Belavia 737 landing accidents lessons for the unwary.
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Belavia 737 landing accidents lessons for the unwary.
Two same company B737 landing incidents with common denominator.
.EW-290PA 737-500 Runway Excursion Landing in Fog
EW-336PA 737-300 Runway Excursion on Landing
During simulator training it is quite common for see crews leaving the autothrottles engaged during manual flying. That includes manual landing. This is what happened in the 737-300 incident at Kiev. The FCTM states "Autothrottle use is recommended during takeoff and climb in either automatic or manual flight. During all other phases of flight autothrottle use is recommended only when the autopilot is engaged in CMD. The autothrottle ARM mode is normally not recommended because its function can be confusing.".
Another common observation in the simulator is the complete cancellation of reverse thrust at the 60 knots call by the PM. Snapping the reverse thrust levers to fully down at 60 knots means significant forward thrust occurs as the translating sleeves move towards close and the N1 is still relatively high on the way down to ground idle. The FCTM states the thrust levers should be positioned to reverse idle by taxi speed and then only full down after the engines have decelerated to idle.
The final report on both accidents has been published but is only available in Russian language. Does anyone know if English language versions are available?
.EW-290PA 737-500 Runway Excursion Landing in Fog
EW-336PA 737-300 Runway Excursion on Landing
During simulator training it is quite common for see crews leaving the autothrottles engaged during manual flying. That includes manual landing. This is what happened in the 737-300 incident at Kiev. The FCTM states "Autothrottle use is recommended during takeoff and climb in either automatic or manual flight. During all other phases of flight autothrottle use is recommended only when the autopilot is engaged in CMD. The autothrottle ARM mode is normally not recommended because its function can be confusing.".
Another common observation in the simulator is the complete cancellation of reverse thrust at the 60 knots call by the PM. Snapping the reverse thrust levers to fully down at 60 knots means significant forward thrust occurs as the translating sleeves move towards close and the N1 is still relatively high on the way down to ground idle. The FCTM states the thrust levers should be positioned to reverse idle by taxi speed and then only full down after the engines have decelerated to idle.
The final report on both accidents has been published but is only available in Russian language. Does anyone know if English language versions are available?
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The autothrottle ARM mode is normally not recommended because its function can be confusing.
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That's an incredibly mealy-mouthed sentence, and I notice it's in the FCTM, which I assume is an unapproved document. I assume the AFM doesn't actually prohibit use in the mode discussed? But I then wonder "why not?" given the statement about confusion. I think you'd have some issues certifying a system that could be described in such terms today.
The following is from FCOM NP:
For a single channel approach, disengage the autopilot and disconnect the autothrottle no later than minimum use height for single autopilot operation.