Sell me the Monitored Approach
bp, no not a member of Balpa, but representing research interests (BLEU, 1975 - 80), with links to CAA and industry.
“The french postal service was of its time and relied on skill and professionalism.“
Undoubtable so, I would not misconstrue them or other French activities otherwise.
“Monitored approach works but is not the answer to solving the problem of lower standards nor having two crew operation with an extremely inexperienced first officer.” Again we agree, excepting that ‘the problem’ as perceived today may have no solution. Operations, equipment, and safety viewpoints have all changed; at best we can only look with an open mind.
“Back to the one pilot and a dog idea.” In the modern idiom, yes; but an intelligent dog. Not an artificial one - AI, but technology based intelligent assistance, fulfilling those tasks of the monitored approach concept.
Selling a monitored approach in the 70 - 80s would have been hard work; selling the concept nowadays has little relevance to the safety case in highly automated aircraft.
“The french postal service was of its time and relied on skill and professionalism.“
Undoubtable so, I would not misconstrue them or other French activities otherwise.
“Monitored approach works but is not the answer to solving the problem of lower standards nor having two crew operation with an extremely inexperienced first officer.” Again we agree, excepting that ‘the problem’ as perceived today may have no solution. Operations, equipment, and safety viewpoints have all changed; at best we can only look with an open mind.
“Back to the one pilot and a dog idea.” In the modern idiom, yes; but an intelligent dog. Not an artificial one - AI, but technology based intelligent assistance, fulfilling those tasks of the monitored approach concept.
Selling a monitored approach in the 70 - 80s would have been hard work; selling the concept nowadays has little relevance to the safety case in highly automated aircraft.
FlightDetent, #49: unfortunately I don’t think introducing extra callouts at this stage will do anything to help on either the better planning or effectiveness of monitoring /authority gradient issues which are more than 20% of the problem.
BoeingDriver99; “Does the monitored versus non-monitored approach produce any verifiable difference? If so; choose your process accordingly. If no difference in the data then it’s whatever you personally choose.”
You and others are quite right to want to see comparative data. It does exist but requires some explanation and I am reluctant to post it directly. Anyone who wants it can PM me and I will send you a link. (Also several others here should check their PMs for one from me.)
Safetypee, #54: this is absolutely right. The visual reference assessment cannot be monitored. Many pilots don’t seem to realise the assessment should be made BEFORE MDA/DH, and is that the visual cues have satisfied the pilot who will be landing that the aircraft’s position and trajectory are either satisfactory to continue, or not. The DH/MDA and visibility numbers are based on the assumption that this decision is the correct one, and do not allow for the possibility that another person may then intervene and it could later be reversed. That’s why the “D” in DH is for Decision.
BP #36: “the airmiss with the stationary hotel” is I presume a reference to a 747 Classic incident with the Captain as PF throughout, i.e.traditional PF/PNF duties, and unaffected by any "BEA mafia" changes, whatevber is meant by that. Quite what the “777 prang” has to do with this subject is unclear. It was the F/O’s sector and he had taken control as PF at 1000ft. The right engine failed at 720ft, followed 7 seconds later by the second. Neither the accident report nor Captain Burkill’s book contain anything to justify “the captain ordered PF to uncouple from the glideslope which didn’t happen allowing the speed to fall below min drag until stall protection kicked in.”
BP #48: “FAKE? If I remember correctly it was a piss take in the log”. For the benefit of readers the Log was the BALPA monthly magazine. No, someone (probably within BALPA) used official stationery heading to produce a fake Flight Operations Department Notice which unfortunately got quite wide international circulation as genuine in subsequent years, with (in my opinion) significantly detrimental effcets on flight safety .
BoeingDriver99; “Does the monitored versus non-monitored approach produce any verifiable difference? If so; choose your process accordingly. If no difference in the data then it’s whatever you personally choose.”
You and others are quite right to want to see comparative data. It does exist but requires some explanation and I am reluctant to post it directly. Anyone who wants it can PM me and I will send you a link. (Also several others here should check their PMs for one from me.)
Safetypee, #54: this is absolutely right. The visual reference assessment cannot be monitored. Many pilots don’t seem to realise the assessment should be made BEFORE MDA/DH, and is that the visual cues have satisfied the pilot who will be landing that the aircraft’s position and trajectory are either satisfactory to continue, or not. The DH/MDA and visibility numbers are based on the assumption that this decision is the correct one, and do not allow for the possibility that another person may then intervene and it could later be reversed. That’s why the “D” in DH is for Decision.
BP #36: “the airmiss with the stationary hotel” is I presume a reference to a 747 Classic incident with the Captain as PF throughout, i.e.traditional PF/PNF duties, and unaffected by any "BEA mafia" changes, whatevber is meant by that. Quite what the “777 prang” has to do with this subject is unclear. It was the F/O’s sector and he had taken control as PF at 1000ft. The right engine failed at 720ft, followed 7 seconds later by the second. Neither the accident report nor Captain Burkill’s book contain anything to justify “the captain ordered PF to uncouple from the glideslope which didn’t happen allowing the speed to fall below min drag until stall protection kicked in.”
BP #48: “FAKE? If I remember correctly it was a piss take in the log”. For the benefit of readers the Log was the BALPA monthly magazine. No, someone (probably within BALPA) used official stationery heading to produce a fake Flight Operations Department Notice which unfortunately got quite wide international circulation as genuine in subsequent years, with (in my opinion) significantly detrimental effcets on flight safety .
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blind pew
If we really must differentiate on the basis of culture and language. I think anyone in the airline industry would agree we have all learned a lot about operating jet airliners from French speakers over recent years.
Though it’s unclear how that relates to the subject under discussion?
I have had the luck to receiving instruction on four continents by more than ten nationalities with amateur, professional, military, self improvement and hobby backgrounds. I’ve tried my best to do this with an open mind. By far I have learnt the most from continentals especially French speakers.
Though it’s unclear how that relates to the subject under discussion?
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I watch this Tech Log forum for serious input which is generally kept within the bounds of the subject. Some of the recent comments here belong in Rumors and News or Jet Blast. Some of the content is almost incomprehensible or has little relevance to the subject?
