I stayed current on hand flying by hand flying. That is the only way you can do it and not just 30 minutes in a sim. I practiced using standby instruments only and not looking at the standard panel. If you rely totally on automation, good luck with your career. If you are very lucky it might work but don't count on it. If the stall warning ever goes off just nudge the nose down and add a little power like you did in the Cessna 150. We learned that in lesson 3 remember?

Post of the century mate.

Many thanks to those who posted/sent me the full link to the EA401 report.

Amazing logic. :D
Bottom line, whatever happened, the pilots can never be blamed!
That maybe be a popular view in a pilots forum, but ....:oh:

And not necessarily meant to be linked in any way with AF447, if you have problems to believe, why even highly regarded professionals suddenly act like absolut amateurs who have no clue whatsoever, it does happen. Sudden momentarily "incapacitation" happens. Humans are like this.

So why did I ever bother practicing speedle/needle/airball? I could have just phoned it in as an "instrumentation problem."

Ihg

but that's why we have two person crews.

crew errors are typically

Knowledge based

skill based

or

rule based

need facts to decide

I did read. And I don't know what you are exactly referring to. I was just expressing my doubts that a pilot, who is able to completely ignore a continuous stall warning for nearly one minute, even applies full aft stick during this alarm, suddenly (during the faulty intermittent stall warning later) not only regards stall warning again, but also adopts by 'instant learning' to do exactly the opposite to what he has ever been taught before.( see your own post: http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45687...ml#post6621429 ). It's simply my view on that, nothing more.
So, no 'high altitude' approch to stall / stall training? The 'ordinary' approach to stall training would have done: nose down. No difference at high altitude.

The BEA press meeting Q and A from 29 July2011 is very interesting .. maybe more interesting than the interim report N°3
It's show the feelings of the BEA (at least those of the director Troadec and the chief investigator Bouillard)
Many disturbing questions (journalists are good at the task to ask disturbing questions) are not directly answered .. not because no infos ..
Some answers are evidently not honest ... but I let you only judge on this subject

French:
Transcription de la conférence de presse du 29 juillet 2011
English:
Transcription de la conférence de presse du 29 juillet 2011

Ihg
 

Is it really that easy as you say it? What was then the reason for doing wrong?

You might read in the history of upset and stall recovery procedure development. Since 2004 it changed 2007 and 2009 (after AF447).

upsets and stall

Those changes and developing and refining the procedures and the asociated recommended (unfortunately only recommended) training would not be necessary according to your saying. Did you do stalls and spins in real aircraft or simulator? No, not approach to stalls, real stalls? I did it in real like some others. It´s a expierience and you dont stay cool when doing it.

If you say the upset should not have happened at all, i might agree. But the recognition and the recovery from stall is some different matter. Two years ago when i mentioned the possibility of stall on this forum, it was rebuked as not possible. Probably AF447 thought as well that it was not possible, by the way also the words of the crew on the CVR.

Not possible? Any failure is possible with humans, also the misjudgement of 3 pilots.

Which ones?

As I write in my post "but I let you only judge on this subject "
Read the Q and A and maybe you will find some ... this is personal appreciation
Not all have the same feeling about honesty

I think Airbus convinced Airbus operators it couldn't be stalled so why not pull back on the SS because it can't stall even with UAS. The captain most likely could have handled it just fine with his experience but these guys couldn't. Hopefully we can let these guys learn how to hand fly an airplane if the autopilot goes south from now on. I can't believe we have reached this stage of automation dependency. It can be changed, you know.

I'll follow Flydive1's lead - which answers are "not honest"?

Since you're prepared to call the BEA liars in public, I think you ought to back up your accusation in public without the snide evasive remark.

The only thing which seems evident to me is that you're determined to push your own nonsense about this inquiry.

That is a myth perpetuated by airline TREs who don't consider anything other than Normal Law. I once had a significant 'discussion' with a ba training captain who assured me that it was impossible to stall an A320. Lord knows how many pilots he'd passed that piece of BS on to.....

If people took the time and trouble to RTFM they would soon understand the aircraft's FBW envelope protection features and how they are degraded if Normal Law is not available. But no-one pays them to do that, so they don't bother....

Why is this allowed?
 

The authorities certify the aircraft knowing that it is possible that Otto throws in the towel at high altitude and the human has to take over.

So how is it within the rules for Air France to designate an FO with no experience of manual flying at altitude as PF (and as Capt's deputy)?

Methink it's simple to answer .. AF seem's no have any FO with experience of manual flying at altitude (at least .. no training) .. so the designation for a Capt's deputy is also simple .. no mistake ....

Automation/Hand-flying
 

Does the sim provide a good replication for hand-flying skills at high altitude? Obviously this is important to practice in the various degraded laws if so.

I believe from the tone and content of some folk that they see as straightforward hand-flying a heavy A330 in alternate law (without protections) in a jet at night at high altitude in severe turbulence with many distracting and conflicting audio AND visual warnings going off, along with wildly misleading airspeed displays due to ADR faults. This ain't so. I've had this happen in part climbing through FL200 in an A321 in stormy weather (not inside a cb) at night, and it is not easy for the crew to manage.

However, I am not implying that a cool head and a competent pair of hands cannot manage the situation, simply that it is far trickier than non-A330 guys may think. Trite remarks about hand-flying and automation are useless. No-one flew the 707 or DC8 in the cruise by hand unless forced to. And that's 50 years back.Incidentally we all hand-fly the 330 when operating; long-haul means we don't do it so regularly as short-haul guys. Twas ever thus.

RoyHudd -- Surely these are two different issues? Hand-flying skills and instrumentation. From the published CVR evidence the pilots did not know for sure what the aircraft was doing. Something like "but the airspeed is mad, no?" from the PF. The instruments have to work and the pilots need to have training and experience. Neither by itself would have saved the aircraft, it seems....back to the classic "accidents are almost invariably due to a chain of events, not a single cause".

RoyHudd- are you saying that the Instrumentation interface is poorly suited to hand flying in aircraft upset?

Pilot training aside, are we getting to the nub of the matter now?

These desperate situations are survived by those designers, engineers and aircrew who understand the simple, time limited, essence of the problem to be solved.

If the behavioural effect of the technology is not directly towards enacting the simple solution to the aircraft upset, then it becomes "The Problem Itself".

West Caribbean 708 similaritites
 

Saw an episode of "Mayday" on TV over the weekend concerning West Caribbean 708, an MD-82.

Report: West Caribbean MD82 at Machiquez on Aug 16th 2005, did not recover from high altitude stall

Although they got in to the high altitude stall in a different way from AF447, it seems that they also didn't get the nose down to unstall the wing but rode the stall all the way down to impact.

Different types and different causes for stall but same pilot behaviour in the stall and same recommendations to improve training in handling high altitude stalls.

mimpe re: your last: Tip of cap, and deep bow.


Three qualifieds seemingly rejected the thought that a/c was STALLED.

Several thousand others are scolding because they KNOW she was.

I'll take the Pilots' side. If only to avoid the "ick" factor by association.

As I said some time back. Flying an A330 at height is not that easy, it is very sensitive. Someone said treat the side stick as if it has Dog !!!!! on it, that may give you some idea.
As for practice in the SIM. Well up to now I have not flown any simulator that has the correct algorithms ,to give the correct feel at height. The sims fly the same at 5000ft as they do at 40000ft so until they are modified IMHO practice in the sim is pointless in terms of handling characteristic at height.

Lyman/Bearfoil/whatever,

There are no "sides". There are only questions for which we need to find answers, and they are:

• What happened?
• How did it happen?
• Why did it happen?
• How can we stop it from happening again to the best of our ability?

Anything else is purely academic and/or lawyer fodder and has no place here.

Doze I cannot argue that. However, should sides be taken, I am available. One cannot have it both ways.

What is "HERE"? I think that as an engineer, you favor the TECH aspect, That is on the other thread. Bless you, I think that is appropriate. I am trying to fold my opinions into the frame, I promise you.

You are so on target, but we are humans, and have not the discipline I think you want/expect.

It is this lack of discipline and constant harping that prevented a career in the line. Guilty!

The career choice was my decision. I ended up in independent aeronautical pursuit, and I have held the gift. It is a gift, it is not a right, nor even a grant. It is a gift, and due the sacrifices of those before us whose names I cannot remember, it is not "inherently dangerous".
It is safe, when practiced with reason, and dare I say, Profitable?

Hi,

DW
Honestly .. the type of accident (stall situation and not recovery) is not the first .. so many were investigated .. and many recommendations made (in fact always the same .. and surely the BEA final report AF447 will again make the same recommendations)
The problem is not make recommendations (they are enough) .. the problem is who will take the hammer to drive the point and force those to whom the recommendations are intended to put them into practice
Recommendations are only words without value if they are not put into practice
If a donkey does not move forward with a carrot you should use a stick

5 degrees?
 

In the BEA press conference linked by jcjeant, J-P Troadec says:

'the pilot should have applied the unreliable IAS procedure and in fact this procedure consists specifically of adopting a pitch attitude of 5°, whereas the pitch attitude that was adopted at that moment was greater.'

So once again we have confirmed, without comment, that the SOP in case of UAS in cruise involves raising the nose - just not as greatly as the PF with his large stick input raised it.

PJ2 has argued against any change in pitch before starting the checklist, and his arguments sound very convincing to me. Why would you make any change in the flight path of an aircraft in level cruise that has shown no signs of instability? And how long would you keep on at this pitch angle? Indefinitely? Surely the chances of inadvertent overspeed are less threatening than the chance of getting yourself too high, too slow.

Is that (overspeed) the only reason to raise the nose, or have I missed something?

How can we stop it from happening again to the best of our ability?
 

Posted in another forum in response to the question:- “What might an Operations or Training manager learn from the AF 447 accident?”

General points:
1. Remind ourselves that it is not possible to understand, and thus predict, how humans will react in all situations, and that …

2. Humans cannot understand all of the interactive aspects of new technology in their operating environment (man, machine, and organisation); either from an operators view or that of a manager / regulator.

3. The operating environment has many threats which are believed to be contained, but can still pose serious problems due to changes in the aircraft, or the operation, or human behaviour, e.g. ice crystals, new aircraft type, operating closer to Cbs. The industry at large and individually we must be aware of the hazards due to change, assumption, and complacency.

Specific points:
A. Add knowledge of ice crystals to the Cb threat, reinforce the need to avoid Cbs by a large margin – more than any ‘legal’ minimum distance.

B. Re-evaluate situation assessment training, and surprise / stress management behaviours.

C. Re-evaluate SOPs for flight instrument failures and flight with unreliable airspeed (UAS). What do crews need to know to determine the difference?
• Determine in what circumstances each SOP might be used, state the assumptions made, and need to consider alternative actions.
• Reduce the complexity of drills – is there a need for a table of attitude vs wt vs thrust vs altitude for UAS. Confirm what is important and why – what are the assumptions.

D. Asses the crew’s dependency on automation; does this affect the currency of hand flying skills. Question if the use of the Fight Director detracts from basic instrument flying skills, or knowledge / rules of thumb for aircraft attitude / power setting for various stages of flight.

E. Consider what drills / crew action might be required in critical situations if either the crew misidentifies the situation, or with good awareness, acts incorrectly: ‘what if’; is there an 'undo' option'.

F. Report and share all incident / event data; follow up all technical investigations with a HF view. Share data with other operators, and seek data from other operators and consider applicability in your operation.

G. Require that aircraft type training identifies the significant differences between FBW and conventional aircraft control, and that the crew are trained in these features, e.g trim followup (autotrim) – when to check / use manual trim, lack of / differnt control force feedback or change of force with speed – what alternative crosschecks could be used.

Key items:
Safety management, safety culture, a learning culture, professionalism, reduce complexity.
Remember that certification requirements only provide a minimum standard.
The company Philosophy and Policy should reflect the need for a safety margin in all aspects of operations, publish this in Procedures (and training material), and Practice this both in training and operations – then check. PPPP

Epilogue:
Occasionally the industry encounters situations beyond the limits of certification, these are ‘black-swans’ where the industry depends, either consciously or not, on the human rescuing the situation. We celebrate many notable successes. Unfortunately we have to suffer failures because the situation is beyond human capability; this hurts our pride, beliefs, and our professional standards, yet correctly we search for a solution, we have to keep on doing our best.
In such circumstances the human is still best placed to evaluate and judge the situation; but the human might benefit from some generic human training to improve awareness, managing surprise, and recall knowledge; aspects of higher professional standards. (Excerpt from an earlier post to this forum).
And remember … (taken from a related blog) “… the software quit before the human.”

Is it legal?
 

I tried earlier, but it doesn't seem to be important. Here goes again...

It is legal for AF to leave the cockpit in the hands of pilots with no competence in manual flying at high altitude....

... when the plane is certified to oblige them to fly manually at high altitude if the autopilot disconnects... ?

oldchina:

I'll add to your "is it legal" a less concise question.

Is it right?

vaneyck

Good point, in that a pitch increase to 5 deg at that power setting would seem to result in a climb and deceleration, where on wasn't required, nor desired. Indeed, some minutes before, the crew had remarked on how a planned climb could not be done since temps had not developed as forecast.

Why go from S & L to decelerating climb when there is no need for it? :confused: If this is what the BEA contact is suggesting, I am puzzled as to why.

@oldchina: The problem is said aircraft was considered "impossible" to stall (no matter how crazy that idea actually is) prior to AF447. This has changed with stall awareness and recovery training now being mandated as a result.

Yes it is preposterous that any such suggestion would be made, but it is implied by the lack of training and the fact that FBW systems are infallible as far as Airbus and the regulators are concerned.

I'm willing to bet that whatever the outcome of the investigation, the systems and training will not be considered a root cause, merely a "contributing factor", and that the crew should have known better (but I'm straying into speculation now).

And, it is of course illegal. waiting to hear the pleadings am I.

@Lonewolf and vaneyck:

More to the point: if you have an aircraft flying in a known pitch/power combination that is sustaining level flight and stable speed quite happily, why use approximations from the book in the first instance?

If the aircraft had been upset and at the same time airspeed became (or was already) unreliable then it is understandable, as it at least gets you back to a ball-park figure, but surely the crew were not so absent-minded as to have not made a mental note of the current pitch and power? They are, after all, supposed to be flying the aircraft?

Wrong (IMO). Airbus were pretty bullish in the early days of the A320 project, but they long since reconsidered their opinions, and anyone in this day and age passing on the idea that an FBW Airbus "cannot stall" needs to be R'ing T F'ing M pretty sharpish.

Jcjeant mentioned that this situation is not new and that recommendations have been made - he also seemed to imply that the recommendations have not been heeded (though I'm personally not so sure). What is the case is that this is the first incident in a *long* time where it has happened at a major flag-carrier, and as such, anyone wishing to sweep it under the carpet is going to face an uphill struggle doing so. To the industry's credit, Airbus, Boeing and the EU and US regulators have jumped on this and have since put forward a major overhaul of training criteria as regards stall training, which is a step in the right direction, which hopefully will plug one hole in the cheese.

However, as an interested SLF I have to beseech the piloting community to press forward with this, using their organisation and the fact that they are one of the last remaining unionised and associated professional groups in the western world to explain to management in no uncertain terms that the rot has gone far deeper and needs to be cleaned up before we suffer another incident like this.

Speaking for myself, whatever I may feel about the causes - I don't care about blame. I don't care about the politics that will follow in the legal battle, where lawyers for all concerned parties will try to blame the other parties in an effort to minimise liability. I care about the system as a whole being made safer.

Blame in itself, is an opinion, without authority.

Responsibility is a Horse of a different Hue.

How did AIRBUS avoid the installation of a Shaker/Pusher?

How can you ask such a silly question?;)

Airbus has reinvented the art of flying, approved by BEA....!

This is why I made the comment I did regarding the aircraft being considered "un-stallable".

It was considered that the aircraft would prevent itself from stalling. The small detail omitted is that it only does this in Normal Law. Combined with the STALL audio warning (problem: it is silenced when the airspeed drops below 60 kts), this was considered sufficient protection.

Repeated for emphasis.

I will grant that a variety of certification decisions of similar weight (and posible lethal side effects) have been made over the years, but when you consider how pervasive shakers are, throughout the airline industry world wide, deliberately omitting them is a signal regulatory decision in a certification process. Not saying this is any sort of golden bullet, see Colgan, but another hole in the cheese? Likely. (But if it cuts out as the SW does, rendered useless in this case??? Not sure).

Of note in the causation chain analysis: regulating authority and manufacturer (and who else?) are the parties to this compromise, which saves cost (and possibly weight?) and reduces by a small amount system complexity.

Question: does anyone know what the test pilots involved in the A330 program thought of this decision, to omit the stick shakers?

There are a few lapels upon which I'd like to have been a fly, eh? :cool:
Nicely put.

'Horse of a different hue'.

Say what ?

Mr. O. 'A horse of a different color', meaning: a different thing altogether. Responsibility is necessary, and entirely proper. It will be used to gauge the size and shape of each meatus in the cheese. Altogether proper, and to argue against it is to feign "JUSTICE". That means only the result matters, and politically wise is that.

You will have noticed my reference to "She did not, technically, STALL". Now that the passion has subsided, make me a bet that this comment was unnoticed by the (both) legal teams.

Airbus is currently attempting to suss a way to fold my comment into their bleatings. "It wasn't actually a STALL, so Shaker/Pusher are mooted......"

I would piss gramma's grave, were it only not so.....

Hi,

I dunno ...
What I'm sure is that the test pilots involved in the A330 test program thought that an artificial horizon was mandatory
So .. it's an artificial horizon instrument in the A330
How the pilots AF447 (apparently) were not aware of this fact ? or used it in a discriminatory manner ( horizontal wings indication only )