Um, no. You missed the key point. The pilot never tried ND input long enough for even the elevator to go past its neutral position. So there never was any real ND input. The elevator moved a little. But it still remained severely NU.

Clandestino, good posting. Regarding, "So, as instrument rated pilot, I don't fly by feeling Gs, I fly by reference to my instruments," I might note that the PF forgot all that and relied, partially, on his feeling of great speed, if I remember the transcript correctly.

Sigh, all this comes back to training bean counters who follow rules and tick off each rule followed as another bean rather than training real pilots to actually fly the plane when the going gets rough.

Ok, fair enough. I suspect there are quite a few people in Paris and Toulouse right now trying to find out when the door to recovery was slammed shut. Unfortunately we have precious little data about what happens when you try to get the nose down in that condition. It appears that there was some response when they tried, so I'm not entirely convinced they were in a locked-in stall...

jcjeant, why not simply ask Ian W what the plane was doing between 02:11:45 and 02:12:00 if it was not dropping its nose despite the PF pulling full NU?

Ian W, look at the third report pages 107 and 108 (English) between 02:11:45 and 02:12:15. Was the nose down anywhere in there, perhaps with a pitch as low as -10 degrees?

Hi Clandestino,
You are presumably referring to pilots using conventional controls (i.e. Direct Law).

AF 447 crew never felt the nose drop as they approached the stall.
The FBW computers would do their best to maintain attitude (when stick free) by the use of full elevator + stab trim. Any attempt to pitch up more (to satisfy a back stick request) would only fail when they had run out of both elevator and stab trim authority.

Then they may have realised the clues in your initial statement - but sadly they did not recognise that they had stalled.
edit. Their brains seem to have filtered out the "stall stall" heard through their ears (in the same way one can filter out unwanted conversation in a noisy room when trying to chat with someone.)
I believe a vibrator / shaker felt through the hand would grab PF's attention better.

I am now a member of the 'Lyman is a fool' club.

- you have NO idea, do you?

- ditto - ditto.

If you have difficulty with the English language, we probably can forgive you. Otherwise please do not waste our time.

Hello

Just quibbling a bit... :rolleyes:
A friend of mine, chopper pilot (ex-military), told me of his IMC trainings without ADI/horizon, and how he (and his colleagues) managed to do some nav/airfield -relatively- complex circuits with "just" heading (and its rate of change), airspeed, altitude&V/S and, of course, a chronometer. It was hard, yes, but they just did it.
I do agree, however, that attitude is the #1 parameter, and on everything else about instrument flying you wrote in the quoted post. :ok:

/quibble & old memories :=


@ Lyman:
I'm sorry, I don't understand why you keep saying that the g-demand law was confusing for the pilot or that the pilot somehow "believed" he was in Normal Law.
- Normal Law is a g-demand law too. In other words, there should be no significant difference in handling/aircraft response on the pitch axis ; the differences are the protections, and the fine gain tuning.
- Alternate Law was announced. Yes, it was the PNF who said that. Why? Because it's his job as PNF!
"PROT LOST." If after that the PF still believes he's in Normal Law......
I strongly disagree on the "flaw" you promote regarding the g-demand law. As I'm not sure that everyone here understand what is a g-demand law, let's try to KISS:
Basically, a g-demand flight law is when, for a given position of the stick, the aircraft delivers the same amount of g regardless of the speed, altitude, pressure... etc.

I'm waiting to see how you can write that. Have you made calculations/simulations? Stall recovery technique was never to pull-up. Not on FBW planes. Not on conventionnal planes. Not on gliders.

I see your point. I do agree that a conventionnal aircraft would have performed differently. If the A330 had had the autotrim-up-movement-inhibition-when-stall-warning-is-ON we discussed above, it would also have performed differently (and better).
But I don't agree with your conclusion, which is -if I understood correctly- that g-demand FBW should be discarted. Because if you discart this, you loose far more than you win.
One has to know its tool. And once again: if stalled, push, don't pull. Whatever you're flying, it will always be the correct input (that's, by the way, what the "new" "all-around" procedure by FAA-AESA&Boeing-Airbus says).

:confused: May I ask how you would stall voluntary an aircraft, then??

No nose plummet indeed, partly or totally due to the THS position.
But that wasn't the "only true symptom of actual STALL". I'm sure you have heard about buffeting? And read about actual buffeting in AF447, per the DFDR data analysis?

Honestly, it's becoming annoying to have the impression that you select/distord facts in order to fit them in a theory. Apologies if it's not what you're seeking, but that's the impression it gaves (me).
To criticize every possible bit of the aircraft/features, and remove every possible bit of the crew responsability won't help prevent future accidents, you know... ;)


She was not what? Not stalled? :eek:
How would you describe it, then?

AZR thanks. Besides the NOSE not dropping, you mention Buffet. I think it is quite possible that "What was that" (perPF) may have been an exclamation re: BUFFET, not the STALLSTALL. If it was, PF is shy two major clues as to assiete.

Re: "PULL UP" and recover? The a/c I believe would drop the nose at STALL with full elevator, pending cg accurate point. IOW, in spite of PF's PULL, not as a result of, sorry. With FULLNU THS, she won't.....

The fact remains, there was not a conventional entry, and a non-conventional recovery would have worked. I believe it almost did, save for the THS planted FULLNU. Who is to say, that at 4 degrees AoA, just because the STALL warn returns, there isn't a full on recovery in process?

The secret is to exchange vertical for horizontal velocity, and a dive is not required, (Standard recovery from STALL). A dive makes things impossible.
"Fly Through with POWER"....AIRBUS)

Power would have overcome the descent, soon, and without a 20k loss in altitude. So instead of FULLUP, if the PF had maintained back stick at that 4 AoA, (but wait, HOW does he KNOW what stick to keep? :ugh:) allowed the engines to power the a/c "through" the ballistic portion of the event, (IT'S in the BOOK), recovery is attained. And, in the traces the PF is shown to be applying his training re: STALLSTALL, and it is "working"; he pulls too hard instead of maintaining only, AND the THS keeps the a/c from recovering.

Apologies for the disjointed writing, had strokes last year.

Oh, and "NOT STALLED". I left out the pinc , majrks, Of course, a Stall, but "What a pilot believes is reality," not STALL/ sorry

In a broad sense, one can say that this airframe flew like a little jewel for these pilots. Better than a little fighter, even.

What did her in I think is the engineers who harpooned her in the ass with that THS.

Hi etudiant
About Alter's last BSPN, there is a more simple "credibility test" one can do:
Alter writes that the events (loss of speeds & other associated alarms) "conduit les pilotes à perdre le contrôle de l'appareil (alors même qu'ils effectuaient scrupuleusement la seule procédure que le constructeur leur imposait de faire en pareil cas)"
[my translation] the events "led the pilots to lose control of the aircraft (even though they were following scrupulously the only procedure that the manufacturer required them to do in such cases)"
=> Really? Let's remind that this very procedure called for (memory items):
- announcement "IAS douteuse" (Unreliable Air Speed) by the Cpt
- AP, A/THR & FD OFF
- 5° pitch up
- AND CLB power
=> wheras AF447's crew:
- didn't make the announcement nor called for the associated procedure (QRH)
- didn't select FDs OFF (AP & A/THR were automatically shut off by the speed indications loss)
- took pitch up to ~11° (i.e. more than twice what was required in the procedure)
- didn't adjust thrust until much later.

Scrupulous application? Huh? :rolleyes:
So much for ALTER's credibility... :ugh:

AZR Also, (forgetful) I am not meaning the 'g' demand LAW, but 'g' PROTECTION as the problem.

It is assumed there will be emphatice accelerations in recovery. The elevators obey the g prot, and just when we think we are recovered, oh oh, some up elevators......damn. The recovery was not botched by the pilot alone, eh?

Where did you find those 4° AoA? During the whole stall, the AoA remained above 30°...

No. No. Definitely no.
When stalled, diving is required, unless you got enough power (thrust) to counteract your aircraft weight and drag @ high AoA, which is NOT the case of any airliner.
The standart recovery from stall is to dive, to trade altitude (which must be a secondary concern, then) to a lesser (and flyable) AoA.

Unfortunately, when pilots believe something that is not really reality, eventually planes crash...
"situation awareness" ; rings any bell?


Argh. :ooh: Once again, the purpose of the 'g' PROTECTION is to protect the aircraft structural integrity. Unless you imply that structural failures (like: loosing a wing or two, in the worst cases) are better... :{

Bearfoil:

Sans wing lift, I presume you believe the thrust of the two engines is somehow going to haul the 200 tons this aircraft weighs up in to the sky? OK, so even if we assume that the wings are still producing some lift (say 75%), that still leaves 50 tons...

Once in the stall, the only valid recovery is to reduce AoA and regain wing lift. Pegging the throttles to the end-stops is only going to induce more NU, which is the opposite of what was needed.

The harpooning was done by the PF in the first 30 seconds - pitch up, climb, loose all the necessary energy to FLY. What happened after that was futile, since the single most important issue was wing-lift... it was gone.

PF demanded NU, the aircraft continued to deliver, the THS was 'requested' to help out with this NU demand. I do not subscribe to any other way of explaining what happened. Without the pilot NU input, there is no THS NU.

Where do you see any evidence to support this? The THS was not 'planted' NU until pretty late in the game, certainly way past the point the aircraft stopped flying and went ballistic.

There are two great mysteries in this thread:

1. WTF the PF thought was happening and why he did what he did
2. WTF people continue to reply to bearfoil/Lyman/whatever as if he/she is trying to engage in a meaningful dialogue rather than just trolling

Not sure which is the more inexplicable. :bored:

We might. Highly loaded, extremely efficient, high Mach no limited wing goes over 45° AoA - and it doesn't spin in the process!! This could even be below-garden-variety stall.

Contingent on final analysis, we might call it FCIMDS: flight controls induced and maintained deep stall.

Engine power is meaningless, if not compared to weight. It also falls off with altitude.

If we only could make this solipsism true, we'd get rid of the CFIT once and for all.

Like having all instrument except speed working reliably? Forget it - it's already patented.

No SAS on FBW Airbuses.

It was considered probable. Your statement is not true. Airbus can operate with simultaneous (long) erratic data coming from redundant sensors. It will operate in degraded mode, though but aeroplane will be certainly able of making it to stop on the runway in one piece.

Bingo. So attitude. So altitude. So heading.

Sure there are but only one is correct: smooth and precise. 5° might be 4° to 6° but never 12°.

So we agreed that your question "what do you do when feeling G" was irrelevant in context of instrument flying? That those who fly be feel when robbed of external visual reference more often succumb to illusions than not?

No sir, I'm not even close to perfection but my striving to achieve it keeps me within tolerances required to stay within the bounds of controlled flight.

And that is exactly why not everyone can be a pilot. Anyone can do my job when everything is going just fine. I was selected, trained and paid to quickly and correctly identify and perform the correct thing to do when things go pear shaped quickly and unexpectedly. BTW, if you fumble with QRH and reach 5° AoA in level flight you will be at so low mach, you'll get no stall warning at 5°. That is provided your stall warning system has valid mach input to adjust its warning threshold. If not - remember that stall warning is not stall itself. Yet.

We don't call it magic sir. We call it "aerodynamics" and "performance". I admit it must look magic to someone unfamiliar with either, just as instant light at flick of the switch would look magical to medieval man.

Thank you for your kind compliments, sir. I'll certainly let my effohs know how lucky you consider them to be. I wish you all the best for your graduation.

Correct, it's called partial panel flying, I did id too during my training and IMHO loss of horizon was the most difficult to handle of all partial panels. Good thing nowadays I have four independent horizon references in front of me. Head-up Guidance System, if you wonder what is fourth.

@ HeavyMetallist:
1st mystery is to last long I'm afraid.
Clues for the second are:
- it may be fun (if kept short ; when it becomes too lenghty... BOAC perhaps has some spare application forms?) ;)
- more seriously, it's healthy to challenge alternate theories, in the hope that "uneducated" (no harm intended) readers don't take them for "real-because-no-one-said-otherwise". At last I hope so...

@ Clandestino:
"IMHO loss of horizon was the most difficult to handle of all partial panels"
I don't doubt it for a second :)

Garage

"SANS WINGLIFT"? Pardonnez MOI? Something has stabilized her rapid descent at 100 knots...... DRAG, then, not lift. As you will.

The approved and trained recovery from STALL warning was working, it shows that in the traces. All that was necessary was to tweak it. TOGA, check. Maintain PITCH, oops. Find 4 degrees AoA (She did), keep the Power up, and wait. That is for 1000AGL, don't you think with seven miles of sky beneath her, it would be even easier?

She did not "Break", evidently? Mush? Whatever, she flew brilliantly. If, at the STALLSTALL each time, the PF had simply maintained the current AoA, and not PULLED FULL, who's to say? And that is with a dancefloor sized plank in back and an aft cg.

clandestino POWER is meaningless? It is what you got, and it better mean sumpin' "What a Pilot believes is his reality" You doubt that? It is the raison d'etre IMC, non?

180,000 pounds of thrust is not two hairdryers in miladies dainty fingertips. It is the reason twins can fly where they do, with great confidence. It is also the way to save the bacon, and that isn't me, that is AIRBUS talking.

PF had the skills, he did not have the confidence, nor the training to be patient; The unacceptable part of this deal is the lack of preparation on the part of the crew (not their issue), and the fear used as a backstop for engineers to look clever, and beancounters to buy the new Bimmer.

She flew brilliantly, right to the end. 4000 feet? I would not put it past a crack crew and less than moronic design of THS and g for gd PROTECTION.

UA means emphatic accelerations; to be expected. Not the time for clever people to protect the airframe from crinkled skin via g "Protection".

IMO

AF447 investigation

Watch the short video and inwardly digest.

2 x P1::2 x P2
 

Apropo nothing other than a feeling of general uneasiness regarding operational standards . . .

Years ago I was the only F/O on a series of extended-endurance supply runs (on L-188), rostered with two Capts and a very young me. We rotated on route. I can still recall my complete awe at being dumped in the skippers seat on first crew-change ex-dept on the first trip. The wonderment, the confusion, the uncertainty as to who was in command. (He, the 2IC minor-god in the F/O's seat was that, of course, but it wasn't spelled out), and, it being after a hasty line training period, the daze I felt myself in, and my eventual engagement for that bit of the trip with the flight engineer (yup) on the details and ramifications of the 7 prop-stops used on that type. But no empathy for the aircraft, or the task.

I can relate too well with the so-low time P2 (P3?) in the F/O's seat. The grip on the stick would have been . . .

With an enquiry in place I think I had better stop here, other than to say that, with 2 skippers, the situation we have tried to deconstruct here for so many months, and which those in AF447 had just 3-odd minutes to resolve, would most likely have been handled otherwise with just one high-time driver at hand, and that in the end I suspect this will be another result similar to the ANZ Antarctic prang, which fundamentally resolved to management disassociation from operational considerations.

<i>(minor typo corrections)(/i>

Heavy Metallist. Like the Iceman says, "You are dangerous".

You think my commentary is what, Inexplicable? To you, I am sad to say, it no doubt is.

If one never challenges the status quo, one cannot complain when it kills.

I, for one, am not here to look good, sound clever, and impress the wife. Those people end up dead and gone, with thousands of passengers still clinging hopefully to your short coattails.

That last is how one keeps one's skill at the necessary level.
Fair enough point. The question remains open as to how often sims are used to train and reinforce good habits rather than check off a certain laundry list of mundane tasks. (Don't know enough, but from the comments here from a few airline professionals, I wonder).
That is a most excellent link, with well chosen excerpts about upsets and pilot reactions. Many thanks.
Unless one is on partial panel scan, of course. :ok: (Per your earlier post ...) Performance as cross check for attitude ... which takes us to ...
The smooth takes practice, IMO.
If I might add (for our non pilot readers) the pilot will often feel G's. It takes dedicated effort to ignore that and fly by what your instruments tell you.
:ok:
Not so. If you aren't intent on climbing, 10-15 degrees nose up is not a reasonable pitch attitude, particularly for a rapid descent. If you want a rapid descent, you would in a reasonable flight regime have your pitch attitude below the horizon.
Could be, but we'll never know.

Back to Davies "when given the choice between stall and something else, try something else." What gets me in the gut is that the PF never seems to have acknowledged the fact of stall being his in-flight condition. :(
I dont' quite agree. Caveat: I used to teach primary flight training in the Navy a few years ago. (For certain definitions of "few." :}). The US Air Force has a similar approach.

Fairly early in the training syllabus, in flight, you teach the simple stall, which is a gentle maneuver. You trim the aircraft, stall it wings level, note that you are falling, then lower the nose to reduce AoA to unstall it (and of course add power to resume airspeed and altitude.)

A few flights later, the spin is taught. You raise the nose up quite a bit higher, and at stall (you get a bit of buffet or a rudder shaker) you kick in full rudder to induce a three dimensional upset. You depart in the direction of the rudder. Your nose is down as you fall. You end up recovering in the T-34C (as we did in the T-28B/C in the era when dirt was recent) by applying full opposite rudder, and stick forward of neutral. (Well, slightly forward is the correct technique).

But this is taught VFR.

Spins on instruments (me under the bag, the flight must be in VFR so that the check pilot isn't in actual IFR doing spins) isn't something I was exposed to until I was trying to get my special instrument rating. That was about 2000 hours into my flying career.

But my point is that the idea of lowering nose to get out of a stall is taught early on. (If I am not mistaken, this is likewise taught in Cessna's in civil aviation, but maybe there are subtle differences I am not aware of).

The "experienced pilot" bit you suggest seems to me an "in IMC" limited condition. So while I agree somewhat on your point there, I disagree that it is only experienced pilots who will lower the nose to overcome falling in a stall. Any pilot would do that, if he or she recognized being in a stall.

What is critical IMO here is that with Airspeed on the fritz, the typical cross check on performance information (as AoA isn't available in the c/p) was missing. Why he'd not believe he was stalled when nose was up and VSI was high descent and altitude was clicking off is another point, but typical upset/out of control flight remedy procedures will include checking your airspeed to see if you are stalled or not (or at an unsuitable airspeed). So, even if he'd had some training on stalls, his cross check of performance would have been frustrated early in the event since early on, he didn't have airspeed as a valid cross check ... and he knew that. He knew it so well that even as airspeed (in retrospect) seems to have returned to utility, he would not or could not or did not check it so ascertain his in flight condition ... other than falling nose-high. <= That condition didn't trigger the correct response from three different pilots.

And I'll wager that that condition isn't part of typical sim training, or at least wasn't.

Lonewolf. Of all people, I would hope you could pause once in a while before making a quick conclusion.

The "Assiette" (That is a brilliant word, so much more descriptive than "Attitude"). Is REASONABLE. By that is meant, it isn't spun, tumbling, or disintegrating. Reasonable in the sense it can be recovered.
We were talking UA, so from there, her assiette is 'reasonable'. That is what I meant, it is not what you think I meant.

I so wish we could avoid the quick conclusion, the short synopsis of ab initio, and interminous example. (This is a broad whine, and not intended for Lonewolf, a man of great patience, and surpassing skill.)

:)

Just a nitpick about "Airbus SAS"....
Airbus is a SAS, which stands for "Société par Actions Simplifiée" and refers to a "société anonyme with special statutes" according to French commercial law (I'm no expert in commercial law, and had to look up he term in Wikipedia).
I would say "Airbus SAS" is the common way of referring to the company, when trying to avoid confusion with the aircraft 'as such'.

Bear, in that case, if that's where you were headed, I'd recommend that you consider using the term "Recoverable" rather than "reasonable" as it's

more precise / less general / less ambiguous,
and
more "air minded"

as a descriptive term. :)

Thank you for spelling that out.

Insofar as opinion goes ...
In French, perhaps.

In English, attitude for aircraft relative orientation to various axes is concise and descriptive, as well as standard professional jargon.

It's meaning is clear.

Beyond that modest lexiconography, the distinction between Angle of Attack and Attitude is a necessary one, hence two terms for those two different frames of reference: on relative to the airmass, one relative to a (Cartesian?) coordinate system. (It seems in the past few threads, sometimes Assiette is interpreted as AoA and sometimes Attitude ... but that may just be the usual "lost in translation" issue).

Thanks Lonewolf. Recoverable is good.

"UNUSUAL"..............even better? Or too generic?

Did you leave out the "wings level" in Spin recovery? Did you teach the next thing? Full Rudder, Opposite Roll? I have a point re.

Bear:

Stall recovery, as practiced, was a wings level training maneuver from start to finish.

Approach turn stall recovery included reduce AoA and level the wings, followed by power (with minimal delay) followed by climb.

Spin recovery was taught as an ailerons neutral maneuver from start to the end of rotation. You then level wings and return the nose to the horizon, wings level, with caution to Avoid Rolling Pull Out!
While the spin is in progress, we did not teach the use of ailerons to recover from the spin: they should be 'neutral' in those two models of aircraft.

In others, perhaps not. (IIRC, the T-2 was also a stick 'neutral' spin recovery, but I'll defer to those who know on other aircraft models).

NOTE: If you turned with aileron during spin entry, you could enter a spiral rather than a spin. They look pretty similar (though you don't get the clean stall break at entry) with a nose low and rotation about lateral axis.
In a spiral you aren't stalled, thus anti-spin inputs won't recover from a spiral. There are a few dead bodies that attest to same :( ... which takes us back to the utility of the AoA gauge.

Sorry for the digression. The above doesn't apply to the AF447, swept wing stall. That aircraft accomplished a lazy turn to the right during the stall, but was not in a spin. Ailerons remained at least somewhat effective (early on?) as well as rudder (see the Captian's directions to PF), and it seems from the released info, so too did pitch control.

A few threads back, someone described the stall as "mushy." There does not seem to have been the clean break at stall that I was familiar with in small aircraft.

Could the aircraft have recovered from the stall by itself. Most jets if not in a spin will recover from a stall hands off,given enough altitude.
Is it possible for the A330 to recover from this particular stalled state?.I do not know.

Yes, mushy. I see it that way, and said so. So did others.

My point in bringing up Ailerons/Spoilers is this:

Roll control was evident, patent, even. She impacted with a rotation to the right of some not emphatic value. Her Flight Path was generally to the Right, but may have some number of completed rotations in the generalized right rotation.

I see, then, not just a ROLL PIO, but a sustained impetus for the PIO. A PIO generally won't stabilize at some value, and continue into eternity. PF was bouncing back off some chronic rotation to the right, that included a wing drop, likely. What do you think?

Did she complete a rotation to the right? several? Because that is yet an additional complication, and suggests more than just a heading distraction? I dare not go further, for fear of appearing foolish.

'Approach Turn Recovery' should that not also include a Rudder correction for the crab that remains?

Thanks again for your patience, and your professionalism.

I think if you re-read my post, you will note I qualify 'sans winglift'. Ah, but you have "selective reading disorder" - don't you?

Nope. Not the slightest.

a) Engine power output is reduced at altitude... something to do with 'thinner' air... see (b).

b) Air pressure, and consequently the lift--coefficient (if you like) of the air is very different - the air is "thin", yes, that would be the word in liquid terms I think. Hence you need to be going a lot faster to get the same number of molecules over the wing surface - else you plummet to the ground. Splat. (Or Ocean. Splash.)

So, what might work at 1000AGL really won't work at 7 miles up.

Physics and all that.

Garage

Yes, definitely, thin air, less power, and that. However, she was recoverable, and had (initially) 30k feet to do so. Plenty of room to recover. Stalling on Approach is conducted in thicker air? Not Always.

Like you say, a consideration though. Mostly my point is this. At low level, maintenance of Altitude is critical, not so at the levels. The method of Recovery is up to the Pilot. Airbus and others think maintaining altitude is more important than losing it, when LOW. It is opined that PF implemented a standard low level procedure to recover from the STALLSTALL.

I say, so what? and Why Not? Like he is deficient for doing as trained, but neglecting his location? To support that, I am saying that had he tried to recover the (proper way), which was not even trained, He would have been deeper in the soup!!

I appreciate your presence, I think I am better understanding your pov.

Reciprocity?

Bear, based on the info available from BEA, which they look to have gotten from the heading trace from the FDR, there was no "rotation" but a gradual heading change of about 270 degrees (roughly) to the right. (In three or four minutes, to turn that many degrees I'll describe as "a gentle turn to the right" as an outcome (turn rate) but given the PIO early on in the upset, maybe that description is false).

Takata and a few others posted the picture a couple of threads back based on the BEA data/reconstruction.

As to PIO in roll:

It appears that the PF was able to eventually get a grip on that after his initial trouble in the roll channel. (Provisional verdict: the A330 is pretty stable in roll even at that AoA). I don't think I am the first to consider that his initial difficulty in controlling his roll once in "Alt 2, here, you have it," may have contributed to a scan breakdown regarding pitch.
We can't read minds, no less read minds from over two years ago, but JD-EE has raised (in the other thread, I think) the suggestion that in the back of his mind, he was worried about descending down into the goo he was flying in. We'll never know.

Insofar as
We taught a balanced flight recovery, meaning center the ball as you fly. The approach turn stall was entered in balanced flight. We had another maneuver we taught, a skidded turn stall, that was a similar maneuver with the ball out, which tended to depart from controlled flight dramatically. (Not uncommon to roll over during the course of it). It was, of course, practiced at altitude.

Rudder was necessary to keep ball centered, particularly as in the prop plane adding power typically yaws the aircraft and must be countered with Rudder. (Heh, one of the first Approach Turn Stalls I ever did in a T-28B as a student, I torque rolled due to not stepping with elan upon the rudder as power was added. Got me an earful, and rightly so).

Did so many of them, I guess that for me it sort of goes without saying. :cool: (Again, this practice maneuver was practiced in VFR conditions).

In Re Garage Years point on thin air:

Both control authority and dampening would be attenuated in thin air, hence the potential to over control.

The content, but also the civil technical discourse is what makes this a Forum of Professionals, and it is a pleasure to notice on this thread or others, the many members that hold steadily to that with no exceptions, like yourself.

That being said, it can be mentioned also the danger of crossing that discourse boundaries into demeaning and personal attack remarks. It may be tempting as an easy and satisfying relief at moments of frustration, but brings without exception a flavor of mud wrestling arena, tarnishing the image of Professionalism that many here I believe hold dear.

It's just a personal opinion, which happens to be also a paraphrasing of the definition and some of the rules of this Forum.

I have become rather lost in all this again :\ Have their been any recommendations or directives yet ? Also, has anyone on this forum actually experienced a high altitude stall in a heavy ? As a nervous passenger it would be reassuring if max height was trimmed by a few thousand feet if convective storms stood in the way, weather radar or not.

airtren You are a man of great discretion, and consummate understanding. Ordinarily, I loathe being "defended", so I'll not take it that way, and your essay on the professionalism is exquisite. Ad hominem is for the schoolyard.

You should read some of my PMs!

Lonewolf, I am not given to gush, but credit where due. The A330 is obviously forgiving, and extremely well behaved. None of the procuring single causes was sufficient to spin or tumble her, not even taken as an aggregate. She appears to have remained ready to recover, should the suss and system provide, unto impact.

And that with all the undiscovered flaws and glitches no one anticipated!

I cannot merge the rotation with only 270 degrees off heading. It was perceptible via BEA, though not with an attached rate, so I'll just accept it, you are probably correct.

I take JD-EE's comment re: 'fear of descent' with a great deal of salt, I assume she meant it that way? Making mistakes does not mean one is also a coward. Nothing suggests such a thing.

That remark is so disgusting, that it merits being immortalized as one of Lieman/bearfoil's gems.....

Being scared to death (and rightly so this time, no 'pun' intended) makes one a "coward"? Making mistakes is often a result.

Again with the putdown without asking the complete meaning. Patience?

Bravery is not the lack of Fear, It is action in the face of it.

JD portrayed an unwillingness to descend because the pilot had a trepidation of "descending into the Storm" That is a suggestion of cowardice. If I read that wrong, I will accept a correction. I will not start calling names out when too sure of something that is obviously not well understood.

Principles, not Personalities. One is looking for reasons to vent?

Vent at Airbus, or the front office. Or those before you who wanted to get that autotrim in, without entertaining the possible results. Who will own that?

One is entitled to one's fears. One is NOT entitled to PANIC. Nor is one entitled to endanger others due his/her fears. Wait, I read "being scared to death" as Panic, is that your meaning? Because that is not acceptable, period.

Chris, are you a pilot? Do you know the Code?

Hi AlphaZulu Romeo,
My impression is that ALTER is a publication by a somewhat marginal union of the type that are widespread in France, (perhaps because management is so often pigheaded).
I interpreted their comment as referring to the procedure to follow in case of a stall warning ( rather than the UAS procedures, which the crew clearly did not follow, perhaps because they got sidetracked by the stall), which afaik was TOGA thrust and small pull up. While I believe the procedure has now been changed, it did seems really blatantly inappropriate just on reading it, the kind of procedure that may mostly work and kill you the rest of the time.
I'm still trying to verify the claim of an actual high altitude stall flight test of an A330.
To do this w/o a recovery chute, using a 100++ million dollar airplane just boggles my mind. On the other hand, it sounds very French, they will try insane things and often pull them off.

bear/ChristiaanJ:

I don't think cowardice or even fear enters into it. I think training, experience, and how one is rewarded for one's actions play into this idea, even if the idea is a guess, or even if it is wrong.

Given
that the pilots in the cockpit had briefed with the Captain about the rough Wx ahead
Given
that they had made a course alteration (~12 degrees) to avoid rough(er)weather
Given
the crew had discussed that a planned climb could not be achieved with parameters (temp) as forecast and originally planned for
Given
this is the ITCZ with significant vertical development in the weather
Given
The crew also discussed the turbulence, and expected more, possible more robust turbulence in the next period of time based on their latest radar scans (of whatever quality, good or medium or poor)
and
Given
Pilots are trained to not fly in the upper two thirds of a thunderstorm (and if what they saw wasn't a thunderstorm, it was certainly non trivial convective activity, which you might usually treat with caution similar to CB's when you carry passengers for a living)

THEN

the pilots could be of a mind to NOT descend into the turbulent air (good thinking, on the face of it) though that does not require that one climb.

JD-EE guess is founded on the idea that concern about meterological factors was near to the front of the PF's thoughts as he worked through the "Hi, I am ALT 2 Law, latched, you have the controls" flying problem. This might be considered a compatmentalization issue, and be a productive line of inquiry for pilot community consideration and lessons learned. Trouble is, there isn't all that much evidence to support this train of thought.

As before: the pitch and power chorus, and the "maintain straight and level as one troubleshoots the UAS problem" chorus, are right.

Had those issues been his sole priorities, we'd not be having this discussion. Not a matter of fear, perhaps a matter of ordering the problems to be solved in the time available. (Won't digress into how the PNF can help with all this, it's his skin too ...)

That said, weather is always a factor in flight, and bad weather moreso. The worse weather gets, the more of one's concern and attention one tends to give to it.

At least, that is my experience.

Nothing to do with scared, coward, brave, none of that.

Typical pilot concern for the weather, and in this case, bad weather.

Reread JD-EE: Clearly the 'pilot didn't want to descend in to the weather' because of his trepidation "Rolling around in his poor head". I take issue with the inference re: a pilot who cannot defend. I do not take issue with the right of JD to make her comment, nor do I seek to demean her, or otherwise insult.

The issue is gratuitous personal attack. Nothing to be gained.