It is actually really sad to see so much ab apologists. Ab philosophy is clearly that of reducing costs, pilots costs included, and if that has so much flaws seems it doesnt matter, there are still a lot of short sighted people believing everything the bea says and shouting pilot error anytime they can

If not understanding how thye a/c keeps trimming, this is Pilot error.

If a fundamentsl trap, this is aircrafts error. If Pilots know the trim is happening, and cannot feel it, where do they see it?

Many years ago I posted on full automation. I suggested pilots were already redundant and electronics would take over within the next 20 years. Public sensibilities? We could employ actors. Then I quipped, "Oh, we already do."

It was meant to cut. I again referred to Davis' 'Handling the Big Jets' - later edition. Hey, I haven't seen a quote from that yet. Is there a single first officer that doesn't carry it with him these days?

It was all meant to shout: If humans are on the flight-deck, they MUST be able to fly the aircraft. Really fly it. Oh, and be allowed to fly it.

Twenty years on and every incident, let alone accident, will be built into the logic of civil airliners' control systems. All that will remain is what to tell the passengers. Frankly, if they believe half the horse-feathers they're fed now, they'd believe anything. They don't matter. Conveying the aircraft to destination with perfect safety is all that matters.

The entire problem that faces the industry now is how to bridge the gap from the human nervous system controlling the kit, to a total black-box industry. That really is not an easy question to answer.

Today I read of a new alloy. A molecular seeding that will make aluminum/aluminium very, very much stronger. Plastic aircraft are a stop-gap, in the same way the hybrid human/electronics control interface is. It's just getting over these years.

As an electronics bod who was later forced to fly the Zero-Reader, I know how difficult this transition period is going to be. The Zero-Reader was a smoldering pile of valves/tubes and melting rubber insulation. How the heck did it find itself advising human captains of civil aircraft?

Sadly, yes.

Your words in gods ear!

The reality is that whenever the automatics are no longer capable of handling, due to invalid signals they need, they throw the aircraft back at the human.

- Perfect - It will be him screwing up finally.
Good for statistics and engineers.

Second reality is that even when the automatics switch off autopilot and autothrust, it can still intervene with pilot inputs, through automatic protections, and therefore limit his authority.

Why on earth? ?
It had detected itself incapable of handling the aircraft, but still messes with controls.

Isn't that a paradoxon?


I am not entirely against automation and technology to improve safety. But the implemented systems must work flawlessly.
Otherwise I don't need them.
So before introducing even more protections, please fix the technology that's already on board.

Concerning statistics, lots of contributors just love those, I am still missing a serious one about automation induced pilot errors. This would give a clearer picture than the one containing just plain pilot error. Not that it would excuse any such error, eliminating those should be just as noble a cause, but it would point back at the magic automatics that benefit from too big a confidence and a lack of genuine criticism, as it would mean responsibility (meaning doe) from you who I mean.

I ask myself
 

Over and over again I ask: did these 2 FOs do any better than an average, armchair, MS Flt Sim "pilot"?

We'll never know, but they were paid big bucks to do better.

That's a pretty serious accusation - where's your evidence?

Here, the poster has said, "We the computer have some ill readings, so you pilot must fly, out." But the computer stays close, and interferes....

For Gretchenfrage then a new word, '.Paradoxicon..' A smiley airbus?

Spot on Gretchenfrage.

About one week ago I opened a thread about this subject at this very place.
It was deleted within minutes for whatever reason.....

AF447, TAM 3054, XL 888T, etc. etc.

KWATEOW
and for three hundred grand plus one would have expected the captain to be on the flight deck during THE critical part of the enroute phase!

somebody asked about statistics. well no accidents involving european airlines during 2010. safety levels the best they have ever been.

its time to look forward. automation has improved safety but isn't quite perfect yet.

@JCJEANT : Right Seat vs Left Seat ; how do you manage ?
 

I apologize if my last post appeared to point out a pilot error again. It is not my point.

My point is that you have two co-pilots with equal rights giving dual inputs.

If the two pilots have to hand-flight because of a mechanical problem, then:

- Can the plane detect and decide who's of the pilot it has to obey yet it has problems and gave the control to the pilots ?
- Can the designers predict in which seat will be the good pilot vs the bad and therefore, allow this seat to take control of the plane and withdrow this possibility to the other seat ?

In AF447, if the PNF or the Captain had not a mean to prevent the PF from giving inputs, since this PF didn't obey his Captain, what should have they do?

Knock Down the PF ?

OK : but what if it has been the PF that was right ?

This has nothing to do with the stall warning or the SS, since the PF'brain was stuck at nosing up whatever would be the stall warning !.

IMO, in the actual state of the art, only a human action could have stop the PF, not the plane.

In particular, it is wrong to say that the Capt and the PNF didn't recognized a stall. Not only they did but they gave the good advices to the PF, only 21s after the PF took control !

And they keep on asking the PF to go down for minutes.

But when the PNF took control, the PF re-took it, several times and again in the last seconds.

Without a knock down he would'have stoped.nosing up.

Should the Capt. have had a billy ?

KWATEOW
and for three hundred grand plus one would have expected the captain to be on the flight deck during THE critical part of the enroute phase!

Couldn't agree more, blind pew. Crossing the ITCZ is not the time to be in the sack.

Mimpe, pretty well covers it.... :D

@Gretchenfrage:
 

To prevent the system of using faulted sensor input but unfortunately the human input was faulted too.

It didn't messed up......... it followed PF demand and didn't limit his orders.


As pax may expect from the crew in front.

Casper - Couldn't agree more, blind pew. Crossing the ITCZ is not the time to be in the sack.

Casper,

Agreed. I pick my break so that I'm in the cockpit if I anticipate difficult conditions. I don't pick my break, the conditions dictate when I'll go on break.

Pilots should never be flying an aircraft they can not hand fly. These two obviously couldn't. If you always fly on autopilot, as Airbus and a lot of airlines want, you lose hand flying skills. AF447 crashed because of lack of hand flying skills. Why can't we let pilots do some hand flying enroute to keep these skills up or rebuild them?

It is simple
 

There are those that train to pass a check and there are those that go beyond that.

Knowing your power-settings and attitudes for unreliable airspeed is something the first group doesn't bother about.

Having said so, flying a jet manually at high altitude (reduced dynamic stability) and low excess power available is not easy.

Another issue is that very few airlines train their pilots well for cases of failed sensors and/or ADC.

Autothrust
 

What is very telling is that none of the facts do fit with your "proposition".
When autothrust disengage, it doesn't "inadvertantly" apply "CLB" thrust (that's an urban legend) as thrust is frozen at its last setting which is independant of thrust levers position (CLB at cruise). Actual thrust levers position is only providing for autothrust its possible range of operation: when placed on CLB, autothrust may adjust N1% between IDLE and CLB level.
When autothrust is disconnected, a warning is sounding and an ECAM will display "ENG THRUST LOCKED", which means that Thrust is frozen. This should be acknowledged by the pilot, stopping the alarm, by moving the levers to their current settings or anywhere wanted.

In AF447 case, it is exactly what happened and thrust was locked at N1% 84, which is low for such FL and weight (about 94% would be needed at Mach .80). In fact, few seconds prior to disconnection, pilots changed their selected Mach from 0.82 to 0.80 (turbulence penetration speed). Consequently, she was decelerating. Next, thrust levers were not unlocked before about 15 seconds after autothrust disconnection, while she first climbed, then still at 84%.
When levers were unlocked, PF manually applied 100% N1, for about another 15 seconds, before reducing thrust when PNF asked him to go down... but she was still climbing. Shortly after that, stall alarms sounded and he applied TOGA while pulling up, and... she stalled. (it is taken from DFDR tracks and report).

if he had just picked an appropriate attitude and power setting ( im not commercially trained) ...I presume its a bit over

1. 85 percent power and
2. 4-5 degrees nose up
3. checking wings level and minimal change of altitude,avoiding overcontrolling and changes to thrust... and
4. immediate (read...IMMEDIATE) call to Captain

none of this would have happened?

I also wonder whether the small thunderstorm in front obscured the Really Big One immediately behind that they ended up fyling into (my view of the relevant satellite depictions and track taken).Can this happen with weather radar? It seems they were in weather they really had no need to be in...supercooled water and all that. A right divergent track of about 20 degrees looked a lot healthier.