Ranger One

We reached the 100 mark... we left off the old thread here:

Old thread, final page

Here's a thought, provoked by Airboeings post which mentioned the enormous proportions fuel leaks can assume: this wasn't a catastrophic situation, the crew had time to analyse the problem and gather data. If you had been on that flight deck, do you think it would have occured to you to call the cabin and ascertain whether there was a *visible* leak, and whether your actions had ameliorated it?

This, and the Concorde thread, have been some of the best I've seen lately - some very thoughtful contributions. I'll be very interested to hear the final verdict on this one, it definitely falls into the 'can't happen... but it did' category.

R1

[ 02 September 2001: Message edited by: Ranger One ]

Flight Safety

I find myself having to agree with the summary of events that Skybloke gave on page 6 of the previous thread. The events can be summarized in the phrase "they left the #2 engine running", which Skybloke used more than once in his summary. Clearly this was not good fuel management once they determined they had a fuel leak, and this explains the massive loss of fuel.

411A

One thing is for SURE, we can all learn from this incident, and as a bonus, no injuries or bent equipment.

Apollo

Ranger One....

I Think it would be pretty difficult to see a fuel leak at night coming from an engine.I'm sure it may also spark a bit of unrest with the pax with you poking your nose at the window.

With regards to the de-pressurization. I recall the pax stating that the masks dropped. Is there no help from the RAT for this system?

tunturi

Regarding pressurisation problems; The outflow valve/s would have driven closed under stanby electical power (Rat/battery)and the cabin leakage rate would then determine how long before cabin altitude equalled aircraft altitude. Depending upon the condition of door seals etc. it could take some time. It (cabin alt) obviously reached the mask trigger point (approx 13000ft ??on Airbus) but the leakage rate is probably a lot less than most might think, maybe 700 ft/min for example.

This is not like an explosive decompression and can be equated to the volcanic ash scenarios in Indonesia (BA747) and Alaska (KLM 747) where all 4 engines flamed out and the crews were faced with conflicting requirements of best glide speed versus high airspeed for windmill relight of engines and cabin pressuisation.

RatherBeFlying

AIRBOEING's statement that the probable positions of the fuel shutoff valves:

• null
• the LP by the wing spar (generally placed well away from the engine so that it can do some good in case of fire),
• null
• the HP with the engine

supports the pilots' action to restore/continue the crossfeed -- fine as long as the LP shutoff does not fail and how do you catch that in time?
So, we may have either:

• null
• two component failures -- pipe and LP valve (with invidious implications for maintenance)
• pipe rupture above LP valve (less likely, but if so, a design shortcoming).

In either nasty case, a crossfeed valve is your last line of defense, as long as there's enough accessible fuel for the remaining engine(s) to get to an airport.

foxmoth

Gulfer - I did say in my post that the 330 normaly does better than the 3nm/1,000', but obvoiusly the NORMAL slope would be degraded by windmilling engines and no residual thrust (though you would probably get this back by comming down at a more efficient speed)
CaptainX - sorry, but I would rather have enough fuel on ONE engine than insufficient on two, fine, start of that way, but then monitoring the situation should tell you it is NOT working and time to shut off the US side.
N.B. anyone tried dead stick in the sim?
not tried it yet, but I would probably aim for slightly high at 5 miles (say 1,600 - 1700') and clean, then drop everything and accept what I got on landing - probably fast, but safer that way than short and slow.

sky9

Wouldn't the situation been a great deal easier if aircraft were equipped with a FF meter on the engine and another in the fuel line within the wing structure.

I am left with a feeling that the overcomplicated automatic fuel transferring on the A330 has contributed to any confusion that the crew may have had establishing whether they had an engine fuel leak or a wing fuel leak.

Nothing these days seems as simple as the checklist suggests, I suspect because the checklist was drawn up with both eyes on the product liability laws.

After every incident like this I question "how well would I do in that situation?" I have yet to find a situation where I know that I would have done any better and incidents like Soux City fill me with admiration for the guys involved.

No doubt the experts will tell us how to do it better; with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

Roadtrip

1.AirTransat employes convicted drug smugglers as captains??

2. Did the captain try and isolate the fuel leak or not (crossfeed off)?? Yes or No. There appears to have been plenty of time to "fly the airplane, analyze the situation, and take appropriate action."

This whole episode smells, and it's not getting any better as more facts get known.

What kind of airline is AirTransat???

fly4fud

all right, my turn now

"great job", "congratulations to all", "well done", etc????? Come on guys, wake up and remove your shades

It looks to me that this once more a case where pilots have endangered a flight and then saved it :o Call'em heroes if you want, but don't forget one thing, pilots are (still) here to save the day and not to make the situation worse. The same was true of the AC story. Those deadstick landings were good (and extremely lucky ), but guess who first placed the aircraft in this situation:

- Air Transat, rumor has it of a fuel leak on one side, all the fuel dumped overboard thru the xfeed valve, great...
- Air Canada, aircraft refuelled with liters, indications in pounds and pilots not knowing how much they have...
- Aero Lloyd, gear down flight, fuel consumption relying only on the FMS (who cares about the fuel gages anyway?)...

Understand that those lines are not written to attack colleagues, but more to the point, to point out how quickly a highly trained group of professionals can be mislead by the circumstances, stress or just fatigue

Capt PPRuNe

I believe the A330 arrived overhead the airfield at about 15,000'.

As this is a technical discussion I am moving this thread to the Tech Log forum.

Ranger One

Apollo:

Doh. I'm short on sack time and I'd completely overlooked the fact that this incident took place at night.

zzzzzzzzzzz

R1

broadreach

Thanks Danny for the reminder re altitude they arrived over Lages at. I believe it was mentioned only once during one of the press conference newspaper stories.

Rockhound

Capt PPrune,
In your message above, were you referring to Air Transat TS 236 overhead Lajes (as Broadreach seems to think)? According to Paul Koring in the Globe and Mail of Aug 31, at 0634 hrs local, 8 mins after the left engine failed at FL 345, the aircraft was at FL 130 and 13 miles from the field. The landing run ended at 0646 hrs.
Apologies if we're not talking about the same thing.
Rockhound

Scud Runner

Obviously, there are still details to be learned before we pass final judgement on this incident.

Some of you are suggesting that there needs to better technology to prevent mishandling of a fuel leak on what is already a high technology aircraft. Others think the A330 fuel management system is overly complicated, an opinion which is completely without factual basis. The A330 and its' relatives have a very simple little feature which can be quite helpful in this regard. It is called EFOB (estimated fuel on board) at destination. It seems to me that keeping an eye on this figure, combined with consistent fuel checks over waypoints, should yield clues to fuel leaks rather simply. Why complicate things further?

It's a poor chef that blaims his utensils!

Scud Runner

Traffic

Capt PPR

Is someone seriously suggesting our friends arrived overhead Lajes at FL150??

I have seen two numbers for the FL at which the second engine stopped FL 320 and now FL 345.

Either way how do you travel 100nm deadstick from either of thsoe levels and arrive overhead at FL 150??

The original propsition that they departed FL 320 and got there by a foreskin sounds more believable unless there is something the 330 can do that no other a/c can manage.

Rockhound

Today's Globe and Mail carries an exclusive by Graeme Smith, which reports that, five days before the dead-stick landing in the Azores, a senior Air Transat mechanic advised his supervisor that the aircraft was not yet ready for line flight because not all the work associated with an engine change had been completed. He was overruled by his (non-union) supervisor and the aircraft was released for duty. The mechanic recorded his conversation with his boss on tape. An AT spokesperson confirmed that the supervisor was suspended with pay last week.
Rockhound

Capt PPRuNe

Just stating what I overheard some AirTransat pilots saying about the incident. I cannot confirm that that is the actual case and we will have to wait for the official report to come out.

It would seem a bit more logical if there was enough height remaining after the second engine flamed out to arrive overhead and then descend from there for a deadstick landing rather than plan for a one off approach from some distance away.

This weeks Flight International has a report that says DeJager (the F/O) said that he made a fuel check at 0457 (z?) and at that time there was sufficient remaining. 28 minutes later, one hour before the fuel starvation he first reported a fuel problem and requested a diversion to Lajes. The emergency was declared 23 minutes later at 0548 and according to the report he told ATC that the right engine had failed 25 minutes later at 0613. Around 13 minutes later at about 0626 at FL320, 100nm from Lajes the left engine stopped. The crew prepared the a/c for ditching but made a flapless heavy landing 20 minutes later at 0646.

It would need to be verified what distance they were from Lajes when the second engine flamed out to determine whether they made the deadstick approach from some distance away or from overhead the field. Either way it will have been a high adrenaline exercise and having had to deadstick a measly C182 from 4,000' overhead an airport I do not envy those guys.

[ 03 September 2001: Message edited by: Capt PPRuNe ]

Techman

This incident is starting to smell of more than just fuel.

Rockhound

From everything I've read and heard in the Canadian media, the aircraft made a straight-in approach to Lajes Field from the northeast. A reputable source is Paul Koring of the Globe and Mail newspaper, who is considerably more knowledgeable on aviation-related matters than the average Canadian journalist; Koring wrote extensively on SR 111. In his article of Aug 31, he gives the following sequence of events (all times local = Zulu):
0458hrs: Fuel check by crew shows no abnormalities. A/C is NNW of the Azores at Fl 390.
0536: Crew notices fuel imbalance.
0541: Concerned about fuel quantity, pilot changes course for the Azores, 540 km away to the SW.
0548: Pilot decides there is a fuel leak and declares emergency.
0613: Still at FL 390, right engine fails, 217 km from Lajes.
0625: At FL 345, left engine fails, 137 km from Lajes.
0634: A/c has reached FL 130 and is 13 km from Lajes.
0646: Landing at Lajes.
Note that my earlier post contains an error: at FL 130 in the glide, the a/c was 13 km, not miles, from the field.
Rockhound