No-one was in charge
 

How can AF explain that there is no-one clearly in charge in the cockpit after the Capt leaves?

Paying pax wouldn't believe it. This has nothing to do with PF / PNF.

If the AP disconnects that is not the time to discuss who's the boss.

Bearfoil and xcitation:

I fully agree that the pilots did not have a cakewalk presented to them. And in my previous posts I have always pointed out that things could have been quite chaotic on the flight deck, AB's stall warning was not their friend, and that from a very early point in the three-minute scenario, the plane may have been unrecoverable.

But that said, it does not appear that any concerted attempt was made to try the only thing that might have saved the plane once the sh__ had hit the fan at the top of the zoom climb, and that was sustained nose-down and trade some altitude for airspeed.

The question we face is "why?" Lack of training? Lack of non-AP flying experience? Lack of appropriate CRM? Or did the normal thought processes of the PF, PNF and Captain just simultaneously "freeze?" What I don't see is any way to lay the cause completely at AB's door. Surely the stall warning logic could be improved, but no piece of equipment is always infailable. Something will always go wrong, and that's why we have pilots. We have to figure out why they failed -- exactly at the time when the equipment/software failed -- and figure out what we need to do to fix it.

Oh, yeah, that'll do it...sort of like my half-hour of CPR training three years ago. "Where do the hands go, again?"

The big question
 

So the question now (for AF & AB) is:
We should give more training to the pilots or "teach" the computers to get out of emergencies?

Computer's way of "thinking" is very simple: "if this, go to that" and so on.
Of course, to "teach" a computer to solve emergencies, like UAS, will take some effort (and money).

Then, when an emergency occurs, the computer shall warn the pilot what is going on and "ask" him if what he is doing is OK.
Computers can "read" the whole Flight Manual in a split second.
The computer opens the page on "Unreliable airspeed", and says: "I am holding 2.5º pitch and applying 85% N1. If you don't agree, please press the DO NOT button".

The problem is, if we "teach" computers to fly these very complex stuff, it's actions will become normal, like today's protection laws are normal. Pilots rely on these laws.
And then emergencies will be "managed" by computers, under the supevision of the pilot. Nice, but if in a dark and stormy night the computer faces an emergency that is not listed?

If flight computing goes in this direction, computer engineers will be thinking that a computer can think. And I am not sure if they are not already thinking that computers can think a "little"...
But they can't (at least to my knowledge).

Wouldn't be easier to allow pilots to hand-fly a little?
Wouldn't be easier to give pilots more SIM time?
Maybe if we change "easier" for "more economical", companies will be "smarter"...

Victor2, are you telling me ATC does not trust pilots any more?

Wouldn't be a nice deal hand-fly in an airspace where you can not gain or loose one hundred ft?

As I recall, in my commercial pilot flight check ride I was allowed to gain (or loose) only 50 ft on level flight, and turns. And I had to be quick going back to the right altitude.

Wouldn't be nice to show computers that pilots can fly too?

Thanks!

Fox 3
I have suggested to my brother, the international traveler, that he not use them at all until their process of correction (I guess a year or two) is gone through.
YES. Seen it as well. Hell, done it myself.
Unless in direct law, the trim is provided by HAL.
HAL is trimming, not the pilot. That's a design feature. No coolie hat on the stick to trim with ...
Succinctly put.
From a formal perspective, yes, I agree, however, given the reaction of the PF in this case, as the various bits of CVR are dribbled out to us, I suspect it may not have mattered.
There is some vidence of "do the wrong drill, and do it now" as the first domino to drop after the Auto Pilot stepped aside.

RWA
Are you supposing that the Artificial Horizon is linked to pitot static system, or do you refer to the FD function rather than the "nose pitch" and "wing roll" attitude indication?
Reach across the cockpit and punch him in the head with some force? That's a bit old school, but it has been known to result in a change of controls. (Don't ask me know I know ...)
JJFFCOuch

You are right about control feedback being wrong in UAS (it can only be thus), but Conf wasn't talking about that sort of feedback but rather visual feedback of what the other guy is doing with the controls.

Whilst I agree that is a potential disadvantage of side stick, I actually don't think it is relevant here - PNF seemed to know perfectly well when PF was climbing or overcontrolling roll (in fact he seemed more aware than PF himself).

See also Bearfoils post(s) on the other thread: http://www.pprune.org/6619313-post1529.html

It is, but I believe there are reasons behind that design and it would be foolish to just call for changes to it without understanding all the logic fully. Clearly the designers never thought a bus would be <60kts in the air, or maybe they thought if it was, it was already lost (may be right), or that the crew must have had enough warning of stall already by that point.

In this case, by the time the SW goes on vacation, the AOA is up at 30deg or more, airdata is going haywire due to high AOA, and the crew have seconds to recognise stall (where they didn't in previous minute of continuous warning) and push nose down over 30degrees (from full NU trim) to get anywhere close to a recovery. With no outside visual reference. And we're so far outside flight envelope we have no real idea how the airframe would have responded to controls. Was it really, practically (not theoretically) still recoverable at that point ?

"How can AF explain that there is no-one clearly in charge in the cockpit after the Capt leaves?"

Wouldn't one assume that that is automatically done through seniority or hours on type? Are there no SOP at AF that clarify that?

Hi,

grimmrad

Read this ... maybe it can help .....

http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/45687...ml#post6619789

I am no stranger to simplification, so here goes. It strikes me that what is involved here is less to do with hand skills than Pilot Attitude.

To accept that manual control failed here is to accept too large a wedge of the format. In NORMAL LAW, for goodness' sake, all pilot inputs are Manual.

No, the failure appears, at this early time, to be re: PREPAREDNESS. I will wager that PF had all the drills down, the changeover down the flying down.

He was not ready, and his skills were not ACCESSIBLE. No more "When I learned.....", please. He knew, and he knew he knew.

The wheels came off, and catch up is impossible when one's talents are not available. I am weary of the Mechanicals. There is likely some interesting metallurgy and design issues here, but I think they will be found secondarily. I love to discuss design and fabrication, and I leave open the window for bent or unstowed Spoiler, or compromised Jacks and Fuel issues.

Not too much the matter there. The ship seemed fine at 2:10:05. What happened next (and is still happening, one fears), has to do with some basics, and that, as a pilot, is embarrassing.

I am afraid I have expressed my feelings to all my family. Until further notice........check your options; Air travel is a luxury, address it as such.

Bearfoil
So have you also told you family to stop driving, drinking and other much riskier activity than flying? Don't make me pull out the stats ;).

Hi,

Human life (personnal life) is not driven by numbers or statistics ( we are not already computers).. but by personnal feelings ...
So I can maybe feel in better security in my car on a crowded highway .. than be seated in a AF plane :)

For many reasons, not the least of which I find to be BEA propaganda, Nonsense PR from All Three principals, and a lack of sincere consideration, Long haul flight on AF has become (unwittingly) problematic

OPINION: The fact that remote mathematical odds are thrown about, I consider it whistling past the graveyard. The loss of an autopilot for any reason (and I have NOT accepted UAS or ICE had effall to do with it) means that one of three potential Pilots may be responsible for an aircraft that has ventured into mathematical probabilities of a demonstrable ONE IN THIRTY THREE HUNDRED OF crashing to the surface of the EARTH.

The odds of losing an auto pilot (disconnection as well as through malfunction) might be, one in one hundred? The chance of encountering bunk MET in ITCZ is likely what, ONE TO ONE?

So, 1/33 UAS
1/100 AP LOSS
1/1 BUNK MET

I see a chance of ONE in 3300 of coming to serious grief on AF.

Tell me again how utterly safe AVIATION IS?

As this thread keeps growing faster than I can keep track, bear with me if these questions have been asked before:

1. Had the PNF pressed the takeover button, would the PF have been able to re-take control?

2. Is it normal for a crew at AF:
- not to be using standard calls (maybe even in English), but informal French throughout?
- to be addressing each other with the familiar "tu" in spite of the age and authority gradient?

3. Just for comparison, what is the official cockpit language in say KLM or LH?

Confess to still being ‘bugged’ by the issue of the THS going to ‘full up.’ Unfortunately the BEA doesn’t say much about it in the latest report – and what it does say is rather contradictory.

That’s just a repeat of the section in the earlier report.

The important thing there, to me, is that autotrim was still in operation.

That’s the contradictory bit. As far as I can see, from the chart on page 111, the THS movements simply weren’t ‘consistent’ with the pilots' inputs at all. Indeed it appears only to have made the one movement – to ‘full up’- during the whole episode.

On Page 111, the pale blue line under ‘STABILIZER POSITION’ appears to show that it didn’t move at all at first. Then, at about ‘2.10.50,’ it began to pull up. This movement seems to have started during a period when the PF (shown as ‘CAPTAIN’) was putting in quite a lot of small movements both ways – none of which seem, on the face of it, to have been large enough to trigger such a huge movement by the THS? The THS movement finished (i.e. reached ‘full up’) at about ‘2.11.50. From then on the THS seems just to have remained at ‘full up,’ and didn’t respond to any of the further stick inputs made by both the pilots?

Can anyone with more knowledge of the aircraft and its systems – bearing in mind that the BEA says that autotrim was still in operation - explain why the THS would have behaved in this (on the face of it, very strange) way?

Is it possible, for instance, that the autotrim was responding not to the pilots’ inputs but to the very low Indicated Air Speed, or to other irregularities ‘reported’ by the sensors?

Sounds like Airbus safety could be enhanced by low time pilots getting high altitude hands on flying so they don't zoom 3,000 ft into a deep stall when the autopilot fails. Also explain to them that holding back on the SS once in a deep stall is not a good idea. Just a thought.

Authority gradient??? In Europe the FO's think and act as they have the same status as the captain, and the EU captains accept that. Had many attitude behavior problems flying with European FO's, but when the S hits the fan they say "You're the captain, it's your problem"…
Until they understand the "Leaders and Followers" rules, conflicts in the cockpit will exist and flight safety will be jeopardized.

I believe the outcome is due to the THS being 'g' driven. In other words, the SS command was given that allowed the actuator to take the elevator to maximum NU, but the expected 'g' didn't occur and the THS moved to (try) correct that situation.

In explanation - the THS will always attempt to neutralize the position of the elevator, and if necessary readjust according to elevator demand.

If I am wrong, you will soon find out.;)

My understanding from the Perpignan report is that, with autotrim in operation, the THS only moves when the elevator goes past the neutral position: nose down elevator will command the THS to move more nose down. The elevator follows the (g-driven) SS orders. So a small nose-down command from the SS that causes the elevator to move from nose-up to less nose-up without going to nose-down will not cause the THS to move.

Yes, pressing the take over button himself. Last one pressing has commands.

No. This shows much stress.

Standard use. At AF the last in F/O will use "tu" in cockpit with the most senior pilot in airline if they're to fly together. It spares a few syllabs. After all, "you" can mean both "tu" and "vous", it's practical to decide for only one word and "tu" helps forming a team spirit. All crew uses "tu", except in cabin where "vous" is used. Sometimes F/A use "vous" talking to captain, mostly when they're white/grey haired.

Horrified
 

As a very part time passenger and model plane pilot, I have followed this threads with interest. The CVR and FDR data is horrifying - I would have thought that professional pilots would have behaved very differently in such a situation. I could imagine myself as thrown into that situation and doing no worse than the PF did - perhaps better when it came to stick inputs. That is scary.

On a recent flight I noticed the issue mentioned in a couple of comments - that is the loss of sense of aircraft orientation. I could have sworn the plane was level but when I looked out saw thet the wings were banked and the plane was turnning left. I can only imagine how hard it must have been for these pilots to sense what the plane was actually doing withouit any horizon on a pitch black night, with what appeared to be unreliable instrumentation.

I guess that is when training and professionalism is meant to take over...

For those who have flown the A330:

How many key strokes (steps) does it take to call up the F/CTL ECAM System Page on the SD. This screen shows where the rudder and THS are, and what the spoilers are doing, what spd brks are or aren't doing, and a prim/sec status. It also looks to tell you which hyd system is up or down as related to a given flight control.

Does this screen get auotmatically pre-empted by rising ECAM alerts, or does is stay active once selected?

Background thinking to my question:

About 20 years ago, something as simple as switching Radio Freqs went from a simple manual task of turning a button here or there, to a process which requires opening a screen and typing in freqs. (This was in the SH-60F). As I had never had trouble with switching radios by hand, I looked into this and noticed that it takes MORE time and steps to switch radios via software. From a pilot task loading perspective, this was idiotic. It appeared to me one of many "solutions" looking for a problem. On that aircraft, the sole FBW control surface was the horizontal stabilizer. (Sorta like the THS in A330, but different). A single, small gauge in the lower center of the instrument panel told you where the stab was at all times. (It was mostly controlled by an auto trim feature). This gauge was a cross check instrument, not a primary scan instrument. You only needed it if things were a bit wrong with the electronics. There was also a manual control that overrode the electro-trim and allowed you to fix its position as needed.

Back to THS on an A330.

I don't know if the crew in AF447 would have thought to look at where their THS was ... but ... if the PNF had wanted to, how many steps in sequence would it take to discover where that control surface was positioned?

mm43, HazelNuts39, thanks so much for the informative replies.

Quoting HazelNuts39:-

I read the BEA's Perpignan report (on a accident back in 2008) but missed the point you very kindly brought up. To quote part of the report:-

So, as I read that, in order to get the THS even to start moving back to a sensible angle, the Perpignan pilots (and later the AF447 ones) would have needed to shove the stick full forward and hold it there for quite a while, until the THS 'accepted the situation' and started moving back from 'full up.'

But, of course, on AF447, every time they attempted that, the airspeed increased and they got another 'stall warning.' And presumably thought they were 'doing it wrong' (what, apart from an engine falling off, can be more serious than an impending stall?) and instinctively relaxed the stick pressure.......

It'd be interesting to know whether Airbus, Air France, or the BEA had warned pilots that this sort of 'impasse' could occur; and indeed had occurred, as far back as Perpignan in 2008? I very much doubt it........

Anyway, thanks again - I now know, to my own satisfaction, the primary causes of this latest accident. And, in my view, they weren't entirely, and possibly weren't even mainly, 'pilot error.'

Have the investigators (BEA) stated that the zoom climb was commanded by the pilot (stick) or is the jury still out considering that a computer function did it unrecognized by the pilot?

I focus on this early event as a possible critical causal factor needed to take a benign failure condition (temporary lack of reliable airspeed) to a severe condition.

To me this is a critical finding, because we can'y elliminate all failure conditions (ala loss of airspeed) etc. We are left with strengthening a minimization factor like pilot training. If there is another critical area that can be worked on in this causal chain that would greatly minimize a repeat of the event chain leading to a fatal accident.

Unfortunately, this was an Airbus accident and this thread will no doubt go on for another One Hundred Thirty plus pages ! Had it been a "real" airplane, "case would've been solved" a Hundred pages ago. Naturally, IMHO. :*

The causes are independent of the plane
 

IMHO The causes are :

1 The decision of the PF to climb, yet the PNF has told him the temp. was to high;
2 The decision of the PF to re take control from the PNF without annoucement and to climb again yet the PNF has urged him to nose down.

These two decisions of the PF are not a reaction to any information from the plane.

They came from his will and only his will.

The first decision leads directly and logically to a stall;

The latter decision prevented the PNF from recovering the plane.

None of these decision should have come from a Professional Pilot.

These decision had nothing to do with training nor CRM, design etc.

Furthermore, the Captain had a nasty feeling proved by his odd question : "Do you have your licence ?" to somebody that had made the journey with him from Paris.

I really think that it should be investigated to understand in which psychological or physical conditions he was.
I believe that the very short time between the entering of the Captain and the level 100, barely allowed him the time to understand that the PF was climbing against all skills. When this was established, then the PNF could took the control again under the Capt. authority. But it was to late.

I believe that tço many people here and in the press don't make the distinction between the period before teh PF re take control of the plane and the short sequence after.
The BEA should have divided the time around this KEY action:

- Because the PNF needed the authority of the Capt to take control except if he were Rambo.

- Because when the Capt. enters, he doesn't see the end of the stall caused by the first decision of the PF. He lives a NEW sequence just after the PF had RE taken the control and that he climbed again, entering in a new stall.
Too short for the Capt to understand.

Hi,

Can anyone explain me this (it's extracted from the BEA report french edition page 23)

http://i.imgur.com/hFfhC.jpg

:confused::confused:

JJFFC
:ok:

The more and more I read the more concrete it seems that the "zoom" was initiated by PF input to the SS not as a result of AP disconnect (which was a point of confusion to me). This is a significant deviation from the previous theory that the AP "wound out" until it reached the end of it's capabilities and handed the plane off in an entirely unstable condition.

Am I correct in my understanding that the climb was in fact initiated by proactive input and that the subsequent trim changes are a result of the auto trim responding to the SS inputs?

Given the very serious issues involved in approaching max altitude even with full instrumentation (let alone under the circumstances involved) any decision to gain altitude would appear to be fundamentally incorrect and display a complete lack of basic airmanship. What pilot would knowingly fly an airplane with degraded systems closer to coffin corner? Did not the senior pilot on the flight deck have a clear responsibility to forcibly (in the verbal sense) take command if required?

I have been unable to find reference to the captain questioning the PF's credentials (was this before the upset? before the flight?). If the captain had enough concerns to actually make a comment then how does he allow this individual to actually be the PF when he retires from the cockpit????

Quoting Lonewolf50:-

Looked it up (can't find the photos again) and the conventional (non-electronic) A330 setup looks pretty good. Big trimwheels either side of the central console, and (I checked :)) they're servo-assisted, and actually move! :)

However, the wheels don't give you the pitch angle; they just have the 'usual' setup, white marks every 15 degrees or so. Apparently there are gauges beside the wheels that give you the angle - how well illuminated they are, and how easily you could read them at night, I just don't know.

Point that occurs to me, though, is that the autotrim was still operating? So, even if the pilots had thought to check the trim settings and maybe wind the wheels forward a bit, presumably the 'systems' would just have wound the things back to 'full up' again?

@SLFinAZ
Page 73 of the BEA Interim report:

What do you want "explained" ?
It's the Honeywell part number and serial number of the FDR memory module.

EDITED

Cross posting :)

English report N°3 page 73

Hi,

Well ... put your spectacles again on your nose (or use binoculars) :8
The SN number of image and txt report are not corresponding (different !!)
Page 23

Of course they are not.

The image is of the CSMU, the memory module. The 'text' P/N and S/N is from the FDR chassis on which the CSMU was mounted.

If you right ... this is odd to the BEA to publish a image and a legend not corresponding ....
That's not serious ...

EDITED
And you no right !

Thanks KBPsen, I thought it was a genuine question, not another effort at a conspiracy theory 'à la Asseline'. I should have known better....

Read my post above !

So they should have published a picture of the FDR chassis that was neither found nor recovered? Who is it that is not being serious here?

related to the thread:

AFP: Rio-Paris jet crash probe 'discredited': relatives

Do we know whether the FDR chassis was retrieved, or only the memory module?

Identifying a part that they didn't recover is confusing. If the identification is really based on an integrated component (the memory module), then additionally reporting the part /serial numbers of the memory module would seem sensible.