight and launch into the drill. Others would light up a pipe, (metaphorically speaking...to indicate a calm, measured approach! :bored: ) and maintain level flight while the other pilot got out the numbers. Why not base the decision for subsequent actions on the phase of flight, where there is an emergency, and where there probably isn't, (as in cruise flight)?

It made sense to divide the phases simply...into "Takeoff or Below MSA" and "Above MSA in Climb/Cruise/Descent.

For the former, to the usual memorized items. For the latter, level off for troubleshooting, set the GPS Altitude and groundspeed on the MCDUs and get out the QRH pitch and thrust tables.

OC, the delay was expected due to time zones.
There has been a major de-skilling of the airline pilot community by virtue of automation. The new guys coming up are very good in handling the automation and there are apparently an increasing number of them who when asked to hand fly an aircraft break out into a cold sweat. The environment makes it difficult to acquire and maintain essential hand flying skills. The periodic simulator training sessions are too infrequent to really maintain hand flying skills. Many of the formerly accomplished hand flyers have commented on their personal loss of the touch. There is no doubt that automation has permitted a high level of safety despite this apparent loss of skills, but when an aircraft loses critical systems and the automation is crippled, are these new pilots ready to take over and fly?

When I was actively flying, such a loss of control as AF447 experienced for the reason it lost control would be unthinkable. The weakest pilot in my squadron could fly solid instruments by hand (Where we sometimes saw problems was in headwork.)
With 32 UAS events and 1 loss of aircraft, the statistics for that condition are terrible. Is it a statistical fluke? I don't think so.Statistics doesn't work like that. UAS is clearly much more hazardous than ordinary flight.

IMHO AF447 could well represent the "canary in the coal mine" warning us that the hand flying deterioration has begun to cripple not only the third world airlines but also the legacy carriers.

Any airline pilot should be able to fly cruise by hand, cold without a warmup. If he cannot do that simple task, then he really doesn't belong in the cockpit.

Machinbird
I am still not convinced by this deskilling you write about. So far what seems to have been discussed is a perception that this is the case which may be widely shared but is just that - a perception. A lot of people saying something is so does not necessarily make it so and given that accidents due to pilot error have remained fairly constant with the massive increase in flights across the globe the statistics would not seem to back this up. I have no doubt that there are pilots who react as you say to the challenge of hand flying but whether this is a general case I am less sure.
I suppose what I am saying is that one must be careful not to over-generalise and to fall into the human error of thinking that things were better in our younger days. Military pilots were notorious (and probably still are) for their high crash rates but this is the price you pay for pushing the envelope as it were. The type of accident represented by AF447 may well have been impossible in your squadron but possibly your colleagues found different ways to have accidents? Error does not manifest itself in a consistent pattern. Where I do think you have a point is that 32 UAS incidents do indicate an issue that does need attention.

Whoa!
 

'bird's last comment is also what scares me.

I fully realize that many of the heavy pilots here have not flown to the edge of the "envelope", or exceeded it. I have no problem with that.

What scares me is a basic lack of airmanship I would expect of a teenager that I was helping learn to fly in a Cessna.

Lost a friend at Cali back in 95 or 96 or...... Stoopid flight management system turned the jet the wrong way and they noticed the error but kept descending whle turing back to the approach fix. Not good.

The increased use of automation seems to be a significant factor in recent incidents.

I would prefer a crew that flies the plane using a combination of "auto" aids and manual kills. IMHO, not enough manual flying these days. I am not a dinosaur. Flew with the latest and greatest avionics and FBW and such since the 70's. I would simply hope that the folks up front in the cockpit can actually fly the plane when all the automation and computer stuff goes away. In short, I want a "pilot" up front.

PJ2's sim pitched down with "full forward stick applied and held (...) from an AoA of 40deg to 10deg (in) 24 seconds", i.e. at an agonizingly slow rate of 1.25 deg/second. How are you going to improve on that? Using manual trim might help, but see Dozy's post #1096. Pulling the thrust levers back to idle would help to increase the ND pitching moment, but that's about all I can think of.

In this initial phase of recovery the sim is performing outside the envelope of known aerodynamic data from flight test or windtunnel. It is possible that actual airplane performs better. On page 111, at 02:12:45 in TOGA and with the THS at -13.8 deg, the airplane pitches down in response to a short push on the stick at 2.7 deg/second, and again at 02:13:30 at CLB thrust.

I agree.
They can in Normal Law - no problem.

On a non FBW aircraft, in the cruise we'd take the autopilot out occasionally, enjoy the feel of the aircraft's response, re-trim it then re-engage the AP.
On AI FBW, there is no requirement to re-trim - it's done automatically. Even if you take the AP out - it's still in Normal Law and handles differently to ALT Law.

There is never an opportunity to practice Alt Law flying skills.
I think the lack of opportunity to practice manual flying skills in Alt Law needs to be addressed in recurrent sim training opportunities..

HN39;

Re, "Pulling the thrust levers back to idle would help to increase the ND pitching moment, but that's about all I can think of."

The TLs were in the CLB detent in the exercise cited, so yes, that would have helped in the speed with which the AoA reduced.

And yes, recovery from AoA's of around 16° (just before the apogee but well into the stall warning) was a lot quicker - between 10k and 15k with more altitude required for the pull-out once unstalled, (secondary stall occurred a few times when we pulled too hard). The exercise described was a recovery from a fully developed stall, (AoA > 40°).

AA 757 CFIT
 

Hi,

gums and OK465

AA flt 965 almost cleared the hill by crew action (based on GPWS). Crew errors, data base deficiencies, etc. played a role.

Clever System was developed and introduced "in the aftermath" of this accident.


PS

The combination of errors was reflected in the percentages:

In June 2000, the jury found that Jeppesen was 30 percent at fault for the crash, Honeywell was 10 percent at fault, and American Airlines was 60 percent at fault.

Hi gums;

Re, "Stoopid flight management system turned the jet the wrong way "

IIRC, towards the first selection in the NDB list, "R" which was way east, and not the approach "R" (Rozo) NDB to which they had been cleared. In the B767/B757 one has to execute the selection while in the Airbus FMC once selected the airplane is going to go there. I always thought that was not a good design precisely because of this accident but it's still that way.

Painful I know - I recall the Dec 20 '95 accident well and know you lost a friend. You can take some solace in the many positive outcomes regarding CRM, SOPs, automation behaviours/procedures but especially Don Bateman's/Honeywell's work on the improved EGPWS system.

On the recovery altitudes, I think familiarity with the boundaries of controlled flight, which comes with an understanding of aerodynamics of your airplane would help but of course that's not what we do nor are we taught a high level of aerodynamics regarding our designs, and, we have no business being there at the boundaries! Not even test pilots actually stall the aircraft anymore as you know.

The exercise was a worst-case - fully developed stall, late recovery attempt, thrust was not idle. As I mention to HN39, a smart recovery, (as in brisk forward stick at the first stall warning blip, held fully forward without variation, thrust at idle), can be made which reduces the altitude required. It's still going to take a lot of altitude to a) regain the AoA and b) regain the energy, (due low availability of excess thrust, so its height for energy, initially).

"In the B767/B757 one has to execute the selection while in the Airbus FMC once selected the airplane is going to go there."

Not always, though I'm sure statistically reliable. I have heard (anecdotally) of the bus abandoning the Flight Path in favor of a turn, caught by pilots who then fly manually to destination. Since I am unwilling to be more specific, note I use the word "anecdotally". These occurrences, upon follow up, were not satisfactorally explained.

Have you heard of this?

On pp9-10 of BEA #3, there is a flight path narrative. On pp29-30-31, graphs indexed to CVR. The latter is more explicit, and one assumes, more reliable.

On the last of these three pages, at the top "Thrust levers to TOGA" (DFDR), there is an interesting flow of data, conversation. With TOGA, the RHS inputs 3/4 stop NoseDown. Strange, eh? The LHS, just prior to RHS "I no longer have control of the a/c" states: "We have the engines....what's happening?" If he was concerned about AoA/STALL, why would he take note of the Thrust at FULL as somehow comforting, instead of a dire threat to LIFT?

So it is strange to entertain that the pilots (including Captain) would be concerned with STALL (high altitude), and be OK with the engines at 100%+ N1?

At the very least, why did BEA choose to truncate the CVR just as the controls went LEFT, the PF had lost control of the ship, and the Captain enters "What are you doing?"

Is it a tease? Obviously there is a reason. What is in there that cannot be seen by the public?

Lyman;

Re, "I have heard (anecdotally) of the bus abandoning the Flight Path in favor of a turn, caught by pilots who then fly manually to destination."

"Flight Path" is defined as the vertical element while "turn" is obviously the lateral element. VNAV requires LNAV because the descent is defined in terms of altitude and possibly speed constraints which are either part of the STAR arrival or merely slow-down or speed control points such as found at Heathrow or Frankfurt. Put another way, the programmed track between waypoints is necessary before the vertical element (VNAV) can manage the descent to achieve the required constraints.

If radar-vectored off the course programmed, the lateral/vertical elements are no longer managed and become instead selected, (short-term operation), and HDG is selected, the lateral element is removed and the vertical element is logically no longer capable of managing VNAV calculations due absence of waypoint constraints, therefore the vertical reverts to Vertical Speed, or more rarely, FPA, neither of which are 100% suitable but for unimportant reasons. The PF can then choose a more suitable mode such as Open Descent - the Alt Sel on the MCP is reset to the cleared altitude if it was previously set to the lowest altitude on the STAR...some airlines allow this, some don't, "just in case."

The Airbus doesn't abandon anything even if in VNAV it is going to miss a constraint - in such a case it will signal on the PFD the need for speedbrakes.

In short, the scenario you're describing can't logically occur and there are no Tech Bulletins extant describing such odd behaviour so I doubt it occurred at all. Leaving the flight path does leave the FMC-programmed LNAV course and the autoflight lateral mode drops to HDG but that is completely normal behaviour for all these autoflight systems, with minor variations on the theme. If what is meant by "fly manually to destination" is the use of HDG on the MCP and Open Descent then this is the same thing as saying one had to use the steering wheel in one's car to get to one's destination and we all know how risky that is. If one selects a downstream waypoint to which one wishes to "go direct", one selects the waypoint, puts it into the requisite line and the airplane will turn towards the waypoint using the shortest route, left or right. In the Boeing, after selecting and placing the waypoint into the requisite line, one then must execute the selection, leaving the crew one more step to make sure that that is what they want. There is no "maybe" about this.

K.I.S.S. (crystal clear)
 

I would add:

And assure the man-machine interface will always be able to HELP effectively the crew even when facing (all possible) extreme conditions. Allowing a FAST ("immediate", if possible) understanding of the problem(s) or threat(s).

In order, at least, to allow the very basic: Aviate and Navigate safely.

In a "graceful degradation" environment in order to increase chances ("giving" time) to succeed.

(*) The "effective aircraft" (System + crew) must always have (good) chances to "survive". Redundancy is the Key. "Sully" case may be is a good example on the need of a "pilot" up front. The System suffered a major failure. Compare "tiny ice crystals" with "flock of canadian geese"

Problem seems:

You need a System specialist and a Pilot. "Better" would be, first a Pilot and (last but not least) a System specialist.

The "microprocessor fired" the FE's. Is the automation (Super Systems) threatening the "pilot side" of the guys up front? :confused:

His words :
"The buffeting is a fairly low frequency vibration of the whole airplane, it shakes. It is described per the English term : it is deterrent, which means it is frightening. A sign that all pilots must identify to let them know : Do not go further.
it is impossible that they did not perceived it. You cannot miss it. It shakes badly."

ref this post
You most probably didn't mean ND for the AoA.
Isn't Stall Warning supposed to be lost with all ADRs selected off ... ?
In my experiment THS never did ... ?

Not any more.
At the initial aural stall warning, the airplane is still flying and considering as approaching the stall. The procedure is now clearly to lower the nose first and even to have to reduce the thrust in case of lack of pitch down authority.
The initial TOGA action has been banned. Minimizing altitude lost is not the priority anymore, reducing the AoA is.

Quote:
Originally Posted by PJ2
Thirty seconds after the first Stall Warning passing through FL270 the AoA was 10degND
ref this post
You most probably didn't mean ND for the AoA.
Isn't Stall Warning supposed to be lost with all ADRs selected off ... ?

Wow..."10degND"! Shoulda caught it, thanks.
Quote:
Pitch slowly reduced to about 10degND still with full forward stick. As it was held the THS unwound and returned to normal settings.
In my experiment THS never did ... ?

Hm, I can't explain that without more information. Ours unwound normally and one could feel it in the response of the airplane.
Quote:
In the approach to the stall, the SOP is to apply TOGA power, lower the nose and minimize altitude loss. This still applies!
Not any more.
At the initial aural stall warning, the airplane is still flying and considering as approaching the stall. The procedure is now clearly to lower the nose first and even to have to reduce the thrust in case of lack of pitch down authority.

The initial TOGA action has been banned. Minimizing altitude lost is not the priority anymore, reducing the AoA is.

Yes, I do recall the change now - what I was trying to do was separate two phases here - the "approach to the stall", and the "full stall" obviously and had referred to publications before the change. Kind thanks once again for the correction.
Have you any thoughts on the altitude required to recover from the full stall? What was your experience in your own experiment?

CONF iture;

Strange, my version of PJ2's post reads: The other strange thing about it is that per S/W schedule (the ADR's were turned back on after the stall) the warning should stop at 6.1 deg AoA for M.658. OTOH the flight path angle for the airspeed and VSI is 9.8 deg down.

I don't know about the S/W system, but I do know, per BEA, that the A/S bug for S/W is absent from the speed tape when all ADRs are AWOL.

"..this marker disappears..."

HazelNuts39...."Another strange thing..." Keep them coming, I relish strange things, especially if they are not crew actions.... :ok:

Thanks HN39...the FPV symbol was 10deg below the line dividing blue and brown on the PFD, which to me indicated an AoA of roughy +10deg while the aircraft was still descending rapidly, so it was my clumsy writing even though I think the meaning came through for most others. On the stall warning, in fact the first exercise there was no such warning because we had all the ADRs off, then on for the FPV later - we did it again using a different failure method to get the sim into Alt 2...these are details behind the larger exercise but technically correct - my posts are almost always too long as it is - PJ2

PJ2;
Thanks for contributing your valuable exercise to the discussion. I was wondering: Do you have to rely on your notes and memory, or does the sim have a facility for recording the flight, e.g. for a post-flight debrief between instructor and pupil?

HN39;

First, I debated long and hard on a decision to contribute the sim experience at all, and not for the obvious reasons of potential misunderstanding etc,...it was a personal exercise with colleagues who in one case are equally interested and who are in a good position to teach others who fly this aircraft and in another case those who for other reasons are interested in the outcomes. But the more I read from the current discussion the greater some contribution seemed to be of value especially since at least two other experiences have been noted. I wanted to give a sense of the event from initial loss of airspeed through the pitch-up/apogee and holding the stick back so the stall was truly "set", and then the recovery characteristics. It is by no means definitive but I think it is sufficient.

The sim has the ability to record its traces. However, arrangements like these are almost always ad-hoc and time for preparation is at a premium with training schedule demands and hours of availability and coordinating with the technicians to obtain materials after is for various reasons an uncertain process.

There isn't time for note-taking in the moment but other recording methods were used. Still photos from an earlier session were helpful but are not complete nor do they give a sense of situation. Videoing is more helpful but doing it well requires close coordination and ideal circumstances; - covering all instruments and in a timely/relevant way is a challenge!

In my non-engineering view, the sim "behaved" as I expected the airplane might. I don't have experience with the Cooper-Harper scale although I am familiar with it and my own characterizations of the airplane were probably generous. The warning and cautions which accompanied the CAS and ADR failures were less distracting than I had anticipated. The loss of two hydraulic systems or the Emergency Electrical configuration is vastly more complex, demanding and challenging for a two-pilot crew. I don't know how to post audio files, (except through links to YouTube - SoundCloud doesn't provide links) just to demonstrate what the Stall warning sounds like but it was hard to ignore. Also, it was not possible to set aside hindsight so it was not possible to be "confused" by the various behaviours.

You are correct, my paste was erroneous, I will modify it, thanks.

I can't remember precisely but your 20000 feet figure would be my number too.
I was certainly impressed by the amplitude of negative pitch required to silent the stall warning. Not much blue sky left on the PFD. We, airline pilots, are simply not used to command such attitudes.

CONF iture, Re, "I was certainly impressed by the amplitude of negative pitch required to silent the stall warning. Not much blue sky left on the PFD. We, airline pilots, are simply not used to command such attitudes. "

No kidding...not much blue left at all. And the AoA crept up - it didn't just change right away. The last bit from around 20deg to 10 seemed to go a bit faster.

PJ2;

In AF447 pressure errors developed in the pitot/static system as the AoA exceeded approx. 25 deg, causing the IAS to drop rapidly, to below 60 kt at about 41 deg AoA. I gather that AoA in your exercises did not exceed 40 deg enough to silence the stall warning, but did you by any chance observe a rapid drop in IAS between 25 and 40 deg AoA?

Sim Limitations
 

Upset Recovery in Sims | AVIATION WEEK

I do think this article touches on very interesting observations that may have direct or indirect association with AF447 crew behavior. I will let the article speak for itself.

@ PJ and 'nuts

Yeah the long response bothers/surprises me, too.

Knowing what we do now, I guess we could "cheat" and crank that THS to the other end to help the pitch moment. Unlike the Viper, the AF jet had a decent cee gee at the time of the incident.

Seems that Doze also tried a recovery in the sim, that right Doze? We need a refresher of your findings.

@RR

I sure hope the human factors is given attention in the findings and recommendations. I still fault the crew, but I empathize with them to some extent due to the warnings and displays they dealt with.

My civilian job was designing and implementing crew displays, and secondly weapon control algorithms to be implemented in part by the crew and mostly by the confusers. Think JDAM, AMRAAM, Maverick, Hellfire, Harpoon, etc.

I also think a HUD would have helped immensely, as the FPM would have been at the bottom of the display even tho the pitch attitude was nose high. Being a HUD-a-holic since 1971, I simply loved that display. Being far-sighted, I didn't have to squint to read the steam gauges on a serious instrument approach.

AF 447 was avoidable
 

Airbus is a great NEW technology in the hands of a OLD time pilots, pilots who were not scared of turning the autopilot off very unlike today’s (now everyone can fly) type of pilots who are ok as system/ cockpit managers but not aviators (sky managers) as used to be the case right up until fifteen years ago. The AF 447 tragedy is one proof of the point i’m making. Airline managements /accountants don’t understand this fact and are slowly but surely turning airline flying into a scary proposition. Command rejects from one Airline are finding Captains jobs in smaller budget airlines and are making flying dangerous. The cruise captain concept is flawed too. The un-stallable airplanes are only as good in the hands of well trained pilots with the aptitude for flying not so in the hands of (now everyone can fly) kind of pilots. Like in the old days if you could not handle the throttle and stick effectively nobody would allow you to even look at the left seat. CRM courses have become boring mumbo jumbo and just eyewash. AF 447 was avoidable. Senior pilots of the major airlines (only god can save the smaller operators) have a responsibility in so much as to warn their managements that flying is becoming safer only in theory. Cockpit managers are good until the bells start ringing in the cockpit when only pilots with the aptitude for throttle /stick may save the day.
Many airline managements are counting on the *hope* that tragedies such as these don't happen to them.
:= As we know the word *hope* does not exist in the flight safety manual.

AF 447 was a "Canary in the coal mine"?
 

Hi,

bobdazzle:

Quote:

---

Airline managements /accountants don’t understand this fact and are slowly but surely turning airline flying into a scary proposition.

---

The "WHY" will led to "BECAUSE".

Very early (after recorders read) BEA told plane operated as designed.

The creation of Human Factors study group is emblematic.

Let's hope findings could identify trends many are concerned.

OC

Your position imo is not conflicting. Will comment ASAP on that.

Safety is increasing. Due many reasons. Automation is an important one.

Man-machine interface of F-GZCP
 

Hi,

After analyzing a paper from June 2009 (below) on UAS

I have some questions:

1) Is it dificult to (fast) detect an UAS? Is it important?

2) Is it important to detect? Why?

3) AF447 crew (PF or PM) identified the UAS?

4) If no, this (fast identification) would be important? (safety could be at risk?)


The quoted text comes indeed from an Airbus SAS Engineering "source"?

Link is:

1st segment: http://aviationtroubleshooting.com.br

2nd: /2009/06/af447-unreliable-speed-by-joelle-barthe.html

Please copy and paste both segments in your browser (without space, check this) The "editing tool" (that ALWAYS inserts the link), sometimes change it causing error in the resulting URL.

(It seems there is a glitch here in PPRuNe "editing" tool.)

Will check.

RR, re your post #1234 and your comments, "3) AF447 crew (PF or PM) identified the UAS? , 4) If no, this (fast identification) would be important? (safety could be at risk?) ", if I may, I would like to refer to you my response to Turbine D(Post 1208[/B], where identification and action of a UAS event is discussed from a human factors point of view. I've read the Barthes paper and others on UAS, (the link doesn't seem to work).

259 Avro Yorks were built, an " un-automated" aircraft, hardly dual-controlled. Between 1942 and 1969 a total of 87 " hull losses" were recorded. (I flew 2000+ hours on type. ( No hull losses !))

Aviation HAD to get safer.

Among the airliner stalls, Aero Mexico DC10 -30 lost 11,000ft. on initial climb before continuing. ( The A/P had been set for a rate of climb not possible when heavy and high.)

W. Caribbean MD82 lacked CRM, (the A/P tried to maintain cruising level when de-icing was selected, reducing thrust. The newish F/O was ignored.)

Reading more about China Air B747SP, I see that their Captains are not allowed to let First Officers do T/Os and landings until the Captain has 1000 hour in command on type. To keep the First Officers in practice extra simulator sessions are given to them, monthly. Is this a good idea, and if so is it done in the West, too ?

( My last session in a Link Trainer was arranged so that I did NDB approaches at two different Middle East airfields with similar patterns. Boxes were ticked, even then!)

Interesting article Tommytoyz. Thanks.

Yes Tommytoyz, a good discussion on this under-appreciated fact, thank you.

The question has been raised here before and this is a good contribution to the discussion. Airbus' May 1999 edition of "FAST", (Airbus Technical Digest) discusses this in an article entitled, "Airplane upset recovery: A test pilot's point of view", p.18, elaborating on this caution.

This said, the next question is, what does the simulator do in such circumstances?

Obviously the sim doesn't just quit working so there is the consideration of degree of fidelity and not a question of fidelity itself. The data up to the approach-to-stall is assumed to be accurate.

It has been suggested that while the behaviour is not based upon post-entry-into-the-stall and actual stall data, there remains a certain level of useful replication by extension. The real question is, how much and how useful? The best advice from the AWST article is to train well to recognize and stay out of such extreme circumstances - good advice!, but we have had a number of full-stall accidents over the past seven years or so.

I am (was) a line pilot and am not a test pilot or an engineer so do not wish to tread in these areas without due care, but what seems required for recovery from a full stall in terms of pitch attitude and unstalling the wing from AoA's as seen here does not seem to differ wildly from technical expectations. Discussion?

Quote from JT:

Quote:

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Like PJ2, I hold the view that a bit of sim time for crew exposure to the improbable may (not necessarily will) provide some benefits.

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Going with ‘the only game in town’ reasoning,

Being exposed to entry conditions and the resulting ‘maneuver’ simulation which took 20,000+ feet to negotiate and complete would be inspirational to me…..

It would inspire any pilot to diligently make whatever effort was necessary in the aircraft to avoid ever actually learning the level and extent of simulation fidelity involved.

HN39;

Re, "I gather that AoA in your exercises did not exceed 40 deg enough to silence the stall warning, but did you by any chance observe a rapid drop in IAS between 25 and 40 deg AoA? "

I gathered from the session that it's difficult to simulate the loss of pitot/static information and get the exact same failures/ECAM messages and the method that got closest was failing ADRs and then re-instituting them to some degree. It didn't affect sim behaviour but it does affect available indications. This is a long way of explaining that I can't answer your question with any meaningful information. On one stall we had no warning which was because all ADRs were still failed and on others we had full FPV indications...a bit ad hoc in this area.

I tried to explain, why that would be the case in my post 386 out of own expierience with stalls in fighter and trainer aircraft.

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46625...ml#post6769341

Thank´s all for the very good discussion points of the last few weeks, very open minded and not much noise.

I stumbled on a video from an F4 in an out of control situation ending in a flat spin, where the aerodynamic forces asociated with high AOA are visualized by contrails (all in the first minutes of the video).

Ejection Decision - A second Too Late! (1981) - YouTube