The FSF report is based on the premise that non-compliance is ‘the’ problem; and by implication that crew behavior is the cause. Their psychological study is weak and provides few substantial answers.
There is little consideration of alternative contributing factors - a systems viewpoint opposed to ‘blame’ the human. (See subsequent EASA? Conference).
The originating criteria for a stabilised approach evolved within the ALAR programme. The details as might be expected were a compromise of safety, human factors, etc, and also had to balance conflicting viewpoints in industry - regulators and manufacturers.
The objective was to get every operator to implement a procedure, and in the absence of alternatives to provide baseline parameters. There was no intent to mandate this, and the major manufacturers did retain their customised recommendations - some differing from the FSF.
Change is slow, but slower still without the ‘how to’ information. Many safety studies excel at identifying what is incorrect (a range of opinions reasoning why … etc), but few provide a mechanism or means to implement change.
Even reliance on regulation is slow and often this suggests that operators to ‘do their own thing’, again without offering advice of how to or alternatives.
Such an approach is better served by stating the overall safety objective; reduction in non-compliance is not very helpful without considering ‘how’.