Here's another take off crash...
 

I guess these guys thought they had the numbers too...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wj8UPEfO1Oo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHqz4...eature=related

Try reading the original question - and then post

No we are still on track...
 

Here are some more examples of pilots not looking outside who also did thier 'numbers'

At least 75 people were killed in an April 26 Indian Airlines crash that occurred near Aurangabad in western India when the pilot failed to get an overloaded Boeing 737 into the air and hit a truck loaded with bales of cotton.

20 MAR 2004 UTA B727 crash possibly caused by overloading [to table of contents]
Preliminary investigation results indicate that the UTA Boeing 727 that crashed on takeoff from Cotonou, Benin last year may have been caused by overloading. The plane was carrying about 10 tonnes of excess cargo and the weight was badly distributed. (BBC)

--------------------

The Point: The captain is out, the FO is trying to take over, and he see's 1000 feet of runway left...ect ect ect....

Personaly I see three major points that came out of this thread...

- There seems to be a total lack of understanding on how much runway a plane should use up getting to thier V speeds.

- There seems to be major disagreement on what an FO should do when the Capt is out.

- And probably most disturbing...many posters in here, seem to have an aversion to a high speed take off rejection, regardless of the numbers, and will just go...

Anyway...it's all educational....I will take the bus on my next trip....:)

Ssg,

After reading your posts throughout this thread, I see your name by a post and it only brings question marks. Put down the helium, man, and come back to earth.

If an aircraft is ten tonnes overweight, then the performance numbers for that aircraft aren't valid. Neither are the stopping parameters, distances, or even the brake energy potential. Taking off that overweight is a train wreck already in motion, whether the aircraft gets off the ground or not. It's an idiotic argument.

One might debate the merits of lighting the airplane on fire and then attempting to takeoff, departing with spoilers deployed, flat tires, or any other wild scenario.

Yes, one needs to be aware of one's stopping distance, but when one throws the numbers so far out as to make them entirely meaningless (ten tonnes over may not fly, but may not be stoppable, either...the flight is doomed regardless of what they do), then all bets are off.

This is entirely meaningless in the face of the present topic; pilot incapacitation in a multi-pilot crew. You've come up with illuminating, but entirely irrelevant examples of departing the wrong runway using a crew that isn't incapacitated, and departing grossly overweight with a crew that isn't incapacitated to help address the topic of rejecting a takeoff for a crewmember incapacitation? Exactly why?

The Comair example used an airplane which departed an unlighted runway which was too short, for which they were not cleared, and which wasn't even parallel with or aligned with the cleared runway; numerous mistakes made before ever pushing up the thrust levers. Same for the Cotonou mishap.

Your assertion here is that the crew should be keeping track of their progress down the runway and make a decision to reject based on the percentage of the runway flow. You've even introduced a Part 135 guideline to emphasize the point. No doubt events such as the infamous Air Florida trip into the Potomac River wouldn't have occured if the crew had been better aware of their progress on the runway and acted accordingly. Are you suggesting that at the moment of pilot incapacitation the monitoring pilot evaluate the remaining runway and make a decision based on his evaluation on the fly to either continue or reject?

This is established before departure. Crews know and understand that high speed rejected takeoffs have a very high potential to end badly. During a high speed rejected takeoff, much, if not most of the runway is behind. Continuing the takeoff, especially when the aircraft is functioning well and has the performance and capability to do so, makes a lot of sense...particularly when returning to land will magically put the entire runway in front of the airplane for stopping distance.

Throw out all sorts of wild and irrelevant scenarios if you like...these only serve to cloud the topic under discussion, which is rejecting a takeoff for an incapacitated pilot. Departing unlighted, closed, wrong runways in the dark, taking off grossly overweight, or any other irrelevant example doesn't help address the question at hand, and it's really starting to make you sound rather foolish. Let's try to keep on track.

Our performance calculation system, the ONLY data we are authorized to use, does not provide distance information to V1, and doesn't even tell us what the distance is to stop from V1 or go...what it does do is tell us what distance will be remaining if we elect to reject. Even if the data we have popped out a number that told us at V1 we had 63.3% of the runway behind, there just isn't any data alongside the runway (say, a big square black sign with a white border that says "63.3%) on it to use...nor would we be authorized to use it, nor does Boeing provide it, nor does Part 121 authorize it, nor does...anybody use it.

We see red lights during a normal takeoff, regularly. Aversion to high-speed rejected takeoff? You bet. You should educate yourself a little on the subject, but suffice it to say, a high speed reject is a risky endevor. As the size of the aircraft increases and along with it the mass, reduced stopping power, and rapidly rising brake temperatures and reduced stopping ability, control ability, etc...high speed rejects are far more risky than simply going airborne and coming back to put the entire runway ahead of you...with the situation under control and planned in advance.

Our fo's are trained to take over to make decisions and fly the a/c in case of emergency. If an fo can not be trusted to take off, dump fuel in emergency and then return, perhaps he shouldn't be in the seat.

Some more guys that decided to just go...
 

Congo plane crashes at end of runway; 85 aboard
Charles Ntirycha / Associated Press
GOMA, Congo -- A Congolese jetliner carrying around 85 people failed to take off Tuesday from an airport in this eastern town, crashing at high speed into a busy market neighborhood at the end of the runway, officials said.

Government officials initially said there were only six known survivors but later in the day an airline official said 60 people had survived. Local officials said dozens of bodies were pulled from the wreckage, though it was unclear if they had been passengers.

Smoke and flames engulfed the charred ruins of the aircraft, which appeared to have broken in two when it slammed into the rooftops of about 10 cement homes just outside the airport, destroying them instantly. Soldiers kept onlookers away after U.N. peacekeepers helped douse flames at the crash site.

"Smoke was rising from the plane," said Christian Kilundu, a spokesman for the Goma office of World Vision, an international aid group that has an office less than half a mile from the crash site. "As fire extinguishers were trying to put out the flames, I spoke to a priest who had been pulled from the wreckage. He was disorientated and had no idea what had happened."

Officials said they had no information on casualties among residents of the area.

The plane was operated by the private Congolese company, Hewa Bora, and was headed to the central city of Kisangani, then the capital, Kinshasa. Hewa Bora's Dirk Cramers said 53 passengers and seven crew were taken from the site and were at local hospitals.

Julien Mpaluku, the governor of the province, said there were 79 passengers on board and six crew members.

"We have already picked up many bodies -- dozens of bodies. There are a lot of flames, which makes it difficult to know if the bodies we are picking up are those of passengers of the plane or else passers-by or people that lived in the area where the plane crashed," Mpaluku said.

Employees at World Vision said the plane "failed to leave the ground," plowing instead "through wooden houses and shops in the highly populated Birere market."

The plane appeared to have been "totally flattened" by the impact, said Rachel Wolff, a U.S.-based spokeswoman for the organization who has been in contact with her colleagues in Congo.

World Vision employees who visited the scene of the crash said they saw at least eight bodies. Hours afterward, the market stalls where women had been selling their wares earlier in the day were still in flames, said Wolff.

A former pilot who survived the crash, Dunia Sindani, gave a similar account in an interview broadcast over a local U.N. radio station. The plane suffered a problem in one of its wheels -- possibly a flat tire -- and did not gain the strength to lift off, Sindani said.

-------

Just fly it to the fence and go...right guys....

I'm a long time reader of pprune and rarely get as tempted to post as this thread has made me, so I gave in.

SSG, it is obvious from your rantings that the only experience of operating big jets is that which you have gained from watching them take off from your own flight deck, or spotters fence.

I will confess to not knowing much about Gulfstreams, but I will hazard a guess that they are overpowered for their size, hence have reasonable acceleration even at high weights, and if operated from long runways will have not very many knots between V1 and VR. Well the larger jets operate differently, and you need to just accept this as fact!

There is no problem in rotating towards the end of a runway. The fact you seem to be missing (or deliberately ignoring) is that V1 could/would have been passed a long distance prior to the aircraft rotating. Therefore your points about the aircraft not having room to stop are irrelevant as a reject would not be attempted at this point unless the crew like going cross country on the deck!

Also, I'm wondering how the second youtube link you posted is in any way an example to prove your point? :ugh::ugh:

This talk of flying to the fence and pulling back the stick is pure nonsense. If you have that little faith in how the larger jets are operated I am inclined to think you are not a pilot at all.

Back to the topic, I have been flying single aisle Airbus for nearly 2 years, so as an FO feel qualified to comment on what I would do in such a scenario.

If after a second, loud, speed callout there was no reponse, and we were on a short runway, V1 being close (time wise) to our standard 100kts call due to quick acceleration, then I would definitely continue. Assuming CAT1 or better weather then a quick radar vectored circuit would give time for the cabin crew to aid the Captain, the paramedics to be called to a stand, the situation to be thought through, and a nice long runway ahead of me. Another important consideration is that after a high speed abort on a short runway, the brakes will be very hot. Fuse plugs could melt etc and being stranded on the runway will just increase the amount of time it takes to get medical treatment to the capt. If an evacuation is required due to a brake fire then getting a heavy captain out of his/her seat in a hurry is not a task I would relish!

If, however, I was on a ridiculously long runway, Munich for example, where a typical V1 would be in the 140-150 region even at max flex, then by the time incap had been diagnosed the speed would still be way below V1 with maybe 2/3's of the runway remaining. In this case an RTO would not cook the brakes too badly, assuming I would have the awareness to disconnect the autobrakes and reduce the deceleration.

Of course being in a bus with a tiller on the RHS makes this scenario better for an incap captain and definitely leads to a better outcome in the eyes of the airport operater who doesn't have inconvenience of a blocked runway.

SSG, I can't believe you just posted an FS movie and mentioned Hewa Bora...

Do you know what an air data computer is? Clearly not. FO "puts in the wrong numbers?" You play microsoft flight simulator, don't you? It would appear any student pilot would have a better idea on this than you.

Your use of the DC-9 overrun at Goma is another example of introducing irrelevant but dramatic material in an effort to cloud the issue. What you left out is that the runway is in poor condition, six years after being damaged and shortened by a volcanic erruption...and still unrepaired. The runway was wet. No details are provided beyond laymans descriptions of blood and carnage, regarding what actually occured...so it's use in a technical discussion contributes nothing at all. I think you used google and listed the first aircraft mishap you found in the hopes it might prove the unfounded and clouded point you're hoping to make.

Did the crew attempt to reject the takeoff or continue? Do you know? Reports vary, some claiming a blown tire, some claiming an explosion, nobody having an useful information on that event, least of all yourself. And of all the environments you could have picked, you chose Africa, where aviation safety is roughly on par with the price of tea in china, and also just as relevant. You picked the Congo, where fire fatal mishaps have occured in the last year. And where airline flights to the EU have been banned for safety violations. This is what you use to demonstrate a safe operation or make a point?

Perhaps in your microsoft flight simulator.

The videos are clear cut examples? One is a rejected takeoff...which overran the end. You assert that the crew should have rejected the takeoff earlier? Earlier such as when the engine hadn't failed? The crew should have simply elected to reject the takeoff for no good reason? You have no credibility here. Clearly just looking for an arguement that doesn't exist.

The other clear cut example you use...the microsoft flight simulation of a crash that never occured, is imaginary, and cartoonish. Clear cut? No. Example? No. It's a clip from a computer game showing an imaginary airplane and nothing more.

Thus far you've used dramatized examples regarding mishaps for which no information is available, cartoons of imaginary wrecks, and while trying to support the notion of rejecting rather than continuing the takeoff, you provide footage of a 747 that rejects and overruns anyway. Brilliant...you couldn't make a worse case if you tried...and one can't be sure you're not trying hard.

Ok....now I get it..
 

If you want to rotate with 9000 ft of runway left, on fire, into the soup...go for it...

if you want to burn up 10000ft slowly accelerating to V1, eyes glued to your AS ind. oblivious to what is happening outside...go for it...

If you want to live in a world where go or no go V speeds will fit just nicely into all take off scenarios without thinking, adapting, or having any concept of being ahead of the aircraft or situational awareness...go for it,..just don't have any passengers that day...

I did a little research...using flex and reduced power, anyone can extend his take distance and V speeds so far down the runway to make a ten thousand foot runway feel like a nail bitter. So I wanna know, using max power, max payload, you guys burning up 8-9000 ft to get to VR..??

SSG,
If my brakes did fail I'd much prefer it to be on landing than at the beginning of an RTO, for reasons that any sane pilot will not require explaining.

A heavy aircraft, using 9000ft of a 10000ft runway to rotate? I don't see anything wrong with that. Maybe his V1 was at 6000ft? You will never know unless you are in that flight deck, This might interest you....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=feGZ4l5fk4Q

please note, this is a real video, not flightsim.

So the pilots in that clip had poor or no situational awareness?

SNS3Guppy, I think the phrase "flogging a dead horse" has never been more fitting.

Why is that policy insane? In fact it makes cold hard commonsense.

Your responsibility as second in command is to advise the pilot in command of the problem and in turn he is entirely responsible for the decision to reject or continue. Any captain who blindly aborts a take off on a "reject" call from the first officer is either supremely over-confident of his first officers uncanny ability to instantly diagnose a serious event during take off -or - he is incompetent. Probably both..

ssg, why are you so adamant about using 8000ft or 9000ft or runway? Can't you use percentages please? It makes no sense to say that using 9000ft of runway to rotate if you don't tell us how long the runway is. What it is 12,000ft? Or 15,000ft? Where is the problem of using 75% of a runway to get airborne? Where is the problem of using the full legal amount? Granted not ideal, but a runway is there to be used and so is an aircraft to its legal and sensible limits.

-----------------------
 

Screwball,

Some posters, on this forum kept making the case that airliners routinely hit Vr with a thousand to go...in response to my observation of 737s on my home field, doing just that on a 10,000 ft field.

As I came to become acquanted with Flex power, and those that abuse it, I realized that some guys are pretty much flying it to the fence, under reduced power...and just waiting and waiting on the take off roll, watching he AS indicator, pretty much hoping the take off would go ok...not much room for error...in the confidence that should something go wrong with one engine, they can throw the power up on the last remaining good one...

So when one poster, mentioned hitting V1 at 75% of the runway, on a 10,000 ft field, with Vr another 2000+ ft down, calling it legal...I had a hard to time thinking that was safe..I still don't

It's just guys using Flex power to take it to the edge....

I take it he's still banging on? This 'ignore' is great. Yup, Alaskan have gone up in my estimation. Any more African overruns popped up?

SSG

When will you get it into your thick head that, on a flex takeoff, should you lose 1 engine you do not have to increase power on the remaining engines. You can if you so desire but there is no necessity to do so. You stupid or something?

Still waiting for your answer to my question about the performance rules you follow on Biz Jets that I asked on another thread.

----------------------
 

Part 25 aircraft...adhere to mininum runway and climb requirements, standard stuff...

Thankyou SSG

Hi D&M

"I have control", priority push-button, continue with take-off.

We follow the same procedure close to V1. We guys are trained for low speed as well as high speed RTO's in the sim, if I have the guy, or the lady, on my left quitting on me, the first thing on my mind is get off the ground at high speeds, give a MAYDAY call, and plan for an arrival. My question is, why is the priority push button so important if you're gonna sit there for 40 seconds keeping that button pushed when you have better things to do when you're airborne ?? All he/she's gotta do while falling over is touch the AP disconnect and the priority's lost again ?? We are told the same thing in the sim or otherwise, BUT WHY IS THIS NOT IN THE SOP (FCOM 3) ??