Cockpit Security - Doors
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Cockpit Security - Doors
In the light of recent events should aircraft manufacturers and airlines alike consider strenghtening the cockpit doors if not changing them to be made out of a substance like steel???
Yes i know it would add to the overall weight of the aircraft but perhaps then prevent would-be hijackers gaining access to the flight deck????
Just a thought
Yes i know it would add to the overall weight of the aircraft but perhaps then prevent would-be hijackers gaining access to the flight deck????
Just a thought
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I believe that we should consider how to combat this latest form of airborne terrorism.
The mass and velocity of an aeroplane, when targeted at a ground feature will cause enormous damage. In order to target the aeroplane, a pliot on the flightdeck has to be coerced into using his aircraft as a weapon, or replaced by another pilot who is prepared to die for his cause.
Both of these scenarios require an assailant to gain access to the flightdeck. Once the terrorist is on the flightdeck he or she will probably require some form of personal weapon to take control.
X-ray and other form of pre-departure screening should ensure that bombs, rifles, guns, grenades etc do not make it onboard the passenger or freight compartment. Ensuring that small blades, shards of glass, garrotte wire etc do not make it into the passenger compartment is almost impossible.
If we accept that a motivated assailant could use hundreds of potential weapons that are readily available on an aeroplane then we must accept that our aeroplanes are vulnerable. They are vulnerable because potential attackers can gain access to the flightdeck.
We should ensure that the flightdeck is a sterile environment. The door should be locked throughout the flight. The door should be secure enough to prevent unauthorised access. Rest areas should be available within the secure flightdeck area for cruise pilots.
If a potential adversary cannot smuggle weaponry onboard to destroy the aircraft, nor take control of the aeroplane due to a lack of access, attacks of the type seen recently will not occur again.
In short, lock a secure flightdeck door for the duration of the flight and never open it, irrespective of what is occurring on the other side.
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The mass and velocity of an aeroplane, when targeted at a ground feature will cause enormous damage. In order to target the aeroplane, a pliot on the flightdeck has to be coerced into using his aircraft as a weapon, or replaced by another pilot who is prepared to die for his cause.
Both of these scenarios require an assailant to gain access to the flightdeck. Once the terrorist is on the flightdeck he or she will probably require some form of personal weapon to take control.
X-ray and other form of pre-departure screening should ensure that bombs, rifles, guns, grenades etc do not make it onboard the passenger or freight compartment. Ensuring that small blades, shards of glass, garrotte wire etc do not make it into the passenger compartment is almost impossible.
If we accept that a motivated assailant could use hundreds of potential weapons that are readily available on an aeroplane then we must accept that our aeroplanes are vulnerable. They are vulnerable because potential attackers can gain access to the flightdeck.
We should ensure that the flightdeck is a sterile environment. The door should be locked throughout the flight. The door should be secure enough to prevent unauthorised access. Rest areas should be available within the secure flightdeck area for cruise pilots.
If a potential adversary cannot smuggle weaponry onboard to destroy the aircraft, nor take control of the aeroplane due to a lack of access, attacks of the type seen recently will not occur again.
In short, lock a secure flightdeck door for the duration of the flight and never open it, irrespective of what is occurring on the other side.
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Gentleman Aviator is right. The only way to block access to the flight deck is blocking it out compleatly regardless of threats or violence in the back. I think airport security is an other thing; those determined enough can and are able to get their will done. Stupidity and plain evil can go a long way. On the other hand we could have armed guards on every flight.
Flying is about compromise. It can be dangerous but we still fly. The security measures taken and inflicted in the future will be a compromise of price and comfort. It's safest to bombserch every luggage, but it takes time and money and therefore not done - yet. I belive that airtravel as we know it will forever change. God willing, security measures will filter out the worst, ie. the un-luckiest, but those crazy enough to do this kind of terror are still living and even contemplating something similar. The only thing that can really stop these people is morality and respect for life.
Flying is about compromise. It can be dangerous but we still fly. The security measures taken and inflicted in the future will be a compromise of price and comfort. It's safest to bombserch every luggage, but it takes time and money and therefore not done - yet. I belive that airtravel as we know it will forever change. God willing, security measures will filter out the worst, ie. the un-luckiest, but those crazy enough to do this kind of terror are still living and even contemplating something similar. The only thing that can really stop these people is morality and respect for life.
The current strategies for dealing with skyjack were formulated during the early 60s and seventies, where the skyjackers were either political refugees "Take me to Cuba!" or people willing to make a political statement by by diverting an aircraft to a remote field, then destroying it on the ground. Some were merely disturbed individuals looking for attention.
Under that paradigm the advice to "follow whatever directions the skyjacker gave", while attempting to alert the authorities on the ground made eminent sense. The skyjacker had the advantage of surprise, was mentally prepared for violence, usually armed and had access to hostages in the cabin, while the pilots were taken by surprise, strapped into seats with their backs to the skyjacker and hampered as they also had to ensure the safe flight of the aircraft. A physical response while airbourne would always have a very low likelyhood of success, while dealing with the situation on the ground, with ground assistance, maximised the chances for survival of all on board.
Under this new paradigm - suicide skyjackers using the aircraft as a 200 ton missile with inbuilt hostage protection while in flight, may require a re-think of the strategies in dealing with skyjack.
In the USA in the early 60s and 70s - before significant ground security checks at airports, pilots began to arm themselves as several pilots were killed at that time.
Under that paradigm the advice to "follow whatever directions the skyjacker gave", while attempting to alert the authorities on the ground made eminent sense. The skyjacker had the advantage of surprise, was mentally prepared for violence, usually armed and had access to hostages in the cabin, while the pilots were taken by surprise, strapped into seats with their backs to the skyjacker and hampered as they also had to ensure the safe flight of the aircraft. A physical response while airbourne would always have a very low likelyhood of success, while dealing with the situation on the ground, with ground assistance, maximised the chances for survival of all on board.
Under this new paradigm - suicide skyjackers using the aircraft as a 200 ton missile with inbuilt hostage protection while in flight, may require a re-think of the strategies in dealing with skyjack.
In the USA in the early 60s and 70s - before significant ground security checks at airports, pilots began to arm themselves as several pilots were killed at that time.
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Spot on, Checkboard, the playing fields have just tilted significantly and the old advice of "do what they tell you to do" has to be radically rethought. A locked cockpit door will help, but it's not a cure-all. Am I right that American public transport flights are already required to keep the door locked?
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I know that Swissair has an armoured cockpit doors on most of there aircraft. They also have a video camara looking back into the area immediatly behind. That keeps the cockpit crew more or less safe and they can see whom is coming or trying to get on to the flight deck. This certainly does not solve the ultimate problem. And, that is, how to screen boarding pax in a more efficient and practical manner? The other part of the equation, is how do we combat terrorism or even solve the worlds problems. I am sure that this issue will a discussion point for many years to come! In the mean time my condolences to all whom have been touched by these tragic events.
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Gentleman Aviator and the Commander
Both with absolutely sound ideas. The Flight Deck door should remain closed for the whole flight. If we wish to stop the same type of incident happening again, then this can only be done by making the Flight Deck door totally secure and it be physically impossible to gain access from the cabin during the flight. As pax will always be able to smuggle things onboard or grab a fire axe or heavy fire extinguisher, or take on board chemical incapacitant sprays, weapons must be considered to be available to these peolple. If we go down this route, which is the ONLY way to prevent similar incidents, by stopping them physically getting at the controls, then there will have to be major changes to the inside of the aircraft - lavatories, food, additional comunication between FD and cabin, operational procedures - all of these and more, will be topics to be discussed.
A very, very, very sad few days for us all.
Both with absolutely sound ideas. The Flight Deck door should remain closed for the whole flight. If we wish to stop the same type of incident happening again, then this can only be done by making the Flight Deck door totally secure and it be physically impossible to gain access from the cabin during the flight. As pax will always be able to smuggle things onboard or grab a fire axe or heavy fire extinguisher, or take on board chemical incapacitant sprays, weapons must be considered to be available to these peolple. If we go down this route, which is the ONLY way to prevent similar incidents, by stopping them physically getting at the controls, then there will have to be major changes to the inside of the aircraft - lavatories, food, additional comunication between FD and cabin, operational procedures - all of these and more, will be topics to be discussed.
A very, very, very sad few days for us all.
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Thoughts along the lines of Checkboard's post have come to my mind too. The "Do whatever the hijackers say" recipe just doesn't work anymore.
In this case, I'm afraid a "Turn the airplane over on its back and pull the stick as hard as you can." would have saved literally thousansd of lives.
Up until now, the "only" thing we have been concerned about is the safety of the flight and the passengers on board. The recent happenings sets the hijacking threat in a different perpective.
September 11th 2001 changed everything.
Nick.
In this case, I'm afraid a "Turn the airplane over on its back and pull the stick as hard as you can." would have saved literally thousansd of lives.
Up until now, the "only" thing we have been concerned about is the safety of the flight and the passengers on board. The recent happenings sets the hijacking threat in a different perpective.
September 11th 2001 changed everything.
Nick.
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A steel flight deck door, well locked is now a must. A video camera looking at the pax cabin(s) is also essential. Any sign of terrorist activity and a pilot should be able to discharge a harmless knockout gas into the pax cabin and land the aircraft asap. Upon landing the terrorists can be dealt with whilst still unconcious.
True this method will probably not spare the lives of all on board, but bear in mind the alternative. May all those poor souls rest in peace.
True this method will probably not spare the lives of all on board, but bear in mind the alternative. May all those poor souls rest in peace.
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I strongly disagree with you. There is no point locking the flight deck doors. On one of the hijacked planes in the USA the hijackers were unable to break down the locked flight deck door, so they started stabbing one of the stewardesses until it was opened. Can any of you seriously say you would not open that door if you got an intercom from a girl saying she was being stabbed? Or, they could say they have a grenade and will blow up the whole aircraft if you don't open the door. They will assure you they will not harm you if you do open it - maybe they DO just want to be 'taken to Tehrain' etc and it could be a 'conventional hijack'.
There are also too many reasons why access is essential to the flight deck:
1. In an emergency the pilots may need to go down the back (gear lock viewers, burning smells etc).
2. In an emergency the No.1 must be briefed. This is far better face to face from a CRM point of view.
3. The toilet is outside the flight deck on short haul aircraft.
4. Pilots require food and drink from the galley.
EME - where EXACTLY do you propose putting a toilet inside a 737 cockpit?! There isn't enough room to swing a cat in there. There are 1000's of them worldwide, each capable of being used like in NY. The cost of redesigning them would be prohibitive and it wouldn't achieve anything.
[ 13 September 2001: Message edited by: BmPilot21 ]
There are also too many reasons why access is essential to the flight deck:
1. In an emergency the pilots may need to go down the back (gear lock viewers, burning smells etc).
2. In an emergency the No.1 must be briefed. This is far better face to face from a CRM point of view.
3. The toilet is outside the flight deck on short haul aircraft.
4. Pilots require food and drink from the galley.
EME - where EXACTLY do you propose putting a toilet inside a 737 cockpit?! There isn't enough room to swing a cat in there. There are 1000's of them worldwide, each capable of being used like in NY. The cost of redesigning them would be prohibitive and it wouldn't achieve anything.
[ 13 September 2001: Message edited by: BmPilot21 ]
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BmPilot21, I fully agree.
A locked door, strong enough to withstand a bad-tempered hijacker, provokes violence towards flight attendants and pax. Who of you wants to be the first pilot landing with only the flight crew still alive? Then there is the possibility of the pilot having family members on board, next in line to be killed unless he opens the door... how long would that door remain closed?
It has been the policy - or actually law - in the US for years (if not decades) to keep the door closed. Did that stop or even just stall the hijackers on any of the four planes? We all know it didn't.
Erik.
A locked door, strong enough to withstand a bad-tempered hijacker, provokes violence towards flight attendants and pax. Who of you wants to be the first pilot landing with only the flight crew still alive? Then there is the possibility of the pilot having family members on board, next in line to be killed unless he opens the door... how long would that door remain closed?
It has been the policy - or actually law - in the US for years (if not decades) to keep the door closed. Did that stop or even just stall the hijackers on any of the four planes? We all know it didn't.
Erik.
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The argument here seems to be...door unlocked v door locked.
How about no door at all. This negates any argument about cabin crew being threatened so as to force pilots out of the flight deck. There is no point in even trying to gain access, controle the flight etc if access does not exist.
Front aircraft door is for flight crew only with a metal bulkhead in front of row one seating. Pilots have their own toilet and self serve galley. Not as nice as being handed a cup of cofee by a prety flight attendant, but the world changed this week and not for the better.
How about no door at all. This negates any argument about cabin crew being threatened so as to force pilots out of the flight deck. There is no point in even trying to gain access, controle the flight etc if access does not exist.
Front aircraft door is for flight crew only with a metal bulkhead in front of row one seating. Pilots have their own toilet and self serve galley. Not as nice as being handed a cup of cofee by a prety flight attendant, but the world changed this week and not for the better.
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If we follow dw's suggestion then we have the ultimate safety measure; a/c cannot be hijacked if they do not exist. I realise that due to this (and other similar) incidents that the cockpit will be closed at all times, but unfortunately with terrorists willing/eager to die the only way to combat them is by preemptive strikes / improved security stopping them getting anywhere near the a/c. No current design is capable of simple modification to permanently seal the cockpit - any don't forget the many regional a/c with no solid partitions, just curtains, and even if you had sealed cockpits and Rambo-style sky marshalls on every flight, consider a light twin (or heavy turbo single) loaded with HE or even ANFO - the Oklahoma city bomb was far larger than the WTC or Pentagon impact. It is impossible to protect every possible target.
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However, taking the front doors out means a corresponding reduction in passenger loads due to aircraft certification evacuation times. Less passengers means higher fares and possibly less travel by the public so there could be big big ramifications and some airlines might not survive in the economic climate.
There is always a balance to be had. The question is how far to one side will it be allowed to be tipped and what will the effects on everyone's liveliehoods be ??
There is always a balance to be had. The question is how far to one side will it be allowed to be tipped and what will the effects on everyone's liveliehoods be ??
There is no doubt that the locked (modified or not) cockpit door is on the way for all airliners that have doors. Our lot have now said that only flight crew and cabin crew are to have access to the flightdeck from doors closed to doors open and I can't see it ever changing back. It seems trivial to mention in the light of so much carnage but it is shame that we will no longer be able to invite the wide eyed air cadet in row 5 up the front for landing.
There are several threads running about new doors and changing the internal config. to have a door to the flightdeck outside the pax. cabin so the crew are sealed in etc. It seems to me that the measure that is going to make the biggest difference is a trained, and armed security officer on EVERY flight. The airlines will moan that it will be too expensive but many operators already employ far more cabin crew than they need simply to provide in-flight service which would seem to be far less important. We often carry 8 crew on an A321, 3 more than the legal minimum so it is only a matter of airlines changing their views on what is really important. El Al have been doing it for years and I think it is time for others to follow, I am sure that the U.S. will go down this route.
It has been a truly dark few days for the world and I feel sick to my stomach that the thing that I love being involved in so much and that has given me so much pleasure has been used to such horrific effect. RIP
[ 14 September 2001: Message edited by: Max Angle ]
There are several threads running about new doors and changing the internal config. to have a door to the flightdeck outside the pax. cabin so the crew are sealed in etc. It seems to me that the measure that is going to make the biggest difference is a trained, and armed security officer on EVERY flight. The airlines will moan that it will be too expensive but many operators already employ far more cabin crew than they need simply to provide in-flight service which would seem to be far less important. We often carry 8 crew on an A321, 3 more than the legal minimum so it is only a matter of airlines changing their views on what is really important. El Al have been doing it for years and I think it is time for others to follow, I am sure that the U.S. will go down this route.
It has been a truly dark few days for the world and I feel sick to my stomach that the thing that I love being involved in so much and that has given me so much pleasure has been used to such horrific effect. RIP
[ 14 September 2001: Message edited by: Max Angle ]
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OK, what about instead of hired security on board evey flight, we simply arm and train a percentage of the flight crew? True, it seems extreme, but it also seems that in states where someone may be carrying a weapon there is less violent crime. Perhaps the fact that the pilots they're trying to hijack might turn around a pull a handgun might change a terrorist's mind about hijacking as a viable option. Of course, no one wants to think about the consequences of discharging a weapon on a jet, particularly at altitute, and the training and certification to carry a weapon would certainly be a pain, but it might be worth it.
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The weight increase resulting from a fully sealed cockpit with its own access door does take away the threat to pax and cabin crew.
But does it also increase safety levels? It takes out an emergency exit. It also prevents the pilots from going into the cabin in case of technical problems: it will be impossible to look, listen or otherwise observe what's going on when the a/c does not work as adertised.
Events that justify an access door have been a lot more common throughout the years.
But does it also increase safety levels? It takes out an emergency exit. It also prevents the pilots from going into the cabin in case of technical problems: it will be impossible to look, listen or otherwise observe what's going on when the a/c does not work as adertised.
Events that justify an access door have been a lot more common throughout the years.
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No single approach will solve security issues on board airliners. You need a multi-facet approach:
1. Improve security at the gate lounge. Better scanning and detection.
2. Redesign the airliner. Self contained cockpit with washroom and galley. No door into the cabin - just an impregnable bulkhead. Fit an external door for crew access.
3. CCTV and electronics to monitor systems and cabin.
4. Marshals on-board - armed.
5. International terrorism should be declared an act of war. No civil trial and years languishing on death row - a simple court martial and death by firing squad!
Don't arm the crew - you have you read some of the posts by pilots on this BB. Could you honestly trust some of these jackasses with a side-arm, in a pressurised cabin with a lot of people?
1. Improve security at the gate lounge. Better scanning and detection.
2. Redesign the airliner. Self contained cockpit with washroom and galley. No door into the cabin - just an impregnable bulkhead. Fit an external door for crew access.
3. CCTV and electronics to monitor systems and cabin.
4. Marshals on-board - armed.
5. International terrorism should be declared an act of war. No civil trial and years languishing on death row - a simple court martial and death by firing squad!
Don't arm the crew - you have you read some of the posts by pilots on this BB. Could you honestly trust some of these jackasses with a side-arm, in a pressurised cabin with a lot of people?
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The key to locking the doors is not "I hear you knocking, but you can't come in," it is denying communication to the smelly chap in the cabin with unorthodox views on the conduct of the flight.
If there is no way for the cabin to communicate with the flight deck (after a panic button is pressed) the smelly chap can't really stop you from landing the aircraft where you want it to.
Fine, he can still blow it up or slice up the SLF, but this is not as much fun to him, so he will lose interest and blow himself up on a bus instead.
If there is no way for the cabin to communicate with the flight deck (after a panic button is pressed) the smelly chap can't really stop you from landing the aircraft where you want it to.
Fine, he can still blow it up or slice up the SLF, but this is not as much fun to him, so he will lose interest and blow himself up on a bus instead.
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I am just reiterating what I had posted on another thread, but I am really curious.
Does anyone believe pilots could/should be trained in high-G manouvers that could disable anyone who wasn't strapped into their seat. It would seem that a well executed split-S or Immelman type manouver could throw anyone who wasn't strapped in their seat to the back of the cabin where they would likely be knocked unconcious or have a few bones broken.
What are the load limits on a large airliner like a 767 or A330? Would it be possible to execute such a manouver as a last resort to disable anyone standing? I've read many reports of FA's breaking ankles in clear air turbulence that it would seem an intentional manouver to disable people would be within the limits of the A/C structure.
Does anyone believe pilots could/should be trained in high-G manouvers that could disable anyone who wasn't strapped into their seat. It would seem that a well executed split-S or Immelman type manouver could throw anyone who wasn't strapped in their seat to the back of the cabin where they would likely be knocked unconcious or have a few bones broken.
What are the load limits on a large airliner like a 767 or A330? Would it be possible to execute such a manouver as a last resort to disable anyone standing? I've read many reports of FA's breaking ankles in clear air turbulence that it would seem an intentional manouver to disable people would be within the limits of the A/C structure.
