DozyWannabe

Wholeheartedly agreed.

Which four are you referring to? As far as I can tell, Asiana did not stall as such, they allowed a low-and-slow situation to progress beyond a recoverable point. That said, I agree completely that this is troubling - but until the flight and CVR data is properly reviewed, I feel that significant commentary merely adds to the noise quotient.

[ EDIT:

What I find more troubling than the accidents themselves is a significant cross-section of the responses I've seen on here. For example, the number of self-identified pilots dismissing the ColganAir crash as down to the actions of an incompetent Captain, when all the report actually said was that he was of below-average ability (along with 50% of all the line pilots in the US). Likewise putting the AF447 PF's actions down to lack of handflying experience (which said posters implied they have in spades). Startle response is an aspect of human factors that hasn't even begun to be explored with any significant depth, and the apparent rush to sweep it under the carpet as an outgrowth of lack of ability is truly frightening to me.

As was the sudden rush to put the Asiana accident down to aspects of Korean culture based on anecdotal evidence that was anything up to a couple of decades old.

Surely until the facts are known and confirmed it would be far more fitting to adopt a "there but for the grace..." attitude, no?

Lonewolf_50

Dozy, please don't forget the following points that are troubling to many who fly:

Being able to fly straight and level, on instruments, is a core skill required of a professional pilot. The pilot at the controls in AF 447 was unable to do that. He didn't do it. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Being able to fly a visual approach, a stable approach, is a core competency of a professional pilot. The crew in Asiana did not. Professional pilots know that you should wave off an unstable approach (go around) rather than try to land it. The crew didn't, and made the go around decision many seconds too late. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Flying in icing conditions, one has to use and know how to use the de=ice equipment, and one has to keep one's airspeed on profile on approach in instrument conditions. (For Colgan, fatigue, and the culture of the company are of course rightly indicted.) I say again, you have to fly on airspeed, on profile, if you are a professional pilot. For whatever reason you'd like to offer, the crew in the Colgan didn't. Why? That needs to be addressed.

But do you really think that root causes will be addressed?

Check out a post Fox3wheresmybanana made in the Aisana thread. It has to do with why he didn't end up flying commercially as his second career.
What he said is very troubling.
My gut feel is that he is right.

If he is, it's very troubling.

DozyWannabe

I don't and haven't - it's just that there are aspects to all of these that require closer examination.

Exactly, and this illustrates the point I was making about understanding startle response. Everything about the PF's background (being a qualified glider pilot, among other things) suggests that he should have been more than competent to handle the situation despite the lack of HA manual handling training, yet it would appear he was so spooked that his abilities deserted him at the worst possible moment - why?

Of course it does. But at the same time, one has to consider that pushing on with an approach when conditions are marginal has caused a plethora of incidents and accidents for airlines of any nationality you care to name. Colloquially known as "get-there-itis", the problem is as old as dirt.

Colgan weren't in significant icing conditions when they crashed, that was the point. Fatigue and culture were as you say rightly indicted, but an opportunity to explore startle response was missed.

They'd better - or we're in trouble.

[EDIT : Just read Fox3's post, and for what it's worth I reckon the 74 skipper he spoke to did his profession a disservice by being so unrelentingly cynical. In my experience the only way to make a difference for the better is to work from the inside out, and if to do so would not cause too much financial hardship, then being in a position to be the kind of mentor the new guys need despite the industry would likely be a hell of a satisfying career move. On the other hand I must confess that despite being paid a compliment that keeps me warm on cold nights from the TRE on our sim experiments (namely that he thought I more than had it in me to be a decent pilot), my honest answer was that I simply couldn't afford it. ]

WillowRun 6-3

So, several posters here all have railed against the evident gaps in flight safety protocols (meaning all the faults, gaps, deficiencies, deficits, propensities to error, and so on, attributed to, or proven to have been factors in, mishaps).

Who has oversight of NTSB in its work, so as to assure that the investigation and investigatory process reach all the evident concerns, issues and questions? Is it the NTSB hierarchy itself? The Congress (choke!)?, and if so, which committee/sub-committee has the staff who actually understand this? Or is it an informal sort of thing, old hands who keep tabs on what's happening and make sure their concerns are carried forward and carried on? I am not, readback/repeat not, casting aspersions on the NTSB, but does it not seem that the technical aspects of the flight safety protocol (again, a word I am using to represent the aggregation of all the safety dynamics iterated on this and other threads) may be getting just a little....bit....ahead of the customary NTSB methods, not withstanding its very cool, very efficacious track record? Let me restate the query this way: do you have the sense that after you read the eventual Board report, you'll be saying, "well done, as far as it goes....but what about the larger systemic concerns, issues, questions"?

* Not * a driver, but intensely interested in aviation safety, kind of like sorta, as if I were running for U.S. Public Aviation Safety Advocate as a delegate to ICAO this fall (Sister Belinda, pray with me that the Brits don't have some putz-icle acronym meaning for PASA....)

DozyWannabe

@WillowRun 6-3:

The NTSB is a nominally independent organisation whose charter specifies that its investigatory authority is seconded to and beholden to no other organisation. In this aspect it is quite unusual in that while - to give a few examples - the BEA of France, AAIB of the UK, BFU of Germany and ATSB of Australia are equally independent, they are still branches of the civil service and as such they must restrict their reportage to facts and cannot directly apportion responsibility.

However what the NTSB does have in common with those agencies is that their remit extends only to recommendations which the regulator has final say over the decision to enforce. The FAA and Congress have no power to influence the NTSB's findings (just as the DGAC and French government have no such power over the BEA), but the regulators are not compelled to act on the recommendations. That said, the recommendations are ignored at their peril (Google "DC-10 Gentlemens Agreement" for an example of why).

I heartily recommend doing some research on the subject - the history is fascinating.

CONF iture

Exactly right !
Who the day after gave to the press the comment made by the copilot "Gauthier y va bander hein !" if not the BEA and/or Airbus ... ?

CONF iture

If at each time the strobe light is flashing the stick is at full nose up position but when in the dark it is at full nose down then something of interest will show up on the elevator trace.
Animation is a wonderful tool for both pilots and investigatory bodies.

PJ2, you still do not produce any reason why the pilots should not get their data at the same time the manufacturer and the investigatory authority put their hands on them ... ?

roulishollandais

Other possible were Mr Tenenbaum, GTA, raw CVR reader... and other RG and F.M.networks :.

DozyWannabe

This thread isn't about AF296, so let's keep this quick.

Thus far the only reference I can find to the phrase:
is within Asseline's own written rebuttal ("Le pilote est-il coupable?" or "Is the pilot guilty?"). Seeing as it is a phrase that sticks in his memory:

could it not be within the realms of possibility that it was M. Asseline or his lawyers themselves that leaked the phrase to the press based on his recollection rather than on the CVR?

The problem with events where press attention and scrutiny is so strong, is that who actually said what tends to become blurred in the retelling, and time (25 years now!) only serves to obscure things more. As mentioned above, the BEA is a civil service investigatory authority and is restricted in terms of the conclusions it can draw (even then, it could not apportion responsibility).

I'm also interested in the timescale we're talking here - "the day after..." what? The day after the accident there is simply no way that the BEA would have had even a draft transcript of the CVR ready to brief the press on it, so I would suspect that the only possible sources of the comment would be from an inadvertent ATC transmission, or from one of the others on the flight deck present to hear it.

[EDIT : One more thing. The idea of Airbus and the BEA somehow colluding off-the-record to point the finger at Asseline is in my opinion considerably undermined by the fact that the former allowed the latter to use their facilities at Toulouse to verify the veracity of Asseline's claims - some of which were correct, and those that were made their way into the report. Of the interested parties involved, it was Air France whose case was the most shaky (and indeed several deficiencies were found in the briefing materials supplied, not to mention the fact that their guidelines regarding displays diverged considerably from what was usually practised). Yet the people (and the union) who tried to champion Asseline's case seemed very reluctant to go after AF with the same vigour they did Airbus - a cynical interpretation of which would be that they weren't about to defecate where they eat (AF employing the lion's share of the union's members)...]

jcjeant

As you are there Dozywannabe ...

They are not exactly involved by default .. BEA go into action at the request of the Department (Minister) of the French transport as this governement branch is the real boss of the BEA

DozyWannabe

Yes, but once they are involved as the primary agency, no other ministry or agency is permitted to interfere with or influence the outcome of their investigation, and all communication with entities outside the investigatory process is directly handled by the BEA themselves. It's the same arrangement as exists with the UK AAIB, Canada's TSB and Australia's ATSB - the US NTSB has a similar arrangement, but its charter does allow for their reports to apportion responsibility.

The French authorities have probably been more aware of how such interference can blow up in the faces of the interested parties than most, as the accident which exposed industry and regulatory collusion (namely the DC-10 "Gentlemen's Agreement" between McDonnell-Douglas and the FAA) happened on their soil.

I've yet to hear an explanation for why the "judicial report on behalf of the families" regarding AF447 claims that the BEA report presents a conclusion of pilot error, when in fact it does no such thing.

jcjeant

I'll tell you a fictional story
You been the victim of a road accident as a pedestrian and you must be amputated of one leg
Your lawyer and yourself ask the competent court to prosecute the driver responsible for the accident for involuntary bodily injury and the court accepts this charge
Some time later the judiciary organize an accident reconstruction but only the driver is present .. and your presence is denied ..
Do you find that normal?
Turning now has a real history
The families of the victims of AF447 and their lawyers had filed a complaint against Airbus and Air France for manslaughter and this charge was accepted by the competent court
Later .. during the mission to reclaim parts of the AF447 wreck .. BEA .. french judicial representatives .. representatives from Airbus and Air France (two companies indicted of manslaughter) .. representatives of the Brazilian government are present .. but not representative of the victims (request denied by the french authorities)
Do you find it normal ?
As I already said .. I closed the book BEA .. and I expect the opening of the first page of the book of the trial which will undoubtedly also interesting than the BEA book

CONF iture

Far more time than necessary to listen to the tape and leak what is of 'interest'.

roulishollandais

@Dozywannaby, jcjeant, Conf_iture,
The passengers were mostly the winners of a lottery organized by a local newspaper "l'Alsace". One of their journalists was there, aswell as a reporter of the local TV FR#3. Both were in the cockpit and got later the head of the victims association. Ma333ybe the forest landing has been filmed from the cockpit -I did never see it- and the trivial sentence recorded. Why would it be so important?
The crew did also sing an old nazy song beefore take off, was it reminded at the trial. Singing nazy songs was also reported in another French airfield...

CONF iture

2 persons were on the jump seats, but they were flight attendants.

DozyWannabe

@roulishollandais:

The cameraman was interviewed for the "ACI/Mayday" episode on the subject and never made any mention of the flight deck. Both his testimony and the reconstruction have both him and his camera (which was off) in the passenger cabin at the time of the accident.

Again, this thread is not about AF296.

CONF iture

Then stop being the first to mention it if you don't want to talk about it ...
Or is it your exclusivity ?

DozyWannabe

Actually it was not me who started discussion on AF296, I merely said:

To which you replied:

In effect admitting that you're more interested in talking about the (discredited, and somewhat outlandish) AF296 conspiracy theories than you are flight safety aspects regarding AF447.

But don't let me stop you. Please, carry on - this is fascinating...

Linktrained

A different aircraft, but perhaps with some similar characteristics :

In the January 2011 issue of Safety First, Jacques Roysay discusses Stall Warning and Stall. He says:

"A practical exercise done in flight in DIRECT LAW on an A340-600 and well reproduced on the simulator consists in performing a low level flight deceleration at idle until the SW is triggered, and then to push the THR to TOGA while continuing to pull on the stick to maintain the altitude.
The results of such a manoeuvre are:
In clean configuration, even if the pilot reacts immediately to the SW by commanding TOGA, when the thrust actually reaches TOGA ( 20 seconds later), the aircraft stalls.
In approach configuration, if the pilot reacts immediately to the SW, the aircraft reaches AoA stall - 2 degrees.
In approach configuration, if the pilot reacts with a delay of 2 seconds to the SW the aircraft stalls."

The example that I had done to me on a Britannia with a new Captain who HAD to go from Flight Idle to Overshoot, MAY have been faster... But it seemed an age. (A Merlin would have been even better.)

I would like to count the seconds OUT LOUD to remind myself just how long it really takes. ( On a sim, of course !)

( The usual Approach Power on a Britannia would have been about " 300 Torque". After THAT example, I never used less than " 250 Torque ".)

DozyWannabe

Yup, that seems to be the thing with jets. In fact according to my copy of HTBJ, a lot of early problems during the prop-to-jet transition came from pilots who hadn't quite internalised the knowledge that with jets there was a significant increase in lag between a thrust command and that thrust being available compared to the old propliners they were used to.

That behaviour in Direct Law makes sense - it behaves just as any conventional aircraft would in that situation. If you're low and slow, then you have to sacrifice some altitude while the thrust increases to a point at which you can initiate a climb, no?

AF447 is a little different, being a high-altitude stall, and additionally the aircraft had sufficient thrust at the onset of AP disconnect to keep flying. It was the pitch up command that led to the bleeding-off of airspeed - but this wasn't a "maintain altitude" magnitude of pitch-up order, it was of a magnitude much greater.