JD EE,

sadly there are no water column measurements available for that area to determine if not exact, at least general deep currents for the time being. There is some stuff on mesoscale eddies, but it's mostly surface or down to 10m. The ITCZ over the area at the time would have some effect on micro-eddies down to 200m.
Also, debris could have trapped air or be neutrally buoyant at various depths, depending on how it sunk and what parts they were (i.e. galley would probably sink faster than outer shell) so that would effect its sink rate significantly.

There is software available for oceanographers and NOAA but i'm afraid that they simply don't have enough data for that area to make the result viable (can anyone confirm this?!??) :ugh:

Hi Bearfoil,
may I ask where the Cg of that model is ?
I suspect it's rather low, i.e. below 1/3rd or even rather 1/4th of the span of that model.
What's the taper on your model?
Could you make a small drawing with dimensions and Cg ?
Maybe I'm just gone take me some Depron and try it myself.

Unfortunately that is where we would need to know the real mass distribution.
Edit:
Found something usefull on mass distribution of the real fin, albeit more anecdotal, pls. see link in post below
/Edit

JD-EE,
from the damage pattern visible in the images shown by BEA this might even be one of the most plausible explanations because it would cover the vertical as well as the longitudinal decelleration.

Problem is maybe more with the overall scenario:
How do you get the plane so quickly from 35kFt high speed to maybe 1kFt at a a relatively slow speed without breaking up the aircraft during the dive/recovery briefly regain control, drop it again and crash it belly first, nose up during the attempted second recovery? (OK, one way this could happen would be if you lost the engines somewhere in the process).


If you look at the following image and extrapolate the two belts and pull a vertical line from where the two belts join, you get a quite good idea about the Cg of the actual fin:
http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/aa587/4.jpg

That would be between 40 and 45% of the span, i.e. quite comparable to the areal center. So a homogenous model should fit. Probably the best model would be an unweighted foam model.

Henra, I admit I am out on a limb here with saw in hand. My understanding is that the recovery technique for a stall is to get the nose down, gain airspeed, and then do something about that solid object towards which you are not headed at an absurd speed. What I'm proposing is that they were at that last stage with too little height to finish the pull-up or even finish a ditch scenario.

I admit this is a reach. It's one way to come close to reconciling a set of data that seems to be utter nonsense. That it requires an "interesting" coincidence of events indicates it's not one of the more likely candidates.

(Another thing the data and discussions have raised in my head is the absurd image if a tail mounted rocket pointed straight down with the intent of getting a plane out of a flat "spin" or sink into which it "supposedly" cannot get into. Sometimes my mind goes "out there". That usually happens when I get tired and start feeling whimsical. I try not to discard even the absurd ideas. That's how I got the one patent in my name, I'd noticed a phenomenon that was irritating in one set of data I was taking. As it happened it applied well to creating an ultra-low powered SatCom transmitter for somebody who shall remain nameless. I am unreasonably proud of that patent, though.)

Henra, in support of your assertion that the VS will not fall straight down I note that bearfoil's analysis is spot on if you consider perfect surfaces. As soon as turbulance appears, as in the instant it leaves the plane, the instability will increase probably with the rudder flapping madly until the whole assembly settles into a leading edge down fluttering spinning spiral into the ocean. I can't kick the simple image of dropping a playing card or the spinning maple leaf. Since the weight at the one end of the maple leaf is much larger than the equivalent on the VS and at the opposite end I expect the angle to the vertical at which it goes down to be much more extreme than the angle of that pesky maple leaf. Horizontal would surprise me considerably. 20 degrees of 30 degrees off horizontal would not. A lot also depends on how extreme the extra weight in the rudder's leading edge is compared to that in the mechanisms and hinges on the trailing edge.

JD-EE

I think you may have it. Your exuberant description of the final radian missing from a "too low" Loop, is spectacular. Also chilling. I don't know if you know, but I believe that is what people think happened at Perpignan. In there also was the thought that the a/c may have been "protecting" her feathers at great risk of striking the water's surface (careful boys, too much alpha). Not her fault, the pilots lost the plot and did her in.

henra

A gracious good morning to you. My first model was the one I described from 12 to 15 feet. I am enlarging it, (roughly doubling it). The scale and shape is typical of me, wasting time making it perfect, when the proposal is not deserving of the time. If I painted it in her colors, and you squinted from ten feet...... Well, I am basically laminating more heavy paper on top of the smaller version, waste not want not.

If it gets to hot wire and foam blank, and the shape, 'feel' is correct, I may get some sprayable EPON and Carbon and make a knee board for the son. I'll need my Patissier (apron) version, if I end up cooking the sucker. (Why?).

Seriously, so far the model is too perfect, I don't see how it could represent what I propose may have happened to the VS. The weight may be too heavy at the bottom, I think cg is probably 25% off the bottom, and too far back from the LE. That makes it lean back at the top, and behave even more perfectly. There must be something wrong. If I move the cg forward and up, the bottom front corner would strike the surface, (at this stage gravel) and replicate the bent upward ribs, and the failed Resin LE.

Bear

rockets for deep-stall recovery
 

Regarding your first remark, consider also that according to Tim Vasquez' analysis, freezing level was at 16350 ft, and cloud base 2370 ft, so at some point they would have had airspeed back and become visual, even though it was dark night but moon-lit.

Regarding the second idea, it may be of interest that the prototypes of at least one airplane (the Fokker F28) were equipped with four solid-fuel rocket engines mounted vertically in the tail to permit recovery if the airplane would encounter a super-stall condition during intentional stalls conducted to explore or demonstrate stall characteristics for certification. They were never used in earnest, and were removed after initial tests had shown satisfactory stall characteristics. The F28 has rear-mounted engines and a T-tail, so the risk of super-stall was naturally considered early during its development. An airplane of conventional lay-out like the A330 should be recoverable by normal use of the elevator up to angles of attack well beyond maximum lift, but maybe not at angles as extreme as some posters on this thread have suggested, at which the horizontal tail surface would be fully stalled too. To get to those large AoA, I believe you have to persist in pulling the stick fully back, ignoring stall warning and increasingly heavy buffet.

regards,
HN39

Sorry for late reply, I was 'in transit'. Yes, that's the statement I was referring to. About 2.5 minutes later there was a second upset, in which the uncommanded nose-down elevator movement was 5 degrees. The report doesn't explain why it was less.
My understanding is that the PRIM's compare the output of the three ADIRU's for all parameters, not the sensors directly. For all parameters except AoA, the PRIM's use only one value, the middle (median) one, and monitor the differences to and between the other two values. In contrast with other parameters - "To calculate a value of AOA to use for calculating flight control commands, the PRIMs would use the average value of AOA 1 and AOA 2. In other words, (AOA 1 + AOA 2)/2."

regards,
HN39

And that's not difficult to answer! One end of 'arm 36g' picks up the load at the hinge line, the other end transfers it to the rear spar of the V/S at a point where the spar is supported by a V/S rib. A longer arm at a smaller angle to the next spar/rib intersection would presumably be heavier.

For anyone interested in the rulebook text, I have copied the two relevant sections below. Perhaps it is of interest to note that similar criteria apply to elevator and ailerons.

regards,
HN39


Part 25 AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
Subpart C--Structure

Sec. 25.303 Factor of safety.

[Unless otherwise specified, a factor of safety of 1.5 must be applied to the prescribed limit load which are considered external loads on the structure. When a loading condition is prescribed in terms of ultimate loads, a factor of safety need not be applied unless otherwise specified.]

Sec. 25.393 Control Surface and System Loads

Loads parallel to hinge line.

(a) Control surfaces and supporting hinge brackets must be designed for inertia loads acting parallel to the hinge line.
(b) In the absence of more rational data, the inertia loads may be assumed to be equal to KW, where--
(1) K = 24 for vertical surfaces;
(2) K = 12 for horizontal surfaces; and
(3) W = weight of the movable surfaces.

The moon at 2009-06-01 0212z was bearing 268.7°T with a true altitude of 8.7° and the phase was 60.5% of full. Considering the ITCZ activity was spread along an East/West axis, the chances (imo) of the moon placing any light on the situation would be extremely remote.

Weather wise, the BBC2 scenario of "supercooled rain" may well have been the prime cause of extremely rapid freezing of the pitots, and other surfaces may have accumulated significant amounts of wet ice that then stuck to the -45°C surfaces. The possibility of a warm [wet] cell punching through, condensing and falling back through undercutting cooler air can not be ruled out.

Regards
mm43

Vertical Stabilizer & Rudder dimensions
 

Bearfoil; henra

This may be of interest to you in your quest to establish the "gliding" capabilities of the Tail Fin.

The following dimensions are approximate, and a Center of Gravity for when recovered has been calculated from images and video viewed when it was floating. The trim along with the rudder angle was used to find an approximate center of buoyancy, and then compared with what trim a homogeneous mass of similar dimensions and volume would float at. An estimate was used to adjust for the additional weight of the clevis joints. This change in trim then provided a reasonable approximation of the Center of Gravity.

http://i36.tinypic.com/2wfi6va.jpg

Airfoil area (excluding the clevis joints) at the base is close to 4.6m^2, tapering to about 0.5m^2 at the top. Total mass of the recovered Vertical Stabilizer & Rudder including attachments is estimated to be 1850kg.

This image from FlightGlobal.com should give you an idea of where the strength is built in to the Airbus Vertical Stabilizers.

http://i37.tinypic.com/2agky2c.jpg

mm43

trim tank
 

@mm43 Total mass of the recovered Vertical Stabilizer & Rudder including attachments is estimated to be 1850kg.

but with sume whight into the trim-tank the CG can change his place a lot..... grity

The Trim Tank is in the Horizontal Stabilizer - nothing to do with the V/S.

mm43

mm43;

I'm pleased to see your estimates of mass and c.g. of V/S & rudder close to those used a little while ago to estimate the V/S attachment loads.

Regarding the BBC2 scenario of "supercooled rain", can you enlighten me in which respect the conditions you envisage could have been more severe than the Appendix C conditions that the airplane is designed for and in which it has demonstrated safe operation during certification?

regards,
HN39

HN39

Looks like we are "singing from the same song sheet!"

Regards
mm43

mm43

grity's post has a nugget in it, however. The fuel from the trim tank might have been the source of the "bi" in the "furcated" slick, no? Also, look at the cutaway of the area you posted and notice the "bracket clevis tab" assemblies (six of them), and the size of the tail. Then see if anything comes to mind from a stress perspective. Are you certain the fuel is in the HS (s)?

HazelNuts39

Thank you for the rules data. I've yet to work any numbers on stress or design considerations, but at the outset, it's hard to avoid thinking that given the stated purpose of the "Arm", and its photographed deficits, the design is......strange.

bear

Fuel in HS
 

I confirm fuel is in horizontal stabilizer, no fuel in VS.

pgroell

Yes, Thank You, 10,593 pounds when full. Google iasa the fuel cg graph is splendid, merci

Plenty of relevant data contained in NTSB report on AA 587 In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer:


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n.../VSforces1.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n.../VSforces2.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n.../VSforces3.jpg

Machaca

Dating from BA038, you do come up with the best and most helpful diagrams.
Wish you'd talk more, but.....

The failed Lug you bring up is what would be 3A if the Lugs were indexed Fore/Aft and Port/Starboard. As I see it in any case. Basically, at the point of peak energy, acting to pull the Lug free (up) out of 3A bracket, The Rudder has just reversed from a Starboard correction (reversal) and the Fuselage has swung right (Tail Left). The Rudder then is commanded full Left, the VS is exposed to peak shear, peak Tension, Maximum Torsion, and just as the Fuselage is at it's most right YAW, the VS is loaded beyond Limit (Ultimate). All three forces reach Limit concurrently, and the Lug Shears/Bracket Releases. The Noise must have been LOUD. The way to simplify the image is to imagine the tip of the VS straining over to the Right, the axis twisting counterclockwise, and Tension is a Triangle, the strongest structure in Engineering. The Triangle consists of the forward and (partially) middle lugs, the tip of the VS and the Left Rear Lug, the Peak of the triangle. There is a fulcrum at 3B.
The failing Lug pulls out, and the VS is essentially at failure. Even at this point, if the Rudder had been centered (by any means, including leaving the a/c), the 300 may have been saved. The first failure was not the Fatal one,imo. The VS still was attached, and more reversals finished the separation as evidenced by the sequence of Thumps on the CVR.

I think if we keep in mind the energy it took to uproot this Vertical Stabilizer, we get to the place of contemplating a solution for the next iterative wide-body, the 330.
Limit load for gust is half that of demonstrated catastrophic failure. At the point that the problem began, Wake Turbulence was behind and the jet should have been climbing out. Is twice the limit load a necessity? No, not at all. The limits are sound, and workable under all conditions. Why did the aircraft crash? WT? No, not in any direct way. It is a cause only in that it started something that should never have happened. Over Control, maximum Ruddering, at maximum rate. Why? The pilot was alternately stomping on each pedal? Out of phase 180 degrees? I do not think so. The pilot and the machine had no idea what the other was doing? Possibly. If the conclusion of the NTSB is that the pilot cycled the Rudder like a novice, also, no.
The Airplane can fly without a Rudder, It cannot stay airborne without a Vertical stabilizer. A small Pitts or Extra can flop its surfaces helter skelter, a 180 ton beast can not. (Not as currently manufactured iac)

Bear

Thanks to Machaca for this useful link. Although the report discusses A300 & A310, while the numbers for A330 may be slightly different, it may be of interest to compare these to the estimates I made back in june (#1345; p.68).

The lateral gust limit load attachment lug force given in the NTSB report for the A310 of 466 kN is 8% higher than the 44 t of my estimate. More serious is that I omitted the 1.5 safety factor to ultimate load. After correction for these differences, the calculated longitudinal acceleration increases to 66 g, which IMHO could suggest substantial horizontal speed at impact.

regards,
HN39

HazelNuts39

I don't see a value for "longitudinal" strength. Popping off the tail as the airframe comes to a complete stop is not a (planned for) dynamic load, and has no bearing on the above destructive testing by NTSB. While the action might happen in a fatal crash (Might), your "longitudinal" strength I take to be what The NTSB calls "Bending moment".

Longitudinal is not Lateral, for purposes of VS failure discussion vis a vis Machaca's images. As you bring it up, I would point out that it is not a design consideration, except collaterally as a result of the other three vectors. As an opinion I would venture to say this direction of failure is least likely in all but a rapid horizontal stop. The value of the velocity (horizontally) would be quite high, as you suggest. I think quoting a value of 66g is misleading, if what you mean is failure as described by BEA to wit: They claim a "Slight horizontal acceleration" and a "large vertical acceleration". They also claim an "En Ligne de Vol" so bias in heading can not be included. This brings up an apparent contradiction, as they (I believe) also claim a slight "rotation, left".

Longitudinal failure in the opposite direction, backward, though also unlikely, is quite possible. It would involve an inflight failure, however. The six joins resist the airstream (through drag) in respectively a tensile at #1 (pair), a tensile at #2(pair), and a compression at #3(pair). #2 works as a consonant fulcrum with #1. The system is basically an inverted "teeter".

That is with the Rudder centered, acting merely as additional "area" in the VS/R combination. If deflected, The Rudder introduces a Torsion, and additional tension at #1, with an additive tensile at #2. It also adds a "bending moment". Compression at #3 is comparably increased.

As with 587, if reversals occur, the self same failure could occur with 447. As I see it, the only addition to the antiquated design of the A300 in the A330 is the addition of what are termed "lateral rods". From the photographs, and aside from disagreeing with BEA re: the mode of failure, The rods look (demonstrably, qed) frankly inadequate; that is another discussion.

If my take on your post is incorrect, I am sorry, please do correct me.

I am extremely interested in your thoughts in disagreement with BEA relative to forward velocity at impact. I have not ever thought the a/c had time in her descent to lose enough energy to allow for the docile impact that is seemingly intimated by BEA. I think you are on to something, as is JD-EE. Next is evidence of damage to a/c not consistent with benign horizontal "acceleration".

bearfoil

Any guesses when the BEA will issue its' scheduled September report? From what I understand, no additional searches will begin until such report is issued, and then only if the report's decision favors such effort. I still got that feeling that what we know now may be the only thing we know - i.e. little official info to follow. Lets hope - but we will see.

wes wall

I am less than totally ignorant of how BEA will do this. I fear this will be played as tightly as they feel they can escape with. Frankly, any "new" released information or opinion would challenge their recent history of having control, and sufficient "answers" to close the issue, with impunity, if not total public satisfaction. It will disappoint, but the disappointment will reside in those who are not privy to the evidence collected (such as it is). "We've done our best, here's the keys to the warehouse, someone else have a go" Right.

Doesn't harmonize with reality.

bear

On this point I have meticulously scanned both reports, but haven't been able to find any statement regarding forward velocity at impact. What you're referring to is merely an assumption held by several posters on this thread.

My earlier post explains the connection between the lateral aerodynamic loads to the design strength of the main attachments, and from there to the failure of these attachments under longitudinal inertia loads. And I do mean failure under impact loads as described by BEA.

The 'root bending moment' is the lateral component of the aerodynamic force on the vertical tail surfaces, multiplied by the distance between its working line and the root plane of the V/S. If you divide the 'bending moment' by the 'shear force' in Machaca's table you'll find a distance of about 4 m. The vertical tensile and compressive forces in the main attachments represent the equal but opposite moment in reaction to the bending moment.

regards,
HN39

No. BEA claims in the initial report a (not sure of the word) minor, small horizontal acceleration, which is an acceptable way of saying "deceleration". Clearly the emphasis is on the vertical, a "pop" off the fuse solely due to horizontal disappearance of forward velocity is not possible given their set-up. They declare a "Compression", followed by a forward flyaway, I'll check this.

What NTSB shows as Shear is actually drag, as I grok it, and can have little to do with forward loss, assuming a centered Rudder and slow forward velocity. Shear turns into a terrifying backwards element with full exposure of the VS "Sides" (alternately) to a 259 knot airstream, (587). The Boeing 737NG and Airbus330 are not dissimilar enough to dismiss a failure cascade of the airframe of 447 mimicing Schiphol. Fully stalled high vertical velocity, Tail slam, middle plant, and cockpit the last to hit, and with the most energy. Occam would suggest that 447 after impact looked reasonably similar to the Boeing, three pieces, but with a tail that stayed attached, ostensibly rather well, at that.

best
bear

From Machaca's post:
Referring to another of your recent posts, I wonder if you noticed that the A300 also has an "arm 36 g"? The NTSB calls it a "support strut" and there's no mention of any damage to it. From NTSB report on AA587:
regards,
HN39

AF447 - The Numbers
 

Let's put some numbers on it - revisited.

The following is a rehash of Post #467 and has had the forces in both vectors doubled. The horizontal velocity represents that proposed by Machinbird in Post #468, and the vertical velocity comes very close to what the Cabin Vertical Speed advisory portrays if it happened in real-time, i.e. activation, transmission, receipt handshake and then end of flight.

18240 ft/min = 304 ft/sec, and 100KTS = 168.88 ft/sec, resulting = 347.76 ft/sec or 106 meters/sec.

The mechanics of determining the time over which the acceleration was reduced to zero is not easily calculated due to the cylindrical shape of the fuselage, plus the area of the main wings and elevators come into play. On top of this, the aircraft is initially buoyant, and the forces canceled out will reciprocate as buoyancy moments. If the aircraft impacted terra firma, the time taken to dissipate the impact moments would be about 100 milliseconds and the structural damage would be extreme. In the case we are dealing with, the shape and area of the fuselage combined with the large area of the wing will provide a dampening effect and probably the time to accelerate to zero is around 250 milliseconds, with half the remaining velocity being absorbed each 50 milliseconds.

Density of air at sea level and 25°C is around 1.185 kg/m3, whereas sea water is 1,025 kg/m3 or 865 times denser than air. Not quite solid, but at the velocities we are talking about, its close to it. On top of that we have an aircraft weighing in at about 210 tonnes, but the total volume is about 1260m^3, and that is potentially the water that could be displaced during impact. The moment at impact will be around 210,000kg x 106m/sec = 22,260,000 m kg/s, and that either has to be dissipated by the aircraft or transmitted into the water. Water does not compress, therefore the energy gets turned into a wave with amplitude and length, e.g. the stone in the pond principle.

http://i34.tinypic.com/bg5kqh.jpg

Looking at the force vectors drawn through the V/S, it can been seen that there would definitely be compression on the forward end of the V/S, and a combination of compression on the aft end caused by the THS forcing framing upwards, later reverting to tension at the aft clevis as the canceling of the forward moment caused the V/S to rotate off in that direction and to port. All these forces will have created their own local tsunami and the effects of that will most likely take a minute to oscillate down to the background sea and swell conditions. HN39's link to a sketch in Post #1345 deals with likely forces the V/S attachments suffered and could easily be adjusted to represent the scenario discussed here.

http://i34.tinypic.com/sb3l88.jpg

Likely points of fracture through the fuselage have been marked, and discussion around the items recovered may help determine if there was another fracture near the aft pressure bulkhead (I think not).

However, the initial parting of the waves will result in a violent return of the water, and the wing spar section will pop to the surface, and fractures already formed at its fore and aft ends will be flexed in the opposite direction, causing complete separation of the fuselage ends. Water will invade those ruptured spaces, eventually permeating through linings etc.. and buoyancy will be lost.

The potentially large volume of the aircraft is the reason I believe that the time to arrest the impact forces was close to 250 milliseconds. What little we know of the pathology reports tends to describe spinal and pelvic injuries that point to terminal velocities similar to those represented above. Deformation of the galley sides, toilet doors etc.. was on the narrow sides from bottom to top. In fact the deformation was mostly near the bottom and relatively small in length, which could imply that the "g" forces were high and of a very short duration. Longitudinal distortion to objects recovered was relatively small, possibly indicative of the greater absorption of energy available in that plane.

Finally, even though the BEA was careful not to mention anything specific regarding the forward velocity at impact, they did draw attention to the high vertical speed, i.e "... the airplane had likely struck the surface of the water in a straight line, with a high rate [of] vertical acceleration".

mm43

HazelNuts39, mm43

Thanks for your patience, I see my blunder as to your first response, but defend my characterization of the A330 VS/Rudder join as stated. The 36g arm design I neglected to mention was copied in A330. The differentiation I see is the addition of "Lateral Rods" to "resist" Lateral Loading, the "Bending Moment" you reiterate from Machaca's post, in which I have utmost faith.

As to my First mistake, it was a big one, and you need to watch me, I can be overconfident and extrapolate a disagreement with a design into areas that do not deserve my critique. The "Longitudinal Load" is most definitely the Shear, but the blending of the Shear with mass inertial load (with a Rudder deflection) sent me ahead of myself, picturing a forward failure of 447 instead of the rearward failure of 587.

A forward failure of the VS in 447's case I consider to be remote, in spite of the confidence expressed in it by BEA. You seemed to have a similar position, noting the Horizontal velocity would have had to have been markedly higher than as reported by BEA. Did I misinterpret your emphasis on a need for the extra velocity?
I wouldn't argue with that possibility, as I said, 447 had little time to slow.

Let's look at "Terminal velocity" (Trends). This is a term of which to be wary. In a standard use, it means the fall of an object in acceleration due to gravity only, ie, Ballistic, until acted upon by (usually) aerodynamic drag until it acquires a stable velocity some point before impact.

I'm sure it isn't purposeful, but the Initial report leaves a misunderstanding waiting to jump. 447 was not falling and accelerating. She was falling and "slowing". I believe she was well over the velocity at impact that could be expected in even a "rough" fall.

It is in the nature of an intact a/c to find a rough stability when in a deep Stall. Pictures of this phenomenon abound. The alternative possibility is one to which I lean sharply, She was donating some parts to the airstream as she made her way down. Radome, (blister) antennae, outer ailerons, spoilers, etc. If upset was sudden and at high speed, "recovery" attempts if even attempted, would be unmeasured, very likely out of sequence, etc. Here the vulnerability of the control surfaces with Kv and Kh "constants" to shed are especially open to loss (aerodynamic). Rudder loss in this instance would actually be one of the last separations, the HS was full of fuel, and would not take kindly to Pitch excursions allowed with Direct Law. If the VS failed in a forward flyaway, as stated, the vH would have been substantial.

I write as I think, and make corrections after I post, not the best way to do it.
Eventually, I'll learn some skills, although I have software that prints directly from my voice! "Automation" to insult rather than my friends, what a concept!

best,
bear

Unaddressed from here, Lateral rods, 36g arm, Radome, Spoiler, Impact speeds and transition to zero value, plus cabin items recovered. Also Aft fuel impetus on upset and difficulty in Pitch recovery.

Pollution Spot - again.
 

The New York Times published details of grid searches made by the FAB on 2009-06-02. A section of the chart with the Pollution Spot is shown below.

http://i36.tinypic.com/2a0cc9y.jpg

Whether these grids were "actually" flown is anyone's guess.

mm43

Figure 4 (Vertical Stabilizer-to-Aft Fuselage Attachment Points) on page 16 of the NTSB report shows the "Transverse Load Fittings" of the A300.

regards,
HN39

A330/340 Section 19, manufactured by Premium AEROTEC GmbH

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n...0Section19.jpg

Basic black and pearls, ready to take the town. Who says Carbon won't work?

Unfortunately, the positioning of 1A,1B (VS joins) forward of the Pressure vessel (or very near it) is unsettling.

bear

Bearfoil

That interesting manufacturing photograph (thanks Machaca) of the tail cone section does show that the longitudinal strength is continuous through to frame 76, i.e. to just before the aft door(s).

The following graphic taken from the BEA Interim Report No.2 confirms the location of the 1a, 1b clevis joints.

http://i53.tinypic.com/rjpi79.jpg

I named the antennas [green] and "Arm 36 g" [blue] for good measure.

mm43

bearfoil:

But you have known this since reading the very detailed section 1.12.3.5 Examination of the vertical stabiliser in the BEA's Interim Report No.2, issued December 2009, no?

Machaca

Yes, I have known that. Why would I make this remark? I am not trying to be mean, nor disrespectful. I love every aircraft ever built, regardless of provenance, and I would never insult especially the beauty of this one.

My motive is not sinister, but it is a motive, as you have made known. I have grown uncomfortable, bringing things up over and over, (En Ligne de Vol?) The purpose is not deception, but to keep as much interest in this tragedy as possible. The enemy of the Truth can be ennui, or the passage of time. It isn't known that 447 didn't experience a corruption of the pressure vessel by a forward and partial failure of the Vertical Stabilizer/Rudder soon after, or even in concert with initial upset. Upset seems a strong possibility, perhaps upset warrants a confidence in reverse, eg the loss of pressure may be as unlikely as is upset likely. I know how investigations are done in this venue, but that is another thread; At all costs must sceptics step up and risk the shushing from those whose confidence is in a paradigm that is old, political, and fraught with parochial motive.

bearfoil

mm43

A beautiful picture of 447's skeleton. I cannot see frame 76. The "Arm36g" is the trapeze between the Rudder hinge stack and the Aft Spar, VS, no? Between the magenta "Fin", and "Rudder" arrows.

Bearfoil

You are correct regarding Arm 36 g, and the graphic at Post #2073 now has that feature identified.

Frame 76 is four frames forward of the "aft pressure bulkhead" (frame 80).

mm43

mm43

Meant to also ask, does the "Arm36g" have a sister on t'other side? Can you comment further on your statement re: "Longitudinal structure continues through to FRAME76"?

Bearfoil

The following is directly from the BEA Interim Report No2 -

The rudder is attached to the fin by means of eight hinge arms and one vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g). The rudder is controlled by means of a control unit (frames 84 and 85) and a mechanical control linkage (rods).

http://i56.tinypic.com/33xin9v.jpg

You will see that the arm is effectively two arms with a common intersection each side of the bush above the rudder bearing on the hinge arm. The fracture occurred on the bottom starboard side.

mm43