He stepped on the Rudder and redefined Va
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Well I am not buying it that airliners are so weak that some pilot or terrorist could intentionaly wiggle the tail loose. If that is the case, something is wrong with the hydros or the tail or the sensors or limiters that allow such actions.
Maybe the solution is to take the hydros out of it, make it all cranks and levers. If the pilot wants to put some rudder in, make him work for it, fight those aerodynamic forces, just like the rest of us in smaller planes that can't even imagine having enough legs to knock a tail off.
Maybe the solution is to take the hydros out of it, make it all cranks and levers. If the pilot wants to put some rudder in, make him work for it, fight those aerodynamic forces, just like the rest of us in smaller planes that can't even imagine having enough legs to knock a tail off.
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Well I am not buying it that airliners are so weak that some pilot or terrorist could intentionaly wiggle the tail loose.
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Misd - No one except a few peeps on PPRUNE believe that wiggling the tail will crash a plane, any more then three pilots over the Atlantic can't fly straight and level.
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With respect to superseded ACs.
Online Digital Special Collections Library
This site appears to have many and is apparently not affected by the US government shutdown. It was not easy to find, however.
Online Digital Special Collections Library
This site appears to have many and is apparently not affected by the US government shutdown. It was not easy to find, however.
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Thanks JT for the link to historical aviation requirements.
On December 31, the requirement that specifies the design tail loads in the yaw maneuver (currently FAR 25.351, formerly CAR Part 04 section 4b.215) will celebrate its 60th birthday!
On December 31, the requirement that specifies the design tail loads in the yaw maneuver (currently FAR 25.351, formerly CAR Part 04 section 4b.215) will celebrate its 60th birthday!
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No one except a few peeps on PPRuNe believe that wiggling the tail will crash a plane,
But in the internet world? Yup, it's a fraud. Good catch by you.
Now which a/c models did Airbus 'fix' the tails on? How? When?
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I'm just waiting for some one to realise that wiggling the stick to and fro above a certain speed makes the wings fall off. Wonder what his solution may be?
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Just a thought...
Maybe what we should do is ask Teldor(no-one-really-believes-she-is)serious to take a Cessna 152 out for a trip around the traffic pattern and, on the downwind leg, do what was done on the 2nd vortex encounter on AA587. Is there anyone here who believes she will do it?
Maybe what we should do is ask Teldor(no-one-really-believes-she-is)serious to take a Cessna 152 out for a trip around the traffic pattern and, on the downwind leg, do what was done on the 2nd vortex encounter on AA587. Is there anyone here who believes she will do it?
Last edited by AirRabbit; 2nd Oct 2013 at 16:38.
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I don't think even that's necessary. One way to think about it is that following Delta191 at DFW, the NTSB commissioned a study that involved deliberately driving a 737 through microbursts in order to collect data - a risky prospect. After Roselawn, they flew an ATR-72 behind a tanker spraying chilled water over the wings to study the ice ridge build-up behind the de-icing boots - an incredibly risky prospect.
And yet they never even entertained the idea of going up in an A300 or B767 and repeating the rudder pedal movements they saw on the AA587 FDR. That should speak volumes to a dispassionate observer.
And yet they never even entertained the idea of going up in an A300 or B767 and repeating the rudder pedal movements they saw on the AA587 FDR. That should speak volumes to a dispassionate observer.
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I don't think even that's necessary. One way to think about it is that following Delta191 at DFW, the NTSB commissioned a study that involved deliberately driving a 737 through microbursts in order to collect data - a risky prospect. After Roselawn, they flew an ATR-72 behind a tanker spraying chilled water over the wings to study the ice ridge build-up behind the de-icing boots - an incredibly risky prospect.
And yet they never even entertained the idea of going up in an A300 or B767 and repeating the rudder pedal movements they saw on the AA587 FDR. That should speak volumes to a dispassionate observer.
And yet they never even entertained the idea of going up in an A300 or B767 and repeating the rudder pedal movements they saw on the AA587 FDR. That should speak volumes to a dispassionate observer.
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NTSB Press Release
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Public Affairs
________________________________________
NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED
OCTOBER 26, 2004
Washington, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.
At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.
The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)
The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.
The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.
The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds. In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.
The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)
The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery training.
Because this crash occurred two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.
A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.
NTSB Office of Public Affairs: (202) 314-6100
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Public Affairs
________________________________________
NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED
OCTOBER 26, 2004
Washington, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.
At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.
The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)
The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.
The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.
The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds. In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.
The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)
The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery training.
Because this crash occurred two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.
A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.
NTSB Office of Public Affairs: (202) 314-6100
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the NTSB is full of humans...humans make mistakes...we have our opinions based on years of whatever we have been doing
my opinion is the airbus 300 series is a piece of shirt
remember that the FAA certified the A300
it also certified the training program used by American Airlines
it also certified the copilot
if they made a mistake somewhere, they could have made a mistake anywhere.
some engineering types are so concerned with elegance in engineering that they forget real life
my opinion is the airbus 300 series is a piece of shirt
remember that the FAA certified the A300
it also certified the training program used by American Airlines
it also certified the copilot
if they made a mistake somewhere, they could have made a mistake anywhere.
some engineering types are so concerned with elegance in engineering that they forget real life
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Originally Posted by flarepilot
the NTSB is full of humans...humans make mistakes...we have our opinions based on years of whatever we have been doing
my opinion is the airbus 300 series is a piece of shirt
remember that the FAA certified the A300
it also certified the training program used by American Airlines
it also certified the copilot
if they made a mistake somewhere, they could have made a mistake anywhere.
some engineering types are so concerned with elegance in engineering that they forget real life
my opinion is the airbus 300 series is a piece of shirt
remember that the FAA certified the A300
it also certified the training program used by American Airlines
it also certified the copilot
if they made a mistake somewhere, they could have made a mistake anywhere.
some engineering types are so concerned with elegance in engineering that they forget real life
So, Mr flarepilot, I understand you acknowledge that humans sometimes make mistakes, and since the NTSB consists of human investigators and researchers, it is your opinion that the NTSB made a series of human mistakes in their conclusions in this instance. Right? Is it possible that the NTSB members have opinions based on their years of doing what they do, or not? You seem to be quite critical of their “final report.” It is clear that the NTSB recognizes that the FAA certified the A300, and that the FAA certified the copilot, and that the FAA certified the AA training program … were those mistakes as well? Was it a mistake made by the NTSB that they made those recognitions … or did the NTSB make a mistake by not recognizing the FAA made those mistakes in certification? Is that a double negative? This is sure hard to figure out ... isn't it? Humans making decisions, when they know they're fallable - other humans not recognizing that fallability when it occurs and reulting in mistaking additional errors as having been good decisions, and then they, themselves, make mistakes in using those positions to answer questions they have about other actions which they observed. Of course, they may have misinterpreted what they thought that they had observed, when what really happened is known only to those who actually completed the actions based on what they knew (or only thought?) was the correct decision to make based on what they knew about the surrounding circumstances - presuming of course, what they saw was actually what they perceived has happened and are not misjudging what they think they saw. OK, I think I've got it now.
So, what organization certified you? You are certificated, aren’t you? Was it the FAA? Did whomever it was who certified you, make the same kind of mistake? Who determines when something is true or a mistake … you? If not you, who is it? The FAA? The NTSB? Some news anchor on TV? Do we all operate in our own little world – carefully protecting ourselves from all the “other” humans who are out there making mistake after mistake – do we all have to look out for ourselves – at all times – in all things? Can we trust anyone? About anything? Forget the evidence … accept only opinions based on years of doing something … right? Of course, no one has ever known of anyone ever doing anything wrong for a long period of time … right? Sure, that’s it.
Well, thanks … I’m sure that there are a lot of us here who are as firmly entrenched in opinions as opposed to facts as you are – and I guess we just have to acknowledge that everyone has his/her own opinion … just like they have various body parts. Enjoy!
Last edited by AirRabbit; 2nd Oct 2013 at 20:32.
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dear mr bunny boy...or aka air rabbit
yes the FAA certificated me...many times
evidence...how many times in modern history has additional evidence come to light years later?
call back in 20 years or so. and you fly the A300 all you want...I'll fly something else...made in the USA most likely.
and all the cute emoticons just add to your heft with all your book learnin'
but planes aren't supposed to fall apart and if they do, you have to warn the pilot ...but no warning...hmmmmm
and if there was a warning in some obscure engineering text...great, but someone forgot to tell the pilot.
I"ve flown with engineering types who had commercial or atp lic. get em talking and they would fly right into the side of a mountain or stall the plane...I've seen it.
yes the FAA certificated me...many times
evidence...how many times in modern history has additional evidence come to light years later?
call back in 20 years or so. and you fly the A300 all you want...I'll fly something else...made in the USA most likely.
and all the cute emoticons just add to your heft with all your book learnin'
but planes aren't supposed to fall apart and if they do, you have to warn the pilot ...but no warning...hmmmmm
and if there was a warning in some obscure engineering text...great, but someone forgot to tell the pilot.
I"ve flown with engineering types who had commercial or atp lic. get em talking and they would fly right into the side of a mountain or stall the plane...I've seen it.