Respectfully, SaturnV, I'd say the priority starts about 15-20 minutes prior, to see what the crew were discussing and doing as they approached the time where things began to go wrong. Without the stage being set, some very wrong assumptions may be made regarding how and why crew responded as they did ... response being more along the lines of your timeframe. That allows the first run through of the synched "crisis period" to dispense with a variety of "they did what? why? how did that get into the equation" questions ... and this means fewer errors in various utterances coming out of BEA.

Regarding conflict of interest and the BEA.

It's there, the question is in what degree. It may be small, or large, and if it stays close to small, would be low risk to a quality investigative finding.

Hahahaha... well done. :D

Firstly, please don't tell Microsoft... really no Powerpoint?

Ok, so now the comedy is finished... right? :rolleyes:

It DOES NOT take weeks - I routinely handle test flight data - audio striped with a timecode on one track on the audio recordings, and performance data striped on the data captures. Synching the two is not difficult, particularly since in this case the encoding is well known ahead of time.

What will take time is ensuring the exact transcription is provided, since in many cases the audio is not exactly the clearest, particularly when things are not exactly going as planned.

However, and this can be argued, the primary content of the CVR will be easily determined from the first few listens through I'm pretty sure, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to copy/format convert the recording to .WAV format to allow analysis on a standard soundfile editor (Adobe Audition or Audacity for example), which gives you simple view of the waveform against time. Since the recording is realtime, timing does not have to be millisecond accurate to make sense of the key events.

Whether or not, those initial broader findings can/should be released is not my place to argue, but I would be dumbstruck if it were not very easy to determine who was in the cockpit (FO1 and FO2, or some other combination of occupant) for example. But now my point is drifting.

It does not take weeks to synch the FDR to the CVR. And at that I will exit stage left...

BEA Press Release - English
 

Flight AF 447 on 1st June 2009

A330-203, registered F-GZCP



Press release on 17 May 2011



According to an article that appeared in « Le Figaro » on the evening of Monday 16 May 2011, the « first elements extracted from the black boxes» would exonerate Airbus in the accident to the A330, flight AF 447, which killed 216 passengers and 12 crew members on 1st June 2009.

Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories.

The BEA repeats that, in the framework of its mission as a safety investigation authority, it alone has the right to communicate on the progress of the investigation. Consequently, any information on the investigation that comes from another source is null and void if it has not been validated by the BEA.

Collection of all of the information from the audio recordings and from the flight parameters now gives us a high degree of certainty that everything will be brought to light concerning this accident. The BEA safety investigators will now have to analyse and validate a large quantity of complex data. This is long and detailed work, and the BEA has already announced that it will not publish an interim report before the summer.

At this stage of the investigation, no conclusions can be drawn.

A final point, and off to other things.

In any human endeavour, but especially those involving great investment, profit, and competition, there is a palpable corporate and institutional culture in play.

BEA is not feverishly working in isolation, they carry vectors of concern into the Lab. This investigation has hundreds of players, and thousands of close and privy PEOPLE. Keep an open mind, but please entertain that these are people, like you and I. Protect the Guilty? Line one's pocket? Keep quiet when to speak is demanded? Shade ever so slightly a finding in the interest of what may be ultimately security and survival? (and not for clients and personnel?).

All respect for all, keeping in mind that all data belongs to the people, and especially where the Public Safety is concerned, there is NO PROPRIETARY

edit... "Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories."

my turn, :ugh::ugh::ugh:

Although a "quick look" is likely just a few hours for the CVR the FDR probably will take a bit longer.
Have lost the link (buried many pages back) to a DFR problems report that discussed the dismal state of the documents that link the raw bits from the DFR to measured paramaters. It also discussed the typical process and problems with using the data:

Before using the DFR data it must be carefully checked to ensure that the calibration values are valid since there have been many instances of wrongly documented "gain/offset" valies or calibration drift after last inspection (which are also inadequate), not to mention totally incorrect channel to parameter maps.

This vetting is in partdone by comparing all 30 hours (or whatever it is) of normal operations to retrieved values - flap position on take-off etc).

Only after this is done can the CVR be synchronized to DFR tracings in a meaningfull way.
I suspect that is where most of the "weeks" will be spent the actual time stamp linking as you point out is very quick.

Summer
 

Anyone care to comment on when BEA might think summer is? Officially, it is the day of the year when the Sun is farthest north (on June 20th or 21st). This day is known as the Summer Solstice.

Cause, contributing cause(s), findings, et al
 

Salute!

I have to lean with Wolf, Bear and others here.....

- We shall finally see that no single design deficiency or crew action had the end result. As with most losses, it will be a chain of events. Hopefully, we will see procedural changes and mabe some "design" changes implemented to prevent future incidents.

- "design", as Wolf says, has lots more than basic airframe characteristics. The human interface with the "system" is an important component of the "design". To this old dinosaur that flew the first operational FBW system, seems that the 'bus has a convoluted sequence of reversion to basic control laws that are closely coupled to the autopilot and other considerations when things turn to worms. Seems that the crew should be able to use a single switch or button to get to the basic FBW control laws and let the plane do what it is aerodynamically and structurally capable of doing.

- I won't argue with the certification process. The FBW control laws for the 'bus appear to be in synch with the basic "requirements" for certification. This is a point I can wait to discuss over a few beers and "there I was" war stories.

For now, I can say my point is that all the reversion sequences do not seem to be considered in the certification process, and that is what is bugging me. Where's the consideration of reasonable crew actions when things go wrong? It's Wolf's point about "design".

All for now, and hope we get to see some "real" data versus speculation soon.

This thread seems to have taken a turn to damn the torpedos full steam ahead.

The press leak is not the responsibility of the parties neither goverment investigators nor manufacturer experts, The BEA has already stated their opinion in this regard.

The public can clamor and fret about the data, but it is not them who have to fully understand it before releasing it. We already have enough folks on internet sites specultaing from all sides, less about technical things and more about somehow the answer may harm their pet theory.

What will happen is that when the data begins to point at major contributors, then begins the challenges to the data by the experts within the investigation Only after the challenges have been vetted will major releases occur, not necessarily as final findings, but more of areas being explored.

The time line for this is probably with a week or two, not months and not days.

It does not help an investiagtion to allow itself to become sidetracked by clammoring for data outside of the experts within the investigation.

If you want to turn this process into a coverup or political forum then there are other sites where it can be taken (JetBlast anyone?)

I think the problem w your assumption Gums is that any "procedural" or "design" changes will be perceived as an admission of some level of culpability. The last thing Airbus wants is ANY question regarding their system logic as this has far reaching implications across their entire fleet. Any design or even training change would be a billion euro plus event. The lawyers would have a field day.

Likewise Air France (albeit at a far less euro payout) wants to avoid any mention of maintenance issue or shortfall in training. The foundation per today's leak is pointing squarely at the pilots who are no longer able to present their case.

The importance of a full release of data is obvious and as others have said can be presented as necessary to present a credible picture.

My hope is that we all have an opportunity to continue what this forum has done so well since the accident which is is question the available data and understand the conclusion the BEA comes too.

Bear the pb is above the AP engage pb but is of a different design.
I would say that for most pilots if an AP disengages that they will take control of the aircraft and then try and re- engage the AP.They do not have experience in hand flying these aircraft at high level with a rearward c.g and many simulators do not replicate tnis very well and in my experience it is never practiced. There may have been some repeated button pressing until they realised that it would not engage or function properly
I do not believe that selection of the fpv was accidental. Airbus philosophy is that if you are hand flying you select fpv and I would imagine that this is what they selected whilst they tried to cope with the situation before them.
The problem with this selection is that the Unreliable Airspeed checklist advises against its use if altitude information is unreliable. We will find out in the coming months what was the root cause of the upset and the wisdom of the selection of fpv.
The A330 is a beautiful machine and many of its systems have been developed to cater for shortfalls in the design of earlier Airbus types.When I first flew it I was very impressed that the designers had put a lot of effort into getting it right. It is an immensly complicated aircraft but also extremely reliable . I would imagine that this crew were aghast by how quickly their perfect machine turned ugly and their atrophied stick and rudder skills failed to cope

Finally I have not seen an A300 with four pitots,which operators aircraft did you see?

KATLPAX:

Your post raised a worry, even though I had no friend or family on AF 447.

There is a pernicious route by which a safety investigation is corrupted by both penal and civil-tort investigations that have damages (money) and punishment (money/jail/cert revocation) as their ultimate outcomes.

Safety investigations, without those encumbrances, may uncover and report (via limdis) critical interface elements without fear of cost/lawyers etcetera. I remain eternally grateful to the judges in the U.S.A. They have time and again upheld the privileged status of mishap safety investigations (not the JAG investigations, which a FOIA can get released) in military crashes. (In which class are the mishaps I was a member of investigation teams a few years back).

As I watch the drama -- drama in part self-generated, and in part manufactured to position parties in legal proceedings -- unfold in re this tragic crash, I consider the Spanish incident (we discussed on these forums a few months back, problem with a configuration fault / flaps, leading to a crash) and the Italian incident more recently discussed on the forums.

If the aim and psychology of a party pursuing a case is not wholly air minded, the myopia and tunnel vision afflicing said parties -- flavored with either virulence or simple desire for financial gain/remedy, in my view blinds them to how complex and interrelated causal factors are (plural required here, even though we are mostly among aviation professionals). Those of you who are not, please take note.

The risk is that this whole proceeding distills down to a hunt for scapegoats rather than unearthing of root causes that can, in combination, be addressed to remedy whatever set of faults set up AF447 for arrival at the surface of the ocean ... not their intended point of landing. :{ This wasn't a rookie crew. That they were unable to overcome a challenge presented to them, for one reason or another, must be mitigated for the benefit of the entire flying public. It may not just be an Airbus issue here, even though the mishap aircraft is an Airbus.

BEA has a hell of a challenge in front of them in terms of remaining objective. I sincerely hope they are up to it.

I worry, for the sake of getting the procedural or mechanical fixes appropriate to this event sorted out and resolved, that the cross contamination of interests previously raised will leak into their work, and corrupt the findings.

My appeal to the hard working folks of the BEA team is to be mindful of the traps and risks of contamination, and to deflect them. It ain't gonna be easy.

The BEA seems to be very unhappy and one can understand easily their reaction. To my knowledge this is the first time in its history that a communicate with such straightforward terms is published.
Since the beginning of the AF447 tragedy, "Le Figaro" has been one of the French media that always has been very well informed. I have realized that months ago and already asserted that, here, some days ago, just before the CVR retrieval. All their sources seem to be, as LF itself writes, very "close the investigation".
In one of its latest release LF indicates that their sources is closed to the "government" but not from the BEA investigation team. This is the first time that LF states the origin of its informations.
The fact that LF writes "government" indicates that someone there directly communicates to LF without the consent, or even the knowledge of the BEA.
LF being a newspaper it is not a shocking matter that their journalist(s) in charge of the case, try to obtain and publish the maximum of informations pertaining this affair. And they do it well.
Politically LF is a right hand newspaper or conservative one would say. There may have some privileged relationships between LF and the political sphere that could play some role and explain the "leaks". Who is the "insider" in the Government may stay a secret but it would tend to show that someone there is really in a hurry to establish the truth. Whatever the BEA says is not that important right now but as we say here "il n'y a pas de fumés sans feu" (there's no smoke without fire).
I was rather surprised how fast LF published its latest news (about the AFR responsibility) but still, even if the LF is not my cup of tea in a general way, I do trust their journalist for what they publish.
If the politics enters in scene we may interrogates ourself on a "struggle for influence" at he head of the ministry, to be the first to "unsheathe" and give a valuable information. Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, NKM, Minister for Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing (in addition she finds time to sleep) is the minister in charge. There is also a junior minister (secrétaire d'état) specifically in charge of Transports ; Mr Thierry Mariani whom we do not hear a lot. Hopefully himself knows him as a Minister.
NKM made the announcement that there was bodies still in good conditions and attached to their seats the day after she came back from Japan, where she went because of the Tsunami and radioactivities disasters. I saw her at the television making this announcement and she looked tired. There was not an absolute necessity to communicate so quickly and the information(s) could have been delayed for a while but it was unveiled right away. By her.
Either someone at the minister wants to be the first to give the information and "short circuit" someone else or , because the AF447 disaster is an international matter, officials in France want to have the "scoop" on some important announcements before it might filter abroad. There might be a political will to bypass the necessary slow technical investigation. Hence the LF informations that are making, by the way, a "buzz" here. AFR unions are not happy at all with these latest informations.

Another important matter is the present situation at Air France. Pierre-Henri Gourgeon (65), the CEO of Air France-KLM should be renewed tomorrow in its fonctions. If AFR is designated as the only and sole responsible of the crash, PHG might be led to resign to assume the responsibility in the name of the company. This last assumption is quite personal.

tubby linton

Brown.

With the "Figaro" already scoring an "own goal", who needs conspiracy theories?

There are no A300 with four pitot probes. It is seeing things which are not there, again.

Squawk_ident;

Thanks for that pragmatic look at the politics involved and the perceived pressure that goes both down and upwards.

At the end of the day, the BEA is just a name for a group of people charged with investigating and determining the cause(s) of an accident, making recommendations to prevent a recurrence, and publishing their findings on behalf of the French State. The people involved are professionals, and no person acting alone should have the ability to determine an outcome that is not supported by the majority.

We know full well that the justice system has the ability to turn facts around and make other determinations, but the BEA's Final Report will be the matter of aviation record.

There is one small point that will never change, and that is the time the FDR and CVR stopped recording. Neither politicians or the judicial system will ever change that.

Bear,

Don't know if you have seen this or not, but for your reading enjoyment:

http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdf...For_Pilots.pdf

It is sort of an introduction, not up to date, but does give you some unofficial reference information.

Theories, media, our old friend ...
 

If we all look back over the postings on both AF447 discussions, fair to say the standard quality of informed input has been very high especially considering that the main wreckage was found only a short time ago.

Personal guess is that broadly the impact criteria has been quite accurately described, though truth may lay somewhere in the middle.

With the DFDR and DCVR recorder being time matched, and harmonic analysis applied, we are gonna be faced with the third thread, the last piece of cheese with the holes in it to let this happen when procedures, technology and culture were all designed to say it should not.

Per previous post, it is the design interface (and all aspects of it) with the human element that has consistently proved to be the weakest link, often at the most trivial level.

Everything that we have pondered, analised and written could be overturned in a single press release, let's not forget that.
Everyone remembers landmark accidents that we have as core material on our CRM refreshers .. this may turn out to be just another one.
Who knows, but despite the conspirisy theorists, I sense that training, technology and culture may well have been a red herring here.

Having had the privilage to spend some time with investigators over the years, I know them to be dedicated people, when they have agreed a likely senario as a team, we will know much more in a substantiated form.

So lets wait on this one, and let them do their job.

Do not forget that this design, AP in or out wants to maintain zero roll rate and 1g .. it can get out of sync per the transatlantic incident, make it extreme and it's gonna be a nightmare with protections lost .. add a human in the loop, perhaps more so, perhaps being there in the first place is the best demonstration.

New guy to these discussions. I’ve read only about 200 pages of posts, some from Part 1, all of Part 2; so forgive me if I repeat something already covered.

The FPA/TRK discussion finally got me hooked.

The FPA-TRK mode, as I understand it, is an alternate FD display with command steering available for the FPV. The HDG-V/S mode is the primary FD display option with the dual-cue command steering for pitch attitude and bank.

The validity of the command steering for either FPA/TRK or HDG/VS is always a function of proper mode selection and annunciations per the FMA.

I guess what I’m getting at is once the FPV is selected is it always valid autonomously as an FPV regardless of the mode selected and the command steering indication. At high AOA, would the FPV not be visible on the PFD when outside the PFD displayed range of attitude versus actual FPA? Are the FD's removed?

Boeing allows the selection of the FPV on either PFD individually thru the individual EFIS control panels. In the HUD, if so equipped, Boeing always displays the FPV and command steering in the HUD is always for the FPV. If the FPV is out of the HUD FOV, it ‘ghosts’ (dashed outline) to indicate non-conformal situations. (The HUD & PFD FPV algorithms are very slightly different however.)

My other question: Is ADR "unreliable" the same as ADR "failed"? My understanding is that in ALT 2 you cannot re-engage the A/P with dual ADR failure.

I may know just enough to not really know enough however.

edit: the Boeing PFD FPV's, if selected, are added symbols to the PFD, the dual-cue FD steering is still for pitch attitude & bank

I would also expect there to be a lot of tedious manual cross-checking between the CVR and FDR to ensure data consistency. For example, ensure that a particular sound, e.g. from a setting of some switch or control, corresponds to a change in the corresponding FDR trace at exactly the same time. If not, the data might be unreliable. Add the ACARS messages, and possible recordings from QAR and internal memories of the instruments and FADECs, and the worst case time required for all this consistency cross-checking may be quite long.


On the CVR,
Preferably even before. IIRC the CVR records the last 2 hours. That requirement is not there by coincidence. The Swiss cheese theory says each accident has multiple contributing factors, some of which may have occurred long before the !!!!! hit the f*n.

***

Can anyone provide a description of the parameters recorded by the A330 DFDR? That would be interesting to study while waiting for the analysis results.

Garageyears wrote:
Pardon my ignorance, but is the CVR data in "stereo" (ie is there input from multiple mikes, positionally offset) or is it just "mono"?

auraflyer,

Even on the BAC 1-11 circa 1980 (UK-registered), the CVR had 5 channels:
each pilot's mic "hot", i.e, live even when pilot not transmitting on radio or intercom;
input to each pilot's headphones (mono);
area microphone.

Quality of audio was excellent (playback by AAIB, Farnborough). Area microphone(s) may not be as good as the others.

Hi,

Jean-Paul Troadec interview

Google Vertaling



Original source:
Vol*Rio-Paris.*"Toute la lumière sera faite" selon le directeur du BEA - France - Le Télégramme

I dont understand this statement ... :confused:

So BEA know where find the plane were the greatest ... but anyways and contrary to this knowledge ... they searched firstly in other aeras ..... :sad:

jcjeant

I don't know how it is done in Europe, but when an a/c flies into a Thunderstorm in US, we look with 99 percent certainty directly underneath the storm, not miles away. Our hurricanes only get their start in the ITCZ, they finish up in Louisiana or North Carolina. In the midwest, it is thunderboomers. I never could follow the logic of the search for 447.

As noted it is designed to withstand even greater depths. It is a multi-layer package of very strong materials. It may have some electronics within that pressure vessel package. All the electronics on the outside would be toast. But the contents of that pressure vessel, as long as it is not breached by an impact during the crash, should be OK.

The description given of reading the device indicated they mounted it on a new set of electronics and discovered it was fully readable. I am not sure if that is the "memory chips" were remounted in a new Solid State Disk package with its electronics or whether they just used the pigtail sticking out of the package to connect to the new external electronics box is not 100% clear. I am inclined to believe the latter hypothesis given that it came together remarkably quickly.

I did notice that the pigtail that connects to the larger electronics package appeared to have disconnected cleanly in the one case and was still connected in the other. So both should have been in useful condition for simply plugging it into a new box and proceeding. I'm not sure if they even bothered to open the cylinder to visually check the contents. I would probably have done that before applying power and risking there being water inside.

My understanding is that they did look around LKP from the very beginning. They found nothing on the surface initially until they searched further north. Nor did they hear the pingers.

So what would you have them do after this? Remember at that time they probably had more faith that the pingers were functioning than in their understanding of what had taken place and where the plane was. That is to say that they likely reasoned that the pingers were working elsewhere, rather than the plane was near LKP and both pingers failed. Yes this reasoning turned out to be incorrect, but I can certainly see what they were thinking.

Phase 3. They chose to search out NW, based on independent sophisticated drift analysis. This also turned out to be incorrect. But again, I can understand their thought processes.

Phase 4. Forget drift analysis. Forget pingers. Start at LKP with the group with the best credentials to do the search. And they succeeded.

I don't see a conspiracy here. To me, this reflects a determined search in the face of lots of unknowns, a few false leads, and the unexpected failure of both pingers.

Will there be lessons learned from this? Sure. But I don't believe you can question the methodology of the search.

Part of the problem here is that some of the involved parties have less that a perfect record. And so people are looking for any evidence of a repeat here. That is understandable, and on the whole it is a good thing. A degree of skepticism is healthy. Only a degree however, only up to a point. Beyond this it starts to resemble paranoia. Courts of law have to decide innocence or guilt on the facts presented - and not on the past record of the defendant.

The way this investigation is running and the involvement of external agencies gives me a degree of confidence that we can trust the conclusions. Sure there can still be bias - and as someone else hinted, subconscious bias can be the most dangerous type of all. But bias does not equate corruption.

Recorders info
 

auraflyer,

4 channel ("stereo"), look the specs here: Info on AF447 CVR

Observe the channel 4 has better specs

And titanium.

Salt water in PCB
 

Hi, JD-EE

Much safer!

What you think about LF info yesterday?

jcjeant

Jean-Paul Troadec has responded appropriately to the question asked. He did mention that the area in which the debris was found was originally searched (US Navy TPL towed by "Fairmount Glacier") and nothing was heard. That was during Phase 2 and between then and Phase 3, the BEA engaged the Drift Group to try and narrow down the area to search.

The group came up with a area of probability that was to the NNW and around 30NM from the LKP and encompassed around 2,000 ^2 km, which was searched using towed side-scan sonar and AUVs equipped with SSS. Phase 3 was extended and the areas to the west and south of those already searched were covered by AUVs. There was an unfortunate interlude which lead the search to be moved over 40NM to the West by South of the LKP and this deviation was responsible for the debris not being found during the extended Phase 3 search.

Following Phase 3, the Metron Report made a statistical analysis of all the data they had at their disposal and concluded that the aircraft would be found within 20NM of the LKP.

Phase 4 under the operational control of WHOI used 3 AUVs and resumed searching from where they had left off at the end of Phase 3, ie about 10NM NNW of the LKP. Working methodically through the remaining area north of the LKP, it took them about one week to come across the debris.

The reason for neither of the pingers being heard remains to be found, and as far as I know, there has been no report of the FDR's missing ULB being located. I am sure that that line of enquiry will be run in conjunction with the ongoing FDR/CVR data analysis.

Overall, the initial air/sea searches for floating debris failed badly, but the ongoing planned secondary searches for the ULB pingers and then using alternative methods was done well.

Wasn't that why there was an extended drying time in a specialized oven before reading the chips? It wouldn't make sense unless they had opened the cylinders and taken out the cards holding the memory chips. I would think that the main thing holding the ocean out of the memory modules was a well situated O ring on an end closure.

Shadoko - regarding slammed cockpit door with everybody outside I'd simply comment that such a situation would be an unbelievable lapse of proper procedure or issuance of an official procedure with a glaring error. Three people can navigate around each other in the cockpit quite easily. So for changing crew and assignments there would be two procedures.

The first procedure simply substitutes one person in once seat. The new person moves into the cockpit over in front of the fourth seat. The person being replaced rises and exits past the new person. The new person emerges and enters the vacated seat. At that time the replaced person exits the plane. At no time is there nobody at the controls.

The second procedure puts the captain back in his seat when the person being replaced is the person in the other seat. Captain enters the cockpit and moves to the space in front of the fourth seat. The person in the captain's seat rises and moves to the door but does not exit. The captain moves into his seat, gets settled in. The person standing moves to the space in front of the fourth seat while the captain assumes control. The third person rises and moves to the door. The replaced person moves into the seat the third person vacated. Once everybody is comfortably at the controls the third person leaves the cockpit. At no time is there nobody at the controls.

It's a simple programming job, if you think about it. What on Earth would cause all three to vacate the cockpit? (Besides, doors I've seen of late have cipher locks on them so they can be opened from the outside. Before that I believe they could only be locked from the inside by a positive action by one of the cockpit crew. If that's still the case the person planing to leave the cockpit in the above two scenarios would exit the cockpit and the last crew member to sit back at the controls would lock the door from the inside.)

(How do you put an elephant in the refrigerator? How do you put a giraffe in that refrigerator? Think about it....)

As if you Europeans didn't work hard to earn it?

(If you're going to get political, so can I. )

We'd best drop this line of discussion.

Shall we mark 2011 May 16 as the date deSitter gave up flying anything other than antique airplanes or third world airlines? They'll be all that still has direct control in a few more years. And I presume that broad statement of yours indicates you do not like autopilot at all. Didn't even the DC3 have some form of autopilot?

bearfoil, how many times do you remember me commenting about how unfriendly it is for the computers to toss up their metaphorical hands and deliver control to possibly surprised and unready pilots, especially when it could raise a flag and continue flying by the same rules the pilots are supposed to adopt in that situation?

I remember getting shouted down, too.

Of course, if THAT is what happened, AB would be into liability up to its neck unless it was following some higher authority's order. In that case the higher authority (the government?) would be at fault. Oh, my, would THAT be a picnic.

(Since when have governments been able to perform engineering? They do it nevertheless with the arrogance that comes with "POWER". "Because we can and we have a 'God given' right to do it.")

Yeah, the hamsters died of hypoxia when the compressors slowed down. They then fell out of the engines at altitude.

Bear, you should know me well enough by now to know I really have a hard time passing up straightlines....

CogSim, regarding two seated pilots the Chinese fire drills I posted can be tweaked to permit both of the seated pilots having had a chance to empty their bladders as needed during the interchange without having only one person at the controls for more than 20-30 seconds at a time. And when there were only two in the cockpit both would be seated at the controls. All they need to do is work through the procedure to see it can come together naturally.

With the bad wx zone so close I am sure they'd be all settled in for the duration of the crossing. Then they'd work out whatever was needed for emptying bladders when it was safe again.

Of course, conversation regarding radar here seems to indicate they might not have had the foggiest idea there was bad weather ahead before the fit hit the shan.

GarageYears, I think "synching" in context would be more like deriving a full sequence of events: A leads to B leads to C and D. C leads to E ... D leads to H, I, and J... Once that is done they have to figure out what the precise timing of each of these events in the cascade mean.

Everything is in order with even times. Now, how do those times really evolve into an event tree? Did B really cause C and D or was something else the real cause? This is where the brain burns out from the complexity that can evolve. (I presume they have procedures derived from long experience to mitigate the complexity exceeding brain capacity. Computers will help. But without the human brain and its experience computers might give quite inaccurate results even accounting for reaction times.)

Have you ever heard the quaint phrase "Microsoft Minutes"? It comes from the presentation of estimated time until a task, say a large file copy, is complete. You often see it sit at 3 minutes for several minutes; you see it skip backwards even by large amounts; you see it skip forwards even by large amounts; it's all "Microsoft Minutes".

I propose a similar measure "BEA Summers". (Did they say WHICH summer?)
I want to see the results almost as much as those most anxious. But I am not going to break a sweat over it until at least the end of the warm portion of the year in the Northern Hemisphere.

gums, I'd be inclined to add another point to your fine set. There should be a procedural change that says a human pilot must control and fly the plane for at least one hour out of every 10 in the air in stretches no smaller than half an hour. That is probably not enough to give the pilots experience for what they will be handed if things get too rough. But, I suspect it will help.