Test pilots?

1994 A330 test flight crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

“How did Airbus avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher? … this decision, to omit the stick shakers?”
The certification regulations do not require a shaker or stick pusher – or any other stall recovery ‘device’ if the aircraft meets the stalling criteria.
IMHO this would have been evaluated in all control law configurations, and thus we might assume, and as indicated by some incidents, that the A 330 has conventional stalling characteristics and does not require any special assistance or technique for stall identification or recovery.
A stick pusher is not installed to prevent a stall, it is a recovery device.

Yeah, it's all according certifications, even some crashs.

:ugh:

Dozy
 

We are where we are. Ticket prices decide what level of training Pilots receive - if you want 8 sims a year the the pax have to pay for it - unfortunately most of the SLF seem to be quite happy with the accident statistics as they are.

The unions in the main are mostly innefectual against the onslaught of the beanconters. If as a man you stand up you will be shot down. ( I tried it once and the union were hopeless)

Any way my friend please do not take this post to be aggresive as it it not intended this way.

safetypee. Can you provide the language ennabling the Pusher waiver? Because there are only a few tenths of a second between prevention and solution.

True. Read your HTBJ to get the background. A basic "stick nudger" was installed in all UK CAA certified 707s due to the less than benign characteristics of that airliner at the stall, and a full stick push was installed in all CAA-certified T-tail airliners because of the deep-stall characteristic inherent in that design (which was illustrated by pancaked 1-11s and Tridents that fell foul of it). I can't remember off the top of my head if one was installed on CAA-certified 747s, but Davies does mention that the stall characteristics are surprisingly benign, and that the aircraft tries to get it's nose down without significant assistance. Judging by the traces, it would appear that the A330 is equally benign, as long as one doesn't hammer the THS to the nose-up stop.

Now - as I said, I don't care about blame, I don't care about legal bobbins (though I hope that the victims families are properly compensated at the end of all of this), but what it ultimately boils down to for me is that it is unacceptable to induce a nose-up attitude of that magnitude (or make any control inputs as large as the PF was making) in the cruise phase of flight. None of your "but the THS should have...", "Why did the autopilot kick out...", "What if the displays were confusing..." matters as far as I'm concerned. If a pilot is expected to handle the aircraft in the cruise phase then he should damn well be trained to handle the aircraft in the cruise phase - automatically, manually, on the trim dials if necessary - and if airlines have been neglecting the training to do so then we have serious problems here.

@exeng - I'm well aware, but I'm also aware that there comes a time when the potential outcry forces manufacturers and/or airlines to listen. The DC-10 crash in Ermnonville was one such time. The A330 test crash which killed senior test pilot Nick Warner was another. Heaven knows it must be a lonely place when you believe that you're the only one sticking your head above the parapet, but that's the point at which you must band together and draw a line in the proverbial sand. We've had one accident where the pilots were so damned tired that they stalled their aircraft and maintained the controls in a stall-inducing attitude until it hit the ground. It now appears that we have a transatlantic flight where the designated pilot in charge seemed to have no idea how to control the thing manually at altitude. Eventually something has got to give. Right now, public faith in the methods of the finance industry and the methods it employs is at an all-time low - with enough pressure you could have the beancounters on the ropes. I'm not saying it will be easy, but if it was ever possible it has to be possible now.

@testpanel (below) - Forgive the guy his wording, which was slightly inaccurate - his point is fairly valid though. They may not have a stick-shaker, but they do have an aural warning and if I recall correctly the word "STALL" flashing in large letters in the centre of the ADI display of the PFD. As such it isn't likely that the annunciations could have been missed (for nearly a minute) unless there was something terribly wrong with either the systems (which the CVR and FDR apparently refute), or the perception of the crew.

But the ring comes round again, DOZE.

It does not matter for purposes of certification who is flying, that's the rub. Assume poor piloting, that is good.

Assuming poor piloting (the BUS does that subrosa, yes?) Without the Barn door doohickey, the STALL IS BENIGN, and recovery is straightforward, easies. It behaved in bizarre, untoward fashion, and would not behave in a straightforward manner. Protections are provided, STALL Recovery behaviour is Provided, on the basis of poor piloting...
We are now talking about survival after the fact, and ipso facto, how one gets to the dance is not about how one survives it.

No it sodding* doesn't. It has an interface that is designed in such a way that there are backstops to prevent inadvertant departure from controlled flight in the vast majority of cases, and to assist the pilots by taking a degree of workload off them during the more tedious portions of the flight (as has been the case with every airliner fitted with an FMS since the '70s).

If you continue with these wild generalisations, then I'm going to have to assume that you are simply trolling to create an argument and I'm not willing to rise to it.

* - I hope that expletive is within acceptable boundaries, mods!

A shaker is NOT a recovery device.............:ugh:

Hi,

SLF don't decide of seat price .. I tried once .. and it's no work :8

Mostly unions launch a strike for their members have more privileges or better wages
Rarely for a safety issues ...
Indeed .. unions are useless for safety grow

Lyman, as there are no requirements for a ‘pusher’ (or any other device) in the stall certification requirements, then no waiver is required. CS 25 / FAR 25.201 onwards.
The circumstances leading to this accident do not appear to differ significantly from the certification demonstration requirements, although the lack of initial recovery action (post stall 'identification') and trimmed condition may represent aspects which were not, and perhaps did not need to be demonstrated.

testpannel, to ease your headache, and for clarification – no recovery device (stick push or otherwise) is required at the stall; I think that most pilots understand that a shaker is not a recovery device.

Addressing pilots with an A320 type rating, is there anyone here who believes that had they been the PF AF447, without the benefit of hindsight, they would not have ended up in much the same situation?

what has this to do with airbus?

have you not been reading the accident reports from analogue aircraft that have stalled in the past?

Exactly the same reaction from crew flying, leading to exactly the same end result.

As much as I respect Aguadalte, his comments about going back to the stone age apply here. We have been there done it, seen the film, read the book.

Aircraft with tactile feedback, stick shakers and all the rest have stalled and crashed in the past just like AF447. The only difference between then and now is that safety has never been better.

The way forward and away from this caveman approach is not to go back to the stone age and install tactile feedback and stick shakers. The way forward is to improve on the technology (with sensible pilot input void of emotion) and increase training where necessary.

So .. airplanes and flight systems and many more things are progressing in the civil aviation world
It's just the pilots who stay the same ...
It's indeed a safety concern

Safety Concerns "stone age"
 

Nothing, except that that was the manufacturer of AF447.
It might apply to all FBW aircraft some way or the other.


With lesser reliable aircraft, with other workloads, with other environmental information. yet lost to the same cause: Unable to recover due to different reasons. Although we have no statistic how much aircraft really expierienced a stall situation and how much of those recovered succesfully. The percentage of stall events versus resulting crash would be the interesting one.

That is your argument again and again despite the fact that nobody wants cables and pulleys back, nobody an old style shaker and nobody a control column the size of a street lighting pole.

It has nothing to do with stone age to (re) add some features, which provide an aditional sensory input by a different sensor (not the eye). Nobody wants the old systems back, invent something brand new (must not bee JD-EE´s old pizza throwing device), something that helps to recognize the situation not only with eyes and ears. Let´s use the full engineering knowledge not to skip something for weight reduction and costs, but to add some new developped gadget despite weight and costs for safety concerns (nice username though).

By the way, we are back to the old stall recovery procedure (see TechLog) as well, why not use the formerly used tactile input channel as well? Pride? Cost? Stubborness?

Just work on a way to get the crews attention by using all available sensory channels to recognize and act to an extreme situation like AF447 got itself in. That must be the aim.

And to repeat it : No stick pushers like the old ones, no stick shakers like the old ones, no center yokes as the old ones, no pulleys and cables, no stone age. Invent something new instead of those with the same or even improved feedback results, and we won´t be back in stone age, but hopefully in a more safer future.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear fellow PPRuNers, please allow me to clear some of the misconsceptions you might have about procedure we're discussing here.

Too keep nomenclature proper: UAS procedure is not SOP. If it is to be applied, you have departed the domain of standard operation. It is EMERGENCY / ABNORMAL.

Emergency procedures are not written by company lawyers, they are written by test pilots. They write them in blood in of those who were unfortunate to trespass into territories forbidden to them by aerodynamics, meteorology or mechanics and underline them in blood of those who were unable to follow them for whatever reasons.

If an emergency procedure could talk this would be what it says to pilot: "I am your emergency procedure. Know me well, apply me properly, timely and precisely when you need me or die. Second guess me only if you are absolutely sure you're better off without than with me but accept you very well might die if you are wrong."

Values of 5° degrees and climb power are written in the book but they are not to be set by the book. They are memory items, they have to be known by heart and set without undue delay. On Airbi they are to be maintained until attitude and setting appropriate for flight phase and weight are read out from QRH and set. They keep you both out of stall and overspeed at any weight even if you fumble with QRH and it takes you couple of minutes to find the table or even if you maintain them until fuel runs out.

5° pitch with climb power, applied at cruise altitude/level will keep you out of both stall and overspeed on any Airbus, 318 to 380, at any weight. So on Piper Cub, ATR-42, B737, Su-27 Flanker and her derivatives (provided external stores don't affect maximum allowable speed more than drag, that is), An-225 Mriya and almost anything in between. Designs on which it might or might not work are relatively overpowered ones with relatively low limiting Mach number, such as early jet transports.

It's basic aerodynamics and performance, folks.

franzl you have gained my respect on 2 counts.

1) you have read and understood my posts
2) That was very much a forward looking post.

Safety Concerns,
No disrespect,but your callsign is very ironic if you dont mind me saying.

Not an indictment of the aircraft,but of the pilot or training.It adds nothing to your argument.

Disagree.Strongly.Not for Airbus,no.They cant go back now,I agree.They must stick to their guns.But for other manufacturers,the way forward is not to copy Airbus.The only thing Airbus have actually done is invent a new way of crashing by totally disconnecting man from machine through its complex and not very user-friendly interface(visual feedback alone-myriad of changing laws during abnormals-autotrim that suddenly cuts out-SS with no feedback-no feedback TL's-stall warning that cuts out etc etc).

KISS.Old is good.Old is tried and tested.Train the pilots better.Thats the way forward.These are my safety concerns,old chap.

Clandestino:

Whilst I appreciate your points enumerated above, I am more persuaded by PJ2's take on the UAS drill, which is that
1) UAS at cruise altitudes is a malfunction (rather than an emergency)
2) at altitude, the need to climb before trouble shooting is absent.
3) Hence, rote response of IF UAS THEN 5deg nose up does not apply to the malfunction arising in cruise.

On second thought, if you were posting a bit tongue in cheek, then a wry grin from me to you. :cool:

I fully understand EP's and required memory items. Used to teach such things, I did, and had to apply a few when things like compressor stalls and engine fires arose in flight. Memory itms are very handy at such times, to be sure.

Have you actually understood anything that has happened in the past 20 years regarding aviation and technology? It may have escaped your attention but FBW accident rates are pretty impressive.

Older aircraft have suffered the same fate, it is documented that pilots reacted incorrectly in a similar situation with all your bells and buzzers yet somehow you twist that round to Airbus are responsible for designing a new way of crashing. :ugh::ugh:

RetiredF4 hit the nail on the head.

It is going that way whether you like it or not because flying is fundamentally safer with more automation. There will always be the odd one or two accidents yet designers will not lose their nerve because statistically flying has become much much safer.

Systems reliability has improved with better technology for all aircraft manufacturers.Thats all.Nothing to do with the Airbus interface design/philosophy.

Of course.The pilots are the same.They dont change.Some are good,most are average, some are below average.

No,he did not hit the nail on the head.All commercial airliners are 2 man crew last time I checked.What better feedback is there than a great big control wheel beween your legs?Dont try to reinvent the wheel.It works and it works well.

Did you read the report?Is it you that doesnt understand whats been going on in the last 20 years?They couldnt fly the plane.They were automation-dependent and that dependence was condoned by both manufacturer and airline.
:mad:

Apologies for asking again.

Was not (at least) the standby Artificial Horizon working?

Would not the fact that it would have been showing mostly blue sky have given them a clue to the marked nose-up attitude?

And thereby an indication of incipient/actual stall?

Why wouldn't they have looked at it?

So does the sidestick - in almost all cases the people kvetching about the Airbus controls and system interfaces are those that have never flown one. Also, not that I'm one for whataboutery, but EAL401 would never have happened if the L-1011 was fitted with a sidestick.

For what feels like the thousandth time, It's not better, not worse, just different.

Also, let's just examine your argument - you want the systems simple, but you advocate yokes and force-feedback. There is no way to implement force-feedback in a digital flight control system without making the system more complex and adding thousands more potential points of failure - that's just engineering reality.

Actually the manufacturer seemed quite concerned that the automation was being used by at least some airlines in a way that they did not intend:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ys-airbus.html

This article came out a few months after AF447, but you can't say that Airbus have been blase about it, nor have they applied any pressure to have it viewed as pilot error and leave it at that.

@Franzl (below) - That's a valid opinion, sure. But I would recommend at least trying the systems out or making an in-depth effort to understand the design decisions that were made - and why they are made, before saying something "must" be changed. As yet, I've seen no evidence that either change you suggest would have helped in this situation or any other Airbus FBW incident, and seeing as there are thousands of the things flying people around the world, trouble-free, every day I'd say the design is as sound as any other as it stands - it's not perfect, but what system is?

[As always, caveat emptor - I'm not a pilot. But the fact remains that there are plenty of pilots on here that are either current on the FBW Airbus, have flown the FBW Airbus and are now on a different type, or are retired FBW Airbus pilots and very few of them have a negative thing to say about the control hardware or logic compared to other types. Several have also said that the aircraft is a dream to hand-fly, thus scotching any ideas about it being designed for automatic flight only.]

Rananim
 

Let´s be realistic, the change is made, and from general layout it is not a bad design. As i read in between the lines you seem to accept that fact for single seated fighter aircraft, but not for a two man cockpit.

I can understand that and i´m with you concerning feedback what the other guy is doing with the stick. I´ve never flown a yoke, and i was always wondering how somebody can execute those tiny necessary commands i could do with the stick inmy F4. Later on i did the ATPL Sim Sessions in a caravelle simulator and missed my stick badly.

I think the SS design can improve to fullfill these tasks. That ranges from feedback to repositioning of the SS from the side consoles to the centre console. Sure some equipment can be moved from the center to elsewhere. The throttles only move some switches, however they are still designed as needing to move an oxcart. Or put the throttles amd trimwheels to the side controls, the interconection of those shouldnt be that difficult to achieve.

I agree with Safety Concerns, there will be no going back to the old design, but we need to get back the old functionality and interface quality of this old design.

Hi,

I asked also ...
Seem's the pilots of the AF447 and pilots here .. don't like to use the Stdby Horizon
Or if they use it ... they use it in an discriminatory manner .. they check it for leveling wings ( or make mayonnaise for AF447) but don't see blue color .. :8
Daltonism :confused:

@jcjeant - That's funny, I seem to recall the Captain specifically directing the flight crew's attention towards the ISIS horizon according to the CVR. I don't think we'll ever know if the flight crew ever looked at it beforehand.

(my bold)
Well, I also agree with this affirmation, there will be no going back to the old design, because it would cost a huge sum of money and effort, and would specially cost the "face" of Airbus Industrie's system design.
What bothers me, is not to see the need for the functionality and interface quality the old design used to have. To improve the tactile feed-back of what your aircraft is doing is to move forward. The challenge of today, would be to create a system much more "user-friendly" (Human Factors speaking) aimed at what would best suit the already identified weaknesses of pilot/machine interface.
When I say that if it was not for men to be never content with what they had achieved, we would still be in the Stone Age, is to put in practice the ideals of men and women like Da Vinci, Einstein, Neils Bohr, Marie Curie, etc., who had the virtue of being open minded and were not afraid of criticism once their goal was to do the things they already did well, but wanted to do better next time (and not get lazy under the glory of their achievements).
There is always room for progression and if to progress one would have to use old stuff like feed-back functionalities or tactile feed-back, so be it!

Regarding the use of the UAS memory items (5º/Climb Thrust) in CRZ, I do agree with PJ2's idea that it is not worth to destabilize an aircraft that is already flying well in present conditions. Pilots who are used to hand-fly their aircraft to TOC do know what ATT they are handling at those altitudes (never more than 3º/3.5º, even overpowered A310's would use no more than 3.5º when reaching TOC or changing altitudes). An ATT of 5º is sufficient to slowly decelerate an heavy bird and bring it to the onset of a stall.:uhoh:

Clandestino;

Thanks for keeping the dialogue on this drill alive. The disagreement on how to apply the drill in force at the time.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Clandestino in post #3167

Emergency procedures are not written by company lawyers, they are written by test pilots.

---

You're probably right but I'm not a test pilot and don't actually know how drills and checklists obtain the form they do. I do know that the UAS drill has many iterations throughout its history since it was first instituted after the Birgenair and Aeroperu crashes.

When the Airbus FCOM Bulletin and the UAS drill first emerged, a pitot (or static) failure was assumed to have occurred at takeoff as the two accidents had. Of course, it is an emergency under those circumstances and the guidance in the memorized drill was appropriate.

An ADR Disagree event occurred on an A330 as early as 1996. The characteristics were pitot icing, an undesired stall warning and a latching of Alternate law for the rest of the flight. I believe these events drove some of the changes which we see today regarding the stall warning, (inhibition above M0.866), the (10sec?) delay in latching Alternate Law, etc. Airbus issued Bulletin #11 dated October, 1997.

I don't know if an Unreliable Airspeed Drill/Checklist was in place at that time or not. The earliest drill I know of is November of 2002; there may be examples prior to this date.

Both FCOM Bulletin 11 and the UAS drill at the time, (found in 1.02.34 - Navigation) stated that the memorized pitch attitude and thrust setting were to be flown. The UAS drill qualified this by stating under "How to Apply This Procedure":

" - if the wrong speed or altitude information does not affect the safe conduct of the flight, first apply the ADR Check procedure to identify the faulty ADR(s) and switch it (them OFF. If necessary, enter the unreliable speed procedure, or severe turbulence table (if in cruise), to set the pitch and thrust corresponding to the current flight phase.

...

- if the safe conduct of the flight is affected (all the speed indications are unreliable, ro the wrong speed indication cannot not [sic] be positively identified):

- immediately apply the memory items: AP/FD/ATHR OFF, and fly the memory pitch - thrust settings";
- Then, once stabilzed, refer to the QRH in order to determine the pitch and thrust settings required by the current flight phase;

... " etc

There is no guidance as to what the meaning of "stabilized" is in this context. Does it mean, "stabilized in the (resulting) climb"?, or does it mean, "stabilized in level flight"?, because setting a pitch attitude of 5deg in cruise is going to result in a strong climb.

In my own experiment* the pitch to 5deg causes an initial climb rate of about 4000fpm with a commensurate decrease in airspeed even with thrust set in the CLB detent. It takes about two minutes to reach FL400 by which time the airspeed is around 200kts.

These numbers are nominal, and are in the same ballpark as those seen in the AF447 data.

Two minutes is not a long time as we know; by the time the QRH is brought out and the page found and numbers read, the airplane is already a long way from stable, level flight and is climbing while the energy level is reducing.

Later UAS drills are not materially different. However, two flight crew training manuals I am aware of states,

"A330/A340 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL - ABNORMAL OPERATIONS, NAVIGATION




So, although the drill/checklist state that setting 5deg of pitch "protects" the airplane from stall, I see the opposite, and I can't see a test pilot actually thinking this was a better solution than remaining level while the QRH was brought out.

One can certainly re-establish stable, level flight by immediately flying the QRH pitch and thrust settings, but what has been lost is the situational awareness of what one's speed is. We know that at cruise flight levels there is not a lot of reserve power. So instead of staying level and keeping the pitch and thrust that was "successful" immediately prior to the loss of airspeed information, the crew loses that awareness by climbing and losing energy, which must be regained.

I would argue that it is not the "Is the safety of flight impacted?" that should be the qualifying condition, but the flight phase and the altitude at which the failure occurs. That removes the possibly-subjective assessment of whether one's aircraft is in jeopardy or immediate danger, and instead outlines those conditions in which the aircraft either is, or is not in immediate danger, which is predicated on the Thrust Reduction Altitudes and the Takeoff flight phase.

At cruise flight phase the airplane isn't in immediate danger if the airspeed information is lost. One has pitch, altitude, VSI and thrust indications from which stable flight can be maintained while the pitot's and ADRs sort themselves out, or if they don't, one has a stable airplane in level flight from which to troubleshoot the ADRs.

This emminently satisfies the first rule of aviation - "Aviate". Once the aircraft is under full control, then carry on with the drills, by first announcing them so that everyone knows what you're doing and can monitor and provide assistance. One continues to Navigate which means ensuring headings are suitable while the abnormals are being looked after, and one continues to Communicate which means using standard calls to announce the abnormal or the drill and, where an action is irreversible, (engine shutdown, for example), confirmation from the other crew member, (PF) before taking action.

To address Mountain Bear's earlier point, none of this is the result of "hindsight bias" or second-guessing the crew. I am well aware of the issue and have written about it on PPRuNe. I don't claim immunity from the bias but what is the boundary between hindsight, and examining what occurred and is known in the data? It isn't easy to establish. We have to start somewhere and then remain cautious. While we may not know what the PF saw on his PFD or elsewhere, there is nothing which should have prevented the crew from carrying out these SOPs, which are also designed by test pilots and manufacturers as well as individual airlines. The question will be, Why were these actions not carried out in the manner trained?, which is a reasonable question to ask for the Human Factors Group.

I am glad that the discussion on this continues as I think it is a material factor in this accident. We do not know what was displayed on the PF's PFD, (although we know that the BEA is pursuing this possibly through the QAR) and we do not know what UAS training was provided or what reactions where recalled.

But the fact that there is some disagreement in how this should be done, means that at least a discussion is warranted and useful. I have yet to see or hear a good reason why flight with pitch and thrust settings which existed prior to the loss of airspeed data should not be maintained and instead the aircraft pitch set, by rote, to 5deg and then without delay, (as per the FCTM remarks), the QRH Procedure to level off and troubleshoot the problem" must be done to avoid exceeding aircraft speed limits, (which we must assume means both high and low speed boundaries).

Thanks again, Clandestino. Agreement isn't the goal, but thinking about the way this drill and checklist is designed and intended to be executed, is.

- I don't think we have any reason to suspect that any of the attitude indicators were not functioning properly - including the *** big ones in front of the pilots - unless someone is hiding something.

@BOAC:Unless the BEA is simply being coservative and admitting that it's unknown.

That said, were you and I in Vegas, I suspect we'd both bet the same on the likelihood of the PFD, RH, being functional. Were it not, I suspect at least something on CVR would have come up, but we do have the PNF switching to 3 ... perhaps a sign of non verbal communication regarding PFD being suspect? :confused:

Unknown.

... or just at a loss to explain the protracted failure to recognise inappropriate attitude?

The roll axis traces in the first half minute after AP disconnect suggest the PF was struggling to get hold in this period, with several regular cycles of overcontrol left/right.

I cannot envisage this happening unless he had a working display as reference ... too regular.

Proof positive - or not?

Certainly makes sense

Mac the knife
It seems interesting to look at the normal and stand-by instruments mounted on 'Airbus A380
------------------
The ADIRS is composed of 3 Air Data and Inertial
Reference Units (ADIRUs).

>The Air Data (AD) section computes primary air data
parameters using data from different probes installed
on the aircraft fuselage:

>1 Multi-Function Probe (MFP) per ADIRU
provides total pressure (Pt), Total Air
Temperature (TAT) and Angle-of-Attack (AOA)
Measurements

>1 Side Slip Angle (SSA) probe per ADIRU
provides the sideslip angle

>2 Integrated Static Probes (ISPs) per ADIRU
provide the static pressure (Ps)

-----------------

The Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS)
provides backup flight and navigation displays in the case
of an ADIRS, FMS or CDS failure.


The ISIS is composed of:
2 independent ISIS units,
the Standby Flight Display (SFD) unit and
Standby Navigation Display (SND) unit
1 standby pitot probe (Pt)
2 standby static probes (Ps)
-Internal gyros (attitude).



In normal configuration:

-The SFD unit computes and displays air data and
inertial reference parameters (SFD)
-The SND unit computes and displays navigation and
flight plan information (SND).

Each unit can perform all the ISIS functions.


---------------

Now on A380 there are 3 multifunction probes and 1 normal probe air speed for ISIS?
and how many probes and static ports are mounted on the sides of the fuselage?


.

I guess noone can figure out why they didn't just hold their previous attitude, about 2.5 degrees up and about 85% N1 and get UAS checklist instead of pulling up into a stall at high altitude. If the low time PF didn't know any better why did the PNF let him continue, I don't care who was designated captain. Neither one had a clue what they were doing. Didn't they teach them that in Alt law you have no stall protection? Couldn't they have figured that out themselves? No normal law, no stall protection.

160 pages in, and this should have been said--and of course has been any number of times--maybe 150 pages ago and this thread closed. Deal with it.

I know it has been brought up many times but posts in the past have suggested it was not recoverable by any crew. Indicating it wasn't entirely their fault. I disagree. It was their fault. Airbus made it easy for them to do what they did but it was their fault. I think pilots of low experience thought the Airbus couldn't stall so disregarded normal flying rules and thought no matter how hard you pulled back on the SS it wouldn't stall. That only works in normal law. They were in alternate law.

bubbers44;
Below is a typical CBT image from the late 90's. Alternate Law is covered very well in any Airbus course I've seen or for which I've had access to the training materials.



http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-KRNS...-KRNSqw4-L.jpg

So is it A, B or C? I never flew an Airbus, by choice. I just learn here.

Bubbers44

To help you think it is a normal A/C without stall protection!

I personally think this will eventually come down to inappropriate inputs PRIOR to the stall and having "looked" at the scenario you have to really hold the aft input to GET the A/C into that position. Extremely high rates of descent 15,000+ and the recovery will require at least 15degrees + nose down and TOGA, once the nose is down.

However during the entry the STALL warning is continually "sounding" and even if you had just let go of the sidestick, after the initial input, the stall warning stops and an extreme attitude is NOT achieved. You have to HOLD it in.

Having got themselves into the deep stall then things would have been very confusing, so we can perhaps understand why they did not know what was going on, but the A/C should not have got there in the first place. This is NOT an "Airbus" problem but perhaps a "pilot" problem. Difficult as it is to say and we always defend our profession but we do sometimes make mistakes / errors and I have made a few in my time.

The only good thing to come out of this, at the sad cost of many lives and as we used to say when I was in the Military "I learnt about flying from that!", is that I hope all of us "pilots" are now thinking about what WE would do in our A/C be it an Airbus / Boeing and we had an UAS situation at night and at altitude manually flying.

Yes, I agree, keep a stable attitude and power, get out the UAS checklist, fine tune it a bit and fly out of the icing. It takes some piloting skills but don't we all have them?