Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?
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Where’s the “feedback” coming from? Does the Airbus sidestick provide you with feedback so you can tell the difference in load on the flight control surfaces between 0kts and Vmo?
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*sigh*. There's 2 parallel lines of discussion going on -
1) The terminology of "force feedback" - of which the usage is incorrect, since there's no information from the result feeding "back" to the input.
2) The actual intent of KP's post, despite the wrong word being used (so let's just forget it was used, and pretend it was "constant force"), the implications of the constant force ergonomics on cues to the pilot. Personally I think it's a double edged sword. It prevents overwhelming forces that can add stress and confusion to the pilot (this was KP's post) but at the same time (I think, based on pure speculation, not having flown such a system) it hides meaningful information, which can add its own source of confusion.
1) The terminology of "force feedback" - of which the usage is incorrect, since there's no information from the result feeding "back" to the input.
2) The actual intent of KP's post, despite the wrong word being used (so let's just forget it was used, and pretend it was "constant force"), the implications of the constant force ergonomics on cues to the pilot. Personally I think it's a double edged sword. It prevents overwhelming forces that can add stress and confusion to the pilot (this was KP's post) but at the same time (I think, based on pure speculation, not having flown such a system) it hides meaningful information, which can add its own source of confusion.
Originally Posted by Vilas
Airbus GA is no problem or for that matter even flying because aircraft trims itself. It even applies to alternate law
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Any stupid thing that an Airbus airplane is able to do automatically, a pilot is able to do manually. Well, at least this stupid thing. Otherwise there would have been no stall accidents prior to the 1980's.
Last edited by Vessbot; 6th Dec 2020 at 00:11.
Originally Posted by Vessbot
(Without the ground there to cue a reaction first, there's every reason to think they would have continued pulling back all the way to the stall warning/shaker/limiter/whatever.)
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I doubt it. They ONLY reason they kept puling back was to reach the runway which was in plain view straight ahead.
The AF447 crew had no outside reference to entice them to pull back, they were simply climbing and slowing down, and as they did the jet trimmed back for them. In a normal aeroplane, the nose would have dropped if the pilots had done nothing.
The AF447 crew had no outside reference to entice them to pull back, they were simply climbing and slowing down, and as they did the jet trimmed back for them. In a normal aeroplane, the nose would have dropped if the pilots had done nothing.
I think a likelier benefit to both of those (447, 8501) would have been if the controls were physically interlinked, and the tunnel visioned CA might have been clued in to what the FO was inputting. In both cases, the CA was making some half-hearted forward pushes, so he had the right idea. But there was no meaningful nose-down response due to the FO overpowering him hard against the aft stop. If the CA knew the reason, they could have yelled for the FO to stop and/or push forward, as he pushed harder forward himself.
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Last edited by vilas; 6th Dec 2020 at 03:13.
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Let's not get 447 into this. First in Airbus you never keep the stick out of neutral on permanent basis. Any Airbus pilot knows if you keep pulling back she will keep trimming up. It's not a secret. The way to stop is leave the stick once the desired pitch is reached. Unfortunately just like the SFO crew never checked their speed the 447 crew never looked at the PFD. Even a B757 which doesn't auto trim has crashed with UAS. The subject is developing/ maintaining raw data flying skill. No one says pilot shouldn't have it. The difference is on practicing how much to, what to and where to. Naturally every one has different views. But no point quoting accidents that have nothing to do with the subject.
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We'll never know for sure if he was trying to follow the FD, but regular raw data flying allows you to more easily look behind the FD, and also allows you to more readily realise when it's time to turn it off.
Over the ocean in essentially night IMC is when some people would probably say is not ideal to practice raw data flying. However it's exactly the situation encountered by AF447.
If you don't feel comfortable hand flying an approach in IMC, you should let your regulator know there needs to be a DAY VMC ONLY limitation on your ATPL.
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I'd say AF 447 has EVERYTHING to do with the subject. A pilot who never does any raw data flying is a slave to the FD/FMA. The instrument scan becomes a stare. On AF447, the FD commanded a nose up input, and the PF said something like "I've been pulling the whole time".
We'll never know for sure if he was trying to follow the FD, but regular raw data flying allows you to more easily look behind the FD, and also allows you to more readily realise when it's time to turn it off.
Over the ocean in essentially night IMC is when some people would probably say is not ideal to practice raw data flying. However it's exactly the situation encountered by AF447.
If you don't feel comfortable hand flying an approach in IMC, you should let your regulator know there needs to be a DAY VMC ONLY limitation on your ATPL.
We'll never know for sure if he was trying to follow the FD, but regular raw data flying allows you to more easily look behind the FD, and also allows you to more readily realise when it's time to turn it off.
Over the ocean in essentially night IMC is when some people would probably say is not ideal to practice raw data flying. However it's exactly the situation encountered by AF447.
If you don't feel comfortable hand flying an approach in IMC, you should let your regulator know there needs to be a DAY VMC ONLY limitation on your ATPL.
Last edited by vilas; 6th Dec 2020 at 07:13.
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Why do commercial flights and training flights need to be mutually exclusive? When you go to the hospital, the doctors who see you may well be in training. Even after training, as consultant or attending physicians, don't you agree that they're honing their skills with each new patient?
Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice.
Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice.
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Why do commercial flights and training flights need to be mutually exclusive? When you go to the hospital, the doctors who see you may well be in training. Even after training, as consultant or attending physicians, don't you agree that they're honing their skills with each new patient?
Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice.
Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice.
Last edited by vilas; 6th Dec 2020 at 09:29.
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I'm not sure accidents have nothing to do with the subject..
They show that a problem exists.
Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)
They show that a problem exists.
Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)
To roundoff a few previous comments:-
KP, #166,'The 9 competencies are' - a model with neat definitions, but what exactly are these aspects in practice, how do we explain them, train them. '… better workload management (because of a higher workload which will make you practise this competency) and situational awareness'. Yet humans continually have difficulty with identifying high workload or when we have 'good' awareness' or even the correct awareness; or when will understanding be sufficient vs an 'optimum' ideal.
Our views are closer than might appear; not what they are, but how we get to them.
Vessbot, #169 re 'skills being transferable'. Ideally it would be convenient to acquire skills in one situation that would transfer to others. However, the research report indicates that some skills may not transfer; page 63 onwards.
Perceptual-motor skills, manual flight handling, feel of the aircraft, could transfer between approach and GA, but less so the mental skill of knowing when to GA, or knowing that the aircraft will 'intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway', knowing that the need is to 'level the wings', - the orientation (the understanding) part of OODA.
Note that the report relates advance proficiency with expertise, a deffiniton not alway used in aviation.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.
A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.
Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.
Refs:- https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Do.../wp_296_en.pdf
https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/SIB_2.../SIB_2013-05_1
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/avia.../SAFO17007.pdf
KP, #166,'The 9 competencies are' - a model with neat definitions, but what exactly are these aspects in practice, how do we explain them, train them. '… better workload management (because of a higher workload which will make you practise this competency) and situational awareness'. Yet humans continually have difficulty with identifying high workload or when we have 'good' awareness' or even the correct awareness; or when will understanding be sufficient vs an 'optimum' ideal.
Our views are closer than might appear; not what they are, but how we get to them.
Vessbot, #169 re 'skills being transferable'. Ideally it would be convenient to acquire skills in one situation that would transfer to others. However, the research report indicates that some skills may not transfer; page 63 onwards.
Perceptual-motor skills, manual flight handling, feel of the aircraft, could transfer between approach and GA, but less so the mental skill of knowing when to GA, or knowing that the aircraft will 'intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway', knowing that the need is to 'level the wings', - the orientation (the understanding) part of OODA.
Note that the report relates advance proficiency with expertise, a deffiniton not alway used in aviation.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.
A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.
Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.
Refs:- https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Do.../wp_296_en.pdf
https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/SIB_2.../SIB_2013-05_1
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/avia.../SAFO17007.pdf
Last edited by PEI_3721; 6th Dec 2020 at 13:08.
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Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required