Stabilized approach criteria
Thread Starter
Joined: Jan 2013
Posts: 2
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From: Netherlands
Stabilized approach criteria
Hi all,
The past years there have been a lot of studies on non compliance with stabilized approach criteria, one of the most known ones is probably the 2017 'Go-Around Execution and Decision-Making Project Final Report' by the Flight Safety Foundation.
Now I wonder if there are any airlines that have actually adopted a new view to stabilized approach criteria in the past years? Not necessarily the ones propagated by the FSF but any new style, other then the current industry standard of 1000' IMC and 500' VMC.
Secondly, I remember reading an article about a US or Canadian carrier who adapted new SAC which are at least very similar to the ones of the FSF but I believe the article read that a go-around wasn't even mandatory until 100' (instead of 300' as by the FSF). Since having adopted those SAC that airline apparently had close to a 100% go-around rate out of unstable approaches. Of course, I've searched my ass off but have been unable to find the mentioned article. Anyone else who read it or actually knows the airline in question?
Cheers!
The past years there have been a lot of studies on non compliance with stabilized approach criteria, one of the most known ones is probably the 2017 'Go-Around Execution and Decision-Making Project Final Report' by the Flight Safety Foundation.
Now I wonder if there are any airlines that have actually adopted a new view to stabilized approach criteria in the past years? Not necessarily the ones propagated by the FSF but any new style, other then the current industry standard of 1000' IMC and 500' VMC.
Secondly, I remember reading an article about a US or Canadian carrier who adapted new SAC which are at least very similar to the ones of the FSF but I believe the article read that a go-around wasn't even mandatory until 100' (instead of 300' as by the FSF). Since having adopted those SAC that airline apparently had close to a 100% go-around rate out of unstable approaches. Of course, I've searched my ass off but have been unable to find the mentioned article. Anyone else who read it or actually knows the airline in question?
Cheers!
Joined: Jun 2006
Posts: 190
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From: CASEY STATION
Waku Waku
I just read the FSF article you mentioned. It was an interesting read. It looks like a very sound set of recommendations that would improve what we are all doing! Unfortunately we work in an industry where change comes very slowly.
I just read the FSF article you mentioned. It was an interesting read. It looks like a very sound set of recommendations that would improve what we are all doing! Unfortunately we work in an industry where change comes very slowly.
Joined: Dec 2002
Posts: 2,775
Likes: 353
From: UK
The FSF report is based on the premise that non-compliance is ‘the’ problem; and by implication that crew behavior is the cause. Their psychological study is weak and provides few substantial answers.
There is little consideration of alternative contributing factors - a systems viewpoint opposed to ‘blame’ the human. (See subsequent EASA? Conference).
The originating criteria for a stabilised approach evolved within the ALAR programme. The details as might be expected were a compromise of safety, human factors, etc, and also had to balance conflicting viewpoints in industry - regulators and manufacturers.
The objective was to get every operator to implement a procedure, and in the absence of alternatives to provide baseline parameters. There was no intent to mandate this, and the major manufacturers did retain their customised recommendations - some differing from the FSF.
Change is slow, but slower still without the ‘how to’ information. Many safety studies excel at identifying what is incorrect (a range of opinions reasoning why … etc), but few provide a mechanism or means to implement change.
Even reliance on regulation is slow and often this suggests that operators to ‘do their own thing’, again without offering advice of how to or alternatives.
Such an approach is better served by stating the overall safety objective; reduction in non-compliance is not very helpful without considering ‘how’.
There is little consideration of alternative contributing factors - a systems viewpoint opposed to ‘blame’ the human. (See subsequent EASA? Conference).
The originating criteria for a stabilised approach evolved within the ALAR programme. The details as might be expected were a compromise of safety, human factors, etc, and also had to balance conflicting viewpoints in industry - regulators and manufacturers.
The objective was to get every operator to implement a procedure, and in the absence of alternatives to provide baseline parameters. There was no intent to mandate this, and the major manufacturers did retain their customised recommendations - some differing from the FSF.
Change is slow, but slower still without the ‘how to’ information. Many safety studies excel at identifying what is incorrect (a range of opinions reasoning why … etc), but few provide a mechanism or means to implement change.
Even reliance on regulation is slow and often this suggests that operators to ‘do their own thing’, again without offering advice of how to or alternatives.
Such an approach is better served by stating the overall safety objective; reduction in non-compliance is not very helpful without considering ‘how’.
Joined: Nov 2019
Posts: 13
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From: Cardiff
Change can be quick but we don't want it reactive, best keeping stablished approach safe and within standard limits, thought certainly have continued a few approaches a bit longer than I should a few times.....
