Mssr. Hollandaise:
Please pardon my non-flying ignorance (again), but what is "vario?"

And, was your remark sarcastic, or serious?

Hi,

Vario ....
Variometer - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

ly
 

Organfreak

Howdy. For context, imagine a human being in free fall, terminal velocity is about 120 miles per hour. This aircraft, at 15 thousand feet per minute descent, would pass our skydiver at 60 miles per hour! DOWN. Probably close to the jet's terminal velocity. Compare that picture with the apparent calm on the flight deck. Do you sense a disconnect? With an angle of attack of 40 degrees, the a/c is presenting an enormous amount of drag to the airmass, hence the : "I feel like we have some crazy speed". The noise must have been loud, and of course, unusual.

Even at the more consistent 10 thousand fpm descent, that is 120 mph. Even as a non-pilot, would you be concerned?

So I am expressing some surprise that others don't clamor for some more CVR.
The Flight deck was more animated, and noisy, than BEA would have us believe, No? Yet without a solution, the three pilots patiently await, what? In virtual silence? Nerves of steel? Ice water in the veins. I doubt it. "We are going to crash, this cannot be..." "Four spades? Double".

Eh?

In the A330 the vertical speed indicator is to the right of the altitude tape and counter on the PFD. See for example page 48 of the second interim report. It consists of (1) an analog pointer that points to a vertical speed scale in white on a grey background graduated at intervals of 500 ft/min and (2) if the V/S is greater than 200 ft/min, a digital window showing the V/S in hundreds of feet per minute.

The analog pointer and the digital indication are normally green, but if the V/S is greater than 6000 ft/min they become amber and the pointer stays at the end of the scale.

Vario
 

Vario, short for variometer, is usually used in English AFAIK only in gliding terminology. Our glider varios are sensitive to small changes in vertical velocity. The equivalent instrument in powered aircraft, from small single engine to airliners, is usually called a VSI (again, AFAIK) – Vertical Speed Indicator.

I suspect the same term for both is used in France – vario. If my surmise is correct, we have a translation from French to English of “vario” to “vario”, whereas it would be more usual to translate vario as VSI.

Hope that helps. If I have it wrong, and English usage in airliners is to call it a vario after all, I shall stand corrected (and have learnt something!).

HN39;

Re, "In the A330 the vertical speed indicator is to the right of the altitude tape and counter on the PFD. See for example page 48 of the second interim report. It consists of (1) an analog pointer that points to a vertical speed scale in white on a grey background graduated at intervals of 500 ft/min and (2) if the V/S is greater than 200 ft/min, a digital window showing the V/S in hundreds of feet per minute.

The analog pointer and the digital indication are normally green, but if the V/S is greater than 6000 ft/min they become amber and the pointer stays at the end of the scale. "

The following image may assist:

Pitch: 10deg ND
Altitude passing: 33580
IVSI 20,100fpm

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-Vc8R...Vc8RFmq-XL.jpg

AOA: approx 28-29 degrees (+,- ambient wind, on the FPV)

FPV: barely visible with no trend information associated with it.

KIAS: 187 and increasing, trending to 209.

I would think that picture, itself, would sell a stand alone AOA gage for trend indentification (and possibly an ALT Law PLI, before the fact).

:ok:

OK465;

Re, "FPV: barely visible with no trend information associated with it.

KIAS: 187 and increasing, trending to 209."

For clarification, "209" in ten seconds at that specific moment - the trend arrow is a real-time indication that changes as rapidly as the energy of the aircraft does and that varies with pitch, power and even external forces should there be any. Not saying you're not aware of this, I think you are but just for all who examine this..., caution is advised in concluding too much from a snapshot. As you're likely aware, the FPV is partially below the bottom limit of visibility for all PFD information. The "FLY UP" arrows, advising of a very steep ND pitch, are just coming into view. Clearly the AoA is greater than the FPV can fully display.

Regarding "AoA" indications etc, as a former A330 captain I don't know what to "recommend" anymore in terms of making this better. Clearly we can't just focus on "loss of airspeed" as 'cause' simply because when that's fixed, something else will arise. What would you advise we could learn from Islamabad, or Tripoli? Other than "understand the airplane", "fly the airplane", I truly don't know. And more automation?! Heaven deliver me, but I read that that exact solution is being touted and even planned, and it is SO wrong! I understand that a serious discussion is taking place next week at the RAeS, (The Aircraft Commander in the Twenty-first Century?) on these topics.

The discussion on these nine AF447 threads has been so varied, so rich and so populated with perceptive thinking and suggestions that address the exact problem (how do we solve "loss of airspeed?") and the broader problem of human factors and automation, (I have written on this as well) that I think some 'distance' is needed from solutions to percolate and filter through to practicality, enhancement to safety and to cost including certification, training and so on.

CVR Transcript: FD1 + FD2 Availability
 

Hello,

A

Quote:

---

FPV barely visibe

---

yes, at # 847 above.
but Nr3 Interim Report En CVR transcript (p 89 to 100) points this:

FD 1 and 2 become --------- FD 1 and 2 become ------------ Comment
unavailable at ---------------- Available again at
=========================================================
2:10:08 ------------------------------ 2:10:17 -------------------------HDG & ALT CRZ modes
2:10:21 ------------------------------ 2:10:26 -------------------------HDG & VS modes
2:10:36 ------------------------------ 2:10:42 -------------------------Transitionally available (how ?)
2:10:45 (may be ?) -------------- 2:10:47 -------------------------HDG & VS modes
2:11:40 ------------------------------- 2:12:52 -------------------------HDG & VS modes
2:12:58 ------------------------------- 2:13:57 -------------------------Temporary (that is to say ?)

During more than half the time of the four minutes event, the two FD were not available. A graphic would give an easier visualization.
I have done it, but unfortunatly i don't know how to insert the picture.
Who will again dare to say that the pilots were stupid?

Hi,

Easy way to post a image :)
imgur: the simple image sharer

Scaning
 

Very very serious !
Normaly your eyes come to the variometer :rolleyes: (VSI) (in french variomètre) every two seconds great maximum. Not only to put your eyes on it, but to correct your altitude:rolleyes: and your speed :rolleyes:, that you scan in the same frequency, and as well as your heading :rolleyes:. When you have seen any of these three informations, you come back to look and correct your attitude:rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes: (pitch and roll). You have also to look outside :rolleyes: with your other eyes (!) and to crosscheck the other pilot :rolleyes: in the crew, to look the other instruments:rolleyes:, manage the warnings, cautions, cabincrew:rolleyes:, hijackers:rolleyes:, fire:rolleyes:, doc. etc.

(Following : I had to many smilies for only one post !)

If anything is wrong, you have to say it to the other pilot:=. The two pilots (or three in AF447) are not independant.

In AF447, altitude,:\ attitude :\, heading :\ , vertical speed (vario):\ ... and speeds :\ :\ were wrong, and the CVR shows a crew totally disconnected from these basics .:ugh:

The crew managment in normal flight says that any of the two pilots has two main functions maximum and two subsidiaries functions maximum, under these four functions :
-pilot
-navigation
-radio-com
-mechaniks.

In case the other pilot cannot assume his functions, you have to do the four functions.

We pilots may be masochist ? We like that ! :rolleyes:

This eyes training does the pilot look so attractive !:):):)!! Your friends like to be looked by you really : they are indeed (here I am happy but it is real) ! hum... It was the case before the FBW and his seemingly sleeping on the control ! - (here I am sarcastic) Also the BEA #3 says the A330 cannot stall (p.26 french version) :mad:

jcjeant
Thank you very much.

Here is the picture, and I hope it's correctly resized :confused:

In my sens, ite missa est
@ 02:11:40
disapearence of the FPV (bird),
with FLAG ON (both) CPT & F/O PFD FD ( Interim #2 - Acars).

http://i.imgur.com/CYgs7.png

OF in over his head
 

Thanks to all who answered my ignorant questions so kindly and clearly. What a great forum this is. I've learned so much about flying from you.

Lyman asked me a bunch of questions about what I think/assume, many posts ago. I was going to give him a detailed answer, but by simply being away from the computer for a while, the time has come and gone. Suffice to say, yes, I agree, there must be more to the story than what we have been told. And to your closing remark, "Four spades? Double," I simply say, "Redouble!" :p

flying s
 

NeoFit

Thanks for the graphic, it is instructive. I consider this wreck to have two discrete phases, if not more. There is #1 the uncoupled a/p, manual control, and wild climb, leading to #2: STALL. Once STALLED, the a/c was in completely unknown territory, it was not "flying". It is fodder for endless speculation and dozens of "What ifs". Though these a/c have STALLED, they do so in other than NORMAL LAW, contrary to my friend ruolishollandais's statement that in French, the Report says STALL is impossible. Any a/c will STALL, and most have, with variable results.

One cannot fly this machine without instruments to inform. Not in these conditions. The Pilot Flying had none of his screen recorded. BEA does not go further. Was there anything to record? Did PNF call for Captain to sort a political discussion between the two seated pilots? That's provocative, but Occam would have it that Captain was called to help fly. There was no Captain referee, only Captain in attendance. "I have lost my vario" says Bonin, "Okay" says Captain.

No orders as to authority from Captain DuBois. None that are given us, in any case. So we are left with a narrative that I believe is lacking in data that would put in context what the conclusions are, or certainly at least suggested.

Mistake? BEA inadvertently included only pilot comment that leads to a definition of Pilot Error? Sure, pigs fly.

IR #2 has a description of previous UAS events to contextualize what happened to 447. It is instructive, and to me, estblishes that any UAS is fraught with risk, unaddressed SOP, and quite frankly, ignorance of the dangers by both manufacturer and line.

How do I know this? Because BUSS was not selected, and was "Optional" to the extent that pilot polling helped decide to deselect its presence in the cockpit.

An opinion poll to determine if pilots want to save their asses with a system that addresses a dangerous Condition? Blase? Perhaps, but it is so telling that UAS was not given the sort of attention it required.

Read IR #2 re: UAS. It describes a crapshoot, not a serious problem/address.

The conditions 447 found that night were severe, but not rare. To arrive at safety, risk is mitigated, not ignored.

Organfreak. Howdy, I mostly wanted to reframe the velocities for you. !5k fpm is 180 Miles Per Hour. That means in one minute, half of 447's altitude will be lost, and recovery will not be likely. That is why postSTALL events are not germane, imho. Once in the climb, and probably very quickly, the odds go sour for recovery. CRM is a relatively newly quantified concept, and arguments that say "Well,, PNF needed to...." Fine. However, if the last chance to live depends on politics, not command, well.........

adios.

VSI Scan
 

Well I am a bit ancient I guess, and the VSIs that I remember were not IVSIs.
We had to hawk the pitch attitude very carefully and note any trends on the altimeter, then apply a correction to pitch to hold altitude. There was too much lag in the VSI to use it for altitude maintenance. All I used the VSI for was to verify I had set pitch and power about right for a descent rate or climb rate.
It is interesting to learn that there has been a change in scan patterns as a result of new technology. :cool:

Lyman claimed:
Please cite an authorative source or support your contention with known facts. There have been hundreds of comments in these forums stating that the stall may have been recoverable. Is it just that you enjoy being a maverick? ;)

Hey Organfreak

My comment comes from a point of view. It has to do with a body of facts, data, and evidence, plus the commentary of those here.

The Interim Report #2 discusses a foundation, a reference for the type of problem 447 had, and what others did, as well as the a/c reactions.
There could not be a worse place to lose instruments. There could not be a more lackadaisacal approach to AD, to training, and to command, by SOP and by culture.

From the OUTSET, something was wrong. Here, the evolution of opinion has landed on PE. I don't buy it. Neither pilot by CVR only, had the kind of demeanor one expects in such a situation, and for this I offer "Where is the Captain?". The entire contents of the releaes re: CVR could not have been better written by a soap opera show. Drama, personality, deviations from the expected, etc.

The two pilots were in trouble, and not because they did not get along. Here on thread, the popular drill is to claim discord, and incompetence. NO PROOF of either, merely a parsed verbal record, VERY parsed. What is missing? How about, "Where's the skipper, this bird is effed up, and we need him NOW." People have jumped, no, leapt to conclusions without listening for tone, volume, and idiom. Have you? Are you content with things as they are, without more data? Would your wife and kids be satisfied that you are painted as an incompetent dilettante, without as much as a complete record of events?

Three trained pilots, with a descent unarrested by any, with a mere position change on a stick. What DRAMA?

OPINION, MINE. It isn't for me to write the report. It was one thing when there was no evidence at all. Since recovery, what is available is parsed, limited, and censored. Should I get access to the CVR, I may have to apologize to BEA.

In the meantme, My opinion is not countered by evidence. Is it supported? I suggest it is, merely by noting the lack of evidence provided, when there is no reason to prevent its assessment. What gets no attention, seemimgly, is the utter lack of a case on which to rest Pilot ERROR, in the absence of a complete record. This is not obvious? Each of the actions can be explained, both to condemn and to clear. Is it odd that the context is lacking for any defense?

Not given what is at stake. Especially not now. BEA will never release any data that serves to condemn their actions. That became apparent when they caused to be released a PRESS memo, exonerating any "NEW" mechanical issues, and that language from the Airframe company. Of all the blatant political hand crossing, that was laughable.

In the absence of a complete record, neither of us can claim a conclusion, it is impossible.

be well.

Lyman, to be honest, I don't disagree with much of that. BUT, your claim (the one I quoted in my previous post) is the one I'm asking you to defend. "Odds"? I dunno about that, but I am of the impression that many/most pilots here would have sussed this stall and flown out of it, possibly without even spilling any peanuts. Any others want to jump in here?

Sorry Goose, I got a little carried away.

"ODDS". Hmm....Odds are hard to quantify, but I'll try. Here on thread there have been Bus drivers who claim to have Simmed this ride, and the reason I believe at least some of that is that a fair number admitted they couldn't recover. KNOWING what was happening. Air Caraibes had a potentially deadly zoom, uncommanded. Can you tell me from the evidence 447's climb was not at least partially commanded by the computer? You can't, simply because the evidence is not available. The g up was 1.65 in a 1 g command control, how's that? I know pilots who have experienced anomalous behaviour in this equipment: "It started to turn...we selected HDG/ALT and corrected, but no one could ever say why she behaved that way."

Mind of her OWN? By definition, my friend.

mind how you go.

We can't say
 

Hi,

Organfreak

Quote:

---

I am of the impression that many/most pilots here would have sussed this stall

---

:ok:

:=

Too many variables to take into account (uncertainties)

For them (and for us) :confused:

Hi,

Lyman
Organfreak
In this video ... at time 46 minutes 18 seconds
Pouvait t-on sauver l'avion ? ask the interviewer? ... on ne sais pas répond le chef instructeur pilote d'Airbus ....
Interviewer question:
It was possible to recover the plane?
We don't know answer the chief instructor pilot of Airbus !

We will be able to understand what occured?
 

Hi,

Bear,

Perfectly K.I.S.S.

Even BEA may not have all required info

Finite State Machines could present "surprises"
 

Hi,

Bear:

Quote:

---

but no one could ever say why she behaved that way

---

Even the designers cannot explain all anomalies occurred since the introduction of these advanced planes.

Important information is simply lost. And FDR is not designed for that.

Is it proven that the Quick Access Recorder data cannot be resurrected from its time in the depths? I don't remember the answer anymore.:O

Personal opinion only, since the AP and A/THR dropped at the beginning of the AF447 event, it is extremely unlikely that any control inputs came via that route. Any surprise control inputs would then have to be through the basic ALT2 control structure which appears to have been debugged quite well.
(Although the aircraft must have 10000 times more experience in Normal law than in ALT2 law.)

The aircraft's behavior in pitch was consistent with stick input.

In really does take the cake to accuse BEA of manipulating data while doing so repeatedly oneself. While the aircraft entered alternate law, it seems some here entered alternate reality.

It would appear from NeoFit's chart that FD data became available just in time to be suspect as a cause for the second pull up leading to the stall.
http://i.imgur.com/CYgs7.png

I hold similar views to Mr. Spinkleman's and have discussed this with a prime offender via PM. I would be great if that person adopted the suggestions discussed.

It is now a free speech world, however, and we are all free to step on our lolly as many times as one can stand.:} Credibility? What's that?:ugh::ugh::mad:

scans and safety
 

Hi Maching Bird,

Thank you for your scan instruction. What I have written in my post is the most academic manner to do which is learned for IR in France, on slower and less powered aircrafts that yours !

In all cases scan has to be rapid, effective, used,:rolleyes: and AF447's CVR shows a very different scenario !:sad:

What do you think about learning effective stall with aerobatics to all airline pilots (and not airline too) ?

Computer systems cannot help us to land when we have fire on board, no more electricity, no more system. A pilot must be able to try to do that, and bring the aircraft and the passenger on the ground.

That is only pleasure !:)

Prime factors are what was in the loop after Law change
 

Hi,

Machinbird:

Quote:

---

...it is extremely unlikely that any control inputs came via that route.

---

I agree!

We have to concentrate (first) on "elements" working in the "great loop". This includes PF (receiving "inputs" we don't have) and A/C "mechanisms" (all that had to work).

Other factors, IMO are to be neglected. Including:

Scientific (and serious) approach requires patience and "Stability"
 

Hi,

Hamburt Spinkleman:

We can assume this, i agree.

With some months (years) delay. :)

This happens in high profile cases. :}

As MB said:

Prime factors (to be considered first)
 

Hi,

Machinbird:

:suspect: , i agree.

Redundancy and reliable inputs
 

Hi,

Quote:

---

no more electricity, no more system.

---

With current design this is "almost" impossible.

Smoke can be much worse:

See Dubai flight 6

PF had no chances even to change comm to other ATC. The "element" suddenly inserted in the loop had no vision ahead. We may say: smoke from a cargo fire "broke the loop". :}

You need fresh air to be able to see ahead. This can be done with a hood.

PS

The same (similar) effect that could explain AF447 PF actions. No valid and reliable inputs to him? Almost zero confidence in the inputs (them) received? This may explain what we learned so far.

Perhaps a graphic refresher of what the aircraft was doing around that time may help. Then answer what the FD data may have shown during the period in which the stall was entered and the SW sounded continuously.

I don´t know, whether you consider that as an authorative source.

http://www.pprune.org/7066105-post66.html

It is not enough to look at the ability of the aircraft to be flown out of the stall, but to judge the success of recovery atempts in view of the knowledge of the crew (and not only of this AF crew) and the ability of the aircraft.

What are your reasons for suspecting that the FD causes the second pull up, when the vertical Flight Mode is ALT CRZ, selected altitude is FL350, actual altitude is 37500 ft? I must admit that my understanding of FD commands is very limited, and I'm just assuming it 'mirrors' the commands that would have been given by an active autopilot.

MACH:

IF (big IF), in fact, the FD 'bit' him at any point, I 'spect it's the return at 2:10:47 when the CAS is 216k and aircraft vertical speed is +1500 FPM which is what the FD vertical command would have defaulted to because the FD buttons were still engaged. With the nose already having come down from 10-12 degrees to 5.6 degrees (1500 FPM) this would be a 'relatively' subtle nose up command initially that, if flown, could rapidly go full scale taking him back to the documented 13 degrees after 2:10:51 as airspeed continues to decay.

V/S 1500 would also have been annunciated on the FMA at this time.

The FD would indeed only default to ALT CRZ* if within FMGEC CRZ ALT altitude capture parameters (i.e. 34,976), and the FD would, at the earlier time of 2:10:17, have been in the process of providing a vertical command consistent with leveling off at FMGEC/FCU CRZ ALT. It was only available in this mode for 4 seconds before it dropped out again. By 2:10:47 they were well above FL 350 (default mode is V/S).

Why Persistent NU?
 

Hi,

After saying "i have the controls" PF became (with the tacit concordance of PM and later the CPT, most of time) the "processor" and the "controller". He was put in the loop substituting in a difficult environment important elements, A/P and A/THR.

PF "output" (SS handling) was evidently based on uncertainties (as per NeoFit graph). His "inputs" are unknown to us and he expressed "high speed" suspicion. His "outputs" were not random, and soon showed a definite "bias to climb" the plane. A bias so strong, to put the plane in a steep climb going above REC MAX.

Probably this is not just explained by "lack of training", surprise, etc. Something very important, together the lack of "reliable" inputs may be was feeding his "processor" during important moments, leading (or misleading :} him to do that).

His "output" was not random. There was a pattern. This pattern was about the same during most of critical moments before stalling the plane.

After stalling, the reason could be partly explained by what was put in post #66


RetiredF4::

Quote:

---

It is not enough to look at the ability of the aircraft to be flown out of the stall, but to judge the success of recovery atempts in view of the knowledge of the crew (and not only of this AF crew) and the ability of the aircraft.

---

IMO, in this case is very important is to understand why the plane was put in the stall. Looking to all reasons that lead to this: Crew error(s), System anomalies (it's outputs, processing of UAS data), man-machine interface issues, etc. In order to learn from this crash this is absolutely necessary.

PS

The wreckage orientation in seabed proved later to be the coherent with A/C heading when hitting surface. When you have a "pattern" this normally "carries" important information.

Using that simple description, the reality is that his "inputs" rejected the visual evidence in favour of the cockpit vibration and unusual noise actually being what he "expected" in a high speed situation.

No pilot actually commented on the "noise", and perhaps this created a common acceptance of "over speed". The don't use the spoilers pronouncement could fall into this "thinking".

Accelerated degradation of the "effective aircraft"?
 

Hi,

After worsening conditions: WX then ice crystals, obsolete AS sensors failing simultaneously, "law change", non trained (to this situation) PF applying large SS inputs at high FL, etc. one may ask:

The lack of reliable info during so many time together with non reliable SW and other factors (noise, alarms, etc.) are to promote, GRACEFUL DEGRADATION of the "effective aircraft" (System+PF) or are a recipe for ACCELERATED DEGRADATION? Stressing HF, etc. Actually their fate was sealed VERY FAST.

It seems like exactly when they needed most reliable resources,( e.g. good man-machine interface to allow them to do just the very basic: aviate.) their inputs (mainly the input to PF) were sub standard (lacking, intermittent and perhaps, misleading). This probably will be understood by summer.

PS

mm43:

Quote:

---

his "inputs" rejected the visual evidence in favour of the cockpit vibration and unusual noise actually being what he "expected" in a high speed situation.

---

We have to check carefully the timing.

The attitudes of PM and later CPT are coherent with "lack of enough info.". Like being unable to do any better, despite some moments briefly raising some "not so strong questioning". Seeming (with available info. we have) more doubts than what would be required to act with confidence. :{