Pilot Incap at 80/100 - what to do?
 

I thought this was fairly clear cut but I have discovered a differing opinion and the ops manuals and FTCM's are both rather vague.

Here is the scenario: Captain PF, at the 80/100 knots call there is no response. What should the FO do? Both for the Boeing and Airbus fleets.

Company restrictions are that only the Captain decides to stop and does it himself, FO can only alert him/her to what he/she sees.

Screwballs

You repeat the SOP call and, if there's still no response, you stop the aircraft - provided you have been trained to close the thrust levers and apply the brakes.

Or, you could take control, fly off (single crew) and continue the flight.

Are you serious?

In the absence of the commander,the first officer takes command.STOP for heavens sakes!!!!!!

"80/100 knots call"

So that is actually two unanswered "calls" now........:hmm:.....and you and your pax are still accelerating to a fiery oblivion in the overshoot.......:suspect:....is this a secret CRM session??

I think after no response at 80 a more robust form of communication would be the first choice!

Well I will repeat...
 

Here are the popular choices, based on past experience:

- Do nothing, and let the captain crash the plane
- Do something, and you crash the plane
- Start reading your SOPS manual
- Call OPS, ask them what to do
- Ask the stewardess to find a capt deadheading in back

----------------------------------

Forget the call outs...did you see the capt slump over?

The scary part about this, is that most of you opt for this guy to stop...in reality, how many of these airliners are overloaded, don't have balanced fiield numbers, and the capt knew he HAD to go...didn't tell anyone ofcourse....

Don't believe me? Go out today to the airport and see plane after plane use up 80% -90% of the runway just to rotate.

This kills me...one poster: 'you can stop the aircraft, provided your trained to do so'

So when does the FO, not get ' pull the levers back and put your feet on the brakes training'? No joke, but are FOs that weak these days...are airlines literaly putting in people that can't stop a plane? Or rotate it and get around the pattern?

This has got to be a wind up, and not for real....

But it's good for laugh.....

I see from the different responses that it seems there is not such an obvious answer to this question. A look through the FCTM of both types does not cover it and neither does the ops manual.

Thanks everyone for your responses, it's good to have a think about these not so clear cut areas somtimes.

Screwballs

If the CA doesn't respond to the 100knot call, speak up! The geezer probably has his hearing aid turned down.

I'll grant I only fly little cessnas (well, pipers too, and even the odd other light thing, but...)

Surely that's the answer by definition: if, when you take over, v<v1 - abort. if v>v1 - keep going.

I seem to have the idea from somewhere that v1 is calculated with reference to AUW, rwy length, density alt and other such stuff before it's needed?

As posted by monkeyflight:

An excellent reply and these are my thoughts exactly.

One of the good things about being a professional pilot is having a good old discussion about these sorts of things.

:ok:

I am a F/O in a company where I cannot all Reject!!! (737) Insane .
Still I happen to think that Monkeyflight's idea is a good one, I ould add to it to use the automatics as much as posible even a twin A/P Approach and Autoland. Safety is paramount.
Also give time for ATC to sort out a tug etc... as once you stop you are not going anywhere

You only have a few short moments to work it out---and a few less seconds thereafter to know if you made the right choice---You gotta get right:eek:

I'd never reject...

"I have control", priority push-button, continue with take-off, assess situation in the air and then make a decision... most likely to return, depending on what kind of Captain Incap we're talking about.

If he's still on the mobile to his wife/girlfriend/builder/lawyer, or deep in the Times crossword, then I'll leave him be.

Other than that, lean close to the CVR and yell "Captain!!! What are you doing???" :E

Screwballs:- if you ever want to make Captain, you will have to learn to make decisions, so make one and STOP! Don't think that you will be better off getting airborne and sorting it out; this is a good time to use your initiative and do the "safe thing". The workload will be so much easier for you.

Many firms, my own included, subdivide the region below V1 into considerations based on what's going on. A general rule, used by us and many others, is any malfunction or problem up to 80 knots will be considered for a rejected takeoff, but above that speed, only for engine fire, engine failure, loss of directional control, or an outward opening door. So it's not quite so simple as rejecting for anything less than V1.

Incapacitation can take many forms. I've had a lack of response due to an ICS failure, lack of response due to me choking on an errant popcorn kernel. That's why there's a second challenge. On two occasions in my career I've had reason to take control from the other pilot, only one on a takeoff, and in that case I didn't actually take control. It was in a small transport category airplane, a Learjet, and involved a non-responsive pilot during a takeoff.

In that case, I was first officer, and in the right seat (I say that because in corporate and charter operations, the F/O may be in either seat, depending on the company policy and practice). The captain was new, inexperienced, and a direct hire captain. He had a track record of poor decisions and problems with other crews, each of whom had reported him to the chief pilot. In this case, I was assigned to fly with him because I was the most experienced F/O at the time.

We flew into LAX, and he was visibly nervous, intimidated by the size and business of the airport. When we departed, he was very hesitant in taxiing, seemed to be confused. On the takeoff roll we developed a door open light. It was relatively early in the takeoff, and I loudly announced the problem, pointed to the annunciator, and stated "Door light, reject, reject, reject." per the company SOP. No response. I stated again, and when I looked over at him, he was hunkered down, had a death grip on the yoke, one on the thrust levers, and showed no signs of doing anything but being intensely focused on taking off.

I knew a false door signal wasn't unheard of, and visually checked the door over my shoulder, and noted the handle positions. I determined that while clearly the door was closed, the indication didn't warrant trying to wrestle the airplane away from the captain who was off in la-la land and still apparently scared out of his whits. He wasn't unconscious, but more catatonic, overwhelmed from the look of it. I quickly determined a high speed rejected takeoff coupled with attempting to take control would do more harm than good.

When the captain didn't respond to further calls, but did rotate, I took care of gear and flaps. After we were cleaned up I tackled the checlist myself and then loudly anounced "You ARE aware we have a door light, correct?" He snapped out of it, and had a fit, stating that we needed to turn around, declare an emergency, and land the other way. He nearly had a panic attack. I left him physically manipulating the controls, but took control from that point on, telling him what to do, and talking him through the remainder of the trip.

When we got home I shared the experience with the Chief Pilot, who had grown to be good friends with that captain, and didn't want to hear it. I added my name to the list of pilots who wouldn't fly with him again, making it a full house; nobody would fly with that captain...and for the remainder of his time they called him a captain, and he was paid as a captain, but flew only with the chief pilot and only in the capacity of first officer.

I don't think the call is as simple as taking the airplane away, SOP notwithstanding. One must look at the circumstances and make the call.

I seriously wonder if a blanket STOP decision is the right one, surely it is circumstantial as stated in the many posts above? Runway length, Density Alt, loading etc.

I suggest the key is to make a decision, based on the circumstances - and work it through. Indecision is what will make an accident out of an incident.

And small caveat on that comment is to obviously make the right decision! :}

737....
 

Re-read my post...if V1 or VR are predicated on 'BS' numbers then the decision to go or not go, should have happend about 3000 feet ago...

Again, go to your local airport, watch an airliner burn up 80-90% of the runway to get to VR and try to convince yourself that right before V1 or VR he would have had enough runway to stop.

Still not convinced...watch the Concorde video and ask yourself why it couldn't climb on half it's engines, if not 3/4.

Anyone in here hear of the 60/40 rule?

It could climb quite adequately on 3/4 of it's engines. It couldn't climb on half it's engines and with the gear stuck down, which is probably the case for most heavy four engined jets.

Try a derate and assumed method.
 

We have a derate and use the assumed temp reduction method. That is probably why you are seeing aircraft use 70 to 90% of the runway.

It does not detract from the fact that the DECISION SPEED at which you must decide to go or stop. it has nothing to do with how long the runway is as those calculations have already been made.

I have used 4500' on a 6500' runway and 8000' on a 10500' runway the power produced on those occasions was a little different due to the different derate but the principle is the same.

If V1<Vr there is no requirement and no need to be able to stop at Vr, so I don't understand your point.

If using balanced field, and reduced thrust/FLEX why fiddle the figures ?? You still have the performance to take more weight out of the field ??

At my present carrier, the 80 knot call is normally acknowledged by the Captain, but if it is not, we have a second call at 100 knots (mainly to varify/compare indicated airspeeds) to which the Captain would normally reply (check)...if no reply received, F/O presumes incapacitation, and either continues (preferred, except if rather light), or stops.

Works well, and eliminates much drama.
Keep it simple, for best results.

What would a typical V1 speed be on the L-1011? On the 737/A319 it can be around 125 to 150. That gives an FO a few seconds to initiate action to stop. Remembering that the decision should already have been made by no response to the second call.

If it was me, and I called out 80 knots and no response, my first action would definitely involve a glance over at El Capitan, immediately, and at least raising my voice a large amount for the next call - however if he/she is doing the whole slumping over/frothing at the mouth/red-faced (usual for the 5th early:}) then I'm stopping.

But this is an interesting area, up until very recently I thought it was clear cut, but now seeing some different points of view it appears that FO's should be also making assesment when they line up on what to do if you are about to get some unexpected command time....

Screwballs

The QRH for the 737 allows for an abort above 80kts for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning or if the aircraft is unsafe/unable to fly. I'm guessing the wording will be pretty similar for most Boeing types.

So if the F/O realises his Capt is incapacitated above 80kts but prior to V1 he must make a judgement against the above criteria. The only one that might fit is that the aircraft is unsafe to fly which is perhaps stretching it a bit unless you take into consideration that if the Capt is PF that may be because the weather is outside the F/Os limits (cloudbase,LVPs,wind, contaminated runway etc) in which case you could make a very good case for stopping.

In my company we are very rarely field length limited and often fly off runways with a huge surplus of length so in reality most of the time a high speed abort would involve a relatively small risk. Certainly if I was ever unfortunate enough to fall over on the flight deck on such a runway I would be gratefull if my oppo stopped and got me help asap I wouldn't be berating him for doing it from 110kts as I breathed my last.

The key thing is that the scenario is thought about and trained for and that we appreciate that circumstances will change from aircraft type to the runway in use and the prevailing weather.

Well....in every airlines i have flown with, it was very clear...if ANY pilot was to become incapacitated during T.O , means no answer at 80 kts from PF (or PNF do not make the call out ), do another LOUD call . If still no answer ,expect the other pilot being incapacitated. The take-off must be aborted before V1.This was trained in sim.
Now imagine you have bad weather + a major failure at, or after V1....single pilot:\ ....what do you think it would have been safest course of action ?

hmmmmm
 

Without getting into a discussion of balanced field...accelerate stop, ect ect..

Let me ask you guys a very simple question so there is no confusion.

If a plane accelerates to V1, and pilot decides to abort, pilot needs to have enough runway to stop the aircraft,(right?) or should he decide to go, and lose an engine right at V1, the plane should acelerate to VR and climb on one engine, (or half the engines) (right?)and clear all obsticles along the initial route or land back at the starting airport.(right?)

There is no excuse for a plane to not have enough runway after a V1 abort to stop, or why the plane shouldn't climb out, engine out, and climb on course. The numbers are verified.there is no fudge factor here. If you put in the CORRECT weight for the aircraft, the CORRECT temp, ect, then you should have the right numbers and be assured that which ever way you go...abort or climb, the aircraft won't crash.

Can we agree on this much?

So if you guys are trying to convince me that an airliner that burns up 90% of runway to rotate, would have had enough runway at V1 to safely stop the aircraft...your totaly full of boloney. It's just that simple.

Why the FAA doesn't deal with this is a chronic problem is probably why they didn't deal with SouthWest. All they have to do is go sit at the airport with a cup of coffee, watch airplanes take off, and take down some N numbers.

737jock...BS numbers means you put in 100,000 lbs instead of 120,000 lbs to make balanced field...you put in 75 degrees instead of 96...to make balanced field, you put everyone at 170 lbs, instead of 250 because your carrying the Dallas Cowboys that day...I know it's a pain to take reduced fuel, fly higher, back off on the power..so lazy pilots don't do it...pros do.

Given your numbers...if you have V1 at 60% on a ten thousand foot field, and accelerated 3000 more thousand feet to 90% (9000 feet) to VR...so you rotate with only 1000 feet left. Uh huh. So if you blow a tire, lose and engine at 8000 ft, you won't accelerate to VR without hitting the fence, and you won't climb...you just killed everyone on board. Who got schooled that day? The passengers...

Then V1 to VR is 3000 feet?...your kidding right? Are you out of Machu Pichu, with one engine and flat tires?

737jock.....feel free to post your balanced field numbers right here and try to explain how you have legal safe numbers rotatiing with a thousand feet left in your airliner..we are all ears...

The fact is you won't...and futhermore you won't be able to come up with VR runway lengths...feel free to ask me how I know this.

Back to the thread....737jock, just passed out at the 100kt callout...the FO looks over...737jock is out cold, FO look forward and sees 1000 feet of runway ahead...yeah, he's going...and let's hope Jesus is there to make sure that the FO doesn't have a blown tire or engine problem..

ssg, what are you talking about putting in BS numbers? Who, when, where, why and how please so I can never fly with them and advise everyone I know not to fly with them.

As for your last example, I'd love to know an airline that flies a 73/A32X that calls 80/100 with 1000 feet of runway to go. Because the above would again apply.

Another sensible post and you're going on the ignore list! ;)

Screwballs

Maybe its different in the G4 world of small corporate jets. Perhaps you just stand em up and go for it on each runway. But here in Europe its balanced field all the way. Nice long runways such as in places like Madrid have high V speeds. Go into somewhere tight with a 70t jet and the numbers get smaller. Using the least amount of thrust keeps the shareholders happy and hopefully the engines going for longer. It also keeps the tree huggers happy with a lower noise footprint and climb performance is greatly improved. Now how much tarmac we chew up after V1 to get to VR I have no idea. Why don't you get your calculator out and see what you come up with. Point is V1 is stop or go time. After that your committed to getting airborne.

Responses..
 

Hand Solo : The Concorde was grossly over weight. The program is done and that's why.

Rjay: Your decision speeds are based on runway length and ability to clear obsticles. I can't speak for your ops, but if you burn up 9000 ft on a 10,000 ft runway to get to VR, something is rotten in Denmark

Ashling: Always nice to have surplus runway, and opens up the conversation for stopping an aircraft after a V1 go,...if on fire...ect...but that's another thread.

Screwballs: there isn't any point of view, you go or you don't. I didn't mention callouts at 1000ft left, but VR. Read the post.

737jock: If your in an airliner and need 9000ft of a 10000 ft runway to hit VR...something is wrong in Denmark...get a new calculator

ExCargo: If you got enough power, to use reduced power for the given runway...terrific...but again...I don't think you will be rotating at the last thousand feet of runway.

Soundbarrier: Nice job...you made my point for me....

D&M: "I'd never reject" .....wow.....you do this for a living?

Interesting thread...

SSG...over and out......

Aaaarrrrhhh, the "rocket science" is back in flying!
 

Call 1: "Eighty"

Call 2: "Ninety"

If no response - STOP! (or "abandon" as my not-for-much-longer current lot prefers).

That should mean that the stop is initiated at no more than 100 kt. - and I sure hope that none of our FO's get through the training system without being able to acomplish this safely.

Look at it this way - if they cannot manage a stop from 100 kt. - what do you think their chances are on a single-pilot circuit? Or a diversion, for the matter? Or surviving another bad decision they make while on their own?

Even if we do a 40-kt overrun, we'll in all likelihood all walk away from it (with the captain being the only possible exception to that rule).

If everybody is so worried about FOs handling a 100-kt.-abort, we shouldn't confuse these poor, feeble individuals :ugh::ugh::ugh: any further and simply stay the party line: "Follow your operators SOPs".

Sometimes I really wonder...

ssg,

You need to re-think that :hmm:

V1 is the speed at which the calculations allow for you to reject and stop in the remaining distance.

Vr is not always the same as V1. It's the speed at which you rotate.

Next time you see a heavy take off, remember that there can be 30 kts difference between the V1 and Vr, especially somewhere like JNB with an elevation of 5000+ feet.

A heavy 747/340 etc will often not rotate until the last 1000 feet, especially in high/hot operations. If you use Flex/Derate, you could easily use this much runway (provided the V1 gives you sufficient space to stop :eek:) as the reduced thrust will use the extra distance to attain Vr.

To my limited knowledge, no 4 or 3 engine aircraft is certified below 1,500 feet with 2 engines out. They will only give you figures from 1,500' with a clean aircraft.

You beat me to it helen. No 4 engined aircraft is certified to survive a loss of thrust on 2 engines during take off.

Some thread creep I'm afraid but SSG is annoying me somewhat by stating things as fact when they are not so clear cut.

Re the Concorde crash my understanding is that there is evidence the aircraft was about 1 tonne over structural MTOW (due to loading extra taxi fuel and some bags that the crew did not know about). Illegal but not an outrageous risk in itself and certainly not grossly overweight. Plus the crew were unaware that some of that weight was on board. What changed was the wind from calm to 8 tail which put them about 6 tonnes over RTOW. The crew did not pick up on this for some reason. The loading of fuel and bags may also have been suspect and may have put the C of G too far aft.

There is also evidence that a spacer was not fitted to the gear causing it to lose tracking when the tyre burst and cause the aircraft to veer and possably hit a runway light which may have contributed to the failure of the second engine.

The crew were forced to rotate well below VR and never made it to V2 due to the loss of 2 engines, the tailwind and the poor tracking caused by the missing spacer.

Even with the weight if they'd just lost the one engine they would probably have got away with it, sadly they lost 2 and some evidence suggests that was because of the missing spacer causing poor tracking after the tyre burst restricting accelaration and causing them to hit a runway light that may have caused/contributed to the second engine failing. If they had been at the correct weight for the conditions that failure on the second engine would still have downed them so my view would be the spacer (or whatever else led to the loss of the second engine) was the more critical secondary factor not the weight. The main factor remains that damned metal strip that caused the original tyre burst.

So SSG carefull when you say it was down to the aircraft being overweight as if that is a fact especially as much of the above is speculation to a greater or lesser extent.

I have re-read it. Where did you mention VR? Simple answer please, as in based on fact, logic, reasoning.

In our outfit the FOs carry out an RTO during each sim check. Due to only Capts handling the thrust levers on takeoff, it's always based on Capt incapacitation (not necessarily obviously slumped over the controls) to simulate a realistic scenario that just might happen in the real world. Strangely, the FOs don't appear to have any difficulty in closing the TLs, selecting reverse and stopping the a/c. Probably because they're good professional pilots.

The split between V1 and Vr on a heavy B744 out of, say, Singapore on a hot humid night will be in the order of 27 knots. (V1 153kts Vr 180kts. Flaps 20). I'll leave the mathematicians to work out the distance covered between V1 and Vr, suffice to say I could see the end of the runway very clearly at rotation!

Depends on the takeoff flap setting.
At max weight, from a sea level airport, flaps 10, 157 knots.
At JNB, flaps 4, 168.
The latter for a -500 model, which has very powerful brakes., best if auto-brakes selected.

CM1 incapacitation
 

hi empty Cruise

from what kind of a company do you guys come from, if you think that an F/O should always go for STOP because he cant fly the plane? If the guy next to you has a valid licence he should be able to do a circuit by him self.:ugh:

Or if he gets another malfunction on the top. None of the scenarious trained, exept two engines out on a 3 or 4 engine A/C are considering double malfunctions as mandatory in a syllabus. So why the heck should it happen now. Ofcourse the remaining RWY is sufficient for STOP before V1, but getting close to it this option is fading fast.

I would consider following items relevant for a GO/STOP decision

1. Are controls free, the CM1 not blocking them
2. Stopmargin

Tendency in low speed would be STOP but if the situation is not clear, because speed increases rapidly, a GO will become more lucrative.

just my thoughts

L

Hi Warmkiter,

We normally operate with V1s in the region of 130-145 kts. - so a stop initiated at 100 kts is really childs play.

I have absolute confidence that our FOs can handle both a "stop" and a "go"-decision - I just protested against those who seemed to imply that they would be pressed to handle a 100-kt. stop ;) I've yet to see an FO bungle one of those in the sim.

In my mind, the only question is which is safer - stop or go? I sense that over the last couple of years the industry has gone from go-minded to stop-averse, and that's not necessarily a healthy development.

Some situations clearly dictate a stop - some clearly dictate a go - and some fall in the gray area in between. An incap verified passing 100 kts. clearly falls in the latter area - but in my mind, the stop side of the coin comes up every time on this one.

From a TEM point of view - the longer one of us operates single-pilot, the greater the chance of problems. A stop requires you to close the TLs, disengage the AT, deploy the reversers and monitor the autobrake. So 4 actions to be acomplished within 5 seconds vs. 100-odd actions to be taken over 15 min. in a return scenario... The thing is that even if the FO bungles the stop, we only run over at 60-odd knots and have the cabin-crew to direct an evac from the smouldering wreckage - whereas if he/she bungles the return, we end up as a LOC/CFIT statistic, and ATC and the CC are but helpless spectators.

There is a difference between being go-minded and stop-averse - and this is one such case.

Best,
Empty

PS Edited to tell you that present lot try to tell us all that we're overpaid bus drivers and try to create so many procedures that there is a procedure for everything. Thinking is dangerous and must be discouraged at any cost. However, a good training department tries to counter that, and succeed in doing so. AO'S - I salute thee :ok: So - that kind of airline!

What a bargain, Take off ! kick the captain out of his seat and you will get to be captain for a flight !

It just so happens we train for this...
 

In my previous company we routinely trained PF incapacitation at 80kts, and just before V1, and what a useful exercise it was too. It taught me to consider (before line up) what my actions would be at each case, based on the prevailing conditions and terrain. After much thought I now find that my usual thought process leads me to conclude that up to and including no response at 80kt and then louder at 90kt (including verification glance), I’ll smartly STOP.

Between there and V1 I tend to conclude it would be better to go for a little flight, get a hostie to read me the landing checks as per their training, and make a nice landing with an ambulance in attendance. HOWEVER, if the departure is a particularly challenging one with close mountains and very bad weather etc, I tend to be very stop minded indeed, and the briefing will reflect this.

Great posts* by the way, it certainly doesn’t hurt to be made to think about it.

*(With probably one exception, and by the way “over and out” isn’t correct RT either - you know who you are.)

hmmm
 

737

Yes the planes are certified for these events...engine out, TR deployments, ect ect...but you knew that right?

A pilot that just throws the levers forward and waits for V1 and VR without looking outside to see how much runway he's burning up in the process should be serving tacos somewhere...

What if your flaps are set wrong, pitot tube blockage, flat tire on take off, engine doesn't produce enough thrust, TR deployment, Spoilers accidentaly deployed...whatever...all will increase runway distance....so if your just looking at your AS indicator with a flat tire, waiting for V1, not looking outside...your gonna crash....

Eitherway, I don't think every scenario is on the checklist or SOPS manual either...so that requires a pilot to look outside once in a while and say 'gee whiz we aren't at V1 yet and 85% of the runway is behind us....hmmmm"

But hey...what do I know? :)

I can't tell you how many pilots never got to V1/VR having crashed at the end of the runway because they had a locked brake solonoid, flat tire, engine wasn't generating power, fuel issues...on and on..but they just kept looking at the AS indicator. How about the guys that put it in to the Potomic? Slats in, but they just kept going...never got off the ground...flew it to the fence, pulled up, crashed....

The concept that you run the numbers, then fly it to the fence, then pull up, should get atleast a couple of people in here wondering if that makes sense. Hope springs eternal.

You seem to miss the concept that the V speeds are based initialy on runway length...your at a particular speed at a particualar place on the runway...hence should you abort, at that particular speed at that particular place on the runway, then you have enough runway to stop, from that particular place and given speed to stop before the end of the runway, if the numbers are correct.

You understand that right? Your V speeds are related to your position on the runway?

So if your at V1 and burned up 85% of the runway, you see that as a problem right? You get that right?

So when I see an airliner burning up 90% of the runway to get to VR. I know he didn't have the right numbers. Given on normal days, V1 and VR are pretty close to each other, I know you cant stop an airliner in 1500 feet at 125kts, even with super pilot at the wheel.

737...if your just sitting there waiting for the airspeed to tell you what you want to hear, regardless of where you acutaly should be on the runway, then you will have an accident. But hey...Taco Bell is hiring!

The fact is...737...if your not looking outside to see how much runway your burning up to get a read on whether the plane is performing, that you are in the right place at the right time....I honestly doubt you will catch you capt between V1 and VR having a silent stroke....this thread is moot for you...

Am I the only one in here that undestands the 60/40 rule and what it means?