For a number of reasons, I suspect you are right. For one thing, you would have to assume that AF/AB/BEA knew a lot more about AF447 from the outset than they ever released. They were pretty quick to take action about the pitot tubes. Conspiracy theories aside, they can't afford a repeat and so you would have to think that any initial measures they took would have been directed at what they believed to be the cause. There are also striking similarities between what possibly happened here, and other presumed icing incidents (including the ATSB report that sensor_validation mentioned).

One problem we are having is how the aircraft shed so much energy (kinetic and potential) and covered so little distance from LKP. This has caused many of us to speculate about a reversal of course at some point. Another explanation may be that the aircraft had a lower total energy at LKP than we have assumed. Kinetic energy must be about right - as I recall its speed was pretty much constant between points. But what about the potential energy.

I wonder what time problems started. Am I correct in understanding that LKP included position but not altitude? If so, could blockage of the pitot drain holes (rather than the tubes per se) cause an overspeed and hence a reduction in thrust? Could the aircraft have been losing altitude for some time before things obviously went wrong? An involuntary descent into a cb cell at night. At some point a drain hole unfroze, then unreliable airspeed......

I guess it is unlikely that multiple drain holes would ice up simultaneously however. Lots of other things seem not to fit with this scenario. If not already there, you would imagine that something like this would get the Captain upfront. Plus you might also at least secure the cabin.

I am sure plenty here will point out other problems with this scenario. Just trying to make order out of insufficient facts.

Hi Bear,
Without a close examination of the wreckage, even if it is not lying far from home, I'm reduced to guess that it may be. Also, that parts of the forward fuselage (cockpit) and engines could have absorbed much more "forward" brutal acceleration than most recovered floating parts. It seems also pictured by the cabin fragmentation and the wreckage mix in the sea bed. Of course, also, I can be totally wrong.

JD-EE
No. Only captains and pilots on their command course qualify for the left-hand seat.
I'm afraid it does. The F/O elected by the captain as the pilot-in-charge - and the captain would be a fool not to choose the most senior one - occupies the RHS. The junior one ,the LHS;
That system, which is rather common with quite a few airlines has a few pernicious aspects :

1/- The PF /PM system is severely disrupted : the PM is not able to offer the optimum aid as every system is - from his new position - reversed, and it's not easy to operate switches that are not in the positions one is familiar with. Even more so in the dark or in periods of heavy stress.

2/- Supposing - it's a speculation - that the RHS has lost his flight instruments, the only available pilot is the least experienced one, operating with controls he's not used to...

That happens a lot more often than you'd apparently think.
But it doesn't matter, the one in charge has four bars on his/her shoulders and expects loyalty from his/her crew.

Musical Chairs
 

In Lemurian's scenario of 'Senior F/O returns to RHS, Junior switches RHS to LHS, Captain vacates', how is it done at a practical level?
At some point there is only one strapped in, but if there is no turbulence, is there any chance that there are none actually strapped in when the Sxxx hit the fan?

If there was just one, what are the chances of a second getting back into a seat and could a single pilot manage the sort of scenarios that have been suggested?

It is assumed that the 1st FO was already in the RHS and the captain in his LHS before the arrival of relief pilot. Then, captain rest. This 2nd FO would take the captain's place (LHS), but now the Pilot Flying would become the 1st FO from the RHS (not optimum).
That is what I understand from Lemurian "musical chair" ballet.

Takata :
Or
- the junior F/O was on the RHS and the senior one comes from his rest -->
- Senior F/O takes over RHS
- junior F/O takes over LHS from the captain.

This is ok as he's occupying a seat he's used to.
What is not optimum will be the assistance he'd expect from the LHS as all abnormal / emergency procedures require one pilot assuming piloting and communication functions and in our case, that falls on the guy on the RHS, and ther other one operating the systems to deal with the checklist, again from a position he's not used to.

Whatever happened during the first period, at the moment of the first ACARS transmission, we can say with quasi total certainty that the two F/Os were in charge of the airplane, the least experienced one on the LHS...( and that in the most ideal conditions... )

What is quite apparent to me in these instants just preceding the accident is the feeling of a *routine* atmosphere :
- normal OPS, crew not concerned with weather
- as too many passengers were found outside the plane, seat belts signs were not on
- captain ready to take his rest ( in the middle of the ITCZ, that's a sign of confidence in his crew and the weather that I have'nt shown in all my career !)
A picture that drastically changed in the following minutes, as they were just four minutes before the end.

All change
 

In the case where the senior F/O is returning from his break then we have the case where no-one stays in a seat as I read it, clockwise from LHS seat reads: Capt, Junior, (Senior-standing) to be changed to Junior, Senior, (Captain-standing)

There again, there are far simpler examples of only one pilot in the cockpit. I just wondered, in an upset what is the chance of getting back into a seat or even getting back into the cockpit?

(Crossed in the post, thanks Lemurian)

Are we expecting any announcements from the BEA today with regard to progress in reading the data recorders?

But over the weekend, some air-safety experts close to the investigation advised colleagues that the recorders, which were dried out in special ovens, seemed undamaged and ready for attempts to download data.
Reading the digital recorders was believed to pose unprecedented challenges because no such devices have been recovered after spending such a long time at such depths.


Air France Black Box Components Appear Undamaged - WSJ.com

Stop press stop press
 

Latest !
France info scoop.
"The BEA announces that the totality of the recorded data on the black boxes has been extracted"
totality = everything, entirety... they've done it !
They've also said that an interim report will be publishjed *this summer*

Edit : Le Monde has this banner, which confirms my post :

"Black boxes" read
 

according to french newspaper Le Figaro BEA was able to read all the datas contained in the so called black boxes over the wek end.

The same news, for non-subscribers:

Air France KLM SA - WSJ: Black Box Components From Air France Wreckage Appear Undamaged - Sources

That's good news about the recorders!
A couple of questions that I haven't seen addressed:
1. Does the damage to the engines indicate that they were running at impact?
2. A friend has an iPhone App that tells him the windspeed when he holds the phone up in the wind.
I don't know how it would work for flying speeds. but it seems fairly accurate in lowish winds.
Could this technology be applied to aircraft even as a separate system?

Bill G Kerr
Apparently yes.

Black boxes
 

The BEA could read all the data of the black boxes of the flight Rio-Paris
The Office of investigations and analyses managed this weekend “to collect the entirety of the data contained” in the two black boxes of the flight AF-447, whose crash landing had caused 228 deaths on June 1st, 2009. The BEA announces that a report of stage will be made public this summer. (AFP and Reuters.)

Breaking News at CNN :

Flight recorders from Air France 447 found in Atlantic Ocean are readable, French air accident investigators say.

BEA communiqué, 16 mai
 

16 May 2011 briefing

Following operations to open, extract, clean and dry the memory cards from the flight recorders, BEA Safety Investigators were able to download the data over the weekend.These operations were filmed and recorded in their entirety. This was done in the presence of two German investigators from BFU, an American investigator from NTSB, two British investigators from AAIB and two Brazilian investigators from CENIPA, as well as an officer from the French judicial police and a court expert.
These downloads gathered all of the data from the Flight Data recorder (FDR), as well as the whole recording of the last two hours of the flight from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).
In the framework of the safety investigation directed by the BEA, all of this data will now be subjected to detailed in-depth analysis.
This work will take several weeks, after which a further interim report will be written and then published during the summer.

takata, do you consider the "fourth occupant seat" that was recovered to be the second of two jump seats in the cockpit?
______________

Not that we may ever be told, but it might prove an interesting contrast to compare the behavior of the crew of AF459 that followed the track of AF447 into the ITCZ. AF459 would have had similar SIGMET information, and presumably received a text alert from dispatch similar to that sent to AF447 regarding convection as seen on satellite between SALPU and TASIL. Did that crew also go to SELCAL mode, and begin a rest rotation? Perhaps not.

From the first interim report, it seems AF450 were on alert after unexpectedly encountering turbulence near NATAL. AF459 also perhaps heard conversation between ATLANTICO and IB 6024 flying ahead on its deviation to the east by 30 NM. And perhaps both AF459 and IB6024 overhead communications between ATLANTICO and LH 507 on its deviation to the west after passing ORARO.

no chris, (even this message will fast go under, like a engine falling throug water, into the troubble of the great message abaut the readable recorders....) the diver stands under the table, in the area the lost trolly-containers are normaly parked, you see the botton demage of the honycomb struktur, the boxes are on top

The fourth occupant seat is indeed the second jump seat and is situated behind the copilot's seat.On my company 330 fleet the third occupant seat is situated behind the centre console and is a more substantial design than the fourth occupant seat.
The pilots seats are handed ,i.e they have the substantial arm rest on their outboard and the seat controls inboard.If an occupant was discovered still attached to a seat it should be fairly straight forward to see who was sitting where

This is the BEA press release :

Hi SaturnV,
I guess so as well.
Look, when they were talking about the wreckage, I was fighting with my video recorder and I was also trying to read the map on their slide at the same time!
Then, it stopped, my recording had failed... and no video of the conference that I am aware of was even posted later.
:-)

Lemurian wrote:
I suppose it will be worth keeping an eye on any new directives over the next month or so, in case they signal anything new ahead of the report...

Galley Storage Unit
 

grity, quote:
No Chris, ...the diver stands under the table, in the area the lost trolly-containers are normaly parked, you see the botton demage of the honycomb struktur, the boxes are on top.

Don’t worry grity, I’m still listening! Methinks you are right. So the area where the diver stands would be the bottom of the storage unit, normally occupied by the TALL canisters with braked castor wheels (the ones that give rise to the expression: “trolley-dollies”), which are used to convey the meals along the aisles during meal times. The latter are, of course, all missing.

This picture might be helpful to somehttp://fromtheflightdeck.com/MEL/PPRune/Eng.jpg

takata - thanks. I'd been thinking in terms of time on type. So you confirmed what I was thinking regardless of what I said.

slats11, I suspected that this problem was known and a suitable bludgeon was needed to get the airlines to switch rapidly. I noticed the pilots unions got on the BEA, AirBus, and the airlines pretty quickly, too. So they took advantage of a handy crisis to get the job done. (God that sounds slimy.) And, indeed, it probably did need doing.

lomapaseo

Your arrow (fore), are you noting the sheared Fan Blades as evidence of high N1?

The depression in the stator ring, does that indicate 12:00? Where the engine was lifted into the pylon? The extensive damage below (6:00), that would be water contact??

Brilliant photo, many thanks

After two years at sea, this engine looks as though it was just removed from a mineral oil bath, very clean. What do you make of the integrity of the IP/LP turbine casing, very stout, yes? So much plumbing left, and reasonably continuous.

The crinkled vanes, there's your forward acceleration, yes? A few milliseconds post water contact?

refer to Turbine D explanations

The problem was definitely known, what isn't known (yet) is whether it caused this crash - however with the known problem and the ACARS messages followed by the crash, no one wanted to take any (further) chances.

[From memory of what I've read] I believe:
AB knew of the problem some time before the crash
AB advised AF (and maybe others?) to fit new model probes.
AF refused to do that without additional tests (that decision may yet come back to haunt them).
By the time of the crash I think the regulators were also involved
By the time of the crash AB had provided test results to AF and AF had, I think, started a replacement program across the fleet


Perhaps more interesting is the ATSB report linked to a few posts back regarding an incident with Goodrich probes. That report seems (to me) to imply that aircraft are flying (possibly regularly) in environments well outside both the certification test region and the manufacturer test region for the pitots. So, that's a known problem too, and wider than the Thales probes ...

News agencies are reporting that ALL the data from the flight recorders is readable....

Hi,

BEA communication 16/05/2011
10 May 2011 briefing

Seem's that BEA deploy the big umbrella :)
A new way of working and communicating
They know they are under scrutiny ....
They know also that "old good time" is somewhat over due to the internet network communication

jcjeant, whatever the reason behind, it's good news, as "conspirationnists" will have a tougher time.

That said : "good old times" ? You're implying that this approach is somehow an admission of cheating earlier, aren't you ? :ugh:
Is it the first time external personal are involved, or the first time BEA communicates so much about it, having learned about previous critics (Habsheim, Concorde...) ? :D

Le verre à moitié plein, pour moi :ok:

Hi,

Not at all ...
For the Concorde case the AAIB was involved ...
But the AAIB was under constraint and had no access to all evidences ..........
I have not a link .. but all this is explained in a report of the AAIB about their findings for Concorde crash.
If you can participate in a BEA investigation but can't access to some evidence .. what the heck ?
Hope this will not be the case for AF447

NTSB would release FDR in about a week
 

I am worried that the BEA announcement hints that FDR readings will not be released until the next interim report "after analysis".

I can understand taking longer with CVR transcripts as considerable time is required to determine exactly what was said by whom when as well as redact utterings that should remain confidential.

The FDR by contrast is simply raw data.

In that depth, it is amazing the FDR data is intact. In the CNN report I read, it says the all the data was downloaded and recovered. Apparently, there were severl international witnesses and the procedure was taped.

Does that mean the data is not corrrupted and can be read or will we need to wait for the next preliminary report for confirmation on that? Obviously, downloading the data does not mean the data has integrity or I'm I reading too much into the press report?

Thx.

I believe that rather than the BEA constraining the AAIB, both the BEA and the AAIB were constrained by the French judicial investigation.

The BEA, being French and used to such things, worked around it. The AAIB complained that they were impeded and that this was a breach of international conventions and EU directives.

To my recollection, I don't think the AAIB complained that anything affected the validity of the conclusions, but it defintiely annoyed them and delayed things.

I had noticed that in the old reports, too. It rather got dropped below the radar or something of late. Some new air speed device is needed since conditions put what tools pilots have way outside of specs. I am not sure the UV trick will work. It will, likely, introduce a slight discontinuity into surfaces leading to it icing up, too.

Wx Radar: the tilt should have been pointed down into the wet part of the storm, moving the tilt up and down to see maximum return. The decision for avoidance route should have been made 80-100 miles in advance.

AF chose not to upgrade to the Wx radar with automatic tilt, etc., including automatic sensitivity adjustments for lat/long. The newer radar has been available for about 7 years. The Collins WXR-700 on AF447 is a 1982 design. . Upgrades are rare at airlines, except by govt mandate, or extremely poor reliability of older equipment, neither of which applied here.