Not true, RWA.

Page 113 of the interim report shows the engine power commanded by the crew (N1 Command), and the resulting engine thrust generated (N1 Actual).

The thrust is clearly not staying at TO/GA, but following the power level set by the pilots.

From CONfiture's post, I think he was specifically referring to the maximum power available during high-altitude cruise.

TOGA / CLB
 

Negative.
I just say that at FL350 TOGA thrust will not deliver anything more than CLB thrust would, and this is normal.
Nothing 'stupid' here, just altitude density.

@Lyman:
 

As long as the AB crew will know what to do with:

'ENG THRUST LOCKED
- THR LEVERS..........MOVE'

all others are allowed to never understand it.

The B. EICAS message:

'THRUST ASYM COMP'

will be known by B. crew but says as less as an A. message.

Quoting CON fiture:-

'at FL350 with no A/THR the output is absolutely the same whatever the thrust levers position from CLB to MCT to TOGA.'

Sincerely hope that I've misunderstood, CON fiture?

That being said you combine that with a junior pilot that insists on pulling the SS up for over a minute while the stall warning is going off without realizing he is stalling and his 2nd pilot not correcting him for over 3 minutes gives no chance of survival. Stupid was not just the engineering, it was the pilots too.

No experienced pilot would pull up continuously with a stall warning blaring for almost a minute. I don't care how many other alarms were going off, that one is the big one, ignore the others.

Hi,

I dunno to what FBW aircraft statistics you take reference ... but for the Airbus FBW serie .. all important accidents were the cause of pilots errors (and some human errors associated) ..... never the aircraft (system or engines or structural) was plain implied in the cause of accidents.
And it's seem's that the AF447 (and the Libyan A330) accident will be added to this list
In fact .. so far .. after read all BEA or NTSB or other reports about Airbus accidents .. the aircraft was always working fine (minus the Sully one and the Qantas A380...) .. the pilots .. no.
Globally today the statistics shown that 75-80 % accidents are caused by pilot errors .....
That's normal that the balance change (more accidents cause pilot errors ) .. as the technology (engines and systems and structures) are more reliable today

Isn't the aircraft at fault, at least in part, if it's certificated pilots repeatedly fail to understand what is happening with it in an emergency?

Slightly off-topic, but this popped up today:

EASA to order checks on A320 angle-of-attack sensors

thats great info Takata.

I dont have access to an Airbus Simulator, but ive run this accident at home twice now with the worst thunderstorm i can find, a pretty much fully loaded aircraft and all the other parameters , and those power settings and pitch attitudecsettings are about right. I an early BBC documentary I think they mentioned power in the high 80's (at least85%) and 3-5deg pitch up. I even dialled up an aft COG to see what effect it would have on stability...nps..

Just maintaining reasonably steady altitude to within a few hundred feet would have been a good proxy, with nil or minimal thrust alteration if they wanted a decent turbulence penetration speed. The climb at low power was the toxic confection. I even wonder if a gentle descent would have given them safer tolerances to a possible stall..done in a planned way, but of course they seem to have chosen to fly right through the densest and widest part of the storm, which would have left yhem with more weather than neccessary to have tolerate(read..survive)
My own simof it didnt seem that difficult and no hint of overspeed or stall...just bumpy and needed patience and gentle hands.

I think the poor guy just lost his scan discipline very quickly, got distracted and probably spatially disoriented, couldnt prioritise,and ignored the (expletive) stall warning and the very good advice he was getting ...

I think the BEA report makes it entirely clear that there was nothing "wrong" with the airplane. This statement is in the broadest sense, yes the airplane had significant fault warnings however the plane responded correctly to all system inputs and the AP " kicked out" leaving the plane in a reasonably stable configuration.

At the time of the AP disconnect the airframe did not need to be "recovered" just flown. The upset was entirely pilot induced and not influenced by any erroneous instrument displays. The PF was simply overwhelmed and either forgot his training or never had appropriate training to begin with.

In spite of knowing that the PF was responding to the crisis inappropriately and immediately taking command he allowed the PF to continue a course of action that led to a potentially unrecoverable situation. To me the apparent company culture as it relates to CRM is the root cause of this accident. The least qualified pilot happened to be the designated PF and was somehow to allowed to continue flying the airplane in circumstances clearly beyong his ability to handle.

The PM should have assumed control within 15 seconds of AP disconnect based on the PF's failure to apply basic airmanship and fly "pitch and power" stabilizing the airplane while the PM worked to sort out and prioritize the fault warnings.

This is a scathing indictment of AF's safety culture and CRM training. For a seasoned pilot to sit there and watch a colleague kill not only himself but the SOB they are responsible for is criminal....literally. This comment is not aimed at the poor pilot involved but at the airline itself. At this point they need to be slapped down hard...and hopefully will be.

I fully agree

good firm clear non democratic CRM could have saved this situation...

none of this liberte fraternite egalite stuff.

We sound like a bunch of 50 somethings...

Hi,

Some article interesting to read .....
Current Issue | Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety June 2011
Current Issue | Flight Safety Foundation
http://flightsafety.org/download_fil...asw_june11.pdf
Read from page 24 to 27
Ironic ?

Mr jeant
Perhaps a translation problem, but Monsieur Drappeur has just cost his company some billions of eurosd. Mr. Lawyer has already copied these comment, and is drooling down his chins.

Too bad the old guy was taking his break. Then it would have been a non event. Reocurring icing problems because of the pitot probes seems to be the only problem when the automatics disconnected because of UAS and the PF hauled back for no reason and put it in a deep stall which any airliner would do. Then he held the SS back for several minutes, ignoring the stall warning until impact. Basic flying skills are going away with the new automation. Some were never acquired if a new guy.

What i said, airbus doesnt care one bit about pilots, only reducing costs

AB
 

but producers of goods only comply to the demands of customers!

@jcjeant, dlcmdrx

Remember that you're reading a translation there. Also note that he does not say that Airbus does not encourage pilots to hand-fly at all, merely that it is not recommended when flying the line. Hand-flying *should* be taught as part of recurring training - either in the simulator or on the real aircraft if necessary.

If Airbus "[didn't] care about pilots", then they would not have fixed the FMC in 1994, would not have instructed airlines to replace the pitot tubes and would not have warned pilots about the dangers of UAS incidents. A bit less hyperbole, please...

Hi,

What can be a translation error for be that the AB spoken person was telling the contrary of reported ??
I'm sure that if it was a translation error in the PDF .. Airbus had reacted and requested a immediate correction
Airbus had always take care of their image projected in the public .. it's for them a commercial imperative !
And on the AF447 case they will still defend their image in every way .. in the press and at the trial

More likely a comprehension problem, and possibly a bit of selective quoting.

Airbus was absolutely not saying that pilots should not be trained to hand-fly - in fact they have said exactly the opposite (expressed concern at lack of such training and practice) more than once recently.

What they said was that such training should not normally take place when the punters are in the back.

Seems entirely reasonable to me - after all, wft is the sim for if not allowing this ? [and that's before we even get into RVSM rules etc.]

if789.

Yep. However, the Gentleman, in saying that the pax pay for the utmost safety, he is parsing the format such that when flying, Pilots exhibit less than........... He has specifically set the table for revenue flight? Sides, the lawyer will pretend what he will. It was an unfortunate set of commentary, imho. This Guy is from Marketing, not Legal......Think?

We've been here before, it seems.....

The 'fidelity' of the simulator 'on the edge and beyond' is doubtful, because of the lack of aerodynamic data 'on the edge and beyond' the envelope. So such training may well lead to installing wrong habits. (The 'low-level' 'maintain altitude' UAS procedures seem to be one of those 'wrong habits'.)

And the 'beancounters' are not going to allow taking real aircraft 'up there' just for training......

Personal remark....
When the 'brown matter hits the ventilator', initial training, or highly incidental sim training (even if FFS), or incidental glider or aerobatic training (as suggested elsewere), will never be enough.

Until more research is done about 'the edge', and that research is fed back into training, and possibly a look at the aircraft/pilot interface, another 'AF447' is bound to happen sooner or later.