New landing distance calculations for Airbus
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: paradise
Posts: 559
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
fmgc, I never said SOP should be ignored or disregarded. You've implied it from my description of SOP as a guideline. A clear definition of a given term is a first step in proper understanding of the implications, consequences, liability etc. The second step is the practical application. All this judicial jungle shouldn't preclude a pilot from applying all his resources to achieve safe operations including following SOP, using sound judgment and airmanship. We're not living in a perfect world and SOPs OM A,B,C and do develop constantly and still are far from being perfect and don't cover all possible scenarios. Only a year ago airbus SOP didn't include a landing performance assessment and now it does. Does that mean you didn't assess your landing performance a year ago coz it was not part of the SOP? Surely not. That's the whole point here. USE YOUR BRAIN should be the first sentence in any SOP. 
Last edited by 9.G; 26th Oct 2012 at 10:31.
Plumbum Pendular
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Avionics Bay
Age: 55
Posts: 1,117
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
achieve safe operations including following SOP, using sound judgment and airmanship
Does that mean you didn't assess your landing performance a year ago coz it was not part of the SOP?
fmgc, the problem with SOPs is the adverse mindset (bias) which may come from the mantra of ‘stick to the SOP’ particularly where there are qualifications – the unless’s are forgotten.
From your example– “single hydraulic failure and get a shorter landing distance than you would for no failure, for a given overweight landing” (#14); why is this so?
Would a pilot just take this information for granted, or think about it – look for the assumptions in the data. The latter requires a mental attitude that ‘The SOP’ may not be applicable to this situation. Abnormal operation may assume different risks, specific crew procedures, etc, (the unless’s); if the mind is already closed to this type of thinking because of the ‘follow SOPs mantra’ then safety may suffer.
Many accident investigations conclude that ‘crew failed to follow procedures’. This implies violation, but with closer examination of the circumstances, the crew may have incorrectly assessed the situation and thence used a different (but incorrect) SOP, or with a good situation awareness, mistakenly chosen an incorrect SOP (forgot the unless) – perhaps a bias from the ‘follow SOPs mantra’. Pilots need to understand both the situation and the assumptions in an SOP.
Further, from your example above; what if the crew follow the SOP and use the OLD data without thought or judgement, overlooking a vital caveat like – no distance margin assumed, require reverse, max brake, etc. Use of normal procedures (SOP) without adjustments required by any caveat may increase the risk of an overrun.
It will be interesting to hear an explanation of the difference in that data; please don’t leave it to guesswork
From your example– “single hydraulic failure and get a shorter landing distance than you would for no failure, for a given overweight landing” (#14); why is this so?
Would a pilot just take this information for granted, or think about it – look for the assumptions in the data. The latter requires a mental attitude that ‘The SOP’ may not be applicable to this situation. Abnormal operation may assume different risks, specific crew procedures, etc, (the unless’s); if the mind is already closed to this type of thinking because of the ‘follow SOPs mantra’ then safety may suffer.
Many accident investigations conclude that ‘crew failed to follow procedures’. This implies violation, but with closer examination of the circumstances, the crew may have incorrectly assessed the situation and thence used a different (but incorrect) SOP, or with a good situation awareness, mistakenly chosen an incorrect SOP (forgot the unless) – perhaps a bias from the ‘follow SOPs mantra’. Pilots need to understand both the situation and the assumptions in an SOP.
Further, from your example above; what if the crew follow the SOP and use the OLD data without thought or judgement, overlooking a vital caveat like – no distance margin assumed, require reverse, max brake, etc. Use of normal procedures (SOP) without adjustments required by any caveat may increase the risk of an overrun.
It will be interesting to hear an explanation of the difference in that data; please don’t leave it to guesswork
Last edited by safetypee; 30th Oct 2012 at 12:51. Reason: removing bugs
Microburst2002, OLD is not a calculation (perhaps you implied otherwise – 25 Oct).
The task is to compare LDA with LDR; where LDR requires assessment of the current situation before looking-up/computing the appropriate distances.
Thus OLD reinforces the need for situation assessment, a mental trigger for threat and hazard management before landing; a reminder to think.
“Overruns always happen in wet or contaminated runways.”
Never say (or imply) never.
A dry smooth desert runway covered in a recent layer of clay dust and an ill-chosen downwind approach – the operator didn’t even published wet landing data.
Might the use of OLD aided situation assessment?
The task is to compare LDA with LDR; where LDR requires assessment of the current situation before looking-up/computing the appropriate distances.
Thus OLD reinforces the need for situation assessment, a mental trigger for threat and hazard management before landing; a reminder to think.
“Overruns always happen in wet or contaminated runways.”
Never say (or imply) never.
A dry smooth desert runway covered in a recent layer of clay dust and an ill-chosen downwind approach – the operator didn’t even published wet landing data.
Might the use of OLD aided situation assessment?
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Up front
Posts: 144
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to the FAA Air Information Circular 120-71 the key features of effective SOP`s are:
a.
(1) The procedure is appropriate to the situation.
(2) The procedure is practical to use.
(3) Crewmembers understand the reasons for the procedure.
(4) Pilot Flying (PF), Pilot Not Flying (PNF), and Flight Engineer duties are
clearly delineated.
(5) Effective training is conducted.
(6) The attitudes shown by instructors, check airmen, and managers all reinforce the need for the procedure.
b. If all elements (above) are not consistently implemented, flightcrews too easily become participants in an undesirable double standard condoned by instructors, check airmen, and managers. Flightcrews may end up doing things one way to satisfy training requirements and checkrides, but doing them another way in “real life” during line operations. When a double standard does appear in this way, it should be considered a red flag that a published SOP may not be practical or effective for some reason. That SOP should be reviewed and perhaps changed.
So is it appropriate to insist a landing distance be worked out for each and every landing? Paragraph b will come to the fore rather rapidly!!!
a.
(1) The procedure is appropriate to the situation.
(2) The procedure is practical to use.
(3) Crewmembers understand the reasons for the procedure.
(4) Pilot Flying (PF), Pilot Not Flying (PNF), and Flight Engineer duties are
clearly delineated.
(5) Effective training is conducted.
(6) The attitudes shown by instructors, check airmen, and managers all reinforce the need for the procedure.
b. If all elements (above) are not consistently implemented, flightcrews too easily become participants in an undesirable double standard condoned by instructors, check airmen, and managers. Flightcrews may end up doing things one way to satisfy training requirements and checkrides, but doing them another way in “real life” during line operations. When a double standard does appear in this way, it should be considered a red flag that a published SOP may not be practical or effective for some reason. That SOP should be reviewed and perhaps changed.
So is it appropriate to insist a landing distance be worked out for each and every landing? Paragraph b will come to the fore rather rapidly!!!
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: paradise
Posts: 559
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That does rather change the meaning of your original guideline comment. We could bat this around for ages especially if we boil it down to semantics.
SOP is a guideline and shouldn't substitute neither sound judgment nor airmanship
So is it appropriate to insist a landing distance be worked out for each and every landing? Paragraph b will come to the fore rather rapidly!!!
Last edited by 9.G; 26th Oct 2012 at 14:34.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Uh... Where was I?
Posts: 1,338
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SOPs
FMGC
Airbus typically changes it SOPs constantly.
1990s SOPs where nowhere near 99,99% of the best course of action. They have changed so much!
SOPs are certainly not a substitute for good pilot judgement and a great deal of common sense is, imho, assumed from the pilot when they write the SOPs. Otherwise they would be many more pages long. SOPs are much more flexible that many pilots think.
Of course it is not food when pilots just ignore SOPs constantly for no valid reason. But there are LOTS of valid reasons to deviate every day from SOPs, if only because they are not always well written.
They are also misinterpreted easily, even by SOP talibans.
SOPs are reasonably flexible, and some items are very arbitrary, chosen the way they have just for standardization reasons.
SOPs do not come from God. Don't treat them as if they did. Adhere to SOPs as a rule. Do not hesitate, however, to deviate from them whe the situation calls for it. Keep your buddy in the loop, maintain team situational awareness and stay away from "the amber".
Airbus typically changes it SOPs constantly.
1990s SOPs where nowhere near 99,99% of the best course of action. They have changed so much!
SOPs are certainly not a substitute for good pilot judgement and a great deal of common sense is, imho, assumed from the pilot when they write the SOPs. Otherwise they would be many more pages long. SOPs are much more flexible that many pilots think.
Of course it is not food when pilots just ignore SOPs constantly for no valid reason. But there are LOTS of valid reasons to deviate every day from SOPs, if only because they are not always well written.
They are also misinterpreted easily, even by SOP talibans.
SOPs are reasonably flexible, and some items are very arbitrary, chosen the way they have just for standardization reasons.
SOPs do not come from God. Don't treat them as if they did. Adhere to SOPs as a rule. Do not hesitate, however, to deviate from them whe the situation calls for it. Keep your buddy in the loop, maintain team situational awareness and stay away from "the amber".
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Uh... Where was I?
Posts: 1,338
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
thanks
here is a sentence by a very wise pilot I know:
Which does not mean that he will ignore SOPs till that happens (that is, never) and therefore he will operate as he pleases, no...
It means he will adhere to SOPs except when in given situations or circumstances doing so is clearly wrong. That is, when according to HIS judgement, it is safer or just more efficient or appropriate to do otherwise.
No matter how hard they tried, SOPs would never foresee and adapt to each and every situation, and they must be taken as absolutely mandatory in a small number of items.
There is a force regarding SOPs which is in some airlines not counterbalanced by any other force. It is the force trying to standardize the operation in the airline, so that all pilots operate in the same way.
An airline should be satisfied if all their pilots operate in a similar way.
When an operator tries to force pilots to operate in the same way, a number of undesirable effects take place:
1st: the "same way" is never fully described, nor fully agreed, even by the senior captains in the airline, and there is a lot changes and errors and a lot of of "they are going to change that...". There are traditional non-written SOPs, written and approved SOPs, both updated and old coexisting, and even soon to be SOPs!
2nd: SOP Talibans will create an atmosphere of terror in which SOPs are a deadly weapon, and people is accused or reported for not being standard.
3rd: traditional ways of operating which are not written anywhere are treated as SOPs, so pilots have to learn them by experience, instead of by reading manuals or training.
As a result of all of the above, many first officers are just incapable of being fully standard because it depends on the captain they fly with, in spite of them all being SOP talibans. They don't have any feedback and each of them is convinced of being fully standard. No matter how hard they try to be strictly standard, they will fail and constantly "deviate from SOPs", according to most captains they fly with.
Every minor supposed SOP deviation on the part of the F/O is treated as a very severe thing, and so F/Os are defenseless because every time a different perception of the SOPs is used as the law with which they are judged. On top of that, in many occasions these judges interpret SOPs in an extremely rigid manner, except when they choose to adapt them to the situation, but only they are entitled to do that, for if the F/O does it is then a blatant deviation. The judges are never judged about the many minor deviations they do every day.
In this airlines F/Os can't fly normally, relaxed and happy as a pilot must fly. They are afraid of their captains. This is not good for CRM, TEM, etc..
Speaking of which, CRM itself is used as a weapon, and you can be easily accused of having poor CRM skills in general, and every time the captain makes a mistake. F/O mistakes are never due to poor captain's CRM skills, though. Their briefings will be like mantras, that they give so the CVR records them but they don't care if you pay attention or not, even worse: they know you don't, because you basically can't (it is too quick) or the briefing is so exact to the official mantra that there is no use, or both. Reciprocally they will never pay attention to your briefings. They won't even bother to pretend they do (like F/O do) and will deal with the agent, the cabin chief or any one, while you are talking and tell you not to stop when you interrupt the briefing...
SOP super strict airlines produce SOP taliban captains, which destroys good team work and impairs safety.
However, in an airline that tries to make its pilots to operate in a very similar way and is not SOP taliban, pilots tend to be very standard and they are relaxed in the cockpit.
CRM is like dancing. You can't dance in a 100% predetermined choreography in a changing environment. It is a flexible thing, and you have to enjoy it and adapt to the music. Sometimes precious time is lost in doing things in a 100% CRM compliant way than in a more straightforward way. One thing is doing things in a very orthodox way when you are training CRM and quite another to be too picky with that every time.
The ideal crew operates in a similar way, which is good enough, and both captain and F/O are tolerant with the other's minor deviations from the stated ways and the non written traditional ways. They speak up when they feel uncomfortable about anything, the F/O without fear or shyness, the Captain without anger. They fly in harmony and relaxed and coordinated in a natural way, like a couple dancing.
here is a sentence by a very wise pilot I know:
"I will adhere 100% to SOPs when the SOPs are 100% perfect".
It means he will adhere to SOPs except when in given situations or circumstances doing so is clearly wrong. That is, when according to HIS judgement, it is safer or just more efficient or appropriate to do otherwise.
No matter how hard they tried, SOPs would never foresee and adapt to each and every situation, and they must be taken as absolutely mandatory in a small number of items.
There is a force regarding SOPs which is in some airlines not counterbalanced by any other force. It is the force trying to standardize the operation in the airline, so that all pilots operate in the same way.
An airline should be satisfied if all their pilots operate in a similar way.
When an operator tries to force pilots to operate in the same way, a number of undesirable effects take place:
1st: the "same way" is never fully described, nor fully agreed, even by the senior captains in the airline, and there is a lot changes and errors and a lot of of "they are going to change that...". There are traditional non-written SOPs, written and approved SOPs, both updated and old coexisting, and even soon to be SOPs!
2nd: SOP Talibans will create an atmosphere of terror in which SOPs are a deadly weapon, and people is accused or reported for not being standard.
3rd: traditional ways of operating which are not written anywhere are treated as SOPs, so pilots have to learn them by experience, instead of by reading manuals or training.
As a result of all of the above, many first officers are just incapable of being fully standard because it depends on the captain they fly with, in spite of them all being SOP talibans. They don't have any feedback and each of them is convinced of being fully standard. No matter how hard they try to be strictly standard, they will fail and constantly "deviate from SOPs", according to most captains they fly with.
Every minor supposed SOP deviation on the part of the F/O is treated as a very severe thing, and so F/Os are defenseless because every time a different perception of the SOPs is used as the law with which they are judged. On top of that, in many occasions these judges interpret SOPs in an extremely rigid manner, except when they choose to adapt them to the situation, but only they are entitled to do that, for if the F/O does it is then a blatant deviation. The judges are never judged about the many minor deviations they do every day.
In this airlines F/Os can't fly normally, relaxed and happy as a pilot must fly. They are afraid of their captains. This is not good for CRM, TEM, etc..
Speaking of which, CRM itself is used as a weapon, and you can be easily accused of having poor CRM skills in general, and every time the captain makes a mistake. F/O mistakes are never due to poor captain's CRM skills, though. Their briefings will be like mantras, that they give so the CVR records them but they don't care if you pay attention or not, even worse: they know you don't, because you basically can't (it is too quick) or the briefing is so exact to the official mantra that there is no use, or both. Reciprocally they will never pay attention to your briefings. They won't even bother to pretend they do (like F/O do) and will deal with the agent, the cabin chief or any one, while you are talking and tell you not to stop when you interrupt the briefing...
SOP super strict airlines produce SOP taliban captains, which destroys good team work and impairs safety.
However, in an airline that tries to make its pilots to operate in a very similar way and is not SOP taliban, pilots tend to be very standard and they are relaxed in the cockpit.
CRM is like dancing. You can't dance in a 100% predetermined choreography in a changing environment. It is a flexible thing, and you have to enjoy it and adapt to the music. Sometimes precious time is lost in doing things in a 100% CRM compliant way than in a more straightforward way. One thing is doing things in a very orthodox way when you are training CRM and quite another to be too picky with that every time.
The ideal crew operates in a similar way, which is good enough, and both captain and F/O are tolerant with the other's minor deviations from the stated ways and the non written traditional ways. They speak up when they feel uncomfortable about anything, the F/O without fear or shyness, the Captain without anger. They fly in harmony and relaxed and coordinated in a natural way, like a couple dancing.
Generally agree with the views on SOPs above, but the use OLD isn’t directly about SOPs and safety culture.
The operational requirements (and thus SOP) for in-flight checking of landing performance already exist:- EU OPS 1.400, FAR 125.371/SAFO 06012.
A significant problem is the with method and accuracy in meeting these requirements – the degree which common sense was or could be applied, or knowing where ‘the amber’ is (#27).
Certification and operational requirements are based on landing weight (mass), but most operational problems, incidents, accidents, relate to landing distance. One safety report noted that pilots would land within 100 lb of the allowable max landing weight, but not within 100 ft of the landing distance. Thus new safety initiatives focus on the pilot’s perception of distance (or lack of it), and the provision of an improved source of advisory performance.
Similarly, the inability to “foresee and adapt to each and every situation, and they (SOPs) must be taken as absolutely mandatory” (#29) isn’t about the SOP’s, it’s about human behaviour. One aspect of using OLD aims to improve risk awareness by providing more realistic data and a perhaps new way of using it – distances vs wt. Pilots need the skills of interpretation and application, and operational flexibility based on the situations; but this assumes that the situation and the risks in the planned landing are understood.
OLD provides landing performance which is more representative of routine operations, enabling pilots to better judge the required landing distance and safety margin, and therefore the risk of an overrun should decrease.
The pre landing distance assessment (SOP) should get all crews to operate in a similar way; OLD can provide a better ‘dance floor’ on which to operate.
The operational requirements (and thus SOP) for in-flight checking of landing performance already exist:- EU OPS 1.400, FAR 125.371/SAFO 06012.
A significant problem is the with method and accuracy in meeting these requirements – the degree which common sense was or could be applied, or knowing where ‘the amber’ is (#27).
Certification and operational requirements are based on landing weight (mass), but most operational problems, incidents, accidents, relate to landing distance. One safety report noted that pilots would land within 100 lb of the allowable max landing weight, but not within 100 ft of the landing distance. Thus new safety initiatives focus on the pilot’s perception of distance (or lack of it), and the provision of an improved source of advisory performance.
Similarly, the inability to “foresee and adapt to each and every situation, and they (SOPs) must be taken as absolutely mandatory” (#29) isn’t about the SOP’s, it’s about human behaviour. One aspect of using OLD aims to improve risk awareness by providing more realistic data and a perhaps new way of using it – distances vs wt. Pilots need the skills of interpretation and application, and operational flexibility based on the situations; but this assumes that the situation and the risks in the planned landing are understood.
OLD provides landing performance which is more representative of routine operations, enabling pilots to better judge the required landing distance and safety margin, and therefore the risk of an overrun should decrease.
The pre landing distance assessment (SOP) should get all crews to operate in a similar way; OLD can provide a better ‘dance floor’ on which to operate.
Last edited by alf5071h; 2nd Nov 2012 at 22:08. Reason: typo
