Pitot Upgrade
 

I remember a post very early on here that the mechs at destination had received ACARS report of faulty airspeed on 447, and moved that plane to the front of the queue for getting the new pitot probes.

I don't think it's about the technical difficulty. The BEA isn't a press agency, its missions don't include, AFAIK, to release ASAP all gathered data.
They have (and will) release intermediate & final reports when those are finished/ready/approved.

Recovered Engine Observations
 

lomapaseo,

Thanks for the good photo of the engine.

Bear,
IMO, what you are observing is not sheared fan blades. The entire fan blade rotor including the disc is gone. What you see are remnants of either booster vanes or blades, but, I can't tell for sure which from the angle of the engine. There is quite an axial distance between the fan rotor and the fan frame. The space between is taken up by 5 stages of booster vanes with 4 stages of booster blades between each stage of vanes. This package of airfoils is sometimes referred to as an LP compressor. It is really hard to say what the N1 speed might have been from this photo, will have to wait for the FDR information to exactly know. If I would hazard a guess, I would say the engine was running (rotors rotating) at impact.

The 12 o'clock position is at the rectangular box-like structure just to the right of depression. The rectangular box structure is integrally cast as part of the one piece fan frame hub. To this an engine mount yoke is attached. You will note in the photo below this a flat platform. The platform attaches to a landing area integrally cast as part of the fan frame. This is a complex mounting system which contains a triple redundancy failure system. Vertically loading is transmitted by 4 bolt between the pylon and then to the mount yoke. In the mount yoke the vertical loads are carried down links on both sides to clevises on the fan frame. You can see one of the clevises in the photo, the broken link is visible and perhaps tells a story. It is both bent down and rearward besides being fractured. By the way, the pylon attachment point is to the horizontal platform.

The rear engine mount has a linkage yoke which contains two short pivoting links on one end that that is joined by pins to accommodate thermal expansion between the mount and frame while the link on the other end directly connects to the turbine frame integrally cast clevis. This then connects to the rear pylon strut bulkhead by means of an upper mount fitting and linkage that accommodates differential thermal expansion of the engine relative to the pylon. In looking at the photo, this detail was all crushed by the vertical impact and appears to be gone, stayed with the pylon?

The "crinkled vanes" should be the stage 5 turbine blade rotor. The turbine rear frame serves as an aerodynamic stator and the LPT module is referred to as a "5 1/2 stage module". The LPT casing is a 360° machined forging made in two sections. The forward section is of a higher temperature capable material welded to the aft section made from the same alloy as the turbine rear frame one piece casting. It is a strong design and should be capable of retaining multiple blade failure from exiting the casing walls. I can't tell what the "crinkling" means as the down (180°) section of the aft end of LPT can't be seen to know if it has been crushed from the vertical forces.

As a matter of interest, these engines are produced (assembled) in the US as well as in France at a SNECMA plant, shared or co-production.

Correction:

Bear, your observation concerning the existance of fan blades is correct. The video in a subsequent posting shows the front of the engine, even the spinner cone on this engine is present. It is the least damaged engine of the two. In the video you will see the second engine pulled up, it has the fan rotor completely missing.

TD

AZR & others
 

Let's not overlook the fact that various interested parties, especially Airbus, will be provided with a copy of the FDR data very quickly.

In the past, if Airbus finds an aircraft-related issue needing operator action or warning, it issues a notice to all operators within days.

This is not intended to guess or replace the official BEA conclusions.

@ Graybeard in re distance and decision points: thanks for the insight on timelines and timeliness.

If the radar is manipulable by the aircrew, and there are two pilots in a cockpit, and aircrew is familiar with the equipment and its function, I am not sure that the automated version is a requirment. I realize this is a partly philosophical argument, and partly fiscal, since you note that companies are loath to upgrade (cost!) without a compelling reason.

To expand my thought into CRM, if the crew is aware of weather forecast before takeoff, and conditions en route, and get occasional to frequent updates on weather as flights progress, then where there is the sort of weather that Wx radar is built for analyzing, the crew prioritizes that function (figuring out how nasty that Wx up ahead really is) in its tasks en route. One pilot flying/monitoring performance compared to planned and expected, the other "I am on radar" monkeying with the radar to coax the best performance out of it that he can.

Seems to me well within the remit of multi place aircraft crew task loading.

What am I missing? Is the auto feature more useful in terminal area evolutions (departure/arrival) or is it intended for more robust capability en route?

would they be expected to communicate with other planes flying the same route re weather up ahead?

Recorders
 

I for one would like to congratulate Honeywell for manufacturing such strong recorders. This certainly will be a boost to the company's name and reputation.

Lonewolf50;

Re "automated" radar...let me dream off-topic a moment. I am thinking about the usual moisture-driven images but married with real-time satellite returns which provide pilot-selectable three-dimensional images and which place one's aircraft in-situ, in-scale, real-time, with the weather one is navigating a path through/around. Such radar would find shear conditions and provide sufficient filtering for crew awareness without overloading them with possibly-available data but which somewhat-to-largely irrelevant to safe flight around the kind of weather seen here. The quality of the data must be extremely high [reliable] but presented graphically and simply so quick decision making about pathways that are, say, ten miles ahead, (just over one minute of flight) and within the turn-rate capability of between 1 & 2 deg/sec. Such capability avoids the threats-to-flight of signal attenuation, (blocking of returns by closer build-ups).

As with RVSM and lower RNP capabilities and such technology's effects upon altitude availablity in increasingly density-challenged airspace, such technologies might tempt tighter fine-tuning of clearances when negotiating giant squall lines, but all this is dreamland stuff. But is "To Filter or Not to Filter", automation's question? I much prefer manual control so I am more aware of the basis upon which the radar returns I am viewing are created. As many others who do this work here have attested, switching between manual and auto gain, tilting the antenna to "survey" heights of returns and simply being aware of the nature of returns, provides more than adequate information to see, anticipate and where necesssary, navigate such weather.

At night, just looking out the window, hand on the heading knob, with permission to deviate, (using CPDLC!..brilliant technology), and watching the radar while observing/memorizing the "pattern of buildups" during (distant) lightning flashes or by moonlight, can be as effective a deviation technique.

In my experience, far too many crews did not know how to use radar and did not even understand what the returns really meant. Rather than spending money on automating the radar-return process, a better bang-for-buck is teaching crews how to use radar correctly but that's tactical approach and doesn't add to business's bottom line or share price.

Unless something really unusual / extraordinary happened I would say that the investigators would have a broad picture of what happened with hours of retrieving the content of the FDR / CVR. I would be very surprised if they manage to avoid any leak within the next 2 months...

@ oldchina (#1484)
Yes of course. My point was to say that the "impatience" of the general public (and the "public" within the industry) has never better been addressed by the BEA. Therefore, let's be patient. They will know before the vast majority of PPruNers. And when they say when they're to release data, it's a careful saying : IMO better say "you'll not hear from us before summer", and disclose data sooner than anticipated, than the contrary.
As you point it, Airbus will know before us, too. And that's good for safety, as well shown in your post.

Earlier press reports said that there have been a few cases where info in the FDR was not able to be read after it was recovered.

Would anyone like to speculate on how these boxes survived in 10,000 feet of water for so long? I would have thought the pressure alone at that depth would have made this unlikely.

They're rated for an even greater depth so not suprising at all that they survived. Finding them 2 years later without the pingers on the other hand.....

PJ, thanks.

1. Isn't it cheaper to do than buy more expensive new kit?
2. Isn't there a motivation, a cultural norm within the pilot community, to know what the kit does? I guess something you are touching on is how to formalize the passing on of lore, rather than the informal "learn on the job" that many pilots are familiar with.

Can't there be a mix of both? Does this all have to be "either or" in terms of getting to know one's machine?

WXR-2100
 

Rather than try to explain it, this is from Collins:

The Rockwell Collins MultiScanTM Hazard Detection System is the first and only radar that analyzes and determines actual weather hazards, not simply atmospheric moisture content to provide flight crews more accurate weather returns. The MultiScan system is derived from extensive operational experience to create a fully automatic, hands-free airborne radar system that reduces pilot workload and enhances safety and passenger comfort by minimizing unexpected turbulence encounters, and provides optimal clutter-free weather displays.
Learn more about MultiScan at Rockwell Collins’ Web site: http://www.rockwellcollins.com/products/cs/at/avionics-systems/weather-hazard/science/index.html

Key Features & Benefits

• Fully automatic operation
• Advanced ground clutter suppression at all ranges
• Enhanced geographic and seasonal weather correlation for maximum worldwide performance
• Optimized weather detection from 0 to 320 NM and all altitudes
• OverFlight™ Protection (prevents inadvertent thunderstorm top penetration)
• SmartScan™ real time weather in turns
• TrueZero™ antenna compensation
• Predictive windshear detection with magnitude, velocity and duration data recording and retrieval
• Variable temperature based gain
• Certified turbulence detection
• Redesigned RF section for improved performance and enhanced reliability
• Demonstrated industry-leading pedestal reliability
• Simultaneous display updates in all range/mode combinations
• Split Function Control on some platforms
• Optional manual mode can be used by crews at any time

You can buy the automated radar with 20 years of improvements one time, or forever train and re-train pilots. Do you have any idea how much the airlines should be spending on training for a 30 year old system?

Survival of FDR data unit
 

Simply by adequate engineering. Desighn depth is close to 20 000 ft. Exposed was the unit to about 13 000 ft. So a lot less than desighn + saftey margin. The hydraulic environment produces a steady load. So if that piece is watertight at the beginning of the period under water it will be watertight even after 2 years or more.
I remember a post in this thread that showed the exact data for that type of FDR, beside the 6000 m depth resistance I thought to remember an impact resistance up to 750 km/h. It´s apparently a very massive piece made of steel.

Radar manual scan at many tilt angles
 

Graybeard,

I commented on this simple and effective procedure in a post some weeks ago.

In most of cases doing that you will be able to fully "characterize" the WX pattern ahead for an adequate "decision making/risk taking" by scanning from sea level to your FL.

And this possibility certainly they had in advance.

Annex14

Simply by adequate engineering.

Simply by engineering to the specifications. Unfortunately 228 souls had to lose their lives to prove, in a real accident, that the company produces what it promises.

I don't understand. Is that a criticism of the flight crew?

Wow, where are you guys getting all the news tidbits on AF447? Some "great" pictures in this thread too...where's it all coming from?

Any word on FDR / CVR data recovery yet?

Does France / "Europe" allow the release of such information to the public?

Readable after ~2years at ~4,000m depth
 

The one showed in mfr website for 4700 is not the cylindrical shape. (see my post #417)

They are using the same case now for CVR/FDR memory. And proved successful.

We need ASAP better ULB´s. Being addressed presently.

And "last but not least" better AS sensors. The 38 cases with machines so dependent on it´s data is a proof of a "slow motion" kind of bureaucracy.

Still for some time giving chances to "Murphy Law".

More Engine views
 

TurbineD, lomapaseo, Bear and others interested in the engines:

There are a lot more views of the engines now available in the latest video posted by BEA:

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....des.pieces.mp4

Hi,

Indeed .. but methink his mission is also:
"If necessary, recommendations of security measures will be made urgently to prevent the accident from happening again"
And it's seem that BEA (maybe in the shadow) had made already one concerning the AF447 case ... as AF revised by a technical note how manage plane when incoherent speeds are read and also send all the pilots to a new (improved?) sim training for that.

Flight recorders are designed to withstand immersion to 20,000ft - double the depth and, if my physics knowledge is correct, double the pressure.

promani
 

Quote:
Unfortunately 228 souls had to lose their lives to prove, . . . .

Excactly that thought of the sad side of I&A investigation is what made me stop that job some 30+ years ago.

Older subsystems can provide good results
 

Older subsystems can provide good results. With proper operation and operated taking into account and respecting it´s limitations.

The Economic downturns affecting air transport perhaps played a role.

IMO much more serious is the "Pitot´s" issue. For new and critically dependent machines.

The new concept of Laser principle AS sensors (some patents filed by EADS) shows we will be during some time still vulnerable.

So is crucial respect the limitations. (obviously including here the ones of "FBW" highly optmized airliners)

"slats11, I suspected that this problem was known and a suitable bludgeon was needed to get the airlines to switch rapidly. I noticed the pilots unions got on the BEA, AirBus, and the airlines pretty quickly, too. So they took advantage of a handy crisis to get the job done. (God that sounds slimy.) And, indeed, it probably did need doing."

It is not beyond the realms of possibility that given the acars messages and any other data that was gathered,that Airbus did not input all the data into a 300 flight simulator in TLS and have known exactly what happened for a very long time.
I have seen flight the engineers doing just this sort of work when my airline used to use TLS for recurrent simulator checks.
Recovering the recorders will simply prove their assumptions and provide a reason as to why adverse weather was penetrated by this crew.

Turbine D

You will probably want to have a thorough look at these two screenshots extracted from BEA's most recent video ("remontée des pièces"):

http://img825.imageshack.us/img825/9...1619h21m09.png

http://imageshack.us/m/641/2627/vlcs...1619h19m15.png

According to the comments of the BEA engineer, the state of the blades is proof that the engine was delivering thrust.

In fact, if you watch to the end of that latest video, you'll see the other engine being lifted out of the water as well. That one is indeed missing the fan blade hub. Perhaps an indicator that it was first to begin absorbing the energy of impact?

According to the sources questioned by Le Figaro, of new elements on the responsibility for Air France or its crew will be communicated by the BEA on Tuesday. The final report of investigation of the BEA should be written during several months but it is possible that the scenario of the drama is definitively established from here the end of the week. Contacted by Le Figaro, the spokesperson of Air France refused with any comment, “as long as the BEA will not have concluded the whole of the checks necessary”. On its side, Airbus also refused with any confirmation.

Such a fast outcome was rather unhoped-for a few months ago still. The wreck of the AF 447 was discovered just six weeks ago. “All that occurs since the discovery from the wreck: the localization of the black boxes, their increase and the fact that they are still completely readable after having spent two years by 4000 meters basic, is completely extraordinary”, Monday evening a government source recalled.

Graybeard;

Thank you for the links...the list from the Collins site is impressive.

As per my history here, I am not anti-automation. But I think you will agree that efficacy, reliability and "truth-telling" in automated systems must be inherent and obvious (to those suitably trained and experienced). I would adopt the system, as described, in a heartbeat and then take the experience of learning and utility from there. "If it works well why look back at older systems?", is the approach.
This isn't a "Plug-'n-Play" system so let's acknowledge that with each change and improvement, continuous training and the benefits of experience are necessary aspects of this, and any kit today.

Graybeard,

I´m not a pilot, but I find telling that a weather radar maker feels that airlines should demand this capability.

Maybe something to factor in the AF 447 incident?

JPI33600;

I am looking carefully (and haven't seen the new video yet, so I may be stating the obvious!), but I think these are photographs of the other engine.

The entire front section is missing from the engine of which the photograph was posted earlier, (lomapaseo and others) but here, the N1 remains fastened, with blades damaged (struck by shrapnel during rotation) and bent in ways with which we are familiar in other accidents.

More Engine Views
 

auv-ee,

Thanks for the video, it answers some real questions!

Graybeard, I'm going to play Devil's Advocate for a moment here. The C-130 is still in use, a fifty year old design.

If the radar system has 30 years of operational use, then it would seem to me that most of how it works is known, and the amount of documentation in pilot operational manuals would be on record, and whatever new tweaks that come out are disseminated. If pilots do not routinely actually use the radar while flying, or are not interested in how that piece of gear works i suspect more are interested). Do not pilots want to get the most out of their gear? (Maybe how I was trained biases my opinion on this). Periodic refresher training isn't optional. Would not use of weather radar be part and parcel of the annual (or bi annual) training requirement?

I found that using radar became easier by using it frequently, and by exploring the features.

Granted if you are on 40-80 minute sectors routinely, there is less time do a bit of working the system, comparatively, than when you have 4-8 hour sectors. Perhaps me idea is only applicable to part of the workforce.

But use it or lose it seems to be a theme on these boards (in re hand flying, approaches, takeoffs, landings, and more). Likewise with radar skills -- use it or lose it.

I do appreciate that the state of the art does advance. Nice piece of kit that you are presenting, no question. :ok:

I note that you feel that it would be good to offload pilot work load, yet again, so that the folks on the flight deck have one more robot at work, doing what pilots used to do.

As I noted to PJ2, some of this is a question of philosophy. I consider my question well answered. Much obliged.

Thanks again for your explaining the suggested upgrade.

The non-human cost of retreving all wreckage must be huge. If you have the FDRs, some engines, the cockpit electronics, and can take pictures of the rest, will they continue to raise all the pieces at all cost?

I'm not intending to be morbid, but the press reported that two bodies were recently recovered and that DNA testing is being done. If the DNA tests are not conclusive, the press report said that no more bodies will be raised.

I can't image why the DNA would not be conclusive; how could that be possible?

Engine Screenshots
 

JPI33600,
Thanks for the still photos of the first engine hoisted onboard the ship. It is a classical indication the engine was running at impact with the fan blades bent in the opposite direction of rotation. In the top photo, the bottom of the engine is facing the camera and suffered the most vertical impact damage, as you can see, the fan frame struts and casing are totally missing.

3holeover,
I would agree with you. The second engine to be hoisted onboard is severely damaged, fan totally missing. It was the one photographed laying on the sea floor. It is probably the one that hit sea first, on the low wing?

In the paper quoted by Rotor12 above 2 informations : no responsability for Airbus and details regarding responsabilty of Air France or the crew could be revealed as soon as tomorrow.

What (how) and the Why´s
 

At this time i guess they yet known what (how)* occurred during the more important last 40+ minutes of recorded data. They had time to hear CVR and see the FDR most important parameters to correlate (timing) to the Audio and "construct a global picture". And yet started the "why´s" study.

Now the many players are about to enter the "organizational turbulent climate" where huge interests are present.

With big clusters of CB´s in their path to the new, summer interim report.

In the meantime we hope to be able to observe some "wave shocks" from the accident.

I hope we could see Recommendations, etc. before summer.

* From 01:35:43 to end of recording estimated for sure after last ACARS msgs and before the next, scheduled and never received.

Wx radar
 

having stayed out of the debate .. which remains my policy until findings are released by BAE, I wish to add my comments regarding weather radar from personal experience.

If it is not pointed at the correct part of the cloud, there will be no return, ie no water droplets to give a return. It means scanning a vertical profile from surface (clutter) returns upwards to get a vertical section through something active.

My ex, working as c/c along with her colleagues were horribly bounced over the roof structure and galley areas because flying in high overcast with no look down, a very active cell failed to paint. One girl was medivac'd out and never flew again having flown 4 rows forward from the aisle and head first into the 'F' foot well.

Own experience from the flightdeck, the number of times I entered "WX radar failed to paint visually active TS cells" together with the Fl, range, angles, and gain used, only to have it signed off as "tested on ground found satis" are too numerous to mention.

Of the manufactures mentioned one was worse than the other in this respect, & I will leave it at that.

Le Figaro informations
 

In addition to rotor12 post


Le Figaro - France : AF 447 : Airbus semble tre mis hors de cause


INFO LE FIGARO - Selon nos informations, les premiers éléments émanant des boîtes noires orientent les enquêteurs vers une erreur de l'équipage d'Air France.

According to our informations, first elements from the black boxes lead the investigators to a crew mistake.

Les boites noires ont vite parlé. Selon des sources au gouvernement et des proches de l'enquête interrogées par Le Figaro, les premiers éléments extraits des boites noires mettraient Airbus hors de cause dans le drame qui a couté la vie à 228 passagers le 1er juin 2009.

The black boxes have spoken very quickly. According to sources in government and close to the investigation interviewed by Le Figaro, the first elements extracted from the black boxes would put Airbus out of cause in the tragedy that claimed the lives of 228 passengers June 1st 2009.

Les enquêteurs du Bureau d'enquêtes et d'analyses (BEA) ont pu exploiter dès ce week-end les données du Data Flight Recorder (DFDR), l'une des deux boites noires, qui a enregistré les paramètres du vol et en conclure assez rapidement que l'Airbus A 330 était hors de cause. Le travail du BEA va maintenant consister à déterminer ce qui s'est passé dans le cockpit, et si les erreurs commises sont de la responsabilité de l'équipage ou de celle d'Air France, notamment du fait des procédures de sécurité imposée par la compagnie.

(...)
BEA Investigators were able to read data from the DFDR (...) the last week-end (...) and have concluded rather quickly that the A330 was out of cause.
The work of the BEA consists now to determine what happened in the cockpit and if the errors made are the responsibility of the crew or the one of Air France, especially because of the security procedures imposed by the company.


Selon les sources interrogées par Le Figaro, de nouveaux éléments sur la responsabilité d'Air France ou de son équipage seront communiquées par le BEA dans la journée de mardi.
.../...
According to sources questioned by Le Figaro, new elements on Air France responsability or its crew will be communicated by the BEA Tuesday.

Le rapport définitif d'enquête du BEA devrait être rédigé durant plusieurs mois mais il est possible que le scénario du drame soit définitivement établi d'ici la fin de semaine. Contactée par Le Figaro, le porte-parole d'Air France s'est refusé à tout commentaire, «tant que le BEA n'aura pas mené à bien l'ensemble des vérifications nécessaires». De son côté, Airbus s'est également refusé à toute confirmation.

.../...
Air France, contacted by Le Figaro declined to answer and Airbus refused to confirm the information.
.../...